Comments by "Ralph Bernhard" (@ralphbernhard1757) on "Intelligence Squared" channel.

  1. From around 56:00 mins on wards.... "What else could we have done?" The question in itself, is already an admittance that the reality of what happened was wrong. In other words, if the Bombing of civilians was the RIGHT thing to do, why even bother asking what else could have been done? It is clearly dawning on more and more people, that the indiscriminate bombing of civilians was pointless, and did little to end the war. As for the question "what else could have been done?", I can think of dozens of better things, even if one stays with the doctrine or policy of strategic bombing. As for my contribution: The Volkswagen factory in Wolfsburg. During WW2, the two main variants of the Volkswagen, the Kuebelwagen and the Schwimmwagen were just what the German Army needed. They were simple, cheap, and didn't use much fuel (a vital factor for oil deprived Nazi Germany), or raw materials such as high grade steel. They were used in the same functions as the famous US Jeep -- general purpose and often vital second line work such as recce, liaison, repair and maintenance troops for the tanks, carrying messages, and as transport for the lower forward echelons of command. In Africa, German soldiers called it "Deutsches Kamel" (German Camel), because it was perfect for desert warfare. Again, especially because it used little fuel (difficult to transport over the Med), and had an air-cooled engine. With around 50,000 and 15,000 built of the two versions, they were also the main vehicles in this category, and invaluable to the German side. Furthermore, the factory was also used to produce mines and torpedoes for submarines, which until mid-1943 were sinking British merchantmen by the scores. One would think that with such potent reasons, the factory would be near the top of the list of likely targets for the bomber boys at Bomber Command. As a plus point, the Volkswagen factory lay far away from any of the formidable centers of the German air defense network, and along the easy to locate Mittellandkanal (waterway). Perfect, for Ralph Cochrane's Pathfinder Mosquitoes... Conclusion? Destroying this factory would have much simpler than taking on more formidable targets, such as big city centers. Assertion? Destroying this factory would have played a vital role in undermining the fighting potential and mobility of the German armed forces. Volkswagen was never attacked in force, and only minor attempts were directed at this exposed factory. It survived the war with only minor damage. Production continued until almost the end of the war, because other targets had a higher priority.
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  13. The question why it took GB 7 years after WW2, to carry out their 1st nuclear test, even though the technology had already been developed by international scientist (also British) before 1945. Because its the American Century for those who walk the corridors of power, and fairy tales of the "Big Three" and "cute Uncle Joe" for those who don't understand how the world really works... Because in WW2 the concept of "a Big Three" was a joke, because the "big three" were not only allies, but also rivals. Each wanting to be on top once the war was over... At the turn of the century, nothing symbolized power and rule like the big gun battleships, and by 1945 nothing symbolized power and rule like the mushroom cloud of a nuke... But while at the end of WW1 the powers got together and divided and negotiated who would get what share of the "symbol of power (Washington Naval Treaty, 1922), at the end of WW2, there would be no such negotiations. Strange... Big daddy USA said to the rest of the world "you shall not have nuclear weapons!" [Google how that unfolded with: "history/british-nuclear-program] Strange, how "best friend forever" would let the financially drained GB spend 5 years and millions of Pounds on developing a weapon for themselves which was already completed in development...and just had to be handed over to "a friend"... Strange also, that during WW2 GB merrily gave their "special friend" all the best war-winning secrets (Tizzard Committee, and all that), but when it became time for the "new best friend" to return the favor, and give the secret of nuclear arms back to GB whose scientists had helped develop nukes in the USA, the answer was "no, it's mine". 1945 Washington DC: "If you want nukes, develop them yourself. In the meantime, I'll dismantle your empire. What are you going to do about it?" That's how leverage works. Rule Britannia, replaced by the American Century. Pax Britannica, replaced by Pax Americana. Why didn't Washington DC/The American Century give their "special friends" the secret of nuclear bombs in 1945? What is your best answer?
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  15. From around 56:00 mins on wards.... "What else could we have done?" The question in itself, is already an admittance that the reality of what happened was wrong. In other words, if the Bombing of civilians was the RIGHT thing to do, why even bother asking what else could have been done? It is clearly dawning on more and more people, that the indiscriminate bombing of civilians was pointless, and did little to end the war. As for the question "what else could have been done?", I can think of dozens of better things, even if one stays with the doctrine or policy of strategic bombing. As for my contribution: The Volkswagen factory in Wolfsburg. During WW2, the two main variants of the Volkswagen, the Kuebelwagen and the Schwimmwagen were just what the German Army needed. They were simple, cheap, and didn't use much fuel (a vital factor for oil deprived Nazi Germany), or raw materials such as high grade steel. They were used in the same functions as the famous US Jeep -- general purpose and often vital second line work such as recce, liaison, repair and maintenance troops for the tanks, carrying messages, and as transport for the lower forward echelons of command. In Africa, German soldiers called it "Deutsches Kamel" (German Camel), because it was perfect for desert warfare. Again, especially because it used little fuel (difficult to transport over the Med), and had an air-cooled engine. With around 50,000 and 15,000 built of the two versions, they were also the main vehicles in this category, and invaluable to the German side. Furthermore, the factory was also used to produce mines and torpedoes for submarines, which until mid-1943 were sinking British merchantmen by the scores. One would think that with such potent reasons, the factory would be near the top of the list of likely targets for the bomber boys at Bomber Command. As a plus point, the Volkswagen factory lay far away from any of the formidable centers of the German air defense network, and along the easy to locate Mittellandkanal (waterway). Conclusion? Destroying this factory would have much simpler than taking on more formidable targets, such as big city centers. Assertion? Destroying this factory would have played a vital role in undermining the fighting potential and mobility of the German armed forces. Volkswagen was never attacked in force, and only minor attempts were directed at this exposed factory. It survived the war with only minor damage. Production continued until almost the end of the war, because other targets had a higher priority.
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  16. What lessons can we learn from history. Today, we watch on while history repeats itself in the Ukraine, because leaders make the same mistakes again and again. A virtual repeat of the leadup to WW1, as history "rhymes" in eternal cycles. On the micro level, only a fool would try to ensure own safety, by making friends 200 miles away. No, of course, a strong neighborhood, and support of a competent local police is what people choose. Yet, when it comes to states, and empires, leaders become erroneous in their decisions on alliances or co-operation. Choosing a faraway state or empire to ensure own interests, is simply not a good idea. A lesson I fear which will never be learnt. Re. the British Empire at the time, and their self-appointed role of Pax Britannica "defenders of the world" (lol) Lord Palmerston stated: “Therefore I say that it is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” And regarding the post-WW2 Pax Americana as the new alpha USA took over the role of "protectors of the world" (lol again), Henry Kissinger repeated the policy almost verbatim for the American Century: “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests”. Has anybody ever explained what such a policy meant in practice? It means that if the safety of "poor you" wherever you live, doesn't serve the "interests" of these kind eternally smiling gentlemen, you'll be coldly written off with a few "thoughts and prayers". It means the slimy deceitful "Albions" and their modern associates and political inheritors expect you (personally) to be there to advance their interests today, but that they probably won't be around to protect you tomorrow... Solution: If they won't be around to protect you tomorrow, to hell with them today. A lesson I fear which will never be learnt...
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  19. The London lords thought they could use a geographical advantage to divide the continent, and thereby always be in a position "to rule" during crises and wars. In the end they became a tool themselves: of the "division" of Europe by Washington DC. Brits lost their inheritance (Empire) because they made the strongest continental power/alliance their enemy as a policy standpoint. The USA "won" bigtime after WW2 because they could could gain from European wars by "sitting on the fence" and waiting until their main rivals (all European empires) had slugged it out to mutual exhaustion. After the end of WW2, "the game" (Divide and Rule/Conquer) stayed the same. Only "the (over)lords" changed from London to Washington DC. The British Empire lost their empire because of the "attitude problem" that might was right. They refused to change when the time for change came "around 1900", and went down as the world changed around them from that point in time onwards. London refused concerted efforts of trying to create more unity on the continent, even though they could have and should have. London refused concerted efforts of creating binding alliances, and prefered to try and create division on the continent, setting continental powers up against each other, hoping to gain from crises/strife/war. The USA simply had a bigger geographical advantage than that the British Empire (power = "might"), meaning that the "might" of Washington DC became bigger than than the "might" of London. Poor suckers went down after WW2....
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  37. antred11 Firstly, Goebels and all the other Nazi elite were criminals. The Berlin speech was a staged propaganda show, and you are therefore quoting a criminal (speaking in front of a bunch of commandeered party followers) to justify the act of soldiers killing unarmed civilians. Hitler ans his criminal clique did not have the authority to speak for the German nation, since he was a dictator (who, against popular myth, was NOT voted for). When did I ever say that I was generally against the use of bombing to limit the industrial power of an enemy? I said I was against the use of armed soldiers (under the ORDER of a higher command) to kill unarmed civilians. Research the RAF's Directive Nr. 5, issued to Bomber Command in February 1942 (for example on Wikipedea). It was an order issued to soldiers kill civilians. Your last paragraph is the result of incorrect comparisons. German bomber crews were never given the direct order to kill civilians. There was always a military/industrial/infrastructure target. This is also true for RAF raids until the March 1942 raid on Rostock. Rostock was the first WW2 attack in which the bomber crews were given the direct order to "de-house" civilians (a palatable way of ordering soldier to target and kill unarmed and innocent civilians). Proof of this is the fact that Goering (head of the German Luftwaffe) was never accused of illegal orders in respect to the bombing of targets in cities, even though he had been captured. If the German raids were illegal, why was he not accused? IMHO, this change of targets after the Directive Nr. 5, was a war crime. If you are going to insist that directly targeting civilians is a fair way of combat, you must also accept that terrorists are going to use the same argument (i.e. that the people working in the World Trade Center were contributing to the US economy, by way of the taxes they paid, etc., and therefore fair game). Again, to make it perfectly clear, the Nazi invasions and subsequent atrocities were terrible war crimes, but but it did not justify the killing of people who were not responsible for these crimes. Furthermore, bombing people who don't know why they are being attacked is counter-productive. It merely make them mad at the attacker, and stiffens their resistance. They will fight back, and rally around the only place they can turn to. Their leadership. The result was a LONGER war, not shorter. The best case scenario was that it made no difference. Thank you for reading and at least giving my opinion a thought.....
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  43. The destruction of German cities and, collective punishment of entire populations(with the subsequent retrospective justification from a 1945 POV) was one of the most ridiculous and counter productive exercises in warfare ever. To illustrate why I say this, consider this objective chain of events. Episode 1: The Area Bombing Directive, and OFFICIAL British government POLICY According to the Area Bombing Directives of February 1942 "...entire cities were to be targeted..." (carpet bombing of city centers, hidden behind euphemisms like "de-housing" or "workforce"). For the next three years, this would be the policy followed by Bomber Command, and a majority (not all) raids were carried out according to this principle. How effective was this to reduce the pressures of Allied soldiers fighting on the front lines? How effective was this to aid the ground forces, the ONLY forces which have the ability to end wars? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Area_bombing_directive Episode 2 Around two years later. One of the most feared German weapons of WW2 was the Tiger tank, built at the Henschell plant in Kassel. Kassel was "blasted as a whole" in October 1943. The entire city center was destroyed and about 10,000 "enemy" women and kids were burned to a cinder.  According to the Area Bombing advocates, it was "a huge success".  Of course, according to the Area Bombing policy, the well-known heavy industrial plant, Henschell wasn't the target of this raid. An indirect result of the raid was that Tiger production rose from 1943 (650 built) to 1944 (around 1000 Tiger I and II). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Kassel_in_World_War_II Episode 3 Normandy The 13th June 1944 was the blackest day in the history of the British 7th Armored Division. In the space of 15 minutes, Michael Wittman, commander of a Tiger tank, went on a rampage, and killed 230 young British soldiers, and 29 AFV's (tanks and APCs). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Wittmann Episode 4 Today Here's the million dollar question. Would Wittman have been able to to the same on 13th June 1944, had  his Tiger tank been destroyed in the October 1943 attack on Kassel? Would he have been able to single-handedly kill 230 young men, if he had been sitting on a bicycle, armed with an old rifle ? (because the heavy industry producing modern tanks had been destroyed in 1943/44) Nor were all those other young Allied soldiers, who were blown to bits on the battlefields by weapons which could have been destroyed in the factories if the right decisions had been made in 1942. Despite bombing the sh*t out of city centers (or,..maybe BECAUSE of bombing city centers?), German armament production rose dramatically until the final quarter of 1944. My personal conclusion? Utter folly to gloat over the deaths over hundreds of thousands, and there are still people who revere men like Portal and Harris as "far sighted". Their decisions indirectly led to the needless deaths of scores of OWN soldiers.
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  46. Sophie Dockx​​​​​​​​​​ True. Back then, the world was as complicated as the one we live in today. The leaders back then had it just as difficult as our leaders do today — since a reliable crystal ball has not been invented yet :-) That leaves leaders to take calculated risks... In case of 'who caused WW2?' Chamberlain or Hitler, the answer for me is easy — Hitler and Stalin :-) The two villains, who had signed the dirty deal which caused WW2, since without knowing how Stalin would react to a German invasion of Poland, Hitler's hands were tied... The reason I say Hitler and Stalin, and not Chamberlain and Daladier, is because Chamberlain's carefully laid out strategy of containing Nazi Germany by using Poland as a proxy (based on the belief of an irreconcilable hatred between the 2 entirely different ideologies separating Nazism and Stalinism) was foiled when Hitler sent feelers, and Stalin greedily offered the N/A pact in August 39 (with its land-grabbing 3rd partitioning of Poland, amongst others). Could that really have been foreseeable in 1939? That basically blew Chamberlain's plan, and the fact that it was so unexpected shows how far most people (leaders and commoners alike) had underestimated the two totalitarian dictators. Can we really blame the people at the time for this? IMO, Chamberlain's actions did not cause the war, since it is really irrelevant what Chamberlain did or didn't do, there would have been a war anyway. I prefer to base my criticism of past events on whether an action was motivated by higher or lower moral reasoning. In this case my personal opinion is that I'll forgive Chamberlain, for his intentions were pure (keep Czech independence intact), by 'signing away' the 3 million German speakers who should never have been a part of the artificial entity called "Czechoslovakia" in the first place (...the failings of Versailles are an entirely different debate, but a given factor in 1938...) Furthermore, Chamberlain's motivation was peace, whereas the two dictators motives were war. Stalin knew EXACTLY that Hitler would invade Poland, the moment the pact was signed, leaving millions of Poles to their fate.... In August 1939, the sole determining factor of 'war or peace', was Josef Stalin. He could have chosen life for millions of people, yet he chose death...
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