Comments by "Ralph Bernhard" (@ralphbernhard1757) on "Voices of the Past"
channel.
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"1911 Encyclopedia Britannica; Balance of Power;
The Nuttall Encyclopedia; Balance of Power ;
A phrase in international law for such a "just equilibrium" between the members of the family of nations as should. prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon the rest. The principle involved in this, as Hume pointed out in his Essay on the Balance of Power…"
https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I/Technology-of-war-in-1914
[Britannica]
In principle, not a bad thing.
Unfortunately, by 1914 the 2 "blocks" of alliance partners had completely skewed the old system of "balancing" the power of countries.
The two resulting blocks were fairly equally balanced in terms of GDP, military forces, education of the population, industrial might, technology, etc.
But concerning other criteria re. "power", like a strategic advantage, access to raw materials, population, global reach, etc. the Tripple Alliance was becoming rapidly "outbalanced" by the Tripple Entente, and intended to correct this resulting "imbalance".
European leaders had long foreseen the potential disaster of a "great war" scenario in times of modern warfare. Improvements in technology, meant ever more devastating weapons. Industrialization, the potential for all encompassing "total wars".
From Moltke the Elder in the mid-19th century [The days are gone by when, for dynastical ends, small armies of professional soldiers went to war to conquer a city, or a province, and then sought winter quarters or made peace. The wars of the present day call whole nations to arms.... The entire financial resources of the State are appropriated to military purposes...] to Churchill in 1901 [ We must not regard war with a modern Power as a kind of game….A European war cannot be anything but a cruel, heartrending struggle (ending) in the ruin of the vanquished and the scarcely less fatal commercial dislocation and exhaustion of the conquerors. —1901, 13 May, House of Commons]
The inflexibility of the alliance system would turn out to be the end of Europe.
According to common practice "states can pursue a policy of balance of power in two ways: by increasing their own power, as when engaging in an armaments race or in the competitive acquisition of territory; or by adding to their own power that of other states, as when embarking upon a policy of alliances." [Britannica]
Because none of the other powers were willing to address the increasing imbalance (as the years passed), Germany/Austria-Hungary set upon a path of increasing both their "power" as well as a more favorable strategic position, by allying with the Ottoman Empire.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman%E2%80%93German_alliance
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October/November 1918.
Why did Wilhelm "have to go"...
In politics, we are hardly ever given the real reasons why things happen, or why policy decisions are implemented.
Of course yesterday's politics, is today's history...
The truth behind "why Wilhelm had to go" is there for all to see, and has been written about in great detail in the past.
It had little to do with WW1, or Wilhelm's "personality disorder" (lol).
As Tolkien states, long forgotten history became legend. Legend turned to myth. And after 100 years the reality of what happened passed out of all knowledge.
Re. why Wilhelm had to go, has simply been forgotten.
The reality of "what happened" is that soon after his ascent to power (around the time "leaning East" Bismarck took his hat), Wilhelm wanted to unite Europe.
In his own frustrated later words "with or without GB".
That can be read about in great detail and with sources in largely forgotton works: for example in the first few pages of THE ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS: MISSED OPPORTUNITY OR MYTH by H.W. Koch (free to read online after registration at JSTOR) or several other free pdf theses on the topic.
Unfortunately most of these scholarly works mostly deal with how it turned out and not the initial intention by Berlin of such a potentially possible European alliance system with an Anglo-German Alliance at its core.
Only a few historians correctly point out how such an alliance system was never desired by key individual European players, especially in London, and therefore "wishful thinking" from the outset. See the "history" of the apparently "poor dissed London lords" who apparently "really really wanted to become Berlin's BFFs" (sic.), but Berlin had insiduous "world conquering dreams".
According to "Die Legende von der Verschmähten englischen Freundschaft 1898 to 1901" (1929) by Gerhard Ritter, the historian makes clear that it was London which never wanted such an alliance. The talks about a Eurpean alliance system did not "start" (as often stated) "in 1898", but much sooner. Bismarck had already sent the "feelers" much earlier, and Wilhelm intended to follow up on these (see the successful good start with the Helgoland-Zansibar Treaty as an act of good faith by both sides).
As it turned out "with GB" was not possible because London wanted "Splendid Isolation" as the elevated policy standpoint of a few influencial lords.
The "few" with veto powers would have used these powers to torpedo any attempt within the circle of London lords for any form of European unity, either "with or without GB".
To Quote: "Thirdly — but more contentiously — his veto of an Anglo-German alliance, as late as 1901, has been blamed, notably by Julian Amery in his biography of Joseph Chamberlain, as leading to the First World War and, by implication, to all the horrors which came after." (Amery 1969, p.158: edit for clarification, "third" in a list of the historian's list of key failures re. the Chamberlain Sr. years).
Just to clarify further. The same British lord who "oh-so honestly" set out try to create an Anglo-German Alliance in 1898 together with Lord Balfour, admitted to vetoing it if there was ever a chance of a version not to the lords' liking under discussion. Same as today, a few key figures can always veto any idea put forward, advocated on, or even decided on by majority concensus, and it did not matter how good such an idea (political proposition) is today, or was at the time.
It was GB which chose "against".
In 1896, Wilhelm II therefore "turned East" and personally handed the Russian Tzar a memorandum named "On the need to form a politico-merchantile union of European states against the USA".
In it, Wilhelm expressed his desire to turn Europe ("with or without GB", but still preferably including GB) into a united power which could stand up against the rapidly rising USA.
Hmmmmmmm....interesting.
"Against the USA" (sic.), and in 1918 Washington DC insisted on exactly this man to abdicate...
In 1918, Wilson representing the rapidly rising power USA, demanded that Wilhelm II should leave office in order for any peace talks to commence.
Of course, the "dividers" intent on "dividing" European power into manageable bits, sat in Washington DC. With their own entry into WW1, these strategists had got their "foot in the door" of European matters: their willing "little helpers" in London and Paris thereby signed the own death warrants for their own empires.
Because if you are a dragon (an imperialist power with an "empire"), don't cuddle up to a dragon slayer (a nation whose very foundation was anti-imperialism).
Wilhelm II had to go, because he wanted a united Europe, to mirror what was happening on the other side of the Atlantic.
It wasn't the "flamboyent Weltpolitic" or "nasty rhetoric" or "wanting to rule the world" (or any of the often overstated "historical details") which made Wilhelm unpopular with the other powers on the fringes of the European continent, but his desire to unite Europe in order to speak with a united voice against the rising USA. Germany's neighbors were unwilling to accept Berlin's "price tag" for such a "united Europe": more influence in the world (and a few more colonies) for Berlin.
Of course, everything has a "price tag".
Even the USA's "help" to "win WW1" had a price tag...
To add to the above.
Our history is often overburdened with judgements, rather than analyses.
A certain standpoint of "my government was better than your government"-attitude plays a large role.
The forms of governments which evolved (timeline) were a result of their geographical locations.
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Wilhelm is often compared to Bismarck.
An interesting "episode" regarding "duplicity" and the way European states interacted at the time, occured in the late-1870s.
Bismarck stepped forward and offered himself as the "honest broker" (Congress of Berlin) to avoid a potential war between the saber-rattling London and St Petersburg, because of the after effects of Russo-Ottoman War of 1877/78 (San Stefano).
As a "thank you" for his efforts as peacemaker and for avoiding war, Bismarck attracted the wrath of the Russian Tzar. Russian anger for getting cheated out of the spoils of this war between Russia and the "evil Ottomans who were oppressing Christians in the Balkans" (the usual widespread "appeal to emotion" for the masses, to cover up the real aims of wars: rule/domination/interests/territory/power/etc., and in this case, St Petersburg heading for the Dardanelles), was suddenly refocussed from London onto Berlin.
Bismarck had triggered a deep feeling in St Petersburg of betrayal: after Russian neutrality had done a large share of "enabling" Bismarck's German unification, St Petersburg now felt that it was obviously time for a "reward" of sorts. Berlin should in return, "enable" further Russian expansion south at the expense of the Ottoman Empire (Dardanelles, the "warm water port"-narrative) and support St Peterburg against British, French or Austrian-Hungarian protests as they realized their long-sought ports outside of the Black Sea ("Greater Bulgaria").
Even worse, while London walked away with a reward (Cypress), Berlin got a crumpled Three Kaiser League and an angry Tzar breathing down their necks. His efforts for securing peace between Russia and Great Britain, resulted in an enhanced risk of war for millions of people in Eastern/Central Europe. All exactly as the "pat our own backs" lords of London (Disraeli/Salisbury) intended. The intention of London throwing their weight into the after-effects of the Russo-Ottoman War, and by supporting the "bad guys" (Ottoman Empire) during this war, had from the outset been to drive a wedge between the "three kaisers", which were perceived to be a threat to the own British Empire.
On analysis, it was a London move to prevent a potentally possible alliance forming out of the existing agreement between the "three kaisers"(Germany/Russia/Austria-Hungary)by driving a wedge between the three.
Is that how London rewarded their peacemakers?
Bismarck: "Once bitten, twice shy..."
The apprentice Wilhelm: "What conclusions can we draw from the above?"
Strangely enough, the same actions by Wilhelm II (1905: the Morrocan "crisis" = avoid a potentially dangerous alliance forming) is interpreted by some historians as having an "evil", or "world conquering" intent, and is widely believed.
So how should we judge the attempt to drive a wedge between potentially dangerous alliances forming? "Evil", or "normal"? Surely it can't be both ;-)
Anyway...
After the Berlin Congress peacekeeping mission, Germany ended up in the vulnerable "middle of Europe", endangered by a 2-front war, with a shattered agreement and potentially without anybody to ally with at all. Fearfull visions of the days of Friedrich must have returned, and only the rapid action by Bismarck averted a disaster. Should Berlin have simply ignored Austria-Hungary's resulting weakness after the Three Kaiser League so rapidly dissolved, Vienna might have simply distanced themselves to look for a "good deal" elsewhere. Russia maybe? A war for Germany on three fronts? His very own agreement between the three empires and kaisers, to keep the peace and which was well within the scope of the "gentleman's agreement" of the Congress of Europe, was almost turned into a complete enciclement of the country whose leaders had stepped forward as "peacemaker".
Another example of the amorality of states.
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It wasn't "a wrong turn" which started WW1. It "triggered" WW1...
The real "WW1", or first "great" war actually took place from 1803 to 1815.
In terms of scope and victims, it was mainly limited by technology. Still, despite the limited capabilities of the weapons of the times, there were more than 4 million victims, in all corners of the globe.
The first truly "global war".
Notice however how historians (correctly btw) separate this "first global war" (aka The Napoleonic Wars) into seven distinct phases, based on a scientific and exact analyses of the reasons/motivations at the time, whereas for WW1/WW2 there are attempts to create one big emotionally steered mashup.
Regarding the Napoleonic Wars, historians are of course far more candid re. "motivations/reasons" (note: the real reasons, not the ancillary details). Most people are entirely emotionally detached from events 200 years ago, so there is also no need to spin history either to appease an own population.
There are no endless debates about "Who started it?"
The Napolionic Wars were of course declared by London, as a preventive war, in May 1803, and the (correct) reason/motivation given for this declaration of war, by most historians, is that it was to "avoid the single hegemony" on the continent.
In 1914, "WW1" evolved out of a local conflict, which started in the Balkans, and through a few unfortunate twists and turns developed into the second truly "world" war, in order to establish domination and rule.
Hanlon's Razor states "not to attribute to mallice, what can adequately be explained by stupidity", and with WW1, Europe started its own demise because of efforts to remain individually dominant/relevant.
Of course, on the other side of the Atlantic, wars were always fought for unity, and common goals (aim of expansion).
The American Century was a ship already launched, but renamed halfway.
The "ship" started its journey with a war of unity (Civil War because of "poor slaves" aka "the emotional argument"), then expanding westwards (Manifest Destiny, Mexican-American War), getting rid of entities which could be misused by foreign powers to "divide and rule" ("Trails of Tears" of the unfortunate "losers" of history), and the consolidation of own strength (Monroe Doctrine/Spanish-American War).
And with that, the "ship" bumped up against the "dock", which was European rule and domination of the globe.
Didn't anybody notice?
The history of the west I guess, in a five minute nutshell...
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Ahhh...the "family ties". Yes, unfortunately "family ties" could not patch things up in divided Europe, in a changing world.
Of course one could argue that there wasn't any "European unity" to "divide" at the time (around 1900), but that isn't the only purpose of "divide and rule". Divide and rule also seeks preventive action, to avoid unity if such a threat is spotted on the horizon...
Also, there was no "1900 alpha" with a "Truman Doctrine"-style tool to create unity (under which it had the sole "ultimate weapon") by
creating a common rival/enemy either...
Only "a Wilhelm" trying to unite European powers behind a common cause...
Unfortunately in the study of history we only have two options: Simply believe what others tell us, or do own research.
Please download and read "Germany and the Spanish-American War" from JSTOR (free pdf).
The US plans to overpower Spain and take their colonies started in 1897.
So did Berlin's contigency plans for the USA (low-key at first, later adapted as the Spanish-American War progressed).
Yet what remains today as "important history"?
The historian explains (its only 12 pages from a longer book) how uniting Europe behind a common cause ("defending own European interests by uniting and siding with Spain") was Wilhelm's real goal.
The "German planned attack on America" today being widely spread as the assumed sign of "Wilhelm's evil" and "desire to rule the world", is an ancillary detail of course. Yes, a highly emotionally charged one (google "appeal to emotion") and can therefore serve as a sort of "clickbait" in history to distract from the more tedious and boring books explaining what really happened.
The Spanish-American War was the last opportunity to unite Europe behind a common cause.
Too bad the alpha at the time was ruled by a gambler and womanizer (Edward) and otherwise engaged (Second Boer War). Too busy to come up with a "turn of the century (1900)"-version of the Truman Doctrine herself.
According to that history, in 1897/1898 Wilhelm did not want to act alone, but preferred to try and find common concensus "along family lines" first, but failed because European capitals were more about "me first", in a rapidly changing world.
Subsequently Europe made it easy for Washington DC to start playing their "divide and rule". Paris was the first to try and snuggle up to a disinterested Washington DC, followed by London...
And today?
The post-WW2 Truman Doctrine and the "united Europe" it helped to forge (at least in the west after WW2), no longer serves its intended purpose.
Time to "divide and rule" again...
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A lot of ancillary and totally irrelavant details.
It was a London policy which made the strongest continental power the default "rival in peace", and the default "enemy in war".
London had 2 chances to correct their faulty reasoning.
One with Wilhelm II, roughly until 1900, until German leaders lost their patience trying to get a mutually beneficial treaty with London.
The 2nd chance, after WW1, while Germany was a democracy.
They blew both chances, and would subsequently lose their Empire.
Because roughly in parallel to Germany on the continent across the English Channel, there was another "new power" rising across the Atlantic, whose position was basically "observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.”
It was the USA.
Or "maybe they (Europe) won't notice if we sneak up on them..."
The American Century advocates in Washington DC were very good at "biding time" until they were strong enough to eclipse "the old", and not to care anymore.
With the "leverage" geography gave them (distance from squabbling Europeans), plus a drastically increasing power, as technology shrunk the world, they knew they would just have to wait long enough until the eternally squabbling Europeans had torn themselves to shreds.
Because in the arsenals of M-A-I-N there was another "weapon".
Well-known at the time, and formulated into words by John Quincy Adams: "There are two ways to conquer and enslave a country: One is by sword and one is by debt."
Note: it was "a plan" of sorts.
Wait.
Simply wait.
Washington DC/The American Century: "Let's see what happens. Never let a crisis or war go to waste."
Washington DC: If your rivals are making a mistake, don't interrupt them...
The main big difference?
While London afronted/confronted the strongest continental power/alliance which was Germany and the Dual Alliance at the time, as a matter of policy, the USA made the strongest power/alliance the "temporary friend" during crises and wars, only to overpower it commercially/economically/financially after WW2 was over."
Smart.
Kaiser Bill wished for "a place in the sun" (i.e. "markets", and "spheres of influence").
IMHO they should've just given him one, without the push-back.
It was greed and the control-freak instincts of "old empires", jealously guarding their own.
What unfolded after that, was basically a bed Europe had made for themselves, and with WW1, Versailles (and others like Saint-Germaine, or Trianon) and WW2, had to sleep in.
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October/November 1918.
Why did Wilhelm "have to go"...
In politics, we are hardly ever given the real reasons why things happen, or why policy decisions are implemented.
Of course yesterday's politics, is today's history...
The truth behind "why Wilhelm had to go" is there for all to see, and has been written about in great detail in the past.
It had little to do with WW1, or Wilhelm's "personality disorder" (lol).
As Tolkien states, long forgotten history became legend. Legend turned to myth. And after 100 years the reality of what happened passed out of all knowledge.
Re. why Wilhelm had to go, has simply been forgotten.
The reality of "what happened" is that soon after his ascent to power (around the time "leaning East" Bismarck took his hat), Wilhelm wanted to unite Europe.
In his own frustrated later words "with or without GB".
That can be read about in great detail and with sources in largely forgotton works: for example in the first few pages of THE ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS: MISSED OPPORTUNITY OR MYTH by H.W. Koch (free to read online after registration at JSTOR) or several other free pdf theses on the topic.
Unfortunately most of these scholarly works mostly deal with how it turned out and not the initial intention by Berlin of such a potentially possible European alliance system with an Anglo-German Alliance at its core.
Only a few historians correctly point out how such an alliance system was never desired by key individual European players, especially in London, and therefore "wishful thinking" from the outset. See the "history" of the apparently "poor dissed London lords" who apparently "really really wanted to become Berlin's BFFs" (sic.), but Berlin had insiduous "world conquering dreams".
According to "Die Legende von der Verschmähten englischen Freundschaft 1898 to 1901" (1929) by Gerhard Ritter, the historian makes clear that it was London which never wanted such an alliance. The talks about a Eurpean alliance system did not "start" (as often stated) "in 1898", but much sooner. Bismarck had already sent the "feelers" much earlier, and Wilhelm intended to follow up on these (see the successful good start with the Helgoland-Zansibar Treaty as an act of good faith by both sides).
As it turned out "with GB" was not possible because London wanted "Splendid Isolation" as the elevated policy standpoint of a few influencial lords.
The "few" with veto powers would have used these powers to torpedo any attempt within the circle of London lords for any form of European unity, either "with or without GB".
To Quote: "Thirdly — but more contentiously — his veto of an Anglo-German alliance, as late as 1901, has been blamed, notably by Julian Amery in his biography of Joseph Chamberlain, as leading to the First World War and, by implication, to all the horrors which came after." (Amery 1969, p.158: edit for clarification, "third" in a list of the historian's list of key failures re. the Chamberlain Sr. years).
Just to clarify further. The same British lord who "oh-so honestly" set out try to create an Anglo-German Alliance in 1898 together with Lord Balfour, admitted to vetoing it if there was ever a chance of a version not to the lords' liking under discussion. Same as today, a few key figures can always veto any idea put forward, advocated on, or even decided on by majority concensus, and it did not matter how good such an idea (political proposition) is today, or was at the time.
It was GB which chose "against".
In 1896, Wilhelm II therefore "turned East" and personally handed the Russian Tzar a memorandum named "On the need to form a politico-merchantile union of European states against the USA".
In it, Wilhelm expressed his desire to turn Europe ("with or without GB", but still preferably including GB) into a united power which could stand up against the rapidly rising USA.
Hmmmmmmm....interesting.
"Against the USA" (sic.), and in 1918 Washington DC insisted on exactly this man to abdicate...
In 1918, Wilson representing the rapidly rising power USA, demanded that Wilhelm II should leave office in order for any peace talks to commence.
Of course, the "dividers" intent on "dividing" European power into manageable bits, sat in Washington DC. With their own entry into WW1, these strategists had got their "foot in the door" of European matters: their willing "little helpers" in London and Paris thereby signed the own death warrants for their own empires.
Because if you are a dragon (an imperialist power with an "empire"), don't cuddle up to a dragon slayer (a nation whose very foundation was anti-imperialism).
Wilhelm II had to go, because he wanted a united Europe, to mirror what was happening on the other side of the Atlantic.
It wasn't the "flamboyent Weltpolitic" or "nasty rhetoric" or "wanting to rule the world" (or any of the often overstated "historical details") which made Wilhelm unpopular with the other powers on the fringes of the European continent, but his desire to unite Europe in order to speak with a united voice against the rising USA. Germany's neighbors were unwilling to accept Berlin's "price tag" for such a "united Europe": more influence in the world (and a few more colonies) for Berlin.
Of course, everything has a "price tag".
Even the USA's "help" to "win WW1" had a price tag...
To add to the above.
Our history is often overburdened with judgements, rather than analyses.
A certain standpoint of "my government was better than your government"-attitude plays a large role.
The forms of governments which evolved (timeline) were a result of their geographical locations.
1
-
A lot of ancillary and totally irrelavant details.
It was a London policy which made the strongest continental power the default "rival in peace", and the default "enemy in war".
London had 2 chances to correct their faulty reasoning.
One with Wilhelm II, roughly until 1900, until German leaders lost their patience trying to get a mutually beneficial treaty with London.
The 2nd chance, after WW1, while Germany was a democracy.
They blew both chances, and would subsequently lose their Empire.
Because roughly in parallel to Germany on the continent across the English Channel, there was another "new power" rising across the Atlantic, whose position was basically "observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.”
It was the USA.
Or "maybe they (Europe) won't notice if we sneak up on them..."
The American Century advocates in Washington DC were very good at "biding time" until they were strong enough to eclipse "the old", and not to care anymore.
With the "leverage" geography gave them (distance from squabbling Europeans), plus a drastically increasing power, as technology shrunk the world, they knew they would just have to wait long enough until the eternally squabbling Europeans had torn themselves to shreds.
Because in the arsenals of M-A-I-N there was another "weapon".
Well-known at the time, and formulated into words by John Quincy Adams: "There are two ways to conquer and enslave a country: One is by sword and one is by debt."
Note: it was "a plan" of sorts.
Wait.
Simply wait.
Washington DC/The American Century: "Let's see what happens. Never let a crisis or war go to waste."
Washington DC: If your rivals are making a mistake, don't interrupt them...
The main big difference?
While London afronted/confronted the strongest continental power/alliance which was Germany and the Dual Alliance at the time, as a matter of policy, the USA made the strongest power/alliance the "temporary friend" during crises and wars, only to overpower it commercially/economically/financially after WW2 was over."
Smart.
Kaiser Bill wished for "a place in the sun" (i.e. "markets", and "spheres of influence").
IMHO they should've just given him one, without the push-back.
It was greed and the control-freak instincts of "old empires", jealously guarding their own.
What unfolded after that, was basically a bed Europe had made for themselves, and with WW1, Versailles (and others like Saint-Germaine, or Trianon) and WW2, had to sleep in.
1