Comments by "" (@lyndoncmp5751) on "TIKhistory"
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@FromPovertyToProgress
You are incorrect. The Hurtgen Forest, Aachen attacks, Lorraine, Alsace, Operation Queen etc were EXTREMELY WELL SUPPLIED. They didnt fail due to lack of supplies. Masses and masses of supplies came in via the Red Ball Express, then the opening of the railways and Le Havre. People don't realise just how much the rebuilt railway network contributed to bringing supplies up.
The westwall battles were very well supplied otherwise none of those massive campaigns could have occurred.
Look how quickly the US was able to respond to the German Ardennes attack with massive redeployment, resources and supplies. This was late December.
Its completely untrue to claim massive levels of supplies couldn't get to the front until February 1945. Massive levels of supplies got to the front all through October, November, December and January.
Antwerp is a complete red herring. Antwerp was not crucial for the westwall battles. Antwerp was only crucial for the advance across Germany, once Germany was broken into. The Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Alsace, Operation Queen etc did NOT fail due to Antwerp not being taken. They failed because of poor strategy and stubborn German resistance.
It was Eisenhowers broad front strategy that caused the stall. Eisenhower dispersed the supplies all along a 500km front and squandered them in pointless and unnecessary secondary campaigns, from the Hurtgen down to the Vosges. It was the SQUANDERING of the supplies, not LACK of supplies. Eisenhower should have listened to Montgomery and concentrated the effort only in the north.
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@rufusmcgee4383
That was in September. In October Patton was well supplied and by the time of his early November attempt to get to the Saar and through the Siegfried Line he enjoyed a 3:1 superiority in men and 8:1 in tanks. He had 9 well equipped and well supplied divisions. 3 were armoured divisions.
As von Mellenthin wrote in
Panzer Battles, page 317:
"" On 2 November Third Army was authorized to attack to the Saar as soon as the weather cleared.
Patton now assured Bradley that he could get to the Saar in three days and easily breach the West Wall with six infantry
and three armoured divisions, plus two groups, i.e. brigades, of
mechanized cavalry. Third Army numbered approximately a quarter of a million officers and men. Its opponents, the First German Army, had a total strength of only 86,000. Seven of the
eight enemy divisions were strung out on a front of 75 miles and the only reserve was the 11th Panzer Division with 69 tanks.
While the German formations were necessarily dispersed defensively,
Patton, with command of the air and ample mobility on the ground,
had the capacity to concentrate overwhelming force at any point he chose. Even on a basis of direct comparison he had an advantage of three to one in men, eight to one in tanks and a tremendous superiority in the artillery arm"
Patton was still failing to achieve his objective SIX WEEKS later when he was pulled out of the Lorraine.
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MC
With respect I didn't miss your point. You said Browning was in charge of the paratroop army. That is the point I was addressing. Bowning was not. General Lewis H Brereton was commanding general of First Allied Airborne Army and it was Brereton (together with General Paul Williams of the USAAF, and Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst of the RAF) who presided over the really important decisions for Market Garden pre drop and these are what ultimately killed the operation. Browning was largely irrelevant. He didn't make any of the big overall First Allied Airborne Army decisions and nor did he make any of the divisional decisions. In truth he might as well not even been there. He was an irrelevant no man's land man in the middle. Neither at the very top nor a divisional commander.
Gavin made his own decisions around Nijmegen. It was miscommunication between Gavin and the 508th PIR that failed to move on the bridge on day one in a timely manner. Nothing to do with Browning. Nor was it Browning who made the decision to pull out of Nijmegen on the 18th. That was also by Gavin.
Though Browning, and Gavin, both prioritised the Groesbeek Heights, Browning never ordered Gavin to abandon any attempt on the bridge. In fact Browning told Gavin late on the 18th that the bridge must be taken the next day or at the very latest by the morning of the 20th.
"" It is fine to blame the 82nd commander for not taking the bridge but the overall commander gets a pass? BS. ""
The overall commander was Brereton. These decisions were all made pre drop to prioritise the Groesbeek Heights.
I haven't blamed Gavin at all. Gavin TWICE ordered Lindquist of the 508th PIR to move on the bridge. Allegedly, Gavin was mad as hell when he learned at 6.00 p.m that the 508th still hadn't moved on the bridge, even though they were ready and assembled at 3.00 p.m. Other decisions were made because the Germans reacted well and follow on reinforcement drops were canceled due to the weather.
I put the blame mostly on Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst. They scuppered the plan before it even took off with their single missions on day one insistence (which even Montgomery could not persuade them to alter) and drops over a number of days. The Germans concluded this was the biggest mistake made by the allies in Market Garden. Browning himself specifically said the most crucial problem at Nijmegen was the non arrival of the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment on the 19th. Browning said had this occurred then the bridge may have been taken on the 19th. We wil never know if that was true or not.
""It was a stupid plan""
Then Brereton should have said so and should have told Monty the operation was stupid, couldn't be done and that FAAA wasn't capable enough, just as he told Monty his Scheldt paratroop alternative wasn't viable. General Gavin thought Market Garden was a good plan and that it would end the war quicker.
""done for political and personal glory more than military brilliance or necessity.""
It was done to try and end the war at a time the Germans looked down and out. Personal glory? But Montgomery also argued for the US 1st Army to advance on his southern flank to Aachen and beyond. The objective of Market Garden was to ONLY get a bridgehead across the Rhine, and also to cut off the Netherlands. The next phase would have been for the Americans to quickly advance to get into a position for both British 2nd Army and US 1st Army to then quickly take the industrial core of the Ruhr, which was expected to shorten he war.
If you argue that Market Garden was a stupid plan/idea then I'd love to know your thoughts about the Hurtgen Forest, which was a far bigger failure and suffered nearly 3 times as many casualties for nothing of note gained and then allowed the Ardennes to occur.
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Well as a matter of fact Aachen and the Hurtgen are considered two separate battles, although within the dictate of a single US Army. The battle of Aachen October 2nd to 21st October and the battle for the Hurtgen Forest 19th September to 16th December (when the German Ardennes offensive superseded operations there). They aren't generally considered one and the same.
Your first paragraph actually makes Montgomery's argument for a concentrated thrust in the north with 4 armies a sound proposal. Montgomery argued against wasting resources and logistics in the south (Lorraine, Alsace, Vosges etc). Instead he argued for a 4 army thrust in the north, centred on Aachen and then the Ruhr. Eisenhower disagreed and instead choose to disperse his effort over the entire front, hundreds of miles. It is much easier to supply 4 armies on one front than to supply more armies on a much wider front all at the same time.
As to your second paragraph, it was the September 4th SHAEF intel summary which convinced Monty that the Germans in front of British 2nd Army were in a very poor state. Montgomery did not come up with this out of thin air. SHAEF intel told him that was the case. Eisenhower then took nearly a week just to get back to him and it was another week before the operation went ahead. The Germans had strengthened somewhat in those two weeks but it was too late to stop the operation. The First Allied Airborne Army was itching to get into combat and Brereton was enamored with the idea. Even Gavin was. Remember only the idea was Montgomery's. The planning,for Market at least, was worked out by the air commanders and Montgomery had to take a back seat, not having any jurisdiction over the FAAA, RAF and USAAF.
The Germans concluded that the biggest mistake made by the allies was dispersed drops over a number of days and that decisions rests with Brereton and Williams. Montgomery, and others including the individual divisions commanders and I believe Browning, argued for double mission flown on day one but Brereton and Williams refused. The RAF's decision to not fly closer to Arnhem was also a major reason.
Garden actually did quite well. Grave, where the 82nd were was reached by XXX Corps in 42 hours. That was 80% of the way.
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@johnathanh2660
Yes Eisenhower had enough on his plate, so therefore should never have taken on the job of C-in-C of all ground forces as well as Supreme Commander. That's TWO separate jobs. Montgomery was doing a good job of it already, from the Normandy beaches to being out of France and in Belgium in under 3 months. Excellent going, far exceeding all expectations.
Eisenhower himself said much. However, he never once said Churchill or Roosevelt pressured him into taking over ground strategy or the broad front so we can categorical reject that theory out of hand. It's a non starter.
You said Montgomery failed to deliver at Caen. That's why I brought up Bradley and St Lo. St Lo was also taken over a month behind schedule. Objective was D plus 9. Why did you criticise Montgomery for taking Caen when he said, but excused Bradley for not taking St Lo when he said? Bradley was facing very little in front of St Lo. Conversely, Montgomerys British and Canadian forces in front of Caen faced the densest concentration of German armour ever deployed in WW2. By the end of June there were 7 panzer divisions and a number of independent panzer battalions (Tigers, Jagdpanzers etc) defending Caen. Conversely, the Americans faced precisely ZERO panzer divisions before July. Bradley's lack of drive against St Lo in June was PRECISELY the reason why the Germans sent every single panzer division to the Caen frontage.
Eisenhower most certainly did NOT trust Bradley to be able to handle the Ardennes situation. Eisenhower had no confidence whatsoever in Bradley's ability to sort the whole disaster out. Bradley insisted he could. Eisenhower totally disagreed and already on just the 4th day of the battle had lost faith in Bradley and instead sent for Montgomery to come down and take over Bradley's US 1st and 9th Armies and to command everything north of the German salient. This is not opinion, this is fact. Bradley even telephoned Eisenhower after the decision to turn to Montgomery was made and Bradley protested. Eisenhower had to cut the conversation short with a "Well Brad, those are my orders" finality.
What do you mean what is my point about Paris/Brussels? You accused Montgomery of failing in his promises. When I factually point out that Montgomery actually EXCEEDED his promise and was in Brussels
So it was the weather which caused Eisenhowers broad front to fail, according to your revisionism? Except the weather was actual not that bad September to mid November 1944, and certainly wasn't the reason the advance stalled. Strange then that the weather didn't prevent Montgomerys Scheldt clearing operation from succeeding in October/November.... the only allied campaign in NW Europe to achieve its goals in autumn 1944. Very strange.
Tedder. Ah yes one of a number of senior British militarily commanders who were insanely jealous and frustrated at the fame and attention Montgomery had at home, while the general public at large had no idea who they were. Montgomery was the poster boy of the British fight against Nazi Germany ever since El Alamein. Conversely hardly anyone could pick Tedder out of a lineup if their lives depended on it. Of course they wished for Montgomery to disappear, despite the fact that he'd done more to help win the war in the west than any of them?
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@brucebartup6161
Blumentritts opinion will answer your question.
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""The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine. ""
Gunther Blumentritt in The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart.
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A far more concentrated and considerably stronger northern effort in autumn 1944 could have been made than wasting men and resources in the Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Alsace etc.
From Eisenhower and the Art of Warfare by DJ Haycock, page 182.
"Despite objections raised to Montgomery's plan of an assault on a 40 division front, it was more sensible than Eisenhower's insistence on the entire front being in motion at all times, for no better reason than he could not abide the thought that the two American army groups would not participate as entities in the anticipated victory. Not only did Eisenhower fail to heed Montgomery's suggestions, but also he never seemed to understand the possible benefits. He was evidently unable to understand that to supply 40 divisions attacking on one front would have been an easier task than to supply first one army and then the other as each in turn went over to the offensive. It was this concentration of effort which Eisenhower failed to understand and to implement""
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@rufusmcgee4383
It should have been over quickly given the force ratios enjoyed by Patton, yes.
A post war official US Army study on Patton in the Lorraine concluded this:
""General Patton can also be faulted for neglecting to practice economy of force. We have noted several instances in which Third Army's forces were spread out on a broad front in an attempt to be strong everywhere with the result that they were decisively strong nowhere. Furthermore, Patton never made an attempt to punch through the German defenses with divisions in column, even though he received approval for such an operation from his superior, LTG Bradley. One rule of thumb for mechanized forces that emerged from World War II was to march dispersed but concentrate to fight. In Lorraine, Third Army fought dispersed. The American armored elements were not at their best in Lorraine either. Much of this can be attributed to the weather, but some of the blame must be given to the army commander for binding his armored divisions into infantry-heavy corps. Patton's reluctance to mass his armor came as a pleasant surprise to the Germans, who believed that their panzer divisions were just as useful in creating breakthroughs as they were in exploiting them. At a lower level, the combat command concept provided great tactical flexibility through decentralized control, but it also tempted Patton's corps commanders to break up the armored division and parcel it out by combat commands, a policy that further diluted Third Army's armored punch.""
Hope that helped.
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@brucebartup6161
Well Montgomery did not ignore Antwerp. He even proposed an alternative to Market Garden on the 8th/9th September. Market Garden was not yet settled on. This alternative was to be a paratroop operation around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt. However, General Lewis Brereton, commander of First Allied Airborne Army automatically said a flat out "no" to a paratroop operation to clear the Scheldt. He rejected the idea as being totally impractical for a paratroop drop operation. Instead, Brereton very much liked the Market Garden idea and decided on that. Brereton was convinced it would work. So Market Garden got the go ahead.
Even had Market Garden not occurred, opening Antwerp would still have taken time. It took three weeks just to clear the mines in the waterways alone. Had British 2nd Army not advanced over the ground to Nijmegen in the 2 days in September, its very very likely a later advance after Antwerp was open would have been met by tougher German defences and in far worse weather. Half the place would have been underwater. Almost certainly taking longer (nobody advanced nearly 100km in 2 days October 1944 to Feb 1945) and very likely suffering more killed and wounded than Market Garden did. Nearly half of Market Garden casualties were POWs.
Montgomerys 4 army thrust would have involved the same 4 armies that were already in the northern section. 1st Canadian, 2nd British, 1st US and 3rd US. The difference is, instead of being diverted and dispersed to the Lorraine and into the Hurtgen they would have been concentrated shoulder to shoulder aiming at the Rhine and the Ruhr. The Canadians sticking to the Antwerp section. If Eisenhower had agreed to this already on August 23rd when Montgomery spoke to him face to face there would have been no dilly dallying in the first two weeks of September. Nor would Patton have been wasting his time against Metz.
Metz could have been bypassed. The Ruhr was far more important than Metz.
I didn't say the Germans would have capitulated if the Ruhr was taken in autumn 1944 but the Germans would have been severely hampered. It was Germanys industrial heartland. If the Ruhr was attained in, say, October there is no way they could have continued fighting for another six months. Not a chance. A vital reason why Germany was able to keep producing and keep fighting up to May 1945 was because the Ruhr didn't fall into allied hands until late March 1945. Even then it remained a pocket, not totally taken for weeks after.
You say Eisenhower was wrong to let Market Garden pass but it had more potential 'end the war sooner' benefits than the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine campaigns, which Eisenhower also let pass and those two campaigns suffered nearly a hundred thousand casualties combined, for no real important strategic advantages gained. In fact the Hurtgen Forest was a strategic disadvantage because casualties suffered in it then lead to a thinning of the front line..... which the Germans drove through and caused another near 100,000 American casualties in the Ardennes.
Seen in this light, Market Gardens failure to reach the Rhine was practically a success story.
Cheers yourself. Enjoy the Sunday 👍
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John Lucas
And the German opposition in September/October to this powerful concentrated northern thrust would have been powerless to stop even the flank, 3rd Army.
Remember, the Germans were able to send in reinforcements from Germany to counter Market Garden because no other allied attacks towards the Rhine were being made at the same time. They could throw all their eggs into one basket. Had the American 1st Army opened up a diversionary attack towards Aachen (instead of probing into the Hurtgen Forest) at the same time the Germans would have been in a quandary, not being able to counter everywhere at one at that point in time. As an example, Sturmgeschutz Brigade 280 was entrained en route to Aachen on September 17th. It was ordered to divert towards Arnhem instead because there was no pressure against Aachen.
The fuel 'crisis' had passed by September 10th.
The Germans would not been able to stop a concentrated northern thrust in early autumn 1944.
Gunther Blumentritt :
""The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine. ""
Gunther Blumentritt in The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart.
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""Notice that Montgomery hardly got a mention ,""
Why would he? Beyond the initial general idea of Market Garden Montgomery had to take a back seat and was superseded in its planning, specifically Market, by the air commanders Brereton, Williams, Hollinghust and the individual divisional commanders. He even backed down from suggesting the 101st be dropped either side of the canal at Son in a wider zone, after Taylor disagreed. A decision that later came back to bite Taylor on the bum.
Interestingly, Major Richard Winters of Band of Brothers fame called Taylor, his own commanding general, a "phony" but Montgomery "the real deal, an example!".
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The 9th SS established itself in the Veluwe region and the 10th SS in the Achterhoek. Both divisions were only a shadow of their former selves. The 9th SS could only muster some 3,000 fighting troops. It's panzer regiment had lost all it's tanks, the two panzergrenadier regiments all their heavy weapons, it's artillery regiment and anti-tank battalion all their guns. Only the recon battalion still had some 30 of it's half tracks and armoured scout cars and the flak battalion had saved four 2cm flak guns. The 10th SS was little better off. On September 10th, after the OKW decided that only one division should rehabilitate inside Germany, the 9th SS was ordered, firstly, to release one panzergrenadier and one artillery battalion to the 10th SS and, secondly, to hand over all its usable weapons and vehicles to the 10th SS before leaving for Germany. However, with the divisional commander's tactic agreement, the handover of equipment was purposely delayed, the Panzer-Aufkalrungs-Abteilung even going so far as to to make it's half tracks temporarily unserviceable by taking off the caterpillar tracks, so that it could hold onto them.
There were no German tank attacks made on any airborne units in Market Garden until the arrival of Kompanie Mielke at Arnhem on the 18th. This was an army unit previously located deep inside Germany. Neither of the two SS divisions in the Netherlands had any tanks available on the 17th September so were unable to call upon tanks assault guns and tank destroyers.
There was a tank destroyer unit Schwere Panzerjager Abteilung 559 in the Netherlands pre drop near to the Belgian border but it doesn't appear to have gone into action until some days into Market Garden when it tangled with the 44th Royal Tank Regiment and US 101st Airborne around Koevering. It managed to cut Hell's Highway for a while.
Sources include Hohenstaufen: 9th SS Panzer Division by Charles Trange and Pierre Triquet, The 9th SS Panzer Division by Herbert Fürbinger, The 10th SS Panzer Division by Rolf Michaelis, Heavy Jagdpanzer: Development, Production, Operations Walter J Spielberger, Hilary L. Doyle & Thomas L. Jentz .
The 3 airborne units and XXX Corps would have had more than enough to fight off the German forces in the Netherlands pre drop. However, the Germans reacted quicker than anyone anticipated by sending in considerable reinforcements in the following days, particular armour. 90% of the German armour deployed in Market Garden wasn't from either of the 2 Waffen SS Divisions although the SS did receive new tanks as the battle raged on. 8 new Panthers were received by 9th SS on the 20th, at Arnhem for example. Direct from the factory.
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Good post, apart from the Sosabowski part. He was never blamed by anyone as the reason it didn't succeed. Not even by Montgomery or Browning, and Browning was out of the paras and shunted out to Burma as an admin way before Sosabowski was got rid of.
The intel was not ignored either. 1st Airborne actually received the intel that "a battle scarred panzer division or two" may be refitting in the area. That's why they brought along 6 and 17 pounder anti tank guns and PIATs.
The fact is, both SS panzer divisions had been decimated in Normandy and were completely without any tanks and only had around 3,000 fighting men each. The tanks actually came in from Germany in the following days, in German army, not SS, units that were nowhere near the Netherlands when the paras were dropped. These units were unknown by any intel. Kompanie Mielke, Kompanie Hummel, Stug Brigade 280, Panzer Brigade 107, Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 etc.
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@gawdsuniverse3282
" the campaign in North Africa was close to the sea,"
Um there were no viable ports between Alexandria and Benghazi. That's over a thousand km, along just one main road. When Montgomerys 8th Army reached El Agheila in late November 1942 they were 1,300 km from the supply line port of Alexandria.
On the Eastern Front it took a train load of tanks roughly two weeks to get from Germany to the front in 1941-1944.
No units in North West Europe took two weeks to get from the Channel ports to the front 😂.
The American armies were well supplied for their broad front failures. Hurtgen Forest, Aachen, Lorraine, Operation Queen, Alsace were all well supplied. Patton had nine fully equipped and supplied divisions, three of them armoured, for his early November attempt to break through the Siegfried Line. He outnumbered the Germans 3:1 in men and 8:1 in tanks, plus overwhelming air and artillery support. He even had brand new M36 Jackson tank destroyers newly arrived from the ports. He still failed in his objectives.
Eisenhowers broad front was at utter disaster. It failed completely all through autumn 1944.
It would have been easier to logistically supply a concentrated northern thrust closer to the channel ports than supplying secondary campaigns down in the Lorraine and Alsace. That's just basic geography.
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Dave M A C,
Trying again. Basically I was wondering what on earth the 16 Panzer IVs of 10th SS at Vorden were doing on the 17th, and subsequent days? The Panzer IIIs and IVs of Kompanie Mielke and the Tigers of Kompanie Hummel both came from 200 km away in Bielefeld, Germany to engage Frosts men at the Arnhem bridge. Mielke arriving on the 18th, and Hummel on the 19th. Where were the Panzer IVs of 10th SS? They must have been non operational? They weren't engaging Frost on those days.
I didn't know that 10th SS was initially raised as a panzergrenadier division and the why they had Stugs. I thought it was just a shortfall in tanks. In Normandy, 9th SS had a full 1st battalion of Panthers but its 2nd battalion was a roughly 50/50 mixture of Panzer IVs and Stugs. 10th SS in Normandy only had one battalion there, again roughly a 50/50 mix of Panzer IVs and Stugs. I just assumed it was because of a lack of tanks and not that the Stugs were already allocated when it was going to be just a panzergrenadier division, like 17th SS?
I don't have that book you mentioned. Is it worth getting? The Tigers of Schwere Panzerkompanie Hummel were assigned to 10th SS and I believe they lost 5 of their 14 Tiger Is in the Market Garden engagements. They were then sent to the Aachen sector, becoming the 4th company of Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 from November to February 1945. Then they fell back to the Rhine then the Ruhr pocket, last engagements being around Altena in April 1945. Interestingly, it was the Tiger Is of Hummel that were involved with the skirmishes against Pershings in late February around Elsdorf. The only Tiger I v Pershing actions in WW2.
Its interesting you mentioned the pictures of the brand new Panthers being only in dark yellow. Are the pictures you've seen very clear? Is there lighting variation? I only ask because in Market Garden Then And Now by Karel Margy on page 598 there is a picture of a knocked out brand new Panther which had the end of its gun barrel shot off by the 1st Worcestershires near Elst. I can make out a camouflage pattern applied. Its very clear on the gun mantlet and turret side. At some point in September around the time zimmerit was discontinued the factories started applying camouflage paint before they sent them out to the units and also introduced the so called ambush or light and shade scheme which was little dots or disc shapes over the paintwork to resemble sunlight patterns. This was also applied at the factories. Different factories had different patterns. I can see tiny disc shapes on the mantlet of the Panther on page 598 but it doesn't have zimmerit. Perhaps the Panthers you've seen predated this one? Do they have zimmerit?
I didn't know SS-Flak-Abteilung 10 was the unit at Ede so thanks a lot for that information mate. Most appreciated.
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Excellent stuff Dave, as always. A wealth of info there on Schwere Panzerjager Abteilung 559 so thank you very much. I can't remember where I read it now but I was certain that a Stug from 559 was lost on the 17th against the XXX Corps break out but perhaps not then. I must be misremembering. I want that book Autumn Gale as it looks great, but not at the prices it's going for. That's even too much for a birthday present. I haven't spent silly money on books for a long time. I used to but I've stopped that now. I think the last expensive book I bought was From Normandy to the Ruhr With the 116th Panzer Division by Heinz Gunther Guderian. Paid over fifty quid for that. Glad you mentioned the later involvement of the 116th PD in Market Garden. The jacket says only one unit on either side fought in Normandy, Market Garden, Aachen, Hurtgen Forest, Ardennes, Reichswald and Ruhr Pocket (basically, all the major battles of 1944/45)...the 116th Panzer Division. I think that's correct?
Definitely right about the new panzer brigades. They were rushed to the front without adequate training and had no organic reconnaissance or even maintenance sections. Yes, Panzer Brigades 111 and 113 were in the Lorraine engaging Patton. One of them only received its Panthers to train on just over a week before going into action. Crazy.
Yes that makes sense for the Waal at Nijmegen being the crucial sector before Arnhem and the reason why 10th SS armour was immediately sent in that direction. Makes total sense now that I reconsider it. Keep the enemy away from the 'island' ASAP. As you say, the Wilhelmina canal at Son could be, and was, easily bridged. Stopping the thrust from getting over the Nijmegen road bridge was another matter. Quite so.
Id like to post more but don't have the time today so I'll just have to make do with this for now.
Cheers Dave 👍
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@ALMdawgfan As I already wrote, Monty had an alternative idea along with Market Garden in case it wasn't green lit. This was to drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt but Brereton rejected this proposal on the 9th September and much preferred Market Garden.
None of the allied leaders in early to mid September favoured concentrating on Antwerp over everything else. The idea was to keep moving closer to Germany while they looked on their knees. Nobody wanted to stop and give the Germans breathing space.
Eisenhower himself, also on 9th September wrote to Monty and told him:
"My initial intention is to occupy the Saar and the Ruhr, and by the time we have done this Le Havre and Antwerp should be available"
Source, Monty and Patton, Two Paths To Victory by Michael Reynolds page 209.
Eisenhower clearly thought the Ruhr could be attempted while Antwerp was being cleared and made no effort to prioritise Antwerp in early to mid September whatsoever.
Antwerp not open is one of the big Red Herrings of WW2. It didnt prevent Market Garden, Aachen, Lorraine, Operation Queen from going ahead. Indeed, in early November, despite Antwerp not being open, Patton was still supplied with 9 full divisions, including 3 armoured (he had 8 times as many tanks as the Germans did), for his failed attempt to bash through the Siegfried Line in the Saar, and then three weeks after Antwerp was opened the Americans fell back into a retreat in the Ardennes.
Antwerp not cleared didn't really prevent any allied attacks from happening autumn 1944 and didn't alter much after it was cleared.
When all is said and done, Market Garden was worth attempting. Eisenhower even after the war said "it would have been criminal not to try it" and German general Gunther Blumentritt said Montys idea to get to the Ruhr quickly in September 1944 was the correct strategy.
Market Garden was nowhere near the biggest Allied 'failure' of 1944. The other Allied offensives fared worse. Pattons Lorraine campaign that dragged on forever and suffered nearly 100,000 casualties, including sick, was more or less a complete waste of time and men for nothing important attained. Again, Blumentritt correctly argued that Metz should have been left alone and instead of trying to get to the Saar in the east, Patton should have ignored the Lorraine and turned north through Luxembourg and headed for Bitburg.
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@ALMdawgfan Its all documented fact and sourced. I even gave you the page numbers with citation. Dont shoot the messenger. I gave you a bona fide proven example of an airborne commander (in that case Taylor) getting Montys initial suggestion overturned and settled between himself and Dempsey, with Monty staying out of it and letting the two of them get on with and sorted out between them. Monty did NOT order the troopers dropped in the day (Brereton did), Monty did NOT order the drops to be carried out over multiple days (Williams did), Monty did NOT order 1st Airborne to be dropped so far away from the Arnhem bridge (Hollinghurst did). I cant even come up with even one major aspect of the planning for 'Market' that Monty actually decided and ordered. Not one.
Hell it wasn't even Monty who decided which division would be allocated which location in the operation. This was decided within the First Allied Airborne Army at Breretons HQ in Sunninghill Park in a meeting at 1800, hours on September 10th after Brereton had flown back to England. Monty wasn't even there.
These choices were decided upon within the FAAA at Sunninghill Park because:
a) The 82nd should be the division to cover the largest section with the most bridges to take, the Nijmegen area.
b) The least seasoned division, the 101st, should cover the Eindhoven area, closest to the British 2nd Army and the first to be reached by XXX Corps.
c) Leaving the British and Poles to go for Arnhem.
At this 1800 meeting on the 10th at Sunninghill Park were Brereton, Browning, Williams, Gavin, Taylor, Urquhart, Sosabowski and their staffs.
Source.
"Page 24 Market Garden Then and Now by Margry"
So Monty did indeed turn over the detailed planning of Market to the air commanders. He wasn't even present when the air commanders planned it.
I never said he was a total bystander. He came up with the broad idea and kept a close eye on it but he didnt execute the detailed planning and he did not ignore it when a particular disagreement went against his initial proposal. He obviously recognised the expertise of the air commanders in planning an air operation. The air commanders decided the guts of the operation, not him.
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@johnlucas8479 Completely incorrect. Patton was tasked with Metz on September 5th 1944. He was not dormant. He simply failed to concentrate his forces. Pattons 3rd Army actually received FOUR fresh new divisions in September.
Bradley said there was "parity of supplies across armies" from mid September. Patton was only devoid of certain resources end of August/beginning of September. Not after that, and the gas crisis was over by 10th September.
All the above facts are sourced from Monty and Patton: Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds.
Further, Montgomery was only given priority mid to late September. After this, US 1st Army was given priority for its Aachen and Hurtgen Forest attacks. This US 1st Army campaign used far more men, tanks, trucks, ammo, fuel etc. Just look at the numbers involved. The entire US 1st Army took part. US 1st Army even received the new M36 Jackson tank destroyers in this campaign. Antwerp not open did NOT prevent the US 1st Army from being well supplied for the October-November Aachen and Hurtgen Forest campaign, nor the following Operation Queen, which also failed. These all failed due to strategy and tactics, plus tenacious German defending, not Antwerp not being opened.
Ironically, Antwerp was fully open end of November and yet what happened? Three weeks later the US Army was in retreat in the Ardennes.
Antwerp changed little to nothing and in truth to the Lorraine Antwerp was just 1/3 shorter distance than Le Havre. Big deal.
Too much is made of Antwerp, largely by Americans who have to have SOME reason for their failures. Hey why not blame Monty yet again.
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"... Bastogne and he thought no other general would have done what Patton did there."
All Patton faced in front of Bastogne were four mediocre infantry divisions of Branderbergers Seventh Army. No SS panzer divisions, no Tiger battalions....and even then he struggled for 5 days to advance less than 20 km including 3 days just to get through the village of Chaumont. The US 1st Army, under Montgomery, meanwhile, were by then fighting off 1st SS, 2nd SS, 9th SS, 10th SS, 12th SS, Panzer Lehr, 2nd Panzer, 9th Panzer, 116th Panzer, the Tigers of SS 501 etc.
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@johnlucas8479 I repeat, Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst made the wrong decisions. Decisions that other commanders involved, and even Montgomery, tried to change, without success. These decisions cost the operation fatally. Urquhart went too meekly along with the RAF choices. His colleague,
Richard Gale of British 6th Airborne said Urquhart should have protested "to the point of resignation".
There was ground suitable for paratroop drops, although not gliders, closer to the bridge to the south of the river. A coup de main there would have secured the Arnhem bridge.
More men dropped on day one would have changed the operation. Double missions were doable as shown by the protestations against single missions by many of those involved.
7 hours needed from first light to attack Flak batteries until the first drops after 1.00 pm? There is the first calamitous flaw. Its light at 6.00 am in England in mid September.
Brereton, together with Williams and Hollinghurst, made fatal wrong decisions. There is no doubt about that. And let us not ignore the fact that it was Brereton who told Monty that yes the operation was feasible with a good chance of success. Brereton could have said no at the beginning and that would have been that. Brereton had already rejected Montys alternate idea of a drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt. Brereton had the say so jurisdiction for the usage of his First Allied Airborne Army.
It was down to him. Browning was a, small fish and of little practical relevance in comparison to Brereton and Gavin on either side of him.
The film A Bridge Too Far gives Browning more importance and relevance than the reality.
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@johnlucas8479 You post about Urquhart proves my point
Urquhart wanted more planes and more men dropped as well as men dropped across the river. Browning was the middle man who had to go Brereton. Browning wasn't the decision maker. Brereton said no to double missions.
It was Brereton who already made the decision for daylight drops by the way.
There was ground suitable for drops south of the river closer to the bridge, though not for gliders. It's feasible a chute drop in limited numbers could have been done there but the RAF would have none of it, and Urquhart didn't argue much.
As I said, Richard Gale, the more experienced commander of 6th Airborne, felt Urquhart went along with the RAFs more distant choices all too easily and should have argued against them more severely, to the point of resignation. Urquhart was an inexperienced airborne commander and was way too easily lead by the RAF decisions. I do not absolve him of blame either. The wrong man to command 1st Airborne in my view, and the view of others much closer to the issue.
This cost the operation greatly, as we know.
And I may add that wasn't the only time the RAF messed up. On the 18th when Joe Vandeluer of the Guards Armoured Division requested RAF fighter bomber support to deal the German 88mm gun road block at Aalst, south of Eindhoven, he was told "sorry, none available". None available, for such an important operation? Unbelievable. It took seven hours to get past that 88mm road block.
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@GiacomoLockhart The Gavin quote was post war in his own book. He was not against Market Garden and he believed it would work.
Most of the actual planning for Market Garden was actually done by......... AMERICANS. Brereton, Williams, Gavin, Taylor etc.
It was THEIR planning which turned out to be flawed, not Montgomerys. Montgomery didnt order them to spread out their drop days, didn't order them to neglect the Nijmegen bridge on day one, didnt tell the RAF to not drop near Arnhem, didnt provide the wrong radio crystals, didn't hide the presence of German Tiger tank units in Germany and he certainly didn't control the damn weather.
If this was all such a horrible idea then Brereton would have said no to it in the first place, just as he said no to Montys alternative plan of a paratroop drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt Estuary. On the 9th, Brereton immediately said no to that plan but a big fat yes to Market Garden.
Oh and falling asleep in the Ardennes and arrogantly thinking the Germans couldn't possibly attack the US Army caused SIX times as many casualties as Market Garden. You should reserve your anger for that but somehow I doubt I will see you over on the Bulge videos castigating Eisenhower, Bradley and Hodges. Hmmmmm, why not?
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Pegasus Archive also states :
"Arnhem, the Operation was doomed from the outset because of the poor air plan. Due to a shortage of transport aircraft, the 1st Airborne Division lost its chief weapon of surprise through being flown to distant drop zones over a period of three days. It has been argued that, with enough high-level pressure applied, the necessary quantities of aircraft could have been found to have carried at least the majority of the 1st Airborne Division to battle in a single lift.
Lieutenant-General Brereton, the commander of the 1st Allied Airborne Army, supported the view of Major-General Williams, the commander of IX Troop Carrier Command, that only one lift should be made each day. All but one of the previous airborne operations had taken place at night, and all with the benefit of moonlight to aid the troops as they landed and formed up, something that the heavens denied to the Allies during the first days of Operation Market Garden. It must also be stated that the majority of the transport aircraft involved in Market Garden were American, and although their crews had since made great strides in their training, the memories of the disastrous, scattered drops of Sicily and Normandy were still fresh in the minds of the Allied commanders. A large-scale landing at night, therefore, was not feasible.
It was, however, perfectly possible that the First Lift could have taken place early in the morning of the 17th September, the Second during the evening, and the Third on the following morning. At such distances from their home bases in England, this would have undoubtedly placed a great strain upon the air and ground crews, yet if it had been done it would have transformed the situation at Arnhem. Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst, the commander of 38 Group, was prepared to commit the British aircraft to just such a timetable, however Major-General Williams refused to allow his American squadrons to fly more than one lift per day. Although he had a great deal of aircraft at his disposal, Williams had not received a proportionate quantity of ground crew to service them, and so it was unlikely that the Americans could maintain the pace if, as was incorrectly expected, aircraft losses would be severe. Had there been a determined effort, it is more than likely that the crews could have been borrowed from other sources for the duration of the initial airlift phase, and if not then there was no reason why the British should have been prevented from making a second lift to Arnhem by themselves. Brereton, however, was persuaded by the advice of Williams and decided only one lift per day would be flown for each division.
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