Comments by "" (@lyndoncmp5751) on "Eisenhower’s Broad Front vs Monty’s Narrow Front in 1944" video.
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@rufusmcgee4383
That was in September. In October Patton was well supplied and by the time of his early November attempt to get to the Saar and through the Siegfried Line he enjoyed a 3:1 superiority in men and 8:1 in tanks. He had 9 well equipped and well supplied divisions. 3 were armoured divisions.
As von Mellenthin wrote in
Panzer Battles, page 317:
"" On 2 November Third Army was authorized to attack to the Saar as soon as the weather cleared.
Patton now assured Bradley that he could get to the Saar in three days and easily breach the West Wall with six infantry
and three armoured divisions, plus two groups, i.e. brigades, of
mechanized cavalry. Third Army numbered approximately a quarter of a million officers and men. Its opponents, the First German Army, had a total strength of only 86,000. Seven of the
eight enemy divisions were strung out on a front of 75 miles and the only reserve was the 11th Panzer Division with 69 tanks.
While the German formations were necessarily dispersed defensively,
Patton, with command of the air and ample mobility on the ground,
had the capacity to concentrate overwhelming force at any point he chose. Even on a basis of direct comparison he had an advantage of three to one in men, eight to one in tanks and a tremendous superiority in the artillery arm"
Patton was still failing to achieve his objective SIX WEEKS later when he was pulled out of the Lorraine.
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@johnathanh2660
Yes Eisenhower had enough on his plate, so therefore should never have taken on the job of C-in-C of all ground forces as well as Supreme Commander. That's TWO separate jobs. Montgomery was doing a good job of it already, from the Normandy beaches to being out of France and in Belgium in under 3 months. Excellent going, far exceeding all expectations.
Eisenhower himself said much. However, he never once said Churchill or Roosevelt pressured him into taking over ground strategy or the broad front so we can categorical reject that theory out of hand. It's a non starter.
You said Montgomery failed to deliver at Caen. That's why I brought up Bradley and St Lo. St Lo was also taken over a month behind schedule. Objective was D plus 9. Why did you criticise Montgomery for taking Caen when he said, but excused Bradley for not taking St Lo when he said? Bradley was facing very little in front of St Lo. Conversely, Montgomerys British and Canadian forces in front of Caen faced the densest concentration of German armour ever deployed in WW2. By the end of June there were 7 panzer divisions and a number of independent panzer battalions (Tigers, Jagdpanzers etc) defending Caen. Conversely, the Americans faced precisely ZERO panzer divisions before July. Bradley's lack of drive against St Lo in June was PRECISELY the reason why the Germans sent every single panzer division to the Caen frontage.
Eisenhower most certainly did NOT trust Bradley to be able to handle the Ardennes situation. Eisenhower had no confidence whatsoever in Bradley's ability to sort the whole disaster out. Bradley insisted he could. Eisenhower totally disagreed and already on just the 4th day of the battle had lost faith in Bradley and instead sent for Montgomery to come down and take over Bradley's US 1st and 9th Armies and to command everything north of the German salient. This is not opinion, this is fact. Bradley even telephoned Eisenhower after the decision to turn to Montgomery was made and Bradley protested. Eisenhower had to cut the conversation short with a "Well Brad, those are my orders" finality.
What do you mean what is my point about Paris/Brussels? You accused Montgomery of failing in his promises. When I factually point out that Montgomery actually EXCEEDED his promise and was in Brussels
So it was the weather which caused Eisenhowers broad front to fail, according to your revisionism? Except the weather was actual not that bad September to mid November 1944, and certainly wasn't the reason the advance stalled. Strange then that the weather didn't prevent Montgomerys Scheldt clearing operation from succeeding in October/November.... the only allied campaign in NW Europe to achieve its goals in autumn 1944. Very strange.
Tedder. Ah yes one of a number of senior British militarily commanders who were insanely jealous and frustrated at the fame and attention Montgomery had at home, while the general public at large had no idea who they were. Montgomery was the poster boy of the British fight against Nazi Germany ever since El Alamein. Conversely hardly anyone could pick Tedder out of a lineup if their lives depended on it. Of course they wished for Montgomery to disappear, despite the fact that he'd done more to help win the war in the west than any of them?
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@brucebartup6161
Blumentritts opinion will answer your question.
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""The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine. ""
Gunther Blumentritt in The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart.
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A far more concentrated and considerably stronger northern effort in autumn 1944 could have been made than wasting men and resources in the Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Alsace etc.
From Eisenhower and the Art of Warfare by DJ Haycock, page 182.
"Despite objections raised to Montgomery's plan of an assault on a 40 division front, it was more sensible than Eisenhower's insistence on the entire front being in motion at all times, for no better reason than he could not abide the thought that the two American army groups would not participate as entities in the anticipated victory. Not only did Eisenhower fail to heed Montgomery's suggestions, but also he never seemed to understand the possible benefits. He was evidently unable to understand that to supply 40 divisions attacking on one front would have been an easier task than to supply first one army and then the other as each in turn went over to the offensive. It was this concentration of effort which Eisenhower failed to understand and to implement""
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@rufusmcgee4383
It should have been over quickly given the force ratios enjoyed by Patton, yes.
A post war official US Army study on Patton in the Lorraine concluded this:
""General Patton can also be faulted for neglecting to practice economy of force. We have noted several instances in which Third Army's forces were spread out on a broad front in an attempt to be strong everywhere with the result that they were decisively strong nowhere. Furthermore, Patton never made an attempt to punch through the German defenses with divisions in column, even though he received approval for such an operation from his superior, LTG Bradley. One rule of thumb for mechanized forces that emerged from World War II was to march dispersed but concentrate to fight. In Lorraine, Third Army fought dispersed. The American armored elements were not at their best in Lorraine either. Much of this can be attributed to the weather, but some of the blame must be given to the army commander for binding his armored divisions into infantry-heavy corps. Patton's reluctance to mass his armor came as a pleasant surprise to the Germans, who believed that their panzer divisions were just as useful in creating breakthroughs as they were in exploiting them. At a lower level, the combat command concept provided great tactical flexibility through decentralized control, but it also tempted Patton's corps commanders to break up the armored division and parcel it out by combat commands, a policy that further diluted Third Army's armored punch.""
Hope that helped.
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@brucebartup6161
Well Montgomery did not ignore Antwerp. He even proposed an alternative to Market Garden on the 8th/9th September. Market Garden was not yet settled on. This alternative was to be a paratroop operation around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt. However, General Lewis Brereton, commander of First Allied Airborne Army automatically said a flat out "no" to a paratroop operation to clear the Scheldt. He rejected the idea as being totally impractical for a paratroop drop operation. Instead, Brereton very much liked the Market Garden idea and decided on that. Brereton was convinced it would work. So Market Garden got the go ahead.
Even had Market Garden not occurred, opening Antwerp would still have taken time. It took three weeks just to clear the mines in the waterways alone. Had British 2nd Army not advanced over the ground to Nijmegen in the 2 days in September, its very very likely a later advance after Antwerp was open would have been met by tougher German defences and in far worse weather. Half the place would have been underwater. Almost certainly taking longer (nobody advanced nearly 100km in 2 days October 1944 to Feb 1945) and very likely suffering more killed and wounded than Market Garden did. Nearly half of Market Garden casualties were POWs.
Montgomerys 4 army thrust would have involved the same 4 armies that were already in the northern section. 1st Canadian, 2nd British, 1st US and 3rd US. The difference is, instead of being diverted and dispersed to the Lorraine and into the Hurtgen they would have been concentrated shoulder to shoulder aiming at the Rhine and the Ruhr. The Canadians sticking to the Antwerp section. If Eisenhower had agreed to this already on August 23rd when Montgomery spoke to him face to face there would have been no dilly dallying in the first two weeks of September. Nor would Patton have been wasting his time against Metz.
Metz could have been bypassed. The Ruhr was far more important than Metz.
I didn't say the Germans would have capitulated if the Ruhr was taken in autumn 1944 but the Germans would have been severely hampered. It was Germanys industrial heartland. If the Ruhr was attained in, say, October there is no way they could have continued fighting for another six months. Not a chance. A vital reason why Germany was able to keep producing and keep fighting up to May 1945 was because the Ruhr didn't fall into allied hands until late March 1945. Even then it remained a pocket, not totally taken for weeks after.
You say Eisenhower was wrong to let Market Garden pass but it had more potential 'end the war sooner' benefits than the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine campaigns, which Eisenhower also let pass and those two campaigns suffered nearly a hundred thousand casualties combined, for no real important strategic advantages gained. In fact the Hurtgen Forest was a strategic disadvantage because casualties suffered in it then lead to a thinning of the front line..... which the Germans drove through and caused another near 100,000 American casualties in the Ardennes.
Seen in this light, Market Gardens failure to reach the Rhine was practically a success story.
Cheers yourself. Enjoy the Sunday 👍
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John Lucas
And the German opposition in September/October to this powerful concentrated northern thrust would have been powerless to stop even the flank, 3rd Army.
Remember, the Germans were able to send in reinforcements from Germany to counter Market Garden because no other allied attacks towards the Rhine were being made at the same time. They could throw all their eggs into one basket. Had the American 1st Army opened up a diversionary attack towards Aachen (instead of probing into the Hurtgen Forest) at the same time the Germans would have been in a quandary, not being able to counter everywhere at one at that point in time. As an example, Sturmgeschutz Brigade 280 was entrained en route to Aachen on September 17th. It was ordered to divert towards Arnhem instead because there was no pressure against Aachen.
The fuel 'crisis' had passed by September 10th.
The Germans would not been able to stop a concentrated northern thrust in early autumn 1944.
Gunther Blumentritt :
""The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine. ""
Gunther Blumentritt in The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart.
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@gawdsuniverse3282
" the campaign in North Africa was close to the sea,"
Um there were no viable ports between Alexandria and Benghazi. That's over a thousand km, along just one main road. When Montgomerys 8th Army reached El Agheila in late November 1942 they were 1,300 km from the supply line port of Alexandria.
On the Eastern Front it took a train load of tanks roughly two weeks to get from Germany to the front in 1941-1944.
No units in North West Europe took two weeks to get from the Channel ports to the front 😂.
The American armies were well supplied for their broad front failures. Hurtgen Forest, Aachen, Lorraine, Operation Queen, Alsace were all well supplied. Patton had nine fully equipped and supplied divisions, three of them armoured, for his early November attempt to break through the Siegfried Line. He outnumbered the Germans 3:1 in men and 8:1 in tanks, plus overwhelming air and artillery support. He even had brand new M36 Jackson tank destroyers newly arrived from the ports. He still failed in his objectives.
Eisenhowers broad front was at utter disaster. It failed completely all through autumn 1944.
It would have been easier to logistically supply a concentrated northern thrust closer to the channel ports than supplying secondary campaigns down in the Lorraine and Alsace. That's just basic geography.
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Dave M A C,
Trying again. Basically I was wondering what on earth the 16 Panzer IVs of 10th SS at Vorden were doing on the 17th, and subsequent days? The Panzer IIIs and IVs of Kompanie Mielke and the Tigers of Kompanie Hummel both came from 200 km away in Bielefeld, Germany to engage Frosts men at the Arnhem bridge. Mielke arriving on the 18th, and Hummel on the 19th. Where were the Panzer IVs of 10th SS? They must have been non operational? They weren't engaging Frost on those days.
I didn't know that 10th SS was initially raised as a panzergrenadier division and the why they had Stugs. I thought it was just a shortfall in tanks. In Normandy, 9th SS had a full 1st battalion of Panthers but its 2nd battalion was a roughly 50/50 mixture of Panzer IVs and Stugs. 10th SS in Normandy only had one battalion there, again roughly a 50/50 mix of Panzer IVs and Stugs. I just assumed it was because of a lack of tanks and not that the Stugs were already allocated when it was going to be just a panzergrenadier division, like 17th SS?
I don't have that book you mentioned. Is it worth getting? The Tigers of Schwere Panzerkompanie Hummel were assigned to 10th SS and I believe they lost 5 of their 14 Tiger Is in the Market Garden engagements. They were then sent to the Aachen sector, becoming the 4th company of Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 from November to February 1945. Then they fell back to the Rhine then the Ruhr pocket, last engagements being around Altena in April 1945. Interestingly, it was the Tiger Is of Hummel that were involved with the skirmishes against Pershings in late February around Elsdorf. The only Tiger I v Pershing actions in WW2.
Its interesting you mentioned the pictures of the brand new Panthers being only in dark yellow. Are the pictures you've seen very clear? Is there lighting variation? I only ask because in Market Garden Then And Now by Karel Margy on page 598 there is a picture of a knocked out brand new Panther which had the end of its gun barrel shot off by the 1st Worcestershires near Elst. I can make out a camouflage pattern applied. Its very clear on the gun mantlet and turret side. At some point in September around the time zimmerit was discontinued the factories started applying camouflage paint before they sent them out to the units and also introduced the so called ambush or light and shade scheme which was little dots or disc shapes over the paintwork to resemble sunlight patterns. This was also applied at the factories. Different factories had different patterns. I can see tiny disc shapes on the mantlet of the Panther on page 598 but it doesn't have zimmerit. Perhaps the Panthers you've seen predated this one? Do they have zimmerit?
I didn't know SS-Flak-Abteilung 10 was the unit at Ede so thanks a lot for that information mate. Most appreciated.
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Excellent stuff Dave, as always. A wealth of info there on Schwere Panzerjager Abteilung 559 so thank you very much. I can't remember where I read it now but I was certain that a Stug from 559 was lost on the 17th against the XXX Corps break out but perhaps not then. I must be misremembering. I want that book Autumn Gale as it looks great, but not at the prices it's going for. That's even too much for a birthday present. I haven't spent silly money on books for a long time. I used to but I've stopped that now. I think the last expensive book I bought was From Normandy to the Ruhr With the 116th Panzer Division by Heinz Gunther Guderian. Paid over fifty quid for that. Glad you mentioned the later involvement of the 116th PD in Market Garden. The jacket says only one unit on either side fought in Normandy, Market Garden, Aachen, Hurtgen Forest, Ardennes, Reichswald and Ruhr Pocket (basically, all the major battles of 1944/45)...the 116th Panzer Division. I think that's correct?
Definitely right about the new panzer brigades. They were rushed to the front without adequate training and had no organic reconnaissance or even maintenance sections. Yes, Panzer Brigades 111 and 113 were in the Lorraine engaging Patton. One of them only received its Panthers to train on just over a week before going into action. Crazy.
Yes that makes sense for the Waal at Nijmegen being the crucial sector before Arnhem and the reason why 10th SS armour was immediately sent in that direction. Makes total sense now that I reconsider it. Keep the enemy away from the 'island' ASAP. As you say, the Wilhelmina canal at Son could be, and was, easily bridged. Stopping the thrust from getting over the Nijmegen road bridge was another matter. Quite so.
Id like to post more but don't have the time today so I'll just have to make do with this for now.
Cheers Dave 👍
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