Comments by "" (@lyndoncmp5751) on "The REAL Operation Market Garden | BATTLESTORM Documentary | All Episodes" video.

  1. Awww diddums. Maybe the British should have the Dutch Army liberate the Netherlands too? Oh wait.......
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  2. Britain WENT TO WAR for Poland. Seems to be forgotten or ignored by Poles.
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  3. GloryCarrier22, Well said. Montgomery was actually well known for NOT taking unnecessary casualties. His caution at times was due to the utter waste he saw in WW2. And those under his command mostly liked and respected him because he genuinely seemed to care about them. Even Americans such as Gavin, Ridgway and Dick Winters of Band of Brothers fame had a lot of time for Montgomery.
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  4.  @andipat100  Nonsense. Hitler didn't want war with Britain and offered Britain peace. There was a sea and air war from September 4th 1939. Britain was bombing Germany as soon as Britain declared war. Not Britains fault Poland didn't fight long and was taken by Germany very quickly. If Britain and the Commonwealth didn't go to war against Nazi Germany and stop the Axis from growing larger, more powerful and controlling the Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean, North Africa, Suez Canal and Middle East then the European Axis would have won and the Third Reich would still be occupying Poland to this day. You are welcome, ungrateful sod.
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  5.  @chaseroberts3111  British 603 Squadron was the best in the Battle of Britain, with the highest CONFIRMED kills and nearly all their kills were Bf109s. The Polish captured Enigma machine was from the 1930s, outdated and not relevant to the 1940s. The German WW2 Enigma machine was not broken until the British captured a WW2 one in 1941 and it was broken by Bletchley Park in England. The allies could not decipher German WW2 Enigma messages prior to this.
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  6.  @chaseroberts3111  Poland was only in WW2 because POLAND was attacked. No other reason. Poland would never had gone to war for Britain. Never.
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  7.  MC  With respect I didn't miss your point. You said Browning was in charge of the paratroop army. That is the point I was addressing. Bowning was not. General Lewis H Brereton was commanding general of First Allied Airborne Army and it was Brereton (together with General Paul Williams of the USAAF, and Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst of the RAF) who presided over the really important decisions for Market Garden pre drop and these are what ultimately killed the operation. Browning was largely irrelevant. He didn't make any of the big overall First Allied Airborne Army decisions and nor did he make any of the divisional decisions. In truth he might as well not even been there. He was an irrelevant no man's land man in the middle. Neither at the very top nor a divisional commander. Gavin made his own decisions around Nijmegen. It was miscommunication between Gavin and the 508th PIR that failed to move on the bridge on day one in a timely manner. Nothing to do with Browning. Nor was it Browning who made the decision to pull out of Nijmegen on the 18th. That was also by Gavin. Though Browning, and Gavin, both prioritised the Groesbeek Heights, Browning never ordered Gavin to abandon any attempt on the bridge. In fact Browning told Gavin late on the 18th that the bridge must be taken the next day or at the very latest by the morning of the 20th. "" It is fine to blame the 82nd commander for not taking the bridge but the overall commander gets a pass? BS. "" The overall commander was Brereton. These decisions were all made pre drop to prioritise the Groesbeek Heights. I haven't blamed Gavin at all. Gavin TWICE ordered Lindquist of the 508th PIR to move on the bridge. Allegedly, Gavin was mad as hell when he learned at 6.00 p.m that the 508th still hadn't moved on the bridge, even though they were ready and assembled at 3.00 p.m. Other decisions were made because the Germans reacted well and follow on reinforcement drops were canceled due to the weather. I put the blame mostly on Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst. They scuppered the plan before it even took off with their single missions on day one insistence (which even Montgomery could not persuade them to alter) and drops over a number of days. The Germans concluded this was the biggest mistake made by the allies in Market Garden. Browning himself specifically said the most crucial problem at Nijmegen was the non arrival of the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment on the 19th. Browning said had this occurred then the bridge may have been taken on the 19th. We wil never know if that was true or not. ""It was a stupid plan"" Then Brereton should have said so and should have told Monty the operation was stupid, couldn't be done and that FAAA wasn't capable enough, just as he told Monty his Scheldt paratroop alternative wasn't viable. General Gavin thought Market Garden was a good plan and that it would end the war quicker. ""done for political and personal glory more than military brilliance or necessity."" It was done to try and end the war at a time the Germans looked down and out. Personal glory? But Montgomery also argued for the US 1st Army to advance on his southern flank to Aachen and beyond. The objective of Market Garden was to ONLY get a bridgehead across the Rhine, and also to cut off the Netherlands. The next phase would have been for the Americans to quickly advance to get into a position for both British 2nd Army and US 1st Army to then quickly take the industrial core of the Ruhr, which was expected to shorten he war. If you argue that Market Garden was a stupid plan/idea then I'd love to know your thoughts about the Hurtgen Forest, which was a far bigger failure and suffered nearly 3 times as many casualties for nothing of note gained and then allowed the Ardennes to occur.
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  8. ​ MC  Well as a matter of fact Aachen and the Hurtgen are considered two separate battles, although within the dictate of a single US Army. The battle of Aachen October 2nd to 21st October and the battle for the Hurtgen Forest 19th September to 16th December (when the German Ardennes offensive superseded operations there). They aren't generally considered one and the same. Your first paragraph actually makes Montgomery's argument for a concentrated thrust in the north with 4 armies a sound proposal. Montgomery argued against wasting resources and logistics in the south (Lorraine, Alsace, Vosges etc). Instead he argued for a 4 army thrust in the north, centred on Aachen and then the Ruhr. Eisenhower disagreed and instead choose to disperse his effort over the entire front, hundreds of miles. It is much easier to supply 4 armies on one front than to supply more armies on a much wider front all at the same time. As to your second paragraph, it was the September 4th SHAEF intel summary which convinced Monty that the Germans in front of British 2nd Army were in a very poor state. Montgomery did not come up with this out of thin air. SHAEF intel told him that was the case. Eisenhower then took nearly a week just to get back to him and it was another week before the operation went ahead. The Germans had strengthened somewhat in those two weeks but it was too late to stop the operation. The First Allied Airborne Army was itching to get into combat and Brereton was enamored with the idea. Even Gavin was. Remember only the idea was Montgomery's. The planning,for Market at least, was worked out by the air commanders and Montgomery had to take a back seat, not having any jurisdiction over the FAAA, RAF and USAAF. The Germans concluded that the biggest mistake made by the allies was dispersed drops over a number of days and that decisions rests with Brereton and Williams. Montgomery, and others including the individual divisions commanders and I believe Browning, argued for double mission flown on day one but Brereton and Williams refused. The RAF's decision to not fly closer to Arnhem was also a major reason. Garden actually did quite well. Grave, where the 82nd were was reached by XXX Corps in 42 hours. That was 80% of the way.
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  9.  @dashcroft1892  The Poles and Canadians were far too slow and failed to close the Falaise Gap. Operation Totalize was a disaster.
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  10.  @ungrimironfist5740  Far more Brits died on the western front that Poles you ignoramus. Even in Market Garden, less than 100 Poles died compared to ten times that number of Brits (nearly 1,500).
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  11. 1st Airbornes intelligence told them the Germans had 8,000 to 10,000 troops in the Arnhem area, and elsewhere a battle scarred panzer division or two refitting. That is why 1st Airborne brought along 6 pounder and 17 pounder anti tank guns. They expected to face tanks. In reality there were zero German tanks in the area on the 17th when the troops dropped. The first German tank attack of Market Garden did not take place until late on the 18th. These were Panzer IVs and IIIs of Kompanie Mielke, which had only just arrived. It was in Bielefeld Germany, some 200km from Arnhem, when the paras were dropping. It moved to Arnhem over the night of the 17th/18th. This tank attack late on the 18th was stopped by the 6 pounder anti tank guns and PIATs of Frosts men. Two Panzer IVs were knocked out.
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  12. Well Browning was shunted out 2 months later and sent to Burma as as admin to Mountbatten.
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  13. The Americans went running to Monty after this and asked him to sort their self made Ardennes mess out for them.
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  14.  @Ussurin  You'd be speaking German if not for Britain.
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  15. Zd zichu S, Please, study the eastern front. The Soviets messed up far more, even when they had the Germans on the retreat. Take the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket of January February 1944. They had the Germans completely trapped and surrounded. Totally blocked off. 60,000 of them going nowhere. Yet 2/3 of the trapped German troops, over 40,000 of them, managed to get out of the trap and the Soviets suffered over 50,000 casualties themselves trying to stop them. That's 3 times the allied casualties in Market Garden. Yet neither Zhukov, Konev or Vatutin were shot as incompetent war criminal traitors. So you were saying?
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  16. Blame Brereton, Williams, Hollinghurst and even Urquhart for that.
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  17.  @SNP-1999  ""the British drop zone being too far." That was a decision made by Air Vice Marshall Hollinghurst of the RAF. He insisted the Flak would be too great if the transport planes flew closer.
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  18. The British 2nd Army front line was still in Belgium on the 17th. Eindhoven was already 30km behind enemy lines. XXX Corps had to get out of Belgium first. Had they attacked Eindhoven first with no paras there to block them then the Germans may have strengthed more so. With no paras landing in Arnhem, Nijmegen and Eindhoven the Germans would likely have concentrated their forces and responded in the greatest strength in the Eindhoven area. When the paras did land in Arnhem, Nijmegen and Eindhoven the Germans had to disperse everywhere to try and handle all threats all at once.
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  19. Monty only came up with the broad idea, which General Brereton liked and told him it would work. It was then Brereton and others who actually planned it, and that's where it went wrong. Monty took a back seat and he let the other generals come up with the details.
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  20.  @nickdanger3802  There was no halt order on Metz. Patton was tasked with Metz by Bradley on September 3rd. Market Garden wasn't even decided on until the 10th. And even then, there was no halt order for 3rd Army to stop before Metz. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2019/01/21/pattons-bloody-battle-at-fortress-metz/ Meanwhile US 1st Army began attacking into the Hurtgen Forest AT THE SAME TIME as Market Garden was happening. The Hurtgen Forest campaign began September 19th, just 2 days after Market Garden began. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2020/01/29/the-nightmare-battle-of-hurtgen-forest/ This myth that all American operations were stood down for Market Garden is hilarious. Trying to blame the failures of the Americans going nowhere on Market Garden is as old as WW2. Its what many Americans like to do.
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  21.  @thevillaaston7811  Bradley himself said that by mid September 1944 there was parity of supplies across all armies. The fuel crisis was also over by September 10th. There was only a fuel shortage at the end of August and beginning of September but it was nothing to do with Market Garden. Market Garden wasn't decided on until September 10th, when the fuel crisis ended. Source. Monty and Patton. Two Paths To Victory by Michael Reynolds.
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  22.  @nickdanger3802  What is your excuse for November 1944 when despite a well supplied 3 to 1 superiority in men, an 8 to 1 superiority in tanks and with overwhelming artillery and air support Patton STILL failed to get to the Saar? Nothing to do with Metz that. He failed to get to the Saar in early November despite telling Bradley on November 5th he'd do it in 3 days. He was still failing to get to the Saar by December 16th when the Germans attacked in the Ardennes. So in a nearly 4 month long campaign, Patton totally failed to get out of the Lorraine.
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  23.  @nickdanger3802  Answer MY question first and I'll answer yours. And Monty was only a division commander in 1940. Not in command of an army. Why couldn't Patton get to the Saar in November 1944 with three times as many men and eight times as many tanks as the Germans, Nick?
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  24. It wasn't a British command. Lewis H Brereton, an American, was overall commander of First Allied Airborne Army and most of the jurisdiction and decisions were American, particularly Brereton and Williams of the USAAF.
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  25.  @bigwoody4704  WTF? Who are you? I have been posting for 2 years.
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  26. Excellent post. I agree with all your points.
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  27. That we will never know.
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  28. Of course he was. He was the most successful and most experienced Western Allied ground commander of WW2 with a battle win record longer than any others. He did more to win the war in the west than anyone else. The Americans turned to him in their hour of need in the Ardennes, even though it wasn't his sector.
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  29.  @johnlucas8479  It was Brereton who decided to drop in the daytime, it was Williams who decided there would be drops over multiple days, it was Hollinghurst who decided the drop zones for British 1st Airborne, it was Gavin who decided the drop zones for US 82nd Airborne and it was Taylor who decided the drop zones for US 101st Airborne, although Gavin and Taylor had to get their choices approved by Brereton and Williams at the Eastcote finalisation. Monty had next to nothing to do with Market. The planning and decisions for Market were done by the FAAA, USAAF and RAF, with consultations with British 21st Army Group and Eisenhower. Monty had zero jurisdiction over the air forces though. He was a land commander with zero power to tell air generals and marshals what to do. Monty himself could not order Market Garden to go ahead. He had to go through Brereton and Eisenhower for it to go ahead. Both of these men had to agree with it and ratify it.
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  30.  @ALMdawgfan  Regarding the decision by Monty to get to the Ruhr as quickly as possible this was the correct decision, as the Germans themselves agreed. Here are the words of German general Gunther Blumentritt, from The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart page 355 : "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force to break through to the Ruhr area. Germanys strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds Northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break through coupled with air domination would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. There were no German forces behind the Rhine and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. The German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Maas and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany" If only Eisenhower had listened to Monty and concentrated every into a, stronger push to the Ruhr in September instead of letting Patton waste time and resources in the Lorraine and Hodges waste time and men in the Hurtgen. Blumentritt, once again, agreed with Monty that the Lorraine offensive to the east should not have happened. "An attack on Metz was unnecessary. Metz and Lorraine could have been masked. In contrast a swerve north in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg (i.e in the direction towards the Ruhr) would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine" Missed opportunities in September 1944. British 21st Army Group and US 12th Army Group should have been concentrated together in a massive push to the Ruhr when the fuel crises ended on September 10th. Bad move by Eisenhower to decide his broad front strategy. It failed.
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  31. ""Notice that Montgomery hardly got a mention ,"" Why would he? Beyond the initial general idea of Market Garden Montgomery had to take a back seat and was superseded in its planning, specifically Market, by the air commanders Brereton, Williams, Hollinghust and the individual divisional commanders. He even backed down from suggesting the 101st be dropped either side of the canal at Son in a wider zone, after Taylor disagreed. A decision that later came back to bite Taylor on the bum. Interestingly, Major Richard Winters of Band of Brothers fame called Taylor, his own commanding general, a "phony" but Montgomery "the real deal, an example!".
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  32.  @nicholasconder4703  Yes I agree with that assessment. It was not a failure, just not a complete success. As you say, it took 100km of German held ground, the Germans retreated, losing major Dutch towns Eindhoven and Nijmegen and subsequent operations right after went on to take Venray and Overloon in Operation Aintree. This indeed provided the jumping off point for the advance into Germany in 1945 after the Bulge in the Ardennes was sorted out. Additionally, Market Garden provided a protective buffer zone in front of Antwerp. All I'll say differently is that it was lack of intel regarding German forces inside Germany that was the problem. There wasn't a great deal inside The Netherlands so they actually got that part of the intel pretty spot on. It was the units quickly there from Germany from the second day onwards, particularly armour, that tipped the balance in Market Garden. Cheers.
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  33.  @nicholasconder4703  Thats true yes. The Dutch intelligence had been compromised. Indeed. It was also felt that not only the two SS panzer divisions there were badly equipped and at half strenght (which was true) they were in low morale (which wasn't true).
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  34. Indeed. Monty had zero jurisdiction over the First Allied Airborne Army, USAAF and RAF and it was those who made the flawed air decisions.
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  35. MC Brereton was in charge of the overall paratroop operation, not Browning, and it was Brereton along with Williams of the USAAF who made the fatal decision to only fly single missions on day one and to disperse the drops over a number of days. The Germans concluded this was the biggest mistake the allies made during Market Garden. Gavin DID order an attack on the Nijmegen bridge on the first day and Browning did not overrule him. However, due to communication mix ups within the 82nd (again, nothing to do with Browning), they missed the chance to go for the bridge in the afternoon when it was lightly defended. When the attack got going around 8.00 pm the Germans had strengthened and the attack was stopped. It is a myth that Browning prevented Gavin from making an attempt to take the bridge.
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  36. ​ MC  ""Nor does this fix the really glaring deficiency concerning how to secure the flanks of the entire 30 Corp as it moved forward."" It is not very well known but there were actually two flanking corps moving up on either side of XXX Corps. These were XII Corps on the left and VIII Corps on the right. Both corps however suffered in lack of supplies and logistics , had even worse terrain to get across (although which terrain in WW2 WASN'T difficult to get across???) and didn't have the advantage of an airborne carpet laid in front of them. They did ultimately help in protecting the flanks. XXX Corps also had it's own rear elements that fanned out in flank protection. This is why Hell's Highway was only briefly cut by the Germans, despite it being deep inside their own territory. The Germans didn't manage to permanently cut the highway and were driven away from it.
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  37. ​ MC  Not sure why the need to "LOL". Nothing funny about my post. Aachen was a more viable option than the Hurtgen Forest in September and could have been gone for if Eisenhower was smarter. The Hurtgen Forest was a needless unnecessary campaign that took out far more men than Market Garden, and achieved very very little. US 1st Army attacks into the Hurtgen began just two days after Market Garden. On the 19th. ""all prioritized logistics were given to Market Garden" Marget Garden only had priority in extra supply transport laid on. It didn't take away any actual supplies from any US army. Nor did Market Garden stop all operations on the western front. Patton's 3rd Army was still trying to take Metz and, as I said, the US 1st Army began it's Hurtgen Forest campaign on the 19th. Just two weeks after Market Garden the US 1st Army had around over a dozen well supplied infantry divisions and 3 well supplied armoured divisions (circa 200,000 men) for their twin pronged attacks at Aachen and the Hurtgen. This was far more than Market Garden had to call on but it didn't do any better as you seem to have already acknowledged.
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  38.  @stevewiles7132  Hehe. No worries. You are dead right though. If the Germans were as bad off as the September 4th SHAEF intel summary told Monty they were, well then the operation would probably have succeeded
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  39. Montgomerys broad idea was liked by almost everyone. Others then took over the planning and he had no jurisdiction over the air forces.
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  40. They did. Dutch resistance couldn't be 100% trusted though and besides, it was reinforcements that came from Germany that made the difference, and Dutch intelligence knew nothing about these reinforcements. All the tanks that caused problems were in Germany when the paras dropped. There was no Dutch intel about them.
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  41. The 9th SS established itself in the Veluwe region and the 10th SS in the Achterhoek. Both divisions were only a shadow of their former selves. The 9th SS could only muster some 3,000 fighting troops. It's panzer regiment had lost all it's tanks, the two panzergrenadier regiments all their heavy weapons, it's artillery regiment and anti-tank battalion all their guns. Only the recon battalion still had some 30 of it's half tracks and armoured scout cars and the flak battalion had saved four 2cm flak guns. The 10th SS was little better off. On September 10th, after the OKW decided that only one division should rehabilitate inside Germany, the 9th SS was ordered, firstly, to release one panzergrenadier and one artillery battalion to the 10th SS and, secondly, to hand over all its usable weapons and vehicles to the 10th SS before leaving for Germany. However, with the divisional commander's tactic agreement, the handover of equipment was purposely delayed, the Panzer-Aufkalrungs-Abteilung even going so far as to to make it's half tracks temporarily unserviceable by taking off the caterpillar tracks, so that it could hold onto them. There were no German tank attacks made on any airborne units in Market Garden until the arrival of Kompanie Mielke at Arnhem on the 18th. This was an army unit previously located deep inside Germany. Neither of the two SS divisions in the Netherlands had any tanks available on the 17th September so were unable to call upon tanks assault guns and tank destroyers. There was a tank destroyer unit Schwere Panzerjager Abteilung 559 in the Netherlands pre drop near to the Belgian border but it doesn't appear to have gone into action until some days into Market Garden when it tangled with the 44th Royal Tank Regiment and US 101st Airborne around Koevering. It managed to cut Hell's Highway for a while. Sources include Hohenstaufen: 9th SS Panzer Division by Charles Trange and Pierre Triquet, The 9th SS Panzer Division by Herbert Fürbinger, The 10th SS Panzer Division by Rolf Michaelis, Heavy Jagdpanzer: Development, Production, Operations Walter J Spielberger, Hilary L. Doyle & Thomas L. Jentz . The 3 airborne units and XXX Corps would have had more than enough to fight off the German forces in the Netherlands pre drop. However, the Germans reacted quicker than anyone anticipated by sending in considerable reinforcements in the following days, particular armour. 90% of the German armour deployed in Market Garden wasn't from either of the 2 Waffen SS Divisions although the SS did receive new tanks as the battle raged on. 8 new Panthers were received by 9th SS on the 20th, at Arnhem for example. Direct from the factory.
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  42. 7th September was nearly 2 weeks before 17th September. They were whittled down to nothing, even abandoning armour due to lack of fuel in the meantime. By 17th September neither SS division had any tanks available left. This is why not a single SS tank attack opened up against any of the paratroop divisions on the 17th, or even the 18th. The first German tank attack against any of the paratroop divisions was that by Kompanie Mielke . Kompanie Mielke was in Bielefeld, Germany when the airborne troops dropped on the 17th. https://mikesresearch.com/2018/08/26/panzer-kompanie-mielke/ This was the FIRST German tank unit to engage any forces in Market Garden. The SS didn't have any tanks at the time.
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  43. Not a single German tank attacked any paratroop divisions on the 17th. Why, because they had none available on that day . Not a single German tank was sent south to death with the US 82nd Airborne at Nijmegen. Why, because they had none available on that day . Kompanie Mielke was the first German tank unit to go into action against any of the paratroop divisions. This was not until late on the 18th, after it had arrived from Germany. The link above is sourced from Retake Arnhem Bridge: An Illustrated History of Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944 by Gerrtisen and Revell. It is a specialised German armour source. Best kind of source to go to when it comes to Germany amour, their deployments, inventories. Also 9th SS Panzer Division by Charles Trange and Pierre Triquet. The 9th SS Panzer Division by Herbert Fürbinger. The 10th SS Panzer Division by Rolf Michaelis.
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  44. Grabner's forcer with ACS, armoured cars and other half tracks was quite resoundingly dealth with by Frost's men at the bridge. Had Grabner actually had tanks then it might have been different but he had no tanks as none were available. Heinz Harmel down in the Nijmegen sector, even decades later after the war, didn't even know that there were German army units (not SS), with tanks and assault guns that had arrived in Arnhem on the 18th and 19th which were not under his jurisdiction and he had no idea of their dispositions. Harmel was in the Nijmegen area and did not know about these German army reinforcements that had just arrived. On the evening of the 20th after the bridge was crossed there were already German anti tank guns blocking the road at Ressen. The raised road beyond Ressen was terrible for tanks. Four Shermans trying to get to Arnhem when the Germans had a company of Tigers from Kompanie Hummel and Stug IIIs from Sturmgeschutz Brigade 280 already there? Tiger I at the Arnhem bridge. Date is 20th September: https://www.pinterest.com/pin/130745195415377492/ Schwere Kompanie Hummel: "19th September 1944......Detrainment in Bocholt and a 80 km road march towards Arnhem......attack with two Tigers(Let Knaack and Feldwebel Barnecki) on the same evening". Page 87 Tigers In Combat Volume II by Wolfgang Schneider. Also this , from 'Nijmegen US 82nd Airborne And Guards Armoured Division' by Tim Saunders From the 82nd's radio log, 20th September. 1730 hrs: ‘South east of Arnhem: three Tiger tanks, two companies of infantry and a heavy gun are on their way to Lent/Nijmegen.'
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  45. British 1st Airbornes intelligence officer Capt Taylor received the information that there were around 10,000 German troops in the area that might consist of a panzer division or two refitting. This report was signed September 13th. What British 1st Airborne then did with that info was up to them. They did, however, bring along a number of anti tank guns to try and deal with that threat. Browning certainly didn't hide anything from 1st Airborne, as 1st Airborne clearly received that intel.
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  46. Monty didnt plan it. He had zero jurisdiction over any air units. It was planned by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst with Gavin and Taylor having big input too. Poor Urquhart in Arnhem had no real role. The RAF told him what to do. Monty couldn't even get Brereton and Williams to fly double missions on day one.
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  47.  @GiacomoLockhart Well I read what you wrote. You clearly wrongly stated "the supreme commander of Op Market Garden was Monty". He wasn't. Eisenhower was. It was Eisenhower who decided on the resources allocated. Nor did Montgomery have any jurisdiction over the air forces. It was the air forces, the FAAA, the USAAF and the RAF which dictated the air component of Market Garden, ie the 'Market' part. Beevor, by the way, is so clueless that he claimed British 1st Airborne was and I quote "lightly armed". This is incorrect. They had 6 and 17 pounder anti tank guns and PIATs and were able to take out Panzer IIIs, Panzer IVs, Stug IIIs and even a King Tiger. In fact after the King Tiger loss at Oosterbeek, Abteilung 506 never again sent any more of their King Tigers into those narrow streets. I will abuse Beevor as much as I like when he abuses Montgomery and other great British commanders. Cheers.
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  48. John Burns. From Monty The Field Marshall 1944-1945: "Eisenhowers headquarters had ruled out Montys appeal for an airborne assault at Walcheren (to clear the Scheldt), early in September, repeated on 10th September". Brereton too flat out rejected this. Eisenhower put zero priority into opening Antwerp at the time.
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  49. The tanks came in from Germany in the days that followed. They were not there before the paras dropped. It wasn't ego either. Monty genuinely felt, rightly, that a northern thrust was more logical than messing about in the south.
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  50. Good post, apart from the Sosabowski part. He was never blamed by anyone as the reason it didn't succeed. Not even by Montgomery or Browning, and Browning was out of the paras and shunted out to Burma as an admin way before Sosabowski was got rid of. The intel was not ignored either. 1st Airborne actually received the intel that "a battle scarred panzer division or two" may be refitting in the area. That's why they brought along 6 and 17 pounder anti tank guns and PIATs. The fact is, both SS panzer divisions had been decimated in Normandy and were completely without any tanks and only had around 3,000 fighting men each. The tanks actually came in from Germany in the following days, in German army, not SS, units that were nowhere near the Netherlands when the paras were dropped. These units were unknown by any intel. Kompanie Mielke, Kompanie Hummel, Stug Brigade 280, Panzer Brigade 107, Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 etc.
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  51. Dispersed drops over a number of days and the long distance drop zone choices were the fatal flaws of Arnhem. Everything else is secondary. There would have been enough paratroops to achieve their objectives at Arnhem, regardless of German dispositions, if the drops weren't so dispersed and so distant.
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  52. TheVillaAston Yes it was Brereton, Williams, Hollinghurst etc who dictated the air decisions of Market Garden. Dispersed drops over days was the main reason it failed, along with German powers of recovery.
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  53.  @randylucas2458  ""Patton's run to Berlin did not have much in the way of tactics or strategic planning he literally charged his way to Berlin as fast as he could get gas" Patton didn't get anywhere near to Berlin. His 3rd Army went to Bavaria in southern Germany and then Czechoslovakia. It was Hodges US 1st Army that headed for Berlin and met the Red Army at Torgau.
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  54. R PM Tigers In Combat Volume 2 by Wolfgang Schneider, Tiger I in the West by Jean Restayn, Market Garden Then And Now by Karel Margry.
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  55. Vioarr, Kompanie Hummel lost a total of 5 of its 14 Tiger Is during the fighting in the Netherlands. It had 9 Tigers left when it became temporarily attached to Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 as its 4th company for the Aachen fighting in November.
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  56.  @nickdanger3802  Patton couldn't take Metz for months. Monty took Caen while facing the densest concentration of German armour ever deployed in WW2. The Americans took St Lo no quicker than Monty took Caen. In fact, had the Americans not given up on St Lo in June then the Germans would have had to divert some of the panzer divisions defending Caen over to the St Lo sector. However, seeing as the Americans applied no serious pressure on St Lo in June, even though it was a June 15th objective, not one of the seven panzer divisions around Caen were deployed to St Lo. Nor were any Tigers either. Montys command of the allied ground forces in Normandy not only teached their objective of Paris ahead of schedule and with fewer allied and greater German casualties than expected but Monty was out of France and in Brussels Begium within 3 months of D-Day. Only Paris was supposed to have been reached by then. Amazing going under Montys leadership. Truly better than expected. Sadly it then all ground to a halt and went nowhere under Eisenhowers command for the next seven months, with the Americans even pushed back into a retreat in the Ardennes.
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  57. John Scurr Correct. It was Brereton and Williams who dictated the air plan. It was Brereton, and Williams who refused to fly double missions on day one. It was Brereton who grounded fighter bomber support and it was Brereton who later passed the buck onto XXX Corps and 1st Airborne, despite Williams refusing the RAFs request for double missions. Brereton accepted zero responsibility. Montgomery, on the other hand, was gracious to not point fingers at any service branch and instead blamed himself.
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  58. The Germans still lost nearly 100km of ground and major towns Eindhoven and Nijmegen.
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  59. Chris Brown, The Americans were their own worst enemies with their Hurtgen Forest, Metz and Ardennes debacles.
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  60. And by the way, the top brass allowed even more stupid plans such as the Hurtgen Forest and the Lorraine to go ahead which were far worse disasters.
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  61. Yes, they reacted much stronger than anyone expected them to. Same in the Lorraine, Aachen, Hurtgen Forest etc. Market Garden wasn't unique in not achieving all its objectives. Operation Queen also failed, as well as the others I cited.
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  62. Indeed. Due to the decisions made by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst British 1st Airborne failed to get to Arnhem in enough strength to make a difference there. XXX Corps couldn't even have crossed the bridge had they got there. The wreckage of Grabners SS column was strewn all over it, creating a road block. Also the Germans always controlled the long exit ramp off the bridge and had excellent fields of fire against anything on the bridge. The plan for Market Garden involved a major section of Arnhem to be captured right up to the northern suburbs, so XXX Corps could cross and fan out. That never happened. The bridge was never captured and only a few houses on the north side were. It was never enough, regardless if XXX Corps reached the bridge or not.
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  63. Bradley at the Bulge made his own mistake, and it was Monty who had to go down and sort out that American mess up for them.
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  64. The Germans gave up attacking British defended lines long before this point as they always failed, instead preferred to attack American lines (Mortain, Ardennes, Alsace).
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  65. Can be Bailey bridged. Its not that wide.
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  66. Cock up within the US 82nd Airborne. The commanders didn't make their orders and tasks clear. Supposedly Gavin told Lindquist of the 508th PIR to move without delay on the bridge after dropping but Lindquist supposedly misheard and stayed where he was. By the time Gavin found out there was no move on the bridge and then reordered Lindquist to do so that evening it was too late and the Germans strengthened.
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  67.  mark bogacki  Browning had nothing to do with the cock up within the US 82nd Airborne command in not moving on the bridge after dropping. Browning wasnt even there yet. It was a US 82nd Airborne mess up.
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  68.  @pizzafrenzyman  Myth. Montys plan for a 40 division concentrated thrust across Northern Germany always including the US 1st and 3rd Armies. He even offered to serve UNDER Bradley if Eisenhower would only accept this plan. Sadly Eisenhower didn't and instead went with the disastrous broad front strategy, messing about in the Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Alsace, Vosges etc which stalled the allied advance and prolonged the war by months.
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  69.  @pizzafrenzyman  The failure is on the airborne commanders who told Monty the idea would work and who then set about planning it. It wasnt Monty who decided the drop zones, the days on which they would be dropped, the follow up drops, the air support etc. Monty actually had precisely ZERO jurisdiction over any of the air forces (First Allied Airborne Army, USAAF and RAF).
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  70.  @pizzafrenzyman  It wasnt PLANNED by Montgomery. How many times do I have to explain this to people? And it did better than any of the American campaigns that same autumn. Nearly 100km in 3 days. The Americans didn't get much beyond Aachen all year, not to mention Patton going nowhere in the Lorraine.
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  71. No it was to end the war.
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  72.  @johnburns4017  The RAF chose the drop zones and wouldn't be swayed otherwise.
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  73. Monty had zero antagonism towards Patton. Patton was not on his command level. Monty was an Army Group commander. His peer was Pattons boss, Bradley. Even so Montys preferred strategy was actually a strong concentrated 40 division 4 army thrust towards the Ruhr. This included Pattons 3rd Army but Eisenhower said no and instead went with the failed broad front strategy that got nowhere for seven months, messing about in the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine. Monty evdn told Eisenhower he would be prepared to serve under Bradley if this 40 division attack went ahead. Most claims about Montgomery are Hollywood myths. Monty never had any rivalry with Patton. It was the other way round.
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  74. Autumn 1944 was a shit show in general. Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Alsace, Operation Queen. All failures. Culminating in the Ardennes retreat. Eisenhowers broad front strategy was a fiasco.
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  75. The idea was to strike for the Ruhr quickly when the chance looked on, rather than stopping and taking a month to clear Antwerp.
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  76. The Villa Aston, Montgomerys Great Swan advance had just taken about 400 km in less than a week. That was faster than Patton. Then there was his advance after El Alamein. Over 1,000km in less than 3 weeks. Who moved faster in WW2? Of course, when faced with substantial and tough German opposition, which Montgomery usually faced, nobody is going to move anywhere fast. Cheers.
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  77.  @thevillaaston7811  Amazingly his post has 5 thumbs up. Clearly some people have watched Hollywood too much and not studied history. How fast did anyone else move when there were Germans in the way?
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  78.  @thevillaaston7811  As soon as anyone met tough German resistance they stopped, or were slowed majorly. That was WW2 in general. Too many people ignore a major reason for Market Garden not fully succeeding.....the Germans.
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  79. There weren't any tanks near Arnhem. The two Waffen SS panzer divisions didn't have any tanks. Tanks didn't start arriving in Arnhem until the second and third days. These were German army units that were in Germany when the paras dropped. The recon photos only captured images of a handful of obsolete early war tanks of a training battalion. These were near Eindhoven on the day the paras dropped and they fled when fighter bombers attacked them and they played no important part in Market Garden.
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  80. Nearly 100km of German held ground was taken and the Germans retreated nearly 100km. How was it a defeat? Only Arnhem was a, defeat. The other 90% was successful.
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  81. Quite rightly too. His idea was sound. However, the actual planning of it and execution carried out by others was where it went wrong.
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  82. I don't think TIK is right to blame Gavin. I would put the blame mostly on Brereton.
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  83.  @rob5944  General Lewis H Brereton was the commander of the First Allied Airborne Army. It was he who had the say so whether his Airborne Army could be used so Brereton could have nipped the operation in the bud right away and Montgomery could have done nothing about it. It was Brereton, together with General Paul Williams of the USAAF who made the crucial decision for only single missions flown on day one and for the drops to be spread out over a number of days.
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  84.  @bigwoody4704  You are deluded. I have seen you in many posts now today just trolling and talking utter tripe. Seek help.
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  85.  @rob5944  Montgomery was in charge of British 21st Army Group, from whence the British ground forces for Market Garden came. He wasn't, however, in charge of First Allied Airborne Army, USAAF or RAF. He still took blame for Market Garden. This was, according to Carlo D'este (biographer of Patton and Eisenhower), the only time an allied general took responsibility for a failed operation in the 1944/45 period. Or something like that. And there were, of course, other failures that same period.
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  86. It was PLANNED mostly by Americans Brereton, Williams, Gavin and Taylor. Monty only had the broad idea but he then had to defer to the air commanders to plan it and that's where it failed. Tell me how those all American Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine and Operation Queen fare? All failed and with circa 130,000 casualties.
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  87. Eisenhower didn't allow Montgomery the full resources he required and requested and nor was the flawed air planning anything to do with Monty. Not his jurisdiction. That was down to the FAAA, USAAF and RAF. For example it was, Brereton and Williams who decided to drop in the day and to have multiple drops over a number of days and it was Hollinghurst of the RAF who made British 1st Airborne drop so far from Arnhem. Quit blaming Monty for the screw ups of others.
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  88.  @ALMdawgfan  Well Monty only came up with the broad outline. He then had to go to Brereton to see if the idea was feasible. Brereton liked the idea and told him that yes it was very feasible. Even Gavin liked the idea and thought it would end the war. Monty wasn't an airborne commander so he turned the detailed planning over to the air commanders as they knew more than he did and he didn't step on their toes. He had faith in their judgement. My opinion is that Monty was somewhat put out by the fact the US 1st Army wasnt allowed to carry out a tandem attack to Aachen.
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  89.  @johnlucas8479  There was no 'plan' presented to Brereton. Only a proposal. An idea. It was Brereton, Williams, Hollinghurst etc who then did the planning. Monty only proposed the outline, but no detailed planning. Brereton liked the proposal and then took over the planning, with the air force bigwigs. Browning couldn't overrule Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst from deciding what they did. He had no jurisdiction over the USAAF and RAF, while Brereton was his superior in the FAAA. Browning had to go along with what those three decided.
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  90.  @johnlucas8479  I didnt claim either of the first two points of yours so? As to point three, Brereton already blocked Montys alternative plan for a drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt. Brereton said no, as the area was unsuitable for paratroop drops and the Flak too intense. Monty was only commander of British 21st Army Group. He had no jurisdiction to order air forces around. Detailed source for all this including Williams choices can be found in Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Margry. This is the only source that reproduces all the serials. It is the most detailed and comprehensive source on Market Garden, in two volumes. Very expensive though but well worth it and far superior to any paperback.
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  91.  @ALMdawgfan  Ike was the guy who liked and agreed to Market Garden. He was the supreme commander and all offensives had to be cleared with him first. Ike also agreed to the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine debacles too, don't forget. Sadly Eisenhower took a week just to get back to Monty on it and didnt allow Monty all the ground forces he requested. Instead of the US 1st Army making a strong tandem attack towards Aachen to supliment Market Garden Eisenhower instead agreed to the US 1st Army making pointless piecemeal probes into the Hurtgen Forest, which got underway two days into Market Garden. Yes the commanders and troopers in the newly formed First Allied Airborne Army were desperate to do a drop and get back into action before the war ended. They had been sitting around doing nothing for months and Monty was the only one interested in using them. Bradley had no interest in using paras for behind the lines drops. Bradley still wasn't interested in 1945 either. It was Monty who used them again, for the Rhine crossings. Paras are elite troops. They want to do the job they trained hard for and only Montgomery offered them that after Normandy.
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  92.  @ALMdawgfan  As I already wrote, Monty had an alternative idea along with Market Garden in case it wasn't green lit. This was to drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt but Brereton rejected this proposal on the 9th September and much preferred Market Garden. None of the allied leaders in early to mid September favoured concentrating on Antwerp over everything else. The idea was to keep moving closer to Germany while they looked on their knees. Nobody wanted to stop and give the Germans breathing space. Eisenhower himself, also on 9th September wrote to Monty and told him: "My initial intention is to occupy the Saar and the Ruhr, and by the time we have done this Le Havre and Antwerp should be available" Source, Monty and Patton, Two Paths To Victory by Michael Reynolds page 209. Eisenhower clearly thought the Ruhr could be attempted while Antwerp was being cleared and made no effort to prioritise Antwerp in early to mid September whatsoever. Antwerp not open is one of the big Red Herrings of WW2. It didnt prevent Market Garden, Aachen, Lorraine, Operation Queen from going ahead. Indeed, in early November, despite Antwerp not being open, Patton was still supplied with 9 full divisions, including 3 armoured (he had 8 times as many tanks as the Germans did), for his failed attempt to bash through the Siegfried Line in the Saar, and then three weeks after Antwerp was opened the Americans fell back into a retreat in the Ardennes. Antwerp not cleared didn't really prevent any allied attacks from happening autumn 1944 and didn't alter much after it was cleared. When all is said and done, Market Garden was worth attempting. Eisenhower even after the war said "it would have been criminal not to try it" and German general Gunther Blumentritt said Montys idea to get to the Ruhr quickly in September 1944 was the correct strategy. Market Garden was nowhere near the biggest Allied 'failure' of 1944. The other Allied offensives fared worse. Pattons Lorraine campaign that dragged on forever and suffered nearly 100,000 casualties, including sick, was more or less a complete waste of time and men for nothing important attained. Again, Blumentritt correctly argued that Metz should have been left alone and instead of trying to get to the Saar in the east, Patton should have ignored the Lorraine and turned north through Luxembourg and headed for Bitburg.
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  93.  @johnlucas8479  Pages 23 to 49 of Margry's Market Garden Then and Now has extensive detailed descriptions of how it was planned including maps, orders of battle. I would highly recommend this two volume tome for anybody truly interested in the minute details of Market Garden. It is the best source there is and certainly vastly superior to Beevor, Kershaw, Ryan etc. All serious students of Market Garden need to own it and put away Beevor.
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  94.  @ALMdawgfan  Monty actually initially proposed things that were overruled and overturned by those in the Airborne and he went along with the new decisions. For example he initially wanted US 101st Airborne strung out 30 miles like a kite string, extending to within artillery range of British 2nd Army. General Taylor, commander of the 101st was against this extended dispersal of his 101st and so Monty did not press the matter but instead backed down when Brereton took it up with him and he let the issue be settled between Taylor and Dempsey, commander of British 2nd Army. Taylor and Dempsey met at Montys HQ on 12th September and came to a mutual agreement between them and Monty did not interfere. Taylor decided on a smaller area to drop over, nearer to Eindhoven, and Dempsey said he'd be able to reach it. Source. Page 24 of Market Garden Then and Now by Margry. As I said, most of the actual planning of Market Garden, as opposed to the initial idea and early proposals, was actually not done by Monty but by the FAAA, USAAF and RAF.
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  95.  @ALMdawgfan  Its all documented fact and sourced. I even gave you the page numbers with citation. Dont shoot the messenger. I gave you a bona fide proven example of an airborne commander (in that case Taylor) getting Montys initial suggestion overturned and settled between himself and Dempsey, with Monty staying out of it and letting the two of them get on with and sorted out between them. Monty did NOT order the troopers dropped in the day (Brereton did), Monty did NOT order the drops to be carried out over multiple days (Williams did), Monty did NOT order 1st Airborne to be dropped so far away from the Arnhem bridge (Hollinghurst did). I cant even come up with even one major aspect of the planning for 'Market' that Monty actually decided and ordered. Not one. Hell it wasn't even Monty who decided which division would be allocated which location in the operation. This was decided within the First Allied Airborne Army at Breretons HQ in Sunninghill Park in a meeting at 1800, hours on September 10th after Brereton had flown back to England. Monty wasn't even there. These choices were decided upon within the FAAA at Sunninghill Park because: a) The 82nd should be the division to cover the largest section with the most bridges to take, the Nijmegen area. b) The least seasoned division, the 101st, should cover the Eindhoven area, closest to the British 2nd Army and the first to be reached by XXX Corps. c) Leaving the British and Poles to go for Arnhem. At this 1800 meeting on the 10th at Sunninghill Park were Brereton, Browning, Williams, Gavin, Taylor, Urquhart, Sosabowski and their staffs. Source. "Page 24 Market Garden Then and Now by Margry" So Monty did indeed turn over the detailed planning of Market to the air commanders. He wasn't even present when the air commanders planned it. I never said he was a total bystander. He came up with the broad idea and kept a close eye on it but he didnt execute the detailed planning and he did not ignore it when a particular disagreement went against his initial proposal. He obviously recognised the expertise of the air commanders in planning an air operation. The air commanders decided the guts of the operation, not him.
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  96.  @ALMdawgfan  Page 22 Market Garden Then and Now, paragraph 7: "Between September 8th and 10th Montgomery also considered an airborne operation against Walcheren Island to open the Scheldt River but Brereton rejected this, asserting that the terrain was very unsuitable and the Flak sure to be intense" As I said if you are truly interested in the Market Garden operation then Market Garden Then and Now is the essential work to read. Its not a paperback. Its a specialist two volume near 800 page tome and as such very expensive for casual observers to own.
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  97.  @ALMdawgfan  Monty WAS relevant. He was by some way the most successful and accomplished western allied ground general of WW2. Let's not ignore that after Hodges fled his command HQ in panic when he heard the Germans had broken through the American lines in the Bulge heading his way and Bradley dithered that it was Monty who Eisenhower turned to and got him to come down and sort that mess out. The irony.
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  98.  @ALMdawgfan  TIk is gold? When he blames the failure largely on Gavin and the 82nd? I don't even agree with that. It never came down to one factor. And British 1st Airborne would have still failed to capture the Arnhem bridge, with or without Gavin doing things differently in Nijmegen.
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  99.  @thevillaaston7811  Haha Bog Woofter caught out lying. Totally busted. Cheers for that. Lovely.
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  100.  @thevillaaston7811  Haha rimshot. Bog Woofter is simply a bullshitter and a liar. I no longer even have to read his posts to know that. He has a demented hate on for Montgomery. Very odd seeing as Monty was the most important and most crucial western allied ground general of WW2, going to the rescue of the Americans not once but twice. Eisenhower relied on Monty again and again. Bog Woofter should be bloody grateful. I dont recall Monty saying he hoped the Americans would be get pummelled by the Germans, as Patton hoped the British would after the American embarrassment at Kasserine. Unfortunately for Patton, Monty defeated Rommel once again.
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  101.  @thevillaaston7811  I even come across people who try and deny that Market Garden could not have gone ahead without the agreement and sayso of Brereton and his First Allied Airborne Army. They just wont accept it. They believe Monty had jurisdiction over the FAAA, the USAAF and the RAF and they refuse to accept facts that Monty only came up with the broad outline of the operation and actually turned the planning and execution of it over to other commanders. As I wrote elsewhere, Monty even backed down when Taylor protested and he let the issue be settled between Taylor and Dempsey. Some people have a bizarre need to have to believe Monty planned and decided everything and that his ego wouldn't allow for anything else. This is of course nonsense. But try telling these people that. You even have nitwits like Bog Woofter ignoring the Germans own orders or battle which show none of the armour that made a difference in Market Garden was even in the Netherlands on the 17th. We know exactly when these units arrived via their own unit records and combat diaries. Its beyong question yet they would rather quote hacks like Beevor and Hastings, both of which have been shown to be poor researchers, just like Ambrose before them. So bloody frustrating.
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  102. Poor flying weather supposedly.
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  103. ​ @thevillaaston7811  Monty, The Field Marshal 1944-1974 by Nigel Hamilton: "Eisenhower's headquarters had ruled out Monty's appeal for an airborne assault on Walcheren (to clear the Scheldt) early in September, repeated on 10th September". Montgomery's alternate scenario of drop around Walcheren was also rejected by Brereton at this time (9th/10th September). Brereton chose Market Garden instead. Brereton was enamoured with the idea of Market Garden and he quickly set about planning it. Chief among this planning was the fatal flaw to disperse the drops over 3 days. The Germans concluded that was the biggest mistake the allies made during the entire operation. Montgomery's idea.  Brereton, Williams, Hollinghust. Gavin, Taylor, Urquarts etc actual planning. The idea was sound. The planning was fatally flawed. Perhaps the First Allied Airborne Army wasn't capable enough at the time. A point Brereton should have stressed. However he did not and instead he assured Montgomery his Airborne Army could perform the mission.
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  104. Yes the First Allied Airborne Army was desperate to get into action and Monty was the only one who wanted to use them for what they were trained for, ie parachute drops behind enemy lines. Bradley had no interest in using them. The planning was done by the paratroop generals and the air forces.
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  105. Vandeluer contacted the RAF for air support on the second day to get rid of the anti tank guns near Eindhoven and was told none was available.
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  106.  @nickdanger3802  Brereton chose wrongly. That's where it all went pear shaped. Even his air commanders and an emissary from Monty failed to get Brereton to fly double missions on day one.
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  107. Huh? Britain stood up to Hitler in September 1939 and declared war on Nazi Germany. What did the USA do? Britain then took the lead in the west for the next years so that by the time the USA finally appeared a lot of the hard work was already done.
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  108.  @TheGixernutter  The Soviets took Poland, not the west. The Poles should be thankful Britain went to war for them in 1939, otherwise the Third Reich would still be there to this day.
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  109. Why do you say that? They were no better than the airborne divisions.
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  110.  @johnlucas8479  Antwerp is a red herring. The US 1st Army was very well resourced for its Aachen and Hurtgen campaign, as was Patton from October onwards. By November Patton outnumbered the Germans 3 to 1 in men and 8 to 1 in tanks and told Bradley he'd be at the Saar in 3 days. He was still failing 6 weeks later. The allied failures of autumn 1944 were not because Antwerp was not open. They failed due to the wrong military tactics and decisions.
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  111.  @johnlucas8479  Completely incorrect. Patton was tasked with Metz on September 5th 1944. He was not dormant. He simply failed to concentrate his forces. Pattons 3rd Army actually received FOUR fresh new divisions in September. Bradley said there was "parity of supplies across armies" from mid September. Patton was only devoid of certain resources end of August/beginning of September. Not after that, and the gas crisis was over by 10th September. All the above facts are sourced from Monty and Patton: Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds. Further, Montgomery was only given priority mid to late September. After this, US 1st Army was given priority for its Aachen and Hurtgen Forest attacks. This US 1st Army campaign used far more men, tanks, trucks, ammo, fuel etc. Just look at the numbers involved. The entire US 1st Army took part. US 1st Army even received the new M36 Jackson tank destroyers in this campaign. Antwerp not open did NOT prevent the US 1st Army from being well supplied for the October-November Aachen and Hurtgen Forest campaign, nor the following Operation Queen, which also failed. These all failed due to strategy and tactics, plus tenacious German defending, not Antwerp not being opened. Ironically, Antwerp was fully open end of November and yet what happened? Three weeks later the US Army was in retreat in the Ardennes. Antwerp changed little to nothing and in truth to the Lorraine Antwerp was just 1/3 shorter distance than Le Havre. Big deal. Too much is made of Antwerp, largely by Americans who have to have SOME reason for their failures. Hey why not blame Monty yet again.
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  112.  @johnlucas8479  The US 1st Armys advance towards Aachen alone involved 100,000 troops including two full armoured divisions and four full infantry divisions. At the same time the attacks into the Hurtgen Forest were also going ahead, with another circa 100,000 men. That is way more men and material than Market Garden.
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  113. Gavin ordered a move on the bridge both pre drop and again at 6.00 pm on drop day. This didn't get going until two hours later and even then one of the companies got lost.
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  114. Market Garden went ahead because of the 4th September SHAEF intelligence summary which assured him the Germans facing his 2nd British Army were and I quote "no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battle groups, disorganised even demoralised, short of equipment and arms". The operation was already planned and in the process of going ahead when other reports started showing otherwise and wasn't about to be cancelled due to a couple of less than half strength poorly equipped divisions refitting in the area.
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  115.  @thevillaaston7811  Its amazing they are all out the woodwork now at the same time isn't it?
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  116. 9th and 10th but both were less than half strenght and neither had any tanks.
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  117. Browning did insist. He told him late on the 18th thst the bridge MUST be taken the next day, the 19th. Unfortunately the non arrival of the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment on that day scuppered it. Gavin then had to use the Guards Armoured Division to fight through the streets of Nijmegen, which was never their task initially. Very difficult for tanks to have to fight in a built up urban area. They are sitting ducks and of course a number were lost to the German anti tank guns by the bridge.
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  118. Well all paratroop operations are risky. Its their very nature. They aren't guaranteed of success.
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  119. Flawed air planning was the reason. Well and the Germans.
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  120. Well that failed then because it was the Americans who were humiliated when Monty had to go to their rescue in the Bulge and save them hehe.
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  121.  @dickvansteijn4115  Sosabowski was an argumentative arrogant man who thought his brigade was more important and capable than it actually was. The Poles suffered lightly, less than 100 fatalities and weren't in the thick of the fighting. Every single one of his troops would have been lost had they dropped over Warsaw. His idea was a crazy one. They would have been blasted out of the sky before even reaching Warsaw. There would have been all those transport planes and gliders lost too.
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  122.  @thevillaaston7811  Sosabowski also refused Browning's offer to expand his brigade into a full division, supplemented with British troops to make up the numbers. He disgracefully didn't want any British troops in his unit. He was not a team player and cared only about the Polish cause not the Allied cause. He was right to be fired.
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  123. That was the air commanders fault.
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  124. Eisenhower was responsible for the war dragging on. His broad front strategy was a disaster. He should have listened to Montgomerys concentrated northern thrust with 40 divisions in 4 armies (2 American, 1 British and 1 Canadian) into northern Germany, with the Ruhr the central focus. Instead Eisenhower allowed US 1st Army to mess around in the Hurtgen Forest and US 3rd Army to mess around in the Lorraine. Military strategy when an enemy is weak is to concentrate your forces and smash hard, not disperse your forces and blunt your power. Eisenhower was a great politician and man manager, but no battle commander. The Germans agreed with Montgomerys idea to concentrate on northern Germany and the Ruhr.
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  125.  @johnlucas8479  Montgomery contacted him on the 4th. His reply came in two parts on the 7th in a small dispatch then the rest on the 9th. That's 6 days in total. Market Garden was DECIDED on the 10th. Source, Michael Reynolds : Monty and Patton, Two Paths To Victory. Buckingham is simply wrong. Immediately after Monty received the 4th September SHAEF intel summary about the poor state of the German Army in front of him, Montgomery contacted Eisenhower that very same day but Eisenhower dragged his feet for nearly a week.
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  126.  @johnlucas8479  Page 209 Monty and Patton Two Paths To Victory by Michael Reynolds. "Monty did not receive a reply to his 4th September proposal until the 7th and even then it was incomplete, with the second part not arriving until the 9th" Sounds like nearly a week to get back to Montgomerys 4th September communication to me. 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th. 6 days. Monty contacted Eisenhower regarding a push towards the Ruhr on 4th September when the SHAEF intel told him the Germans facing his 2nd British Army were in a poor state, but Eisenhower took nearly a week just to get back to him. "Time is vital" and "the matter is such vital importance". Clearly Eisenhower didn't think so. He dragged his feet.
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  127. 1st Para had the intelligence report on 13th September that a battle scarred panzer division or two were refitting in the area. That's why they took along 6 and 17 pounder anti tank guns and PIATs.
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  128.  @GJVuyk  Of course Browning did. Even Captain Taylor Intelligence Officer of 1st Airborne had the intel about 10,000 German troops, probably from panzer divisions, were in the area. The intel report was dated 13th September and signed by Captain Taylor.
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  129.  @michaelthomas7178  Patton ground to a halt in late August. Market Garden was not even planned until over a week later and not even decided on until two weeks later. Patton received four fresh new divisions in late September 1944 but still couldn't take Metz until well into November. On 5th November 1944, Patton attacked toward the Saar with NINE divisions and had 250,000 men and over 600 tanks compared to the Germans 89,000 men and 69 tanks. Patton said to Bradley he'd be through the Siegfried Line and at the Saar by November 8th. Patton still hadn't done it by December 16th when the Germans pushed the Americans back into a retreat in the Ardennes and he was sent elsewhere.
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  130.  @michaelthomas7178  It was the American 1st Army attacks towards Aachen and into the Hurtgen Forest which got priority over Patton. Not that Patton could even achieve a minor objective of Metz.
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  131.  @imperialcommander639  There was no intelligence summary that found 1000 tanks, and by the end of day one when precisely ZERO German tanks had emerged from the Reichswald to engage the 82nd positions, well that should have bee then end of any such fantasy. What did they assume these phantom 1,000 tanks were doing all day, when they didn't even encounter one 😂.?
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  132. American air decisions had a major role in it not fully succeeding.
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  133. Montgomery wanted a massive concentrated thrust with 40 divisions, including two American armies, to head for the Ruhr, but Eisenhower went with the broad front strategy instead.
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  134. Brereton and Williams refused to fly double missions on day one. Even an emissary of Montgomery couldn't get them to change their minds.
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  135. To reiterate, not a single German tank or assault gun was in the Arnhem area when the paras dropped and thus not a single German tank or assault gun was able to move out and threaten British 1st Airborne until late on day 2. These were tanks from Kompanie Mielke, which had just arrived from travelling 200 km from Bielefeld, Germany from late on the first day. Similarly, the other German armour which fought around Arnhem (the Stug III assault guns of Brigade 280 and the Tiger 1s of Kompanie Hummel) were also in Germany on the 17th and did not arrive in the Arnhem area until the 19th. The two Waffen SS panzer divisions didn't have a single tank between them and the 8 brand new Pathers that 9th SS had on paper in its inventory had not yet arrived from the factory. They didn't get to Arnhem until the 20th, too late to participate in the fighting for Arnhem against Frost's men. The only tanks available in the entire Market Garden area of operations on the 17th were some obsolete early war tanks of a training battalion and these were in the American drop zone. They fled when they came under attack by US planes and played no further role in the battle. None of the German units with armour that made a difference in Market Garden werw in the Arnhem area when the paras dropped on the 17th. The routes to every single bridge objective were totally devoid of any defending German armour.
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  136. It was Brereton who came up with the multiple day drops plan.
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  137.  @nickdanger3802  The recon photos captured a handful of early war obsolete tanks of a training unit. https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/centre-for-air-and-space-power-studies/documents1/ahb-narrative-arnhem-the-air-reconnaissance-story-second-edition-march-2019/ These played no role of significance in Market Garden and in fact were around the 101st sector on the 17th and fled when attacked by fighter bombers. They played no other role in Market Garden. All the German tanks around Arnhem werein Germany on the 17th and didn't arrive in the Netherlands until the 18th. None were identified by any intelligence pre drops.
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  138.  @johnlucas8479  I repeat, Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst made the wrong decisions. Decisions that other commanders involved, and even Montgomery, tried to change, without success. These decisions cost the operation fatally. Urquhart went too meekly along with the RAF choices. His colleague, Richard Gale of British 6th Airborne said Urquhart should have protested "to the point of resignation". There was ground suitable for paratroop drops, although not gliders, closer to the bridge to the south of the river. A coup de main there would have secured the Arnhem bridge. More men dropped on day one would have changed the operation. Double missions were doable as shown by the protestations against single missions by many of those involved. 7 hours needed from first light to attack Flak batteries until the first drops after 1.00 pm? There is the first calamitous flaw. Its light at 6.00 am in England in mid September. Brereton, together with Williams and Hollinghurst, made fatal wrong decisions. There is no doubt about that. And let us not ignore the fact that it was Brereton who told Monty that yes the operation was feasible with a good chance of success. Brereton could have said no at the beginning and that would have been that. Brereton had already rejected Montys alternate idea of a drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt. Brereton had the say so jurisdiction for the usage of his First Allied Airborne Army. It was down to him. Browning was a, small fish and of little practical relevance in comparison to Brereton and Gavin on either side of him. The film A Bridge Too Far gives Browning more importance and relevance than the reality.
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  139.  @thevillaaston7811  Has Big Woody called the Grenadier Guards "cowards" and Carrington "Scarrington" this week? Clone Warrior is definitely either Big Woody, or somebody else we know from these boards with another new accout that was registered right after you caught him lying. Just ignore the twat.
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  140.  @johnlucas8479  Browning need not have been there at Nijmegen. He offered little, either pro or con, to the events around Nijmegen. He was got rid of before Sosabowski was. Already Browning was shunted out of the airborne in November 1944 and was in Burma as an administrator to Mountbatten by December.
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  141.  @johnlucas8479  You post about Urquhart proves my point Urquhart wanted more planes and more men dropped as well as men dropped across the river. Browning was the middle man who had to go Brereton. Browning wasn't the decision maker. Brereton said no to double missions. It was Brereton who already made the decision for daylight drops by the way. There was ground suitable for drops south of the river closer to the bridge, though not for gliders. It's feasible a chute drop in limited numbers could have been done there but the RAF would have none of it, and Urquhart didn't argue much. As I said, Richard Gale, the more experienced commander of 6th Airborne, felt Urquhart went along with the RAFs more distant choices all too easily and should have argued against them more severely, to the point of resignation. Urquhart was an inexperienced airborne commander and was way too easily lead by the RAF decisions. I do not absolve him of blame either. The wrong man to command 1st Airborne in my view, and the view of others much closer to the issue. This cost the operation greatly, as we know. And I may add that wasn't the only time the RAF messed up. On the 18th when Joe Vandeluer of the Guards Armoured Division requested RAF fighter bomber support to deal the German 88mm gun road block at Aalst, south of Eindhoven, he was told "sorry, none available". None available, for such an important operation? Unbelievable. It took seven hours to get past that 88mm road block.
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  142.  @johnlucas8479  The bombing missions were so late because the troops were not going to be dropped until the afternoon. Had there been double drops the bombings could have been scheduled earlier. Its light at 5.30 to 6.00 am in England in mid September and not dark in the Netherlands until nearly 7.00 pm. More than enough time for bombing AND double drops. If we pull everything forward by 3 hours then the troops could have been scheduled to drop at 10.30 to 11.00 a.m then that is MORE than enough time for a second drop in the 7 or so hours of daylight left. They only have to drop when its still light, not complete all their missions when its light. A second drop as late as 5.30 pm could have been doable. Transport planes can fly back at night. They did it on D-Day. No big deal.
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  143.  @johnlucas8479  Anyway, what is your gist? That Browning WAS to blame, as the opening poster says? Despite Browning not being the bigwig that made the crucial planning decisions and despite Browning not really making the big tactical decisions in the actual battle itself?
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  144.  @johnlucas8479  It did prove my point. Urquhart asked for more planes because the single mission had already been established and wouldn't be changed. Urquhart knew there wasn't going to be enough men dropped on day one. I already said Williams, as troop carrier commander, was also to blame. But Brereton was the commander of First Allied Airborne Army and agreed with Williams. Brereton himself rejected all pleas by the airborne commanders and Monty for double missions. For Dragoon, the preliminary bombing raids began hitting their targets before 6.00 am. Same could have been done for Market Garden and thus a 7.00 to 7.30 am first drop was doable. Enough time for double missions for Market Garden. This is why double missions were argued for by airborne commanders and an emissary from Montgomery.
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  145.  @thevillaaston7811  All bark and no bite. Toothless little doggie.
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  146.  @thevillaaston7811  The fact that he didn't respond with "huh, what are you talking about, Im not him" is a telling giveaway. Not even any denial. 😂
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  147.  @stevewiles7132  Yes, that's a given. All accepted by consensus. But we are concerned about the allied mistakes in this thread, no? Cheers.
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  148.  @johnlucas8479  Well the actual quote I have in front of me from page 255 of Market Garden Then And Now is "no Typhoons available yet today". Nothing about poor flying conditions. In fact the weather was not too bad in the afternoon when the 88mm guns were holding Vandeluer at bay near Aalst. Certainly not impossible flying conditions. The morning was worse but the afternoon improved. Still, no Typhoons had arrived to help before Vandeluer got past the 88mm guns at around 5.00 p.m after a near 7 hour delay. Lacked clarity? There was a grouping of German 88mm guns on the side of the road in clear view. They weren't even hidden in a forest. There is a picture of one of these guns on page 260. It's out in the open by a roadside pole and away from the woods. It was clarified enough. Simply yet another air failing, to add to a long list of others.
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  149.  @johnlucas8479  Many sources have stated the weather improved after the morning of the 18th. The GERMANS were even flying aircraft on the afternoon of the 18th. The 21st Army Group report you cited even states that. How come the weather was ok for the GERMANS to fly around in but yet no Typhoons were sent to assist Vandeluer to get past the 88mm anti tank gun road block near Aalst? The Typhoons didn't have to fly from England 😂. As I said, it was just another in a long list of screw ups from the air commanders. The USAAF and the RAF hampered the operation right from the beginning.
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  150. @Answer Questions Just to clarify, XXX Corps didn't wait for air support. They were told early on that no Typhoons were available, so they sent elements to the right and to the left of the main highway, on long convoluted detours. The left hand element actually managed to link up with the 101st Airborne but the right hand element ran into a collapsed bridge, German paras and SS troopers and were halted. The main column still had to get past the 88mm anti tank gun road block on the main highway, which they couldn't do. The guns were in an excellent position.
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  151. @Answer Questions Yep. I have big problems seeing responses andI often dont get notifications. You Tube is getting worse.
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  152. Brereton made the big decisions, not Browning. He was Browning's boss and the commanding general of First Allied Airborne Army, not Browning. Browning was largely irrelevant and had no real major roll in the operation. Browning did not even have the jurisdiction to overrule the RAF drop zone choices around Arnhem even though he didn't agree with them. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst were mostly to blame. Browning was a bit player to be honest. Nor did Browning tell Gavin to ignore the Nijmegen bridge at any point and in fact Gavin ordered the 508th PIR to go for on day one twice. Pre drop and again around 6.00 pm. Clearly Browning had no input in the communication mix up between Gavin and Lindquist there.
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  153. Furthermore, when 9th SS sent a force from Arnhem across the bridge and down towards Nijmegen on the afternoon of the 17th to counter the threat posed by the 82nd Airborne in that sector there was not a single tank among this force. Why? Because they didn't have any. They only had half tracks etc. No tanks, no assault guns.
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  154. Patton. Patton couldn't even take Metz for months. He failed to concentrate his forces. Never even managed to get out of the Lorraine and suffered 55,000 needless casualties as a result.
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  155.  @johnlucas8479  I will blame the airmen. They screwed it up. Hollinghurst wouldn't even allow a drop south of the Arnhem bridge due to flak. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst dropped a massive clanger with their spread out drop serials. It was the air commanders who messed up the plan.
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  156.  @johnlucas8479  The conditions were no different. Four days of clear weather were forecast when the decisions were made. There was no forecast for fog in the morning when the plans were drawn up days before. As we now know, the 4 days of good weather was a wrong forecast because the weather wasnt good enough on days 2 and 3.
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  157.  @thevillaaston7811  Yes was 'ego' about trying to finish the war as quickly as possible rather than messing about in the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine like Hodges and Patton, wasting far more men for irrelevant objectives?
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  158.  @GiacomoLockhart  Not even one senior allied commander was against Market Garden at the time. Even Gavin said he felt it would end the war. By the way the Germans were able to attack through the thinly defend Ardennes front lines precisely because the Americans suffered excessive losses in their failed Hurtgen Forest, Aachen and Operation Queen campaigns, circa 100,000 casualties. Eisenhowers broad front strategy was a complete disaster. It went next to nowhere for seven months. Ironically the Americans had to then go running back to Monty to take over US 1st Army in the Ardennes after Hodges fled his command HQ and Bradley dithered. Eisenhower WAS supreme commander in Market Garden, just as Villa Aston says and it was Eisenhower who didn't allow Montgomery the full resources he requested.
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  159.  @GiacomoLockhart  Beevor is a well know hack amongst true WW2 specialists. He's merely a populist author in the vein of that other hack Ambrose. Beevor is too gutless and cowardly to heavily criticise the Americans because it would kill his career in his most lucrative market. Instead he writes what his American readers wish to hear. He's pathetic.
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  160.  @GiacomoLockhart  I will agree that Market Garden was a failure if YOU agree Pattons Lorraine campaign and Hodges Hurtgen Forest and Operation Queen were even bigger failures. What say you?
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  161.  @thevillaaston7811  This guy is strange isn't he? Market Garden was a failure but Eisenhowers broad front wasn't? How does that work? Presumably he also thinks the American Ardennes disaster wasnt the biggest allied screw up of the entire 1944/1945 period. Nearly 100,000 American casualties. Just to get back to the start lines they were ALREADY AT six weeks before? It would never have happened under Montys watch.
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  162.  @GiacomoLockhart  Montys ego? But Monty wanted British 21st Army Group and US 12th Army Group to stick together and bash through to the Ruhr. He didn't want British 2nd Army to get to the Ruhr alone. He wanted US 1st to tandem attack towards Aachen on his southern front drawing away German reinforcements. Monty ALWAYS wanted the Americans involved in the northern thrust towards the Ruhr and to stop them messing about wasting men and resources in the Lorraine, Alsace and Vosges as southern Germany was irrelevant. German general Gunther Blumentritt agreed with Monty and he said had a larger and more powerful allied thrust gone for the Ruhr in early to mid September it would have been all over for Germany. Blumentritt is quoted on page 355 of The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart. Blumentritt also said Metz was a waste of time and that instead of Patton trying, and failing, to get eastward across the Lorraine to the Saar he should have instead headed north to Bitburg.
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  163. Just one last thing. The two panzer divisions were at less than half strength and didn't have a single tank between them. They had all been lost in Normandy, like the rest of their heavy weapons. There was no intelligence that powerful TANK units were there in the Netherlands and in fact it was German tank units that were sent in from Germany in the days that followed that made the difference. None of these were previously identified by any intelligence reports, as they were deep inside Germany. Kompanie Hummel (Tiger Is), Kompanie Mielke (Panzer IIIs and IVs), Brigade 280 (Stug IIIs), Brigade 107 (Panthers), Battalion 506 (Tiger IIs). None of these were in The Netherlands before the 18th/19th. The only tank unit identified was the Herman Goring training battalion, equipped with a mere handful of second rate obsolete early war tanks and this unit played no role in Market Garden. It was attacked by US fighter bombers down in the 101st zone on day one, where it scattered and was not encountered again during Market Garden. This unit was what the famous recon photos captured. They were not Panthers or Tigers. None were in The Netherlands pre drops.
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  164.  @GiacomoLockhart  Monty did not 'execute' Market Garden. He turned the planning and decisions over to others. Brereton of the FAAA and Williams of the USAAF chose to drop in daytime over multiple days, Hollinghurst of the RAF forced 1st British Airborne to drop so far from Arnhem and Gavin kf the 82nd and Taylor of the 101st picked and chose their own drop zones. Monty actually had very little input beyond the broad outline/general idea. He left it up to what he considered capable others to plan and execute and he didn't step on their toes and interfere or overrule them. He trusted their judgements 100%.
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  165.  @GiacomoLockhart  You have already mentioned Eisenhowers broad front plan. I find it staggering you call Market Garden a failure but will not call Eisenhowers broad front strategy a failure. Market Garden was no more a failure than Eisenhowers other green lit campaigns that same autumn. Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Aachen, Operation Queen, the Ardennes calamity.
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  166.  @thevillaaston7811  Correct. Market Garden was PART of Eisenhowers broad front. Already Pattons attack towards Metz was ordered from 5th September, while the Hurtgen Forest attack started on the 19th, just 2 days into Market Garden. Eisenhower wanted to probe everywhere at once but would not attack anywhere extremely strongly and concentrate his forces.
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  167.  @GiacomoLockhart  Your posts are just one diatribe after another about Montgomery who was, lets face it, the most accomplished and successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 and he took more ground across more countries while facing more quality German units than any other Western Allied general. You are falling for the myth, not the reality. When German General Gunther Blumentritt also said the best course for the allies in September would have been a really strong fighting force going for the Ruhr then you should start listening. Of course Monty had an ego. No great commander doesn't. And sure he was difficult to get along with his peers, although those under his command liked him. An attempt to win the war quickly was not ego, especially as he initially wanted the US 1st and 3rd Armies to go with him to the Ruhr. Not just 2nd British Army. He wanted TWO Army Groups to be concentrated together in a powerful thrust across northern Germany.
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  168.  @GiacomoLockhart  And Market Garden was born out of the 4th September SHAEF Intelligence Summary which told him the Germans facing the Second British Army were and I quote : "A collection of fugitive battle groups, isolated, disorganised, even demoralised, short of equipment and arms" . Had Market Garden not happened then for the last seventy years Montgomery would have been pilloried and castigated for being too timid and too cautious for not at least trying to go for it when the Germans looked down and out. You know it, I know it, we all damn well know it.
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  169.  @GiacomoLockhart  6 and 17 pounder anti tank guns are not light weapons. They could and did take out Tiger tanks, including a 68 ton King Tiger at Oosterbeek. The first German tank attack of Market Garden was stopped by 6 pounder anti tank guns and PIATs by Frost's C Troop Anti Tank Battery commanded by Sgt Robson. Two Panzer IVs of Kompanie Mielke were knocked out near the Arnhem bridge and the Germans called off that attack. You were saying?
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  170.  @GiacomoLockhart  Market Garden couldn't even have gone ahead without the agreement of Eisenhower and Brereton. Had Brereton said no, the operation is killed there and then but Brereton liked the idea and assured Monty it was feasible. Why do you exempt all these other generals and solely blame Monty? By the way you are simply LYING about Gavin. I have Gavins verbatim quote right in front of me. Ready? "We knew the risks were great but we believed that the battle we were about to fight would bring the war to an end." Your response now?
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  171.  @GiacomoLockhart  I never said 9th and 10th SS werent in the area. I said they didn't have a single tank between them. They didnt. They were at less than half strenght. 9th SS only had around 3,000 combat troops. The 8 brand new Panthers on their paper inventory hadn't arrived from the factory and didn't get to Arnhem until the 20th, too late to take part in the battle for the bridge. Source. Market Garden Then And Now, Karel Margry.
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  172.  @GiacomoLockhart  Arnhem was a defeat and a failure. However the rest of Market Garden suceeded. The Germans retreated out of Eindhoven and Nijmegen, the Waal River was crossed, a protective buffer zone in front of Antwerp was created and the ground taken provided a springboard for the British and Canadian advance into Germany in 1945. It took off from the Nijmegen area. Subsequent battles right after Market Garden in October, such as Operation Aintree, took Overloon and Venray. As I keep saying, Market Garden was no more a failure than all the American campaigns that same autumn. None of them achieved their objectives either and they suffered even more casualties than Market Garden.
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  173.  @GiacomoLockhart  I said tank unit. As in units that actually had TANKS. The pictures were of a few second rate obsolete tanks of the Herman Goring training battalion. 9th and 10th SS never had any tanks when the paras dropped but 1st Airborne still took 6 and 17 pounder anti tank guns. The first German tank unit to engage British 1st Airborne Division was 200km away in Bielefeld, Germany when the paras dropped on the afternoon of the 17th. It arrived at Arhnem late the following day. Please learn to read properly, thanks. Your anger and attitude is getting the better of you and is doing you no favours at all.
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  174.  @GiacomoLockhart  The casualty rates could have been better with different tactics? What do you base that on? The American tactics further south were even higher and were a result of piecemeal non concentrated attacks which made them drag on and on. The Hurtgen, Lorraine and Operation Queen were supposed to have been concluded quickly when they were dreamt up. They weren't planned to go on for months haha. They just did, due to poor tactics and an underestimation of the German enemy. Market Garden =15,000 casualties, mosly POWs not wounded or killed. Lorraine =55,000 casualties killed and wounded. Hurtgen Forest = 35,000 casualties killed and wounded. Operation Queen = 30,000 casualties killed and wounded. Looks to me that Market Garden took more ground more quickly and with fewer casualties than any of these American campaigns. How about that?
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  175.  @GiacomoLockhart  The Gavin quote was post war in his own book. He was not against Market Garden and he believed it would work. Most of the actual planning for Market Garden was actually done by......... AMERICANS. Brereton, Williams, Gavin, Taylor etc. It was THEIR planning which turned out to be flawed, not Montgomerys. Montgomery didnt order them to spread out their drop days, didn't order them to neglect the Nijmegen bridge on day one, didnt tell the RAF to not drop near Arnhem, didnt provide the wrong radio crystals, didn't hide the presence of German Tiger tank units in Germany and he certainly didn't control the damn weather. If this was all such a horrible idea then Brereton would have said no to it in the first place, just as he said no to Montys alternative plan of a paratroop drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt Estuary. On the 9th, Brereton immediately said no to that plan but a big fat yes to Market Garden. Oh and falling asleep in the Ardennes and arrogantly thinking the Germans couldn't possibly attack the US Army caused SIX times as many casualties as Market Garden. You should reserve your anger for that but somehow I doubt I will see you over on the Bulge videos castigating Eisenhower, Bradley and Hodges. Hmmmmm, why not?
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  176.  @GiacomoLockhart  Nobody talked about heavy weapons. Beevor claimed 1st Airborne were only lightly armed. 6 and 17 pounder anti tank guns are not light arms. The 17 pounder was one of the best and most powerful anti tank guns of WW2 and the 6 pounder was the first gun to take out Tigers in Tunisia. Beevor, as usual, was just plain wrong and the knocked out German arnour around Arnhem proves it.
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  177.  @GiacomoLockhart  Yes we ALL know that Monty would have been heavily criticised, especially by Americans, had he just sat at the Belgian border and not tried to go for it when SHAEF intel told him the Germans in front of him were more or less finished. Look how much flak he gets from Americans for nor taking Caen quickly even though he was facing the densest concentration of German armour ever deployed in WW2 (7 panzer divisions and 3 Tiger battlions in less than 20 miles of front) and despite taking Caen twice as quickly as Patton took Metz. For crying out loud, look how much some Americans bitch and cry like babies at Monty for a few cherry picked and edited words in his Bulge press conference after helping them out in their self made mess. Its unbelievable.
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  178.  @GiacomoLockhart  You claim you are ex military yet try to argue the powerful 17 pounder anti tank gun can be considered a light arm? Lol. Im done with you. You are hilarious.
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  179.  @thevillaaston7811  Absolutely mate. Add to that he denies when he has said things he shouldn't have and then purposely misquotes. The lightly armed thing in particular. I never said the anti tank guns were heavy weapons. I said they weren't light arms. And then the tank thing. Its pretty clear I was referring to units with tanks. Finally, like a number of others, he refuses to accept that James Gavin himself liked the idea of Market Garden and believed it would work and end the war. There is now a myth that says nobody but Monty liked the plan and believed in it. If that were the case it simply would never have got going in the first place. Only a madman would think otherwise.
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  180.  @thevillaaston7811  Yes the plan was a doable one and indeed, 90% of it succeed. Even the Arnhem bridge could have succeed had certain things been done differently, notably close drops to the bridge and drops north and south of the bridge. The very fact that XXX Corps managed to get nearly 100km AND were able to keep hold of all the ground they took (and somewhat enlarged by the supporting corps on the flank) proved the idea was feasible. XXX Corps actually linked up with the 82nd in less than two days. Forty two hours to be exact. 8.30 am on the morning of the 19th. As you say, had the Nijmegen bridge been captured by then and XXX Corps had a free roll over the bridge they may have been able to link up with Frost's men later that day, before the Germans could send forces across the Arnhem bridge to block the way to Arnhem. The weather was a crucial factor as well, preventing reinforcements infantry in the 82nd zone and of the Polish brigade. Had the weather been better, had more effort been made to take the Nijmegen bridge on day one been made and had different decisions been made for the Arnhem drops then it could have had a different outcome. And this is without even mentioning what difference a strong tandem US 1st Army attack towards Aachen could have made to the operation.
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  181.  @thevillaaston7811  I think its funny that he claims to have read all those sources he cited, yet clearly had never even heard of Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst until yesterday. He didn't even know who planned Market. Hilarious.
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  182.  @thevillaaston7811  Its ok for James Bogle to castigate Monty, the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 but then he protests when you question his own service? When did James Bogle help win WW2 like Monty did? Lambasting Montys service is ok, but not lambasting his own supposed service? I dont agree with those double standards to be honest.
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  183.  @GiacomoLockhart  You never did explain how Eisenhowers cautious broad front strategy (Hurtgen = 35,000 casualties, Lorraine = 55,000 casualties, Operation Queen = 30,000 casualties, Ardennes = 100,000 casualties) saved more lives than Market Gardens 15,000 casualties. Do you think it was right that Eisenhower allowed US 1st Army to make pointless piecemeal probes into the Hurtgen Forest just two days after Market Garden began, instead of opening up a major supplementary attack on Aachen in support of Market Garden? General Blumentritt thought this would have been the best strategy.
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  184.  @thevillaaston7811  Just baffles me why some think Market Garden had such high casualties (most were POWs and not wounded/killed) when the OTHER campaigns that same autumn had far higher casualties, dragged on for far longer wasting far more resources and achieving less. I mean, what the heck did the Hurtgen and Metz etc actually achieve? Go figure.
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  185.  @GiacomoLockhart  Seeing as Market was planned by Brereton, Williams, Hollinghurst, Gavin, Taylor etc how was Market Garden Montys "plan"?
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  186.  @thevillaaston7811  Fully agree with that. It is 100% correct. Market Gardens circa 15,000 casualties pale beside the circa 200,000 casualties suffered in the failed American campaigns that same autumn. How come we never see these Market Garden critics on the Hurtgen Forest boards?
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  187. It was 90% a success. Nearly 100km of German held ground was taken, the Germans retreated and major Dutch towns were liberated. A protective buffer zone in front of Antwerp was created and the British 2nd Army got closer to Germany which was very useful for the invasion into Germany after the American Ardennes calamity was sorted out by Montgomery.
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  188. Patton couldn't get out of the Lorraine in four months of trying. This was due to his tactics, not lack of supplies. He all too often failed to concentrate his forces. This was the conclusion by the official US Army history of the campaign. Apart from that, there wasn't much of importance along Patton's advance line. Certainly not Mannheim, Frankfurt etc. The Ruhr, however, was on the line of advance of British 2nd and US 1st armies. The Ruhr was Germanys vital industrial area. By the way, if anything took supplies away from Patton then it was the US 1st Army's twin pronged attack on Aachen and the Hurtgen Forest, which took place immediately after Market Garden. Market Garden used British supply reserves from Normandy for the ground forces, while no airborne forces were planned to be allocated for Patton in September anyway.
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  189.  @arturkedzierski8371  No, Germany invaded Poland.
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  190.  @martsyketlinski  " Britain broke EVERY promise she had given to Poland. Very shameful" So Britain DIDN'T declare war on Nazi Germany on September 3rd 1939, keeping its promise to Poland. Silly me, I thought Britain did.
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  191.  @thevillaaston7811  Has he been banned then?
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  192. Montgomery didn't plan it.
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  193. Germany also lost nearly 100 km of land including major towns. Only Arnhem was a German victory. Eindhoven, Nijmegen etc were German defeats.
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  194. Then Patton should have been relieved of command for his Lorraine calamity. 55,000 casualties and he still failed to get out of the Lorraine.
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  195.  @nickdanger3802  Patton was in a secondary front. The Lorraine and coming out into Southern Germany (Pattons axis of advance) were less important than aiming for the Ruhr.
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  196. Pegasus Archive also states : "Arnhem, the Operation was doomed from the outset because of the poor air plan. Due to a shortage of transport aircraft, the 1st Airborne Division lost its chief weapon of surprise through being flown to distant drop zones over a period of three days. It has been argued that, with enough high-level pressure applied, the necessary quantities of aircraft could have been found to have carried at least the majority of the 1st Airborne Division to battle in a single lift. Lieutenant-General Brereton, the commander of the 1st Allied Airborne Army, supported the view of Major-General Williams, the commander of IX Troop Carrier Command, that only one lift should be made each day. All but one of the previous airborne operations had taken place at night, and all with the benefit of moonlight to aid the troops as they landed and formed up, something that the heavens denied to the Allies during the first days of Operation Market Garden. It must also be stated that the majority of the transport aircraft involved in Market Garden were American, and although their crews had since made great strides in their training, the memories of the disastrous, scattered drops of Sicily and Normandy were still fresh in the minds of the Allied commanders. A large-scale landing at night, therefore, was not feasible. It was, however, perfectly possible that the First Lift could have taken place early in the morning of the 17th September, the Second during the evening, and the Third on the following morning. At such distances from their home bases in England, this would have undoubtedly placed a great strain upon the air and ground crews, yet if it had been done it would have transformed the situation at Arnhem. Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst, the commander of 38 Group, was prepared to commit the British aircraft to just such a timetable, however Major-General Williams refused to allow his American squadrons to fly more than one lift per day. Although he had a great deal of aircraft at his disposal, Williams had not received a proportionate quantity of ground crew to service them, and so it was unlikely that the Americans could maintain the pace if, as was incorrectly expected, aircraft losses would be severe. Had there been a determined effort, it is more than likely that the crews could have been borrowed from other sources for the duration of the initial airlift phase, and if not then there was no reason why the British should have been prevented from making a second lift to Arnhem by themselves. Brereton, however, was persuaded by the advice of Williams and decided only one lift per day would be flown for each division.
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  197. Yes. Taking the southern Netherlands would have been harder with more casualties had they waited and done it a month or two later.
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  198. ""Frankly had goring and Hitler kept up with the Battle of Britain they would have won in Britain would have had sued for peace."" They did keep going, for months and got nowhere. They kept losing more of their own planes (and 4 times as many airmen) as they took out. The longer the Battle of Britain continued the stronger the RAF grew. The RAF was like the Hulk. Stronger at the end than at the beginning. The reverse was true for the Luftwaffe. By autumn 1940 the German's daylight attempts to take air space over southern England had totally failed. Best they could do was night terror bombing of civilians and they resorted to that in the autumn and winter of 1940/41...and again didn't really get anywhere with it. And all this failure was before they tried to take on the Royal Navy, which again didn't fare too well for them. Their biggest and best battleship, Bismarck, barely lasted a week after moving out into the Atlantic to supposedly terrify British shipping.
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  199. Rob, The ultimate responsibility was Breretons. It was Brereton who (along with Williams of the USAAF) absolutely insisted on dispersed drops over a number of days, against the feeling of the individual divisional commaders and, I believe, Browning too. Even Montgomery could not change the minds of Brereton and Williams. Dispersed drops over a number of days meant the paras could just get on with the tasks at had but also had to concentrate on protecting the drop and landing zones for days. This was all because of the insistence of Brereton and Williams in only flying single missions on day one and dispersing the drops over days. The Germans concluded that this was the biggest mistake made by the allies.
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  200.  @rob5944  Well it was Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst of the RAF who refused to allow the RAF to fly closer to Arnhem. He insisted the Flak would be too much. Hence the RAF got to choose the drops zones and they were further away. Richard Gale of 6th Airborne said that Urquhart should have more strongly argued against this 'to the point of resignation'. Market Garden was kind of half hearted by Eisenhower. It wasn't backed as much as it maybe could have been, including a diversionary US 1st Army attack towards Aachen. Instead the US 1st Army attacked into the Hurtgen Forest just two days later, on the 19th.
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  201. Market Garden had nothing to do with Montgomery then marching alone to Berlin. The idea of Market Garden was to get a foothold across the Rhine, avoiding the Siegfried Line further south. Then if done on time, to move north to the sea, cutting off the Netherlands. Then the US 1st Army on his southern flank would have been expected to get to Aachen and beyond pretty quickly and both would then advance towards the Ruhr, cutting off the most important German industrial hub. After that supplies would have been built up and then all armies march in tandem eastwards. Honestly, this crazy idea that it was all about Montgomery going alone to Berlin is hilarious. Where does it come from??
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  202. ""The No.3 argument would not stand by the mere fact that after Allied took control of the Nijmegen bridge on Day 4, Sept 20th, they did not continue to pursue immediately toward Arnhem, but rather waited for the next day for the infantries to come along. The German defense btw Nijmegen and Arnhem, which is only 7 miles apart, was the weakest at the time. Basically the British chickened out, and could not make efforts to rescue their own paratroopers."" The Nijmegen bridge wasn't taken until dusk on the 20th and there were still Germans around and in Nijmegen itself. The Germans were not cleared from Nijmegen until the 21st. The attack towards Arnhem got going on the 21st and the lead elements were quickly annihilated. This was the 4th time the Guards Armoured Division was stopped by well placed German anti tank guns. Any attempt before would still have met with the same fate because the Germans already had well placed anti tank guns between Lent and Arnhem. In Arnhem itself a company of Tiger tanks plus newly arrived Panthers of 9th SS were about to cross the bridge there and take up positions at Elst. This was received by the 82nd at 1730 hrs, 20th September.: From the 82nd's radio log: ‘South east of Arnhem: three Tiger tanks, two companies of infantry and a heavy gun are on their way to Lent/Nijmegen. From Tim Saunders Nijmegen US 82nd Airborne And Guards Armoured Division. The Guards tanks were sitting ducks on the raised singe lane road beyond Lent.
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  203.  @charleszhaowang  Well Harmel of 9th SS didn't know, even decades later after the war, that there were actually German army units (not SS), with tanks and assault guns that had arrived in Arnhem on the 18th and 19th which were not under his jurisdiction and he had no idea of their dispositions. Harmel was in the Nijmegen area and did not know about these German army reinforcements, that had just arrived. On the evening of the 20th after the bridge was crossed there were already German anti tank guns blocking the road at Ressen. The raised road beyond Ressen was terrible for tanks. Four Shermans trying to get to Arnhem when the Germans had a company of Tigers and Stug IIIs already there? Montgomery wasn't in the picture much after 10th September when it was green lit. The planning was then taken over by the air forces and Montgomery had to back out of it. Even Browning was largely irrelevant. He was neither Airborne Army Commander (that was Brereton) or a divisional airborne commander. It is tough to find out exactly what Browning DID actually devise and order because I can't find much of relevance. It was Gavin who chose his own drop zones around Nijmegen, and consulted these with the USAAF commanders. It wasn't Browning. It was Gavin who made the decision that he could spare a battalion to strike on the bridge on drop day, if the situation permitted itself. I agree. I don't blame the failings at Nijmegen. British 1st Airborne didn't arrive in Arnhem in sufficient numbers to make a difference. They never captured the bridge there, only part of one side . Arnhem failed because of the dispersed drops . The refusal to fly double missions and the distant drop zones killed the Arnhem operation before it even began. I'll add that neither Montgomery or Browning were responsible for that. I disagree with TIK blaming Gavin. Gavin was a perceptive and experienced paratroop commander.
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  204. Oscar But the Germans actually retreated in Market Garden and lost a lot of ground. They were pushed out of Eindhoven, pushed out of Nijmegen, back beyond the Waal river to near the Rhine and the allies got closer to Germany. The Germans only won at Arnhem, but at Arnhem the paras were outnumbered and the supply line to them was too long. If the Germans were supermen, why didn't they hold Eindhoven and Nijmegen and stop XXX Corps at the Belgian border?
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  205.  @rob5944  I think there has been an argument that the individual German soldier after losing a commander showed more initiative than his allied counterpart and yes they were also probably more adaptable to the changing situations. On the other hand, outnumbered paras at the Arnhem bridge kept the vaunted Waffen SS at bay for ages until their ammo ran out so???
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  206. Well the two SS divisions in Market Garden were also considered elite, and veterans of the fighting around Tarnopol on the Eastern Front and Normandy. No less elite than 1st Airborne and probably even more battle hardened. Yet they were held at bay. No doubt the German ground forces were very effective though.
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  207.  @rob5944  They were but not as grossly understrength as Frost was at the bridge. And at Arnhem the Germans were continuously getting re-inforced by units sent in from Germany with armour in the following days, including Tigers and Stug IIIs on the 19th.
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  208. And Browning was got rid of two months later.
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  209.  @jamesavery3559  Not really. The ground taken wasn't cancelled out. It proved very useful for the invasion into Germany and it also blocked and protected Antwerp from any German counter attack.
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  210. What???
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  211. They failed.
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  212. True. Very true.
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  213. 1. Brereton was in command of the airborne units, not Browning. 2. Browning NEVER told Gavin to ignore the Nijmegen bridge, despite Groesbeek having the priority. 3. Gavin allegedly ordered Lindquists 508th PIR to "move without delay" on the Nijmegen bridge after dropping but the 508th didn't. He then reordered the 508th to "delay not a second longer" around 6.00 pm later that day. The screw up between the commanders within the 82nd on the 17th was not Browning's fault. It was a 82nd failure. Browning gave no orders to ignore the Nijmegen bridge. Nobody did. It was, however, Gavin who decided and ordered all 82nd troops to withdraw from Nijmegen on the 18th, not Browning. Browning then specifically told Gavin later on the 18th that the Nijmegen bridge "MUST BE TAKEN" on the 19th, or morning of the 20th at the very latest.
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  214. Bailey Bridges.
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  215. Got closer to Germany and liberated major Dutch cities. That ground had to be advanced over any so better to take it in 3 days in September instead of taking weeks in November when it'd be half underwater.
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  216. That was Arnhem.
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  217. Monty didnt plan it. It was largely planned by the air commanders. Monty had zero jurisdiction over any air units and he had to go to them in the first place just to see if it was doable. Brereton, commander of First Allied Airborne Army liked the idea, told Monty it would work and then he and Williams of the USAAF and Hollinghurst of the RAF set about planning it, along with the individual paratroop division commander and Monty never overruled them. He couldn't. He didn't have the power.
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  218. 1. It was Eisenhower who took a, week just to get back to Montgomey and give his idea the go ahead. 2. Patton in the Lorraine in early November 1944 had ten divisions with 3 times as many men and 8 times as many tanks as the Germans plus overwhelming artillery and air support.......... yet still failed to get through the Siegfried Line. He couldn't even get through 69 tanks of one panzer division that had to defend a 75 mile frontage all through the rest of 1944. Monty got through 7 panzer divisions and a Tiger battalion quicker than that around Caen.
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  219.  @thevillaaston7811  In Sicily it was MONTY who requested Patton get to Messina asap to cut the Germans off. He even wrote to Alexander about that. Sadly Patton pontificating and arranging his cavalcade procession into Messina allowed the Germans to escape. Bradley wrote that this sickened and soured him on Patton.
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  220. They weren't. Only Arnhem wasnt successful. The rest was. Nor was Sosabowski the scapegoat and in fact Browning was got rid of first.
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  221.  @thevillaaston7811  Yes. XXX Corps managed to get nearly 100km in 2 days. If the bridges had been taken they would have gotten even further.
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  222.  @nickdanger3802  I said nearly 100km in 2 days. I am correct. They started at Neerpelt, Belgium on the afternoon of the 17th. By the afternoon of the 19th they had gone circa 90 km into Nijmegen near the bridge. Thats nearly 100km in 2 days, despite having to build their own bridge at Son. XXX Cops did their bit. Not their fault the airborne divisions failed to have bridges ready for them. Had the Nijmegen bridge been taken by the 82nd the XXX Corps would certainly have been at Arnhem in 2 days.
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  223.  @johnburns4017  And there was another delay of 4 hours south of Nijmegen when the 82nd were getting orders relayed for the advance on the bridge. Even Gavin was fed up with the time it was taking to pass the orders throughout the 82nd.
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  224.  @thevillaaston7811  Yes, it is getting on for a hundred km from Neerpelt Belgium to near the Nijmegen bridge, which where XXX Corps were in just two days. They started at 2.35 pm on the 17th and at 3.30 pm on the 19th the Grenadier Guards group advanced through Nijmegen and got to the bridge approaches quite quickly. I have not read those other Monty books. Let me know if you find anything new. I can't even find anything on Monty bitching about Patton. As you say, it was always the other way around. The American generals bitching at Monty , mostly due to jealousy (Patton) or embarrassment (Bradley). Simpson seems to have got on well with Monty though, as did Ridgway and Gavin.
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  225.  @johnburns4017  Yes, the US 9th Army was just south of British 2nd Army. Monty had overall command of US 9th Army until April 1945 when his British 2nd Army moved off to Bremen and Hamburg and US 9th Army stayed to help mop up the Ruhr Pocket. General Simpson seems to have liked Montgomery.
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