Comments by "" (@lyndoncmp5751) on "Gavin wasn't to blame? 'New' evidence on Operation Market Garden's failure?" video.

  1. Operation Market Garden was lost by the air planners before it even began. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst simply made the wrong decisions. It was never lost by any individual airborne commander. Brereton should have told Montgomery at the beginning that he didn't have the resources. He didn't.
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  2. Operation Market Garden was lost at BRERETON'S headquarters.
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  3. John Lucas By the way, you ever heard of postponements? To wait for clear weather? There was no reason why Market Garden HAD to take place on the 17th and ONLY the 17th. It could have been postponed for clearer weather (for double missions) on the next day, or the day after. A much larger operation (D-Day) was postponed due to the weather. XXX Corps weren't going anywhere at Neerpelt. They didnt have to move until the airborne was over the Netherlands. They could have waited indefinitely. The decision by Brereton and Williams was even more risky weather wise because it relied on a NUMBER of different days of clear weather to be able to fly in the rest of the airborne. As The Villa Aston points out, a number of prominent air commanders thought double missions could have been done. Difficult and strenuous, yes. Impossible, no. And nor is there a very great difference in daylight hours between southern England in mid September and Northern Italy in mid August. England is further north and daylight hours in summer and early autumn are slightly longer than in the Mediterranean. It was lackadaisical command and over caution by the air planners that lead to the biggest mistakes made in Market Garden and I stand by that 100%.
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  4. John Lucas, I believe it was an operation worth trying. There almost certainly would have been more difficulties and more casualties had a British 2nd Army ground advance been carried out later in worse weather and with strengthened German defences. It failed because of the decisions made by the principle air commanders. Im not letting Hollinghurst off here. His decision to not fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne. The German conclusion was that dispersed drops and over a number of days was the biggest mistake made by the allies. Those decisions rested solely with Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst. Nobody else. Eisenhower can also be blamed for not shutting everything else down for just a week and not giving more resources to Market Garden, particularly more transport planes. Instead he allowed Patton to keep on bumbling in the Lorraine and he allowed Hodges to open up his failed attacks into the Hurtgen Forest. Market Garden did not fail because of any individual airborne commander (no, certainly not Gavin) and not because of XXX Corps.
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  5. The Villa Aston You can add in the casualties for the little known (or conveniently ignored) Operation Queen as well. Nearly 40,000 casualties, over twice those of Market Garden, and objective not reached, despite Antwerp being fully open and operational during most of it. If we want to know which generals deserved court martial then look no further than Hodges and Patton. Hodges for the twin failures in the Hurtgen Forest and Operation Queen, and Patton for the Lorraine. Bradley, of course, was 12th Army Group Commander who presided over ALL of these failures. Total casualties = 130,000. And that's BEFORE we even get to the Ardennes cock up.
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  6. John Lucas, The point about bringing in the casualties of other battles is a very valid one. We can argue that the casualties of Market Garden, the subsequent battles in southern Netherlands (Operation Aintree etc) and the clearing of the Scheldt COMBINED still came to far less than the Hurtgen Forest. When Hodges attacked into the Hurtgen Forest, it was not planned and not envisaged to drag on for 3 months. Likewise, when Patton attacked Metz, it was not envisaged to take 3 months. Its certainly not a badge of honour to state words to the effect of "but those battles dragged on for much longer that's why they had more casualties". Ultimately the casualties CAN be compared because none of these operations were meant to last months and none of them were anticipated to fail. They all had pretty straightforward objectives and they all failed to meet those objectives. Whether one dragged on for longer than the other is not a get out clause. The Hurtgen Forest was a bigger and more costly failure than Market Garden and that's all there is to it. I will add that the Hurtgen Forest failure directly lead to more casualties in the Ardennes.
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  7. John Lucas Let me ask this question. When Hodges ordered the first attacks into the Hurtgen Forest on 19th September 1944 (just two days after Mark Garden began) do you think he expected to still be fighting in the Hurtgen in December and with 40,000 US casualties behind him? The Germans, by the way, suffered considerably fewer casualties in the Hurtgen Forest campaign than the Americans did so there goes your argument. Nearly half of the casualties in Market Garden were in 1st British Airborne and mostly POWs, not killed or wounded. Arnhem was the place where by far the largest number of casualties took place, understandably because Arnhem was 100km behind enemy lines. Im not aware of any battles in the Lorraine or Operation Queen taking place 100km behind enemy lines. Are you?
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  8. John Lucas, The first big mistake the air commanders made was to STILL BE SITTING ON BASES IN ENGLAND. Plans and organisation should have already been underway to shift bases to the continent once the Falaise Gap was coming to a close in August. Montgomery's 2nd British Army was already in Belgium at the start of September. Quite obviously, Brereton and co preferred the cushy life in quiet rural England far away from the mayhem of the front lines. Had the FAAA already had bases on the continent closer to the Netherlands the operation may have gone smoother. The FAAA knew they were going to be used for a major drop soon. In fact the FAAA was desperate for it. The second mistake was not practicing double towed gliders. This was done for Operation Varsity but not for Market Garden. It has been stated that almost all of the American troops could have landed by D+1 by double towing Waco gliders. The time spent sitting idly in England in August/early September could have been spent practicing double towing. It was not. Exactly what WAS the First Allied Airborne Army doing in August/early September? You reject mistakes made in choosing the Arnhem drop and landing zones? I completely disagree. The lessons learned in Normandy was to NOT land too far from your objectives. Richard Gale of British 6th Airborne said Urquhart went along with the RAF decisions too meekly and Urquhart himself later stated this was an unnecessary and fatal error. The Poles were earmarked to land just south of the Arnhem bridge, so why not a section of 1st Airborne dropped there on drop day? Yes it was not perfect with some swampy ground (yet hardly a damn lake) but it was doable. Comet planned to drop just south of the bridge as well. There were other open areas closer north of the bridge. Not as large as those chosen further away but these smaller patches of open ground could have been utilised and used. Look at the smaller patches of areas landed on by glider in Normandy. In the dark!!! It was reluctance on the part of airmen in the RAF that dictated the drop/landing zones and not a question of "well that's all there was". This was an air mistake that doomed British 1st Airborne. Furthermore there were mistakes made within 1st Airborne. Urquhart was probably not the right man to command it while Lathbury made some poor choices. The decisions of airmen Gavin and Taylor at Nijmegen in not putting more effort on the Nijmegen road bridge on day one has already has already been talked about ad nauseam so no need to go there. The decision by Taylor of the 101st to refuse to have a drop on the other side of the Eindhoven waterway can also be considered a mistake. The Son bridge was not captured. Of course, Brereton could have nipped it in the bud and said no to the entire operation and there would have been nothing Montgomery could have done about it. He had no jurisdiction to order FAAA into an operation. Brereton had just rejected Montgomerys alternate proposal of a paratroop drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt, but he liked Market Garden and clearly assured Montgomery his FAAA had the means to go for it. Obviously FAAA did not. Big mistake in convincing Montgomery otherwise. It was mistakes made by the air commanders that killed the operation. The Germans agreed.
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  9. Can't edit for some reason. I meant the decisions by Gavin and BROWNING at Nijmegen, not Taylor. Market was all air planned and executed. It failed. Garden did not.
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  10. John Lucas, To reiterate, Market Garden failed because 'Market' failed, and Market failed because of the planning and decisions made primarily by three air commanders, Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst. The problems further escalated by decisions made within all three parachute divisions (not any one single commander in one division). That is the bottom line. End of story.
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