Comments by "Kameraden" (@Alte.Kameraden) on "The Numbers Say it All | The Myth of German Superiority on the WW2 Eastern Front" video.

  1. To be honest, 2 to one is pretty significant when you're referring to millions. As you often have to take account onto where those men are concentrated. I mean this is how the Germans pushed toward Stalingrad despite that USSR had a 2:1 advantage over all. Most of the Russian defences were focused near Moscow in anticipation that the Germans would try to take it during the Spring/Summer of 1942. ie a large percent of that numerical advantage the Red Army had in early 1942 were not where the Germans attacked. Instead the Germans pushed south, which took the Red Army by surprise. In turn, many of the Soviet Offensives were very strong for similar reasons. Wars are not fought fair. Also, if we were talking about a battle Napoleonic style battle, than 2-3x the men was normally recommended/required when going on the offensive regardless. But in modern war, numerical advantages are not as important as tactical/strategic and material advantages. What really matters more than men is the amount of artillery, tanks, trucks and aircraft available to the Red Army. It is interesting to note I remember reading somewhere that at any given time on all fronts combined the Germans had normally around 400 armored combat vehicles available, save for a few periods, because of loses, and long term repair. Then when you compare that to Operation Bagration, well what was that around 3000 Red Army Tanks? Your Courland videos also presented this problem quite well, with much of the armor in Courland in long term repair (ie no parts likely), and the Tank Divisions involved being well, inept much of the time. I don't think any practical person would ever believe the Red Army had 10x the men, and suffered 14x the loses. In fact I think 14x came from a German estimate from during the war itself, but it was primarily from 1941, and included captured. That 12:1 figure comes pretty close to that claim I often see of 14x the loses, which is as much a myth as 5 Shermans to Kill a Tiger.
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  2. I think a lot of these late casualties can easily be contributed to the total collapse of the German Army Group Center during Operation Bagration. The Soviets nearly surrounded but mostly destroyed German Army Group Center in 1944 leaving a huge gap in the German lines, and they did this so fast that no one could of stopped them. The Soviets used overwhelming rocket and artillery followed up by a massive armored assault and nearly destroyed Army Group Center. It's often been described as Germany's Greatest Military Defeat. Unlike say Kursk which is propagandized as an amazing Defeat, this one literally broke the spine of the German Army in the East. Causing a massive frontal wide retreat, desperate retreat to new lines before the Soviets had a chance to exploit the breach. It was a very costly retreat, as the Soviets launched local offensives in just about every single sector. 1945 can easily be explained because of the massive disparity in numbers by this time, on top of that the German Army was also heavily reliant on Conscripts and Volksturm. For example out of the official troops defending Berlin over 80,000, half were Volksturm. You also have to remember by 1943 the German Army had used up all it's well trained Infantry meant to support it's armored offensives. By Kursk for example they were pulling men out of field hospitals, and yet still some armored divisions went into combat without infantry support by Panzer Grenadiers. It makes complete sense that the German Military wouldn't be so successful late war. I think anyone that would view this in the context of a "myth" have a warped sense of reality. At this time the Germans were a Defeated Army, they were of course going to struggle greatly. Numbers do not lie. Battle for Berlin, 140 some armored vehicles vs around 6000 soviet vehicles. less than 200,000 men manning Germany's last major defense line vs 2-3 million. The Germans were going to get walked over, definitely when you take account most of the troops available were poorly trained, and even in civilian clothing.
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  3. +44suse Which makes the Soviets look even less competent then. lol
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  4.  @СергейРублев-т7я  My primary argument is that numerical superiority in man power isn't as important in modern war and is worthless without the equipment to back it up. The Red Army suffered greatly in 1941 because much of it's armor and airforce were wiped out during the opening of Operation Barbarossa much of it with it's pants down. A vast majority of those numerical numbers are also "filler" on both sides, poorly trained often conscripted infantry that just exist to 'deny' enemy access to land along the front, or to secure land that may still have some enemies hidden behind the lines. Like on the western front with the Allies, a bulk of the fighting was done by a minority of the armed forces when on the offensive. By 1943 the German Army ran out of these... well ran very low on these experienced crack divisions they needed. Which evened the playing field greatly. Meanwhile the Red Army was no longer losing experiences divisions, no longer suffering mass loses in amss encirclements. Which also evened the playing field more. It's rarely ever about who has the most men, but who has the most equipment, and most crack troops, and best officers all in conjunction with each other. TIK isn't wrong that the quality of the German officer corp crumbled as the war progressed. The quality of everything German fell. I often tell people, it isn't about how good the Red Army was, but how bad the German Army deteriorated. You have to remember, both Russia and Germany struggled greatly during this conflict. By the end of the war, it wasn't like either side had 3-5 years of training crack divisions available to them ie Army units that spent years training. Often weeks, months if that even was the norm by the end of the war. When it came to say Latvian Conscripts serving as Red Army Riflemen, or the Volkssturm, you can argue 'days' of training. I also believe the Germans believed the Red Army was much larger than it actually was. It explains why German small scale counter offensives were often routed by 'inferior' forces. If you imagine a German officer, or even soldiers believing such. Then you also take into consideration by this time Russian troops likely had far more reason to fight harder than their Axis counter parts, they knew they were winning, and like the Hard almost to the death fighting some German units conducted outside of Moscow for example when the Red Army counter attacked there. Even a small band of Riflemen resisting hard can cause a larger German counter attacking force to question the strength of the force they're facing. Issue is, do these "false" reports by the Germans of Russian strength, were they intentionally false or did they actually believe that is what they were facing at the time? It isn't like they had "Soviet" personnel list. It is why I don't really disdain against people like Manstein when they're clearly stating figures that were likely false. I wouldn't be surprised if Manstein truly believed those were the odds he faced, and anyone post war trying to tell him otherwise, well... "Liar!"
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