Comments by "Titanium Rain" (@ChucksSEADnDEAD) on "Dark Skies" channel.

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  24.  @richardpatton2502  "But on your latest explanation on the software and reverse engineering. How confident are you that perceived enemies like Russia do not possess that info already?" - One one assume that as soon as enemy contacts started reacting to radars being turned on, they'd simply change the algorithms so that the frequency hopping becomes unpredictable again. Besides, if you were so assume that Russia broke American crypto there's a whole lot of more pressing issues that have to be addressed before stealth. "The Skyraider was supposed to be obsolete in Korea but when Vietnam came around there they were, down on the dirt." - You look at footage of cops flying the relatively "low and slow" helicopters and what do you see? FLIR. The mechanical eye sees more than you can with the human one. If you're gonna fly a modern turboprop like the A-19 Super Tucano like you'd fly a Skyraider, you're doing something wrong. For example the A-7 was a formidable bombing platform. But if you look at video from the time (this is a good one: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8lVoK_APac) you can see it's not all sunshine and rainbows. You will either have to be queued about target information or you have to acquire it visually. The latter is much harder when you have to observe a pitched battle and mark your own targets. From my limited research the A-7 only got FLIR in 1978 and that was in the Navy, with the ANG A-7s only getting it in 1988. So, in the end there's nothing wrong with the machine, it's the human inside that limits the capabilities. You give the human machine eyes to see the target without requiring low and slow passes, and you solve the problem. "Also, this kind of air support is very good for morale on the ground, which importance is frequently and systematically ignored..." - If the morale gains come from using an inferior platform then we have to question if morale is even a reasonable goal. Are troops meant to see an air show or effects on target?
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  133.  @northroad1  Andrew Krepinevich’s 1986 book “The Army and Vietnam” explains the internal conflict between the regular Army and the airmobile supremacists better than I could. Additionally, in 1966 the USAF Chief of Staff directed a study on CAS and found out that Army troops were satisfied with USAF CAS, but they were being excluded from the CAS role by the Army brass. Quote: "Meanwhile, U.S. Army advisors were working to develop ARVN airborne helicopter assault tactics, using equipment of two U.S. Army companies which had arrived in Vietnam in late 1961. Almost at once a problem arose over fixed wing/air-ground coordination. According to directives issued by the newly organized U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), all helicopter operations into areas where enemy opposition was expected were required to have fixed-wing tactical air cover. U.S. Army corps advisors who controlled helicopter usage, however, tended to ignore the requirement. In April 1962, during a visit to South Vietnam, General LeMay learned that Army advisors were not calling for fixed-wing air support, that only about 10 percent of ARVN heliborne operations were accompanied by VNAF aircraft, and that the Air Support Operations center at Ton Son Nhut frequently were not informed of such operations. Concerned about this situation, LeMay subsequently obtained permission to assign air liaison officers (ALO’s) to all ARVN corps and division headquarters and USAF forward air controllers to augment VNAF liaison squadrons…," “The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1961-1973” (Office of Air Force History, 1977)
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