Youtube comments of Ben Wilson (@benwilson6145).
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From the Official ONI Report.
Demoralization of the Bismarck's crew was now apparent. One officer is said to have drawn his revolver and shot several seamen who refused to obey him. Officers were reported to have committed suicide, and scores of the crew jumped overboard before the action ceased. Almost all of the 400 anti-aircraft gunners, for whom no special protection had been provided during surface action, became casualties.
The upper deck was being pounded into a mass of twisted steel. Hatches and doors were jammed in all parts of the ship. Crews in two magazines were drowned when it became necessary to flood the chambers because of fire. A direct hit crashed into a forward compartment where 200 men were trapped under jammed hatches. Fires on the gun deck cut off the forward half of the ship. The air was dense with smoke, fumes and the gases generated by the bursting shells. Paint was burning off the bulkheads and many men without gas masks were suffocated.
By 1000 all the Bismarck's 15-inch guns were out of action, and fire from the secondary battery was spasmodic. The Rodney, King George V, and the Norfolk, which had joined the action after spotting from the flanks, fired their last salvos front a range of only 8,300 yards. At 1010, out of the Bismarck's entire armament, only one anti-aircraft gun remained workable, The ship was a wreck, on fire fore and aft, and wallowing heavily. The British commander in chief broke off the gun action at 1022. The cruiser Dorsetshire then fired three torpedoes into the Bismarck, and she sank at 1037.
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From the ONI Report.
One torpedo struck amidships on the port side, one on the starboard quarter, and possibly a third on the port quarter; The torpedo which hit the starboard quarter wrecked the steering gear, jamming the rudders and causing the Bismarck to turn slowly in circles to the starboard. Frantic efforts were made to repair the damage: It was announced that the man who succeeded in freeing the rudders would be given the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross. Divers succeeded in centering one rudder, but the other could not be freed, Efforts were made to steer the ship by her engines, but after a short period, instead of proceeding on her intended southeasterly course, the Bismarck was actually northwest of her position when the attack was made. There appears to have been further controversy among the officers. The captain, when asked by an officer whether he should try to blow off the jammed rudder, is reported to have replied, "Do what you like; I am through with it." The ship's best speed was now reduced to 10 to 12 knots.
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I am full of admiration for the Canadians, but in North Africa which this video is about they were a minor number of them, the Forces there were British, Indian, Australian, New Zealand, Free French, South African, Rhodesian, Poles, Czechs.
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@robertfindlay2325 It was Auchinlecks failure that resulted in the Rommel being at El Alamein. He was a brilliant General but his appointment of Cunningham and Ritchie that caused this disaster.
The slow movement of the Eighth Army after El Alamein is a myth. The advance was not as fast as Monty wanted, as he was held up by his officers not obeying orders and stopping, these included Lumsden, Freyberg and Gatehouse. The most ironic part it was Gatehouse who was sacked by Montgomery after failure to follow orders and attack Rommel’s retreating troops that made the allegations that Montgomery was too cautious after El Alamein. While the truth is he disobeyed orders sitting on a hill at Mersa Matruh saying “ This is Custances battle and I’m not going to interfere”. Gatehouse’s tanks were held up by one anti tank gun and he had approx 40 tanks. Monty had advanced so far that his headquarters were ahead of his own Generals. Rommel described the Eighth Army advance as vulture like, in a letter to his wife. The 8th Army did 1,100 km in just 17 days from El Alamein to Benghazi November 4th to 20th 1942. If you can find any one to beat that let us know, maybe look at the advance rate of the 1st Army in North Africa. After El Alamein the Germans and Italians had lost about 30,000 captured, including nine German Generals, 10,000 killed and 15,000 wounded.
Of Rommel’s 600 tanks, 450 were left on the battlefield and about 1000 Artillery guns.
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Operation Sealion
The situation which had developed in the destruction of the English expeditionary force and the weakness of the English land defences caused us to entertain the idea of deciding the war in our favor by a rapid invasion of England. On account of the circumstances previously described as existing before the war and the surprisingly rapid development of the situation in the west, no preparations of any sort had been made. Since an invasion could only succeed if it took place quickly, in any case before the coming autumn, it was necessary now (Hitler himself gave orders for its preparation) to attempt to create the necessary conditions, both as regards material and training, with the greatest haste and with every means of improvisation. To produce new landing craft in great numbers and in time was, from the point of view of material and construction, no longer possible even though at this time the naval ferry barge (M. F. F.) had been designed and completed. It was, therefore, necessary to fall back in the greatest possible measure on available tugs, as well as barges of the coastal and inland water transport system. These were modified for landing purposes. Their greatest disadvantage lay in their very limited seaworthiness (up to sea 3); and, as most of them were not self-propelled, they required towing. Investigations were made into landing conditions on the south coast of England and current and weather conditions in the Channel. Training of the troops intended for the landing was extended as more of the necessary materials became available and all possible preparations of a tactical nature were made.
From the beginning it was clear to the leaders that the invasion could succeed only under certain particular conditions. The navy was certainly not in a position to protect the landing forces against the English Fleet, whose full weight would have to be reckoned with in such a situation. This task would have to be taken over by the air force. To this end it was necessary not only to wipe out completely the Royal Air Force but also to attack beforehand the ports near the landing area with such effect that the English naval forces would have to withdraw to more distant bases. Otherwise the air force would not be able to prevent the enemy's naval forces from reaching the landing forces at night by short approach routes.
When in September 1940 the preparations for invasion were complete, it also became apparent that complete defeat of the English Air Force had by no means been achieved. Thus, one of the most important prerequisites for an invasion was lacking. There could be no question of a short postponement, for once October and the beginning of the autumn gales had set in, a longer period of good weather such as would be required for success could no longer be expected. Postponement to the spring of 1941 could only render the military conditions less favorable. With such limited prospects of success, the resolve to carry on with the invasion of England could not be justified unless it presented the only and final means of ending successfully the war against England. This was not the case, for the German leaders saw in the Mediterranean another possibility of striking a decisive blow against England. This was quite apart from the shipping war which, as U-boat numbers increased and with the yet-hoped-for forceful participation of the air force, should gradually produce some result.
Hitler, therefore, decided to abandon the invasion, although the apparent threat of it was to be maintained
Grossadmiral Karl Dönitz, Kriegsmarine.
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From the Official Report.
At 1030 on the 26th a Catalina of the Coastal Command sighted the Bismarck about 550 miles west of Land s End. The King George V, Rodney, and Renown were now converging on the Bay of Biscay. Reconnaissance planes from the Ark Royal took up the watch on the Bismarck, At 1500 an air striking force was dispatched from the Ark Royal, but its attack was ineffectual. The second and decisive attack was made by 15 Swordfish, armed with torpedoes, and lasted from 2055 to 2125,
The 400 men assigned to the Bismarck's anti-aircraft guns maintained a furious barrage, but the crews, which had been on watch almost continuously for 5 days, were near exhaustion and their fire was not as effective as previously. The planes attacked simultaneously from a number of points, diving to the attack at an angle of about 50 .
One torpedo struck amidships on the port side, one on the starboard quarter, and possibly a third on the port quarter; The torpedo which hit the starboard quarter wrecked the steering gear, jamming the rudders and causing the Bismarck to turn slowly in circles to the starboard. Frantic efforts were made to repair the damage: It was announced that the man who succeeded in freeing the rudders would be given the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross. Divers succeeded in centering one rudder, but the other could not be freed, Efforts were made to steer the ship by her engines, but after a short period, instead of proceeding on her intended southeasterly course, the Bismarck was actually northwest of her position when the attack was made. There appears to have been further controversy among the officers. The captain, when asked by an officer whether he should try to blow off the jammed rudder, is reported to have replied, "Do what you like; I am through with it." The ship's best speed was now reduced to 10 to 12 knots.
At 0857 the Bismarck sustained her first hit. Five minutes later a 16-inch shell from the Rodney apparently put the German battleship's A and B turrets out of action. C and D turrets were firing on the King George V when a shell from one of the British warships carried away the rangefinder and paralyzed the control position. These exchanges took place at a range of about 20,000 yards. By 0020 range had been narrowed to 11,500 yards; 10 minutes latter the Bismarck was on fire and virtually out of control, though her C and D turrets were still firing independently and her secondary battery was in use.
Demoralization of the Bismarck's crew was now apparent. One officer is said to have drawn his revolver and shot several seamen who refused to obey him. Officers were reported to have committed suicide, and scores of the crew jumped overboard before the action ceased. Almost all of the 400 anti-aircraft gunners, for whom no special protection had been provided during surface action, became casualties.
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@robertfindlay2325 The slow movement of the Eighth Army after El Alamein is a myth. The advance was not as fast as Monty wanted, as he was held up by his officers not obeying orders and stopping, these included Lumsden, Freyberg and Gatehouse. The most ironic part it was Gatehouse who was sacked by Montgomery after failure to follow orders and attack Rommel’s retreating troops that made the allegations that Montgomery was too cautious after El Alamein. While the truth is he disobeyed orders sitting on a hill at Mersa Matruh saying “ This is Custances battle and I’m not going to interfere”. Gatehouse’s tanks were held up by one anti tank gun and he had approx 40 tanks. Monty had advanced so far that his headquarters were ahead of his own Generals. Rommel described the Eighth Army advance as vulture like, in a letter to his wife. The 8th Army did 1,100 km in just 17 days from El Alamein to Benghazi November 4th to 20th 1942. Look at the advance rate of the 1st Army in North Africa they achieved less than half the speed of the Eighth Army . After El Alamein the Germans and Italians had lost about 30,000 captured, including nine German Generals, 10,000 killed and 15,000 wounded.
Of Rommel’s 600 tanks, 450 were left on the battlefield and about 1000 Artillery guns.
I respect Auchinlect, but it was his poor choice of Commanders, first Cunningham then Ritchie that allowed the Germans to get to El Alamien. The men had lost faith in him.
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Soft Factors, Crew ability. Extract from The Cruise of the Bismarck!
At 1030 on the 26th a Catalina of the Coastal Command sighted the Bismarck about 550 miles west of Land s End. The King George V, Rodney, and Renown were now converging on the Bay of Biscay. Reconnaissance planes from the Ark Royal took up the watch on the Bismarck, At 1500 an air striking force was dispatched from the Ark Royal, but its attack was ineffectual. The second and decisive attack was made by 15 Swordfish, armed with torpedoes, and lasted from 2055 to 2125,
The 400 men assigned to the Bismarck's anti-aircraft guns maintained a furious barrage, but the crews, which had been on watch almost continuously for 5 days, were near exhaustion and their fire was not as effective as previously. The planes attacked simultaneously from a number of points, diving to the attack at an angle of about 50 .
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The Cruise of the Bismarck
The 400 men assigned to the Bismarck's anti-aircraft guns maintained a furious barrage, but the crews, which had been on watch almost continuously for 5 days, were near exhaustion and their fire was not as effective as previously. The planes attacked simultaneously from a number of points, diving to the attack at an angle of about 50 .
One torpedo struck amidships on the port side, one on the starboard quarter, and possibly a third on the port quarter; The torpedo which hit the starboard quarter wrecked the steering gear, jamming the rudders and causing the Bismarck to turn slowly in circles to the starboard. Frantic efforts were made to repair the damage: It was announced that the man who succeeded in freeing the rudders would be given the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross. Divers succeeded in centering one rudder, but the other could not be freed, Efforts were made to steer the ship by her engines, but after a short period, instead of proceeding on her intended southeasterly course, the Bismarck was actually northwest of her position when the attack was made. There appears to have been further controversy among the officers. The captain, when asked by an officer whether he should try to blow off the jammed rudder, is reported to have replied, "Do what you like; I am through with it." The ship's best speed was now reduced to 10 to 12 knots.
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MV Ondina a tanker built in 1939 while in company with the HMIS Bengal was involved in a battle with two Japanese Merchant Raiders in the Indian Ocean.
The Aikoku Maru (Captain Oishi Tamotsu) and Hokoku Maru (Captain Imazato Hiroshi) commenced firing at 1200 hours, and soon straddled the Ondina with their cruiser-armament. The first hit on Ondina ripped off a part of the main mast, leaving only a stump standing.
The Ondina herself had her answer ready: the third shell fired by Ondina was a direct hit in the superstructure of Hokoku Maru, but apparently it did little to affect her speed or armament. Content with the hit, the gun captain then ordered the gunners to concentrate their fire on the stern. Only a few moments later, a lucky hit on the starboard torpedo mount turned the Hokoku Maru in a ball of red and yellow flames, and as the ship emerged from the smoke, she was listing heavily to starboard, and simultaneously started to settle by the stern. The explosion ripped off the stern and threw her two floatplanes overboard, while massive fires raged in the superstructure.
The Ondina and the Bengal continued shooting at the Aikoku , until they ran out of ammunition. The HMIS Bengal sailed away and the Ondina was set on fire by the Aikoku, they abandoned ship in the lifeboats.
The lifeboats were machine gunned by the Aikoku who rescued the survivors of the Hokoku and departed.
The surviving crew reboarded the Ondina , extinguished the fires and sailed back to Fremantle. So a merchant Tanker sank a Japanese Merchant Cruiser.
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ONI Report. By 1000 all the Bismarck's 15-inch guns were out of action, and fire from the secondary battery was spasmodic. The Rodney, King George V, and the Norfolk, which had joined the action after spotting from the flanks, fired their last salvos front a range of only 8,300 yards. At 1010, out of the Bismarck's entire armament, only one anti-aircraft gun remained workable, The ship was a wreck, on fire fore and aft, and wallowing heavily. The British commander in chief broke off the gun action at 1022. The cruiser Dorsetshire then fired three torpedoes into the Bismarck, and she sank at 1037.
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The British Merchant Navy had always recruited seafarers from abroad, mostly from the Empire, Australia, Canada, Ceylon. Hong Kong, India, Malaya, New Zealand, Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa and Trinidad. Also from most of Europe.
The British Merchant Navy 27% causality rate was the highest of any British Service. I am unaware of the causality rate of the US Merchant Marine but an sure it was high also, all very brave men.
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The naval staff and the U-boat command had expected great results from the use of U-boats. Because of the confined waters and the probable counter-action, it seemed likely that there would be frequent contact with the enemy; but the result of the U-boat activity was extraordinarily disappointing. The chief reason for this was torpedo failures. If a torpedo shortage had been evident in the early months of the war, it was now torpedo ineffectiveness in the Norwegian expedition which became disastrously apparent. As a result of being in contact with the enemy for extended periods, the U-boats were forced to remain submerged for a very long time. This caused pressure in the boat which penetrated the depth chamber of the torpedo and considerably increased its depth setting. For example, Klt. Prien was able to fire at close range at the big English transports near Harstad, but the torpedoes went too low. The reason for the increasing number of torpedo misses was only understood by the German Navy at a very much later date when the individual technical faults of the torpedoes were ascertained by systematic testing. It was actually true that, despite numerous opportunities to fire, there were few, if any, successes. The effect on the crews was marked. They lost confidence in the weapon, and the personal influence of the U-boat commander in chief was necessary to restore their morale. At the same time everything possible was done to overcome torpedo faults.
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An Essay by Admiral Karl Doenitz [Grossadmiral Karl Dönitz, Kriegsmarine]
The situation which had developed in the destruction of the English expeditionary force and the weakness of the English land defences caused us to entertain the idea of deciding the war in our favour by a rapid invasion of England. On account of the circumstances previously described as existing before the war and the surprisingly rapid development of the situation in the west, no preparations of any sort had been made. Since an invasion could only succeed if it took place quickly, in any case before the coming autumn, it was necessary now (Hitler himself gave orders for its preparation) to attempt to create the necessary conditions, both as regards material and training, with the greatest haste and with every means of improvisation. To produce new landing craft in great numbers and in time was, from the point of view of material and construction, no longer possible even though at this time the naval ferry barge (M. F. F.) had been designed and completed. It was, therefore, necessary to fall back in the greatest possible measure on available tugs, as well as barges of the coastal and inland water transport system. These were modified for landing purposes. Their greatest disadvantage lay in their very limited seaworthiness (up to sea 3); and, as most of them were not self-propelled, they required towing. Investigations were made into landing conditions on the south coast of England and current and weather conditions in the Channel. Training of the troops intended for the landing was extended as more of the necessary materials became available and all possible preparations of a tactical nature were made.
From the beginning it was clear to the leaders that the invasion could succeed only under certain particular conditions. The navy was certainly not in a position to protect the landing forces against the English Fleet, whose full weight would have to be reckoned with in such a situation. This task would have to be taken over by the air force. To this end it was necessary not only to wipe out completely the Royal Air Force but also to attack beforehand the ports near the landing area with such effect that the English naval forces would have to withdraw to more distant bases. Otherwise the air force would not be able to prevent the enemy's naval forces from reaching the landing forces at night by short approach routes.
When in September 1940 the preparations for invasion were complete, it also became apparent that complete defeat of the English Air Force had by no means been achieved. Thus, one of the most important prerequisites for an invasion was lacking. There could be no question of a short postponement, for once October and the beginning of the autumn gales had set in, a longer period of good weather such as would be required for success could no longer be expected. Postponement to the spring of 1941 could only render the military conditions less favourable. With such limited prospects of success, the resolve to carry on with the invasion of England could not be justified unless it presented the only and final means of ending successfully the war against England. This was not the case, for the German leaders saw in the Mediterranean another possibility of striking a decisive blow against England. This was quite apart from the shipping war which, as U-boat numbers increased and with the yet-hoped-for forceful participation of the air force, should gradually produce some result.
Hitler, therefore, decided to abandon the invasion, although the apparent threat of it was to be maintained.
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The slow movement of the Eighth Army after El Alamein is a myth. The advance was not as fast as Monty wanted, as he was held up by his officers not obeying orders and stopping, these included Lumsden, Freyberg and Gatehouse. The most ironic part it was Gatehouse who was sacked by Montgomery after failure to follow orders and attack Rommel’s retreating troops
that made the allegations that Montgomery was too cautious after El Alamein.
While the truth is he disobeyed orders sitting on a hill at Mersa Matruh saying
“ This is Custances battle and I’m not going to interfere”. Gatehouse’s tanks
were held up by one anti tank gun and he had approx 40 tanks. Monty had
advanced so far that his headquarters were ahead of his own Generals, leading to the capture of his Step son.
Rommel described the Eighth Army advance in a letter to his wife as vulture like.
The 8th Army did 1,100 km in just 17 days from El Alamein to Benghazi November 4th to 20th 1942. If you can find any one to beat that let us know,. After El Alamein the Germans and Italians had lost about 30,000 captured, including nine German Generals, 10,000 killed and 15,000 wounded.
The problems with the Generals in the Eighth Army not doing as they were ordered had caused problems for both Ritchie and Auchinlect. Monty sacked Gatehouse and Lumsden but could not sack Freyberg as he was a New Zealander.
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U 162 sank the schooner Florence M. Douglas 200 G. T., sunk by shellfire on May 4, 1942, at 1300 EWT, about 65 miles 000' true of Georgetown Beacon.), perhaps one of the lesser sinking's. U-162 was commanded by Fregattenkapitän Jürgen Wattenberg He served in Admiral Graf Spee until she was scuttled off Montevideo on December 17, 1939, and was then interned in the Argentine. He escaped from Buenos Aires in April 1940. making his way back to Germany. The German Embassy provided forged passports, and other false documents were procured by a German resident of Buenos Aires. The exact route taken to Peru by Wattenberg is not known, but planes, busses, and horses for crossing the Andes were used by various other prisoners. At Callao, Peru, he embarked on the S. S. Rakuyo Maru, a Japanese steamer, which stopped at Los Angeles on June 12, 1940 before going to Japan.
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Operation Sea Lion. Grossadmiral Karl Dönitz, Kriegsmarine
The situation which had developed in the destruction of the English expeditionary force and the weakness of the English land defenses caused us to entertain the idea of deciding the war in our favour by a rapid invasion of England. On account of the circumstances previously described as existing before the war and the surprisingly rapid development of the situation in the west, no preparations of any sort had been made. Since an invasion could only succeed if it took place quickly, in any case before the coming autumn, it was necessary now (Hitler himself gave orders for its preparation) to attempt to create the necessary conditions, both as regards material and training, with the greatest haste and with every means of improvisation. To produce new landing craft in great numbers and in time was, from the point of view of material and construction, no longer possible even though at this time the naval ferry barge (M. F. F.) had been designed and completed. It was, therefore, necessary to fall back in the greatest possible measure on available tugs, as well as barges of the coastal and inland water transport their very limited seaworthiness (up to sea 3); and, as most of them were not self-propelled, they required towing. Investigations were made into landing conditions on the south coast of England and current and weather conditions in the Channel. Training of the troops intended for the landing was extended as more of the necessary materials became available and all possible preparations of a tactical nature were made.
From the beginning it was clear to the leaders that the invasion could succeed only under certain particular conditions. The navy was certainly not in a position to protect the landing forces against the English Fleet, whose full weight would have to be reckoned with in such a situation. This task would have to be taken over by the air force. To this end it was necessary not only to wipe out completely the Royal Air Force but also to attack beforehand the ports near the landing area with such effect that the English naval forces would have to withdraw to more distant bases. Otherwise the air force would not be able to prevent the enemy's naval forces from reaching the landing forces at night by short approach routes.
When in September 1940 the preparations for invasion were complete, it also became apparent that complete defeat of the English Air Force had by no means been achieved. Thus, one of the most important prerequisites for an invasion was lacking. There could be no question of a short postponement, for once October and the beginning of the autumn gales had set in, a longer period of good weather such as would be required for success could no longer be expected. Postponement to the spring of 1941 could only render the military conditions less favourable. With such limited prospects of success, the resolve to carry on with the invasion of England could not be justified unless it presented the only and final means of ending successfully the war against England. This was not the case, for the German leaders saw in the Mediterranean another possibility of striking a decisive blow against England. This was quite apart from the shipping war which, as U-boat numbers increased and with the yet-hoped-for forceful participation of the air force, should gradually produce some result.
Hitler, therefore, decided to abandon the invasion, although the apparent threat of it was to be maintained
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@OldEastGermany Facts are that Britain lost 15 844 tanks total, this was in Belgium, France, Italy, Tunisia. Libya Egypt, Greece, Somalia , Eritrea. Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Ethiopia, Madagacar, India, Burma, Malaysia Singapore . HongKong, and Borneo. There are captured Italian Tanks in that number used in Egypt, Libya and Syria.
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@OldEastGermany Charles Babbage was British, not German and invented the first computer in in 1830. Other Notable German inventions, the first use of poison gas on the battlefield, the largest murder of non combatants in a war, the most rapes in a war, the use of non piloted aircraft and rockets to kill civilian populations, the mass medical experimentation on captives, the largest murder and ethnic cleansing of people, the first destruction on cities by bombers, the largest number of murdered prisoners of war, the mass starvation of an entire continent, so much to be proud off!
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ONI Report
One torpedo struck amidships on the port side, one on the starboard quarter, and possibly a third on the port quarter; The torpedo which hit the starboard quarter wrecked the steering gear, jamming the rudders and causing the Bismarck to turn slowly in circles to the starboard. Frantic efforts were made to repair the damage: It was announced that the man who succeeded in freeing the rudders would be given the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross. Divers succeeded in centering one rudder, but the other could not be freed, Efforts were made to steer the ship by her engines, but after a short period, instead of proceeding on her intended southeasterly course, the Bismarck was actually northwest of her position when the attack was made. There appears to have been further controversy among the officers. The captain, when asked by an officer whether he should try to blow off the jammed rudder, is reported to have replied, "Do what you like; I am through with it." The ship's best speed was now reduced to 10 to 12 knots.
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@isolinear9836 Look you Moron, there has never been a HMS Canberra, HMS Australia or an HMS Hobart, Why can you not get that in your thick head? This is the US report on Savo Island.
Conclusion
The Battle of Savo Island was the worst open-sea defeat in United States naval history. Over a thousand sailors were lost, four heavy cruisers were sunk, and a severe blow was dealt to our military ego. How could our Navy, after significant wins at Coral Sea and Midway, let this happen? As in any complex story, it happened for many reasons. It was caused by errors at every level from the strategic to the tactical. It was caused by an ineffective command and control organization, poor leadership, misguided priorities, failure to understand the enemy, over-reliance on technology, and a rush to execute a military campaign. It was also caused by the fog of the war, inflicted upon sailors operating under incredible pressure at the edge of exhaustion. Then there was the factor of luck. On this day, Admiral Mikawa had all the luck, while "Murphy" was embarked with the Allied Fleet.
Among these many factors, the overriding reason for the debacle off Savo Island to emerge--the absence of a coherent command structure. The decision to place Admiral Fletcher in tactical command, reflected in Nimitz and Ghormley's Operation Plans, was a proper decision. Admiral Fletcher, however, did not act as the Officer in Tactical Command or, by today's doctrine, as the Commander of the Joint Task Force (CJTF). Instead, he acted as the carrier group commander with paramount concern for preserving his three carriers. Fletcher's early withdrawal forced Admiral Turner to his own early withdrawal, leaving the poorly supplied Marines ashore. This situation might have been rectified by providing Admiral Fletcher with his own command and control vessel and placing it in the Guadalcanal area. In addition, Fletcher might have seen his role differently had he been able to better synchronize the entire operation. Such an organization might have precluded the lapse in aerial coverage that allowed Mikawa to sail up the Slot undetected. It certainly would have ensured Fletcher's awareness that the sorties had not.
Strange the USN does not blame the British for having ships that do not exist. Maybe it was the Aliens that stole them?
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This is what Karl Doenitz states.
The difficulty of the Icelandic passage did not prevent the battleship Bismarck and the cruiser Prinz Eugen from being sent into the Atlantic in May 1941 after the completion of their working up and according to the strategic dispositions already mentioned. After the sinking of
the battle cruiser Hood, which proved the outstanding fighting power of the new German battleship, the unit was able to shake off contact with the English once more, but on the next day she was contacted again by an enemy aircraft. In a hard struggle the Bismarck fell victim to the English battleships and formations of aircraft, assembled together from the whole of the North Atlantic. Our own aircraft sent out from western France could not, unfortunately, bring her any effective help because of the great distance. Prinz Eugen succeeded in escaping, and entered Brest in good condition.
The sinking of the Bismarck was a grave loss for the navy, even though the leaders, as already mentioned, in their bold and unusual methods of conducting the war, had reckoned with such reverses. In this operation it seems that radio location from ships played a decisive part for the first time. It afterwards became more and more apparent that the enemy had a definite superiority over us in this direction. This superiority was one of the reasons which caused the units of the German Fleet and later the armed merchant cruisers to succumb outside home waters. On the other hand, the strong reaction of English naval forces proved that the strategic object had succeeded - that of keeping the English Fleet busy, added to the direct success attained by sinkings. At this time the English convoys were guarded partly by single battleships, partly by groups of battleships.
The intention of the leaders to continue the Atlantic operations with the remaining ships was interrupted by the great threat to the Biscay ports from the air. While the U-boats could be protected against it by the building of strong pens, there was no such possibility for ships. In spite of the strongest air defense measures in Brest, the enemy succeeded in getting various bomb hits on the ships, which prevented them from further operations in the Atlantic.
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Italy invaded, France, Greece, Albania, British Somalia, Yugoslavia, Kenya, Egypt, Tunisia, they did not invade Libya, they were already there, it was a colony, the reward for supporting the Allies in WW1.
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The British Minister of Shipping at the outbreak on WW2 requisitioned pretty much every Passenger Ship, Cargo Ship and Tanker in the British Empire. The Passenger ships were used as Troop Transports, Armed Merchant Cruisers , and Hospital ships, As the war progressed other ships were chartered from invaded countries like the Netherlands and Norway. There were berths available for some ships but on government approval. There were some Neutral Ships from Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Turkey and even Egypt. There is an interesting tale on YouTube of USA Missionaries having difficulty in getting to Africa to carry out Gods work. They eventually got passage on an Egyptian ship the Zamzam, There they joined other civilian including a a Life Magazine photographer. As the sun rose one morning they had bee stalked by the raider Atlantis who immediately opened fire on the ship with at least 70 shells. the ship was on fire and sank. It is heart breaking to hear the words of a four year old thinking he was going to die. The the Neutral American Passengers were transferred the blockade runner Dresden who told them they were going to land them in Brazil, Instead they were sent to France locked in a hold expecting to be sunk at any time.Another Passenger Ship to be attacked by a German Raider was the SS Nankin, it was enroute from Perth to Calcutta. The vessel and crew were captured including and many civilian passengers Men Women and Children. The Civilians were handed over by the Germans to the tender care of the Japanese where they were interred in great hardships.
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Maybe time to be less nitpicky and look at "Reverse Lend Lease" a term used by President Roosevelt ?
”Reverse Lend-lease was the supply of equipment and services to the United States. Nearly $8 billion (equivalent to $124 billion today) worth of war material was provided to U.S. forces by her allies, 90% of this sum coming from the British Empire. Reciprocal contributions included the Austin K2/Y military ambulance, British aviation spark plugs used in B-17 Flying Fortresses, Canadian-made Fairmile launches used in anti-submarine warfare, Mosquito photo-reconnaissance aircraft, and Indian petroleum products. Australia and New Zealand supplied the bulk of foodstuffs to United States forces in the South Pacific. Though diminutive in comparison, Soviet-supplied reverse lend-lease included 300,000 tonnes of chromium and 32,000 tonnes of manganese ore, as well as wood, gold and platinum. In a November 1943 report to Congress, President Roosevelt said of Allied participation in reverse Lend-lease: While in April 1944 Congress were briefed by the Foreign Economic Administrator, Leo T Crowley;In 1945–46, the value of Reciprocal Aid from New Zealand exceeded that of Lend-Lease, though in 1942–43, the value of Lend-Lease to New Zealand was much more than that of Reciprocal Aid. Britain also supplied extensive material assistance to American forces stationed in Europe, for example the USAAF was supplied with hundreds of Spitfire Mk V and Mk VIII fighter aircraft.”
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This is from an interrogation of one of Rommel's subordinates.
The Generalfeldmarschall concentrated his effort on means which could be procured comparatively quickly—first of all, mines. He had made extensive use of mines in Africa
and had studied British mining tactics very closely. In France, his objective was first to surround all strong points with deep minefields, and then to lay mines between strong points, wherever the terrain was suitable for armoured vehicles. This plan required an immense amount of material, of course. When Rommel came to France, 1,700,000 mines had been laid in three years: The monthly rate of supply was 40,000. He increased and accelerated production by making use of all sorts of material—even old artillery shells, hundreds of thousands of which were to be found in depots and arsenals. In the few months of his activity, 4,000,000 mines were laid. Considering that it took some time before his measures produced results and that in the last weeks before the invasion transport was exceedingly hampered by Allied air attacks, it may be said that he increased the efficiency of this particular component of the defenses 20 to 30 fold. His final aim was to lay 50 to 100 million mines.
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@wolfsoldner9029 All my points were from the trial of the Nazi Doenitz who was lucky not to be executed, I will add two more bits of his trial to show how much of a Nazi he was and why you are wrong.
How far can Karl Doenitz be considered to have been a thorough Nazi, responsible for indoctrinating the half million officers and men of the navy with theories of racial pride and racial hatred which led to the enslavement of conquered peoples and the slaughter of Jews? Here again the record is not absolutely clear. Doenitz, faced with quotations from his own statements supporting the Nazi ideology, strove to picture his Nazism as no more than loyalty to his soldier’s oath to the Fuehrer, and a call for wartime unity in the service under his command.
It is not easy to accept Doenitz’s explanation that he became the heir to Hitler’s mantle, not because he was a known and fanatical Nazi, but solely because he was the senior officer of an “independent service.” To grant this would be to doubt the Nazism of Hitler himself.
Captain Moehle of submarine headquarters Kiel, whose duty it was to brief submarine skippers on current orders before their departure on patrol, testified that he himself was in doubt as to the admiral’s meaning, and when next in Paris asked clarification from the admiral’s staff. There he was told the story of an outward-bound U-boat which sighted British airmen on a raft in the Bay of Biscay. Unable to take them aboard for lack for time, the submarine avoided them and continued on her mission. Her skipper so reported to Admiral Doenitz on his return.
He was told that he had acted wrongly. If he could not capture the flyers he should have killed them on the raft to prevent their rescue and return to duty to fight against German submarines. Capt Moehle testified he repeated this story to submarine skippers who asked whether the order of 17 September meant to kill survivors.
Capt Moehle’s testimony was partially substantiated by a Lieutenant Heisig, who stated that Doenitz, lecturing to the graduating class of the submarine officers school, gave the order the same interpretation.
There were three reported caes of UBOats machine gunning survivors in the water, though due to the lack of witness only one was used at his trial. If you kill everyone then there are no witnesses.
Now on to your other lie.
Bismark survivors
At 2059 U 74 [commanded by Lieutenant Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat] rescued 3 survivors in BE 6142 and according to their statements the ship must have been sunk at about 1000 in BE 5330, i.e. N.W. of BE 6150. This agreed with B.d.U's assumptions.
So they can pick up survivors?!!!!!!!!!
This is another sign of your beloved Nazi's at work on the Bismark, from USN ONI report.
Demoralization of the Bismarck's crew was now apparent. One officer is said to have drawn his revolver and shot several seamen who refused to obey him. Officers were reported to have committed suicide, and scores of the crew jumped overboard before the action ceased
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Author : VzAdm [Vice Admiral] Ruge, Friedrich
Position : Naval Liaison Officer, A Gp B [Army Group B]
Date of MS : 21 May 46
Place : Camp 2226, Bruges, Belgium
29. Events proved that he foresaw the method of attack correctly down to details. If, in spite of all his efforts, he did not succeed, the causes must chiefly be sought elsewhere. He did everything in his power to strengthen the defense, which he accomplished to an unexpected extent. He did his utmost because he was convinced that the first stage of the invasion would be the decisive event of the war. He said so from the beginning and reported this view to OKW and the Fuehrer.
30. When the Allies succeeded in establishing their beachhead, Rommel was of the opinion that the war must be ended promptly at any cost. He said to me once, “Much better end this at once and live as a British Dominion than be ruined by continuing this hopeless war.” He was opposed to a Eurasian block and favored cooperation with the Atlantic powers. He felt himself to be an heir to the traditions of the West, and I think he died for this conviction.
MS # A – 982
Vice Admiral Ruge who was on Rommel's Staff in Normandy stated during an interview with the US in 1946.
30. When the Allies succeeded in establishing their beachhead, Rommel was of the opinion that the war must be ended promptly at any cost. He said to me once, “Much better end this at once and live as a British Dominion than be ruined by continuing this hopeless war.” He was opposed to a Eurasian block and favoured cooperation with the Atlantic powers. He felt himself to be an heir to the traditions of the West, and I think he died for this conviction.
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Albert Felsen Name one British Q Ship of World War 2.
The Nazis started unrestricted submarine from the first day of WW2 with the sinking of the Athenia,
Now lets look at Nazi Doenitz and his orders towards survivors.
Early in 1940, Standing Order 154 went to U-boats:
“Do not pick up survivors and take them with you. Do not worry about the merchant ship’s boats. Weather conditions and the distance to land play no part. Have a care only for your own ship and think only to attain your next success as soon as possible. We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began the war in order to destroy us, so nothing else matters. [Signed] DOENITZ.”
The records show that on 3 January 1942, Hitler discussed merchant shipping with the Japanese ambassador:
“Merchant ships would be sunk without warning with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible… We are fighting for our existence and our attitude cannot be ruled by humane feelings. For this reason he must give the order…that U-boats were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the lifeboats. Ambassador Oshima heartily agreed… and said that the Japanese, too, are forced to follow similar methods…”
The order of 17 September 1942 reads:
“To all commanding officers:
“1. No. attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk, and this includes the picking up of persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.
“2. Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply.
“3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of importance to your boat.
“4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard for women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.”
On the same date this order is recorded in the war diary of the flag officer submarines:
“The attention of commanding officers is again drawn to the fact that all efforts to rescue members of crews of ships which have been sunk contradict the most primitive demands for the conduct of warfare by annihilating enemy ships and their crews. Orders concerning the bringing in of captains and engineers still stand.”
The prosecution asked the reason for the statements “rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews,” and “be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of women and children.” Neither Doenitz nor is witness could answer these questions specifically. Though no admission of guilt could be wrung from Doenitz, the prosecution introduced testimony to show that at least one high-placed submarine officer did interpret this as an order to shoot survivors.
Captain Moehle of submarine headquarters Kiel, whose duty it was to brief submarine skippers on current orders before their departure on patrol, testified that he himself was in doubt as to the admiral’s meaning, and when next in Paris asked clarification from the admiral’s staff. There he was told the story of an outward-bound U-boat which sighted British airmen on a raft in the Bay of Biscay. Unable to take them aboard for lack for time, the submarine avoided them and continued on her mission. Her skipper so reported to Admiral Doenitz on his return. He was told that he had acted wrongly. If he could not capture the flyers he should have killed them on the raft to prevent their rescue and return to duty to fight against German submarines. Capt Moehle testified he repeated this story to submarine skippers who asked whether the order of 17 September meant to kill survivors.
Now for his guilt in murdering captured military personnel.
Hitler, on 18 October 1942, signed a directive known throughout the service as the “Fuehrer’s Order”:
“All enemies on so-called commando missions. . . challenged by German troops, even if . . . in uniform . . . are to be slaughtered to the last man . . . even . . . if . . . they are prepared to surrender.
Individual commandos captured separately were to be “handed over to the SD” (security police). That, Doenitz admitted, meant they would be shot.
This fact casts doubt on his subsequent denial, and the denial of Admiral Doenitz, that the shared the guilt for the execution of the crew of MTB 345. In July 1943 the British Motor Torpedo Boat 345 left the Shetlands on a mission to destroy German shipping and to lay mines in Norwegian waters. Attacked by superior German naval forces while hidden at the island of Apso, near Bergen, her captain destroyed his ship and surrendered himself and his crew as prisoners of war. They were interrogated by German naval intelligence officers, and, despite the recommendation of their naval interrogators that they be accorded prisoner-of-war treatment, they were turned over by the navy to the Security Police, on the suggestion, if not the insistence, of the naval commander in Norway, Admiral Schrader.
The British sailor, Paul Robert Evans, who was one of the crew of a two-man torpedo fired against the Tirpitz in December 1942, was captured in uniform. He was executed a few weeks before Doenitz became commander in chief. Doenitz disclaimed knowledge and responsibility.
Doenitz was found guilty on two charges, namely Crimes Against the Peace (i.e., waging was that are illegal under International Law) and War Crimes (i.e., contravention of rules governing the conduct of warfare).
I suggest that the Nazis were capable of there own thoughts of murder, after all the murdered over 30 million people.
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Although in March the major attacks on convoys could still be carried out, by May it was quite clear that the enemy's air strength in the Atlantic, consisting of long-range planes and of carrier-borne aircraft, had increased enormously. Of even greater consequence, however, was the fact that the U-boats could be located at a great distance by the enemy's radar, apparently on short wave, without previous warning on their own receivers. They were then heavily attacked by destroyers and aircraft carriers without even seeing the convoy, which had been diverted. If, however, in spite of this a convoy was contacted, it was discovered that the problem of finding it was no longer the only difficulty in that U-boats could not now attack the convoy because its fire power forced them to submerge.
From this new situation it was evident that the enemy's aircraft and destroyers must now be fitted with new radar. The U-boat losses, which previously had been 13 percent of all the boats at sea, rose rapidly to 30 to 50 percent. In 1943 alone, 43 U-boats were lost. These losses were suffered not only in convoy attacks, but everywhere at sea. There was no part of the Atlantic where the boats were safe from being located day and night by aircraft. All the U-boat entrance and exit channels in the Bay of Biscay were, in particular, most carefully watched. Losses here were especially high.
Under these circumstances, the previous surface war on convoys could not be continued because, in the meantime, the favorable conditions in the American sphere of activity had also changed and U-boat successes had diminished considerably in that theater.
Grossadmiral Karl Dönitz, Kriegsmarine
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Armchair Historian, you maybe need to do some research rather that taking information off the Internet as being correct. The slow movement of the Eighth Army after El Alamein is a myth. The advance was not as fast as Monty wanted, as he was held up by his officers not obeying orders and stopping, these included Lumsden, Freyberg and Gatehouse. The most ironic part it was Gatehouse who was sacked by Montgomery after failure to follow orders and attack Rommel’s retreating troops that made the allegations that Montgomery was too cautious after El Alamein. While the truth is he disobeyed orders sitting on a hill at Mersa Matruh saying “ This is Custances battle and I’m not going to interfere”. Gatehouse’s tanks were held up by one anti tank gun and he had approx 40 tanks. Monty had advanced so far that his headquarters were ahead of his own Generals. Rommel described the Eighth Army advance as vulture like, in a letter to his wife. The 8th Army did 1,100 km in just 17 days from El Alamein to Benghazi November 4th to 20th 1942. If you can find any one to beat that let us know, maybe look at the advance rate of the 1st Army in North Africa. After El Alamein the Germans and Italians had lost about 30,000 captured, including nine German Generals, 10,000 killed and 15,000 wounded.
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@electronwave4551 Go back to the beginning, Lockdown, Test Trace and eliminate Covid tin the population, done, Shut borders by air, sea, and road, done. Quarantine arrivals and not let them spread it, done. Keep the population aware and onside, done. Stand up to stupid legal challenges from a Queensland Cane Toad, done. Stand up to the moronic demands from the Prime Minister including legal challenges , done. The first is the most important. the remainder so there is no reintroduction. If every State and Country were to do this then Covid is beaten, Simple steps.
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@ruedigerschwarz What a stupid response. The vessel was a neutral vessel owned by the Egyptians. It was unarmed and attacked without warning. No orders to stop, no warningfired at it.There was no radio transmission attempts. 55 six inch shells fire at this old passenger vessel. Typical Nazi response. It was not a naval transport, again a typical Nazi anwser. Was the Nazi Captain in charge of the Atlantis psychic? How did he know it was a naval transport ? Then shell it 55 times, destoying the ship, destroying lifeboats. sinking the ship. Noble work indeed. They were amblances onboard, very dangerouus equipment. There were also American volunteer ambulance drivers! The passengers were mostly Americn missionaries and there families, there story is on YouTube, hear a four year old explain why he feared for his life? Childern being shelled, very Nazi. They were not taken to Brazil, another lie. They were kept men, women and childern in the hold of the ship and forced to be on a blockade runner to France while they feared for their lives every day. There was also an American news reporter onboard, his story is very interestng. Nazi Germany at its best, treating Neutral American missionaries as prisoners of war, not putting them on a neutral ship, not landing them in Brazil. There is no honour giving women and childern to be imprisoned by the Japanese. Or to place them locked in the hold of a blockade runner into France where either the British or the German Uboats may sink them.
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I think you missed the meaning of Allan Brookes Diary, it was written only for his wife's reading not a political comment, he knew the officers killed in WW1 and his comment in his diary on the lost officers was a personal lament. I think that you can easily see from your research that Britain, France , Soviet Union, Italy and Germany all suffered from poor leadership that may have been contributed to by WW1 loses. The Germans Generals of course were able to write there own histories after the war and blame Hitler. Churchill did similar and blamed his mistakes on the Generals. You need to read Allan Brookes Diary.
The reason that all the Desert Generals were from the Indian Army as they were used in East Africa to defeat the Italians, Britain could not send troops in 1940 to the Desert War as they were needed to defend the UK. The other great Indian Army General, Slim was fighting in Somalia as well, shot in the bottom by the Italians. O'Connor was a brilliant General, born in India, Indian Army trained, no tank experience, but he learned and excelled. Auchinleck was another who learned to integrate tanks, infantry, artillery and aircraft. Allan Brooke ran what was the best British Military college, in Quetta, before WW2. Montgomery taught there as well. Please do not dismiss these men, the Indian Army had many capable men.
Cunningham was worn down and should not have been given command of the Eight Army. Ritchie was given a temporary promotion and while a good Divisional General could not lead the Eight Army, a mistake by Auchinleck, for this he was sacked by Churchill. Brooke commented that Auchinleck "could have been one of the finest of commanders" but lacked the ability to select the men to serve him. Please also note that Auchinleck was another who had a great deal more to command than North Africa. Iraq, Iran, Syria, Palastine, Italian and British Somalia, Ethiopia eg
Montgomery to his credit gave both Ritchie and O Connor jobs in the invasion of Europe after D Day.
The leadership shown by the England based Generals in the BEF under Gort was not great in many cases, both Allan Brooke and Montgomery were among the better. Some others like General Fortune were captured.
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Other Medals given were,
Captain W. Horsman Ondina became Ridder (Knight of the) “Militaire Willems Order” der 4de Klasse posthumously and was Mentioned in Dispatches
Lieutenant-Commander Wilson RNR of the Bengal , received the Distinguished Service Order.
Australian Able Bodied Seaman Bertram Albert George Hammond RAN (Royal Australian Navy) MV Ondina, received the Distinguished Service Medal and the Bronzen Kruis (Bronze Cross) on May 22nd, 1943. However, this medal was replaced by a much higher honour, being “The Netherland’s Bronze Lion” with an “Honourable Mention.”
2nd.Officer Bartele Broer Bakker
MV Ondina
“Military William Order” - MWO, which is the highest award that can be award, “Ridder der Militaire Willems Orde” or “Knight of the Military Willems Order.”
“Distinguished Service Cross” - (DSC).
“Great gallantry when the vessel, escorted by only one destroyer was attacked by two enemy raiders, one of which she sank. Although her crew was forced to abandon ship during the action, she was re boarded and was brought safely to port.”
“Honourable Mention” - (EV)
“War Memorial Cross” (OMK).
MV Ondina was given a rare Dutch distinction, the “Koninklijke Vermelding by Dagorder”, issued on July 9, 1948.
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ONI Report The cruise of the Bismark.
At 1030 on the 26th a Catalina of the Coastal Command sighted the Bismarck about 550 miles west of Land s End. The King George V, Rodney, and Renown were now converging on the Bay of Biscay. Reconnaissance planes from the Ark Royal took up the watch on the Bismarck, At 1500 an air striking force was dispatched from the Ark Royal, but its attack was ineffectual. The second and decisive attack was made by 15 Swordfish, armed with torpedoes, and lasted from 2055 to 2125,
The 400 men assigned to the Bismarck's anti-aircraft guns maintained a furious barrage, but the crews, which had been on watch almost continuously for 5 days, were near exhaustion and their fire was not as effective as previously. The planes attacked simultaneously from a number of points, diving to the attack at an angle of about 50 .
One torpedo struck amidships on the port side, one on the starboard quarter, and possibly a third on the port quarter; The torpedo which hit the starboard quarter wrecked the steering gear, jamming the rudders and causing the Bismarck to turn slowly in circles to the starboard. Frantic efforts were made to repair the damage: It was announced that the man who succeeded in freeing the rudders would be given the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross. Divers succeeded in centering one rudder, but the other could not be freed, Efforts were made to steer the ship by her engines, but after a short period, instead of proceeding on her intended southeasterly course, the Bismarck was actually northwest of her position when the attack was made. There appears to have been further controversy among the officers. The captain, when asked by an officer whether he should try to blow off the jammed rudder, is reported to have replied, "Do what you like; I am through with it." The ship's best speed was now reduced to 10 to 12 knots.
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Translation of
Reply to Questionnaire “Normandy”. Field Marshal Keitel
, Generaloberst Jodl
Question: 1. What were the successive plans considered by the OKW:
a) 6 Jun 44 when the Allies landed?
b) After they established a beachhead and the British and Americans had joined?
c) After the fall of Cherbourg (1 Jul 44)?
Answer: 1. to (a) above: The first plan was to eliminate the British as well as the American bridgehead, while both were still weak, through immediate counter-attacks. As the first step the British forces east of Orne [river] should be destroyed or thrown back across the Orne.
To 1 (b): After neither had succeeded and the American and British forces had united, but Cherbourg was still holding out, it was considered to break through the American front by an attack from Carentan to the west and to strike those forces attacking Cherbourg in the rear.
This intention, according to the Commander in Chief West could not be carried out.
The assembly and supplying of an assault unit so far to the west was too difficult and would have taken too long. Our own forces facing the British army - at that moment seemingly the more dangerous - would, of necessity, have had to be weakened too much.
The order previously given therefore remained in force namely, to break through to the British lines by an attack from the area southwest of Caen toward the northwest, gain the coast northwest of Bayeux and to defeat the British isolated from the Americans.
To 1 (c): This intention was maintained after the fall of Cherbourg. In addition all armored units had necessarily to be relieved at the front by infantry divisions.
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I am a bit confused, USCGC Modoc was on ice patrol, but was rescuing torpedoed ships crews in the Bay of Biscay and yet saw the Bismark, none of this appears in the US Navy Report. This is the extract
"Many anxious hours passed for the British, particularly as they assumed wrongly that Bismarck was retiring to the northeast. All hopes for finding her again rested on the many warships closing the area or in the long-range patrols by Coastal Command aircraft squadrons flying out of Britain and Iceland. In addition, many American patrol aircraft, including patrol squadron VP-52 out of Argentia, flew long search patrols in the waters of the western Atlantic. All these air patrols were made more difficult and dangerous by high winds, rain squalls, and low cloud cover.
It was not until 1010 on 26 May that British luck changed. A British Catalina aircraft of No. 209 Squadron, piloted by US Navy observer Ensign Leonard B. Smith, USNR (US Naval Reserve), spotted Bismarck at a range of about eight miles. While Ensign Smith flew the aircraft and evaded accurate German antiaircraft fire, his British copilot radioed a report of the enemy warship's location."
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How about an Official ONI Report?
Demoralization of the Bismarck's crew was now apparent. One officer is said to have drawn his revolver and shot several seamen who refused to obey him. Officers were reported to have committed suicide, and scores of the crew jumped overboard before the action ceased. Almost all of the 400 anti-aircraft gunners, for whom no special protection had been provided during surface action, became casualties.
The upper deck was being pounded into a mass of twisted steel. Hatches and doors were jammed in all parts of the ship. Crews in two magazines were drowned when it became necessary to flood the chambers because of fire. A direct hit crashed into a forward compartment where 200 men were trapped under jammed hatches. Fires on the gun deck cut off the forward half of the ship. The air was dense with smoke, fumes and the gases generated by the bursting shells. Paint was burning off the bulkheads and many men without gas masks were suffocated.
By 1000 all the Bismarck's 15-inch guns were out of action, and fire from the secondary battery was spasmodic. The Rodney, King George V, and the Norfolk, which had joined the action after spotting from the flanks, fired their last salvos front a range of only 8,300 yards. At 1010, out of the Bismarck's entire armament, only one anti-aircraft gun remained workable, The ship was a wreck, on fire fore and aft, and wallowing heavily. The British commander in chief broke off the gun action at 1022. The cruiser Dorsetshire then fired three torpedoes into the Bismarck, and she sank at 1037.
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@colinhunt4057 Doenitz. The situation which had developed in the destruction of the English expeditionary force and the weakness of the English land defenses caused us to entertain the idea of deciding the war in our favor by a rapid invasion of England. On account of the circumstances previously described as existing before the war and the surprisingly rapid development of the situation in the west, no preparations of any sort had been made. Since an invasion could only succeed if it took place quickly, in any case before the coming autumn, it was necessary now (Hitler himself gave orders for its preparation) to attempt to create the necessary conditions,
both as regards material and training, with the greatest haste and with every means of improvisation. To produce new landing craft in great numbers and in time was, from the point of view of material and construction, no longer possible even though at this time the naval ferry barge (M. F. F.) had been designed and completed. It was, therefore, necessary to fall back in the greatest possible measure on available tugs, as well as barges of the coastal and inland water transport system. These were modified for landing purposes. Their greatest disadvantage lay in their very limited seaworthiness (up to sea 3); and, as most of them were not self-propelled, they required towing. Investigations were made into landing conditions on the south coast of England and current and weather conditions in the Channel. Training of the troops intended for the landing was extended as more of the necessary materials became available and all possible preparations of a tactical nature were made.
From the beginning it was clear to the leaders that the invasion could succeed only under certain particular conditions. The navy was certainly not in a position to protect the landing forces against the English Fleet, whose full weight would have to be reckoned with in such a situation. This task would have to be taken over by the air force. To this end it was necessary not only to wipe out completely the Royal Air Force but also to attack beforehand the ports near the landing area with such effect that the English naval forces would have to withdraw to more distant bases. Otherwise the air force would not be able to prevent the enemy's naval forces from reaching the landing forces at night by short approach routes.
When in September 1940 the preparations for invasion were complete, it also became apparent that complete defeat of the English Air Force had by no means been achieved. Thus, one of the most important prerequisites for an invasion was lacking. There could be no question of a short postponement, for once October and the beginning of the autumn gales had set in, a longer period of good weather such as would be required for success could no longer be expected. Postponement to the spring of 1941 could only render the military conditions less favorable. With such limited prospects of success, the resolve to carry on with the invasion of England could not be justified unless it presented the only and final means of ending successfully the war against England. This was not the case, for the German leaders saw in the Mediterranean another possibility of striking a decisive blow against England. This was quite apart from the shipping war which, as U-boat numbers increased and with the yet-hoped-for forceful participation of the air force, should gradually produce some result.
Hitler, therefore, decided to abandon the invasion, although the apparent threat of it was to be maintained.
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