Comments by "" (@BobSmith-dk8nw) on "The A6M Naval Carrier Fighter - Zero or Hero?" video.

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  9. First off - let me say that this was an excellent presentation that broadened my understanding of the aircraft and the context in which it was used. That said, I have some comments to make. My primary, though far from my only source would be: Eric M Bergerud's - Fire In The Sky: The Air War In The South Pacific (available on Amazon (!!)) Boom & Zoom Japanese Naval Aviator Tactics: As to dog fighting vs. Boom and Zoom - Boom and Zoom is an offensive tactic whereas dog fighting, on the part of the Japanese Naval Aviators could be seen as a defensive tactic. If they were in a position to do so - then the Japanese might attack using Boom and Zoom tactics - but - if they were jumped - they would very commonly use the defensive loop tactic or if they were slow enough to do it begin turning fights. There are a couple of defensive moves aircraft favoring Boom and Zoom tactics might employ - one of which would be to turn into their attackers and take them on - head on. The more rugged Allied Fighters could do well here - but the Zeros could not. Also - another defensive tactic used by Allied aircraft would be the dive away. Here - Allied Aircraft tended to dive well - Zeros did not. It's not like the Allied Aircraft couldn't turn or loop - or that the Japanese aircraft couldn't dive - it was just that different aircraft were better at some things than others and better in some contexts than others. Good pilots knew when to do what - and bad pilots died. While the Chinese did start using I-15's and I-16's - they also had a number of biplane fighters, which you would expect to be more maneuverable. This may be one of the reasons for the Boom & Zoom tactics. As to Chennault's tactical acumen - he was a leading fighter proponent in the Army Air Corp before resigning and he DID start working with the Chinese Air Force as a trainer and an advisor to Chiang before becoming involved with the AVG. He would therefore have been familiar with what the Russian "Volunteers" were doing in engaging the Japanese - as well as what the Chinese pilots were doing. Rather than saying that it was really the Russians who came up with the "don't dog fight the Japanese" determination - it might be more accurate to say that they all had access to the same information and could form opinions together or on their own. Chennault then WAS the person who passed on this bit of information to the AVG pilots he recruited and trained. This information was available to Allied military's but these military's also had the combat experience of their own pilots in engaging the Japanese - so - the development of boom and zoom tactics to be used against the Japanese wouldn't have come from any one source. It was a tactical response by all concerned to the maneuverability of Japanese aircraft. Structural Integrity: It is my understanding that because the available engine wasn't powerful enough that armor and self sealing fuel tanks were known about but not used - but that the supporting structure - not just the skin - was also lightened. Here saying that it wasn't something that would fall apart at the slightest touch is one thing - but - how did it compare structurally to the F4F, P-40 and P-39 - or the Spitfires? We are not just talking about structural failures due to maneuvering - but battle damage. Something that is structurally stronger - can sustain more battle damage.  It is my understanding that the A6M and Japanese aircraft in general did not stand up structurally to battle damage as well as Allied Aircraft. Range: As to the reasoning behind the phenomenal range of the A6M & the G4M - it is my understanding that Japanese strategy for defending against the Americans was to take a number of islands where they could have land based aircraft, which was why the Japanese Navy had so many of them. The idea was that they could support each other, to defend Japan and attack American naval units trying to penetrate through this web of island bases. It was in support of this strategy that they wanted such long ranges for their aircraft - and - for the G4M to be such a fast bomber as well. Early Warning: As to the Philippines - the Japanese attacks were scheduled to come in early - just as the Americans suspected they would and had launched to deal with them. But - there were weather problems over Taiwan where they were launching from that delayed the launch - so that by the time they arrived over such as Clark Field - the Americans had all run out of gas and had to land. There were two American radar sets at Clark field that did detect the Japanese coming but all their planes were out of gas so they couldn't do anything about it. The Japanese knew exactly where those radar sets were and bombed both of them. One bit of info on this was that the sun came up in the Philippines before it did on Taiwan (by a bit) and MacArthur's air commander wanted to attack the Japanese air fields on Taiwan - but MacArthur wouldn't let him. In China - Chennault had developed an extensive early warning network of Chinese Observers who called in reports of Japanese Aircraft. Thus - the AVG aircraft had time to climb to altitude to make their interceptions with an energy advantage. Japan's Operations in the Solomon's: This was a horrible mistake on the part of the Japanese. What they should have done was let Guadalcanal go and concentrated on New Guinea. But - even after they lost Guadalcanal - they conducted an Air Offensive against Henderson Field that had a severe impact upon their losses to no good effect. The G4M's were flying to high and carried to small a bomb load to actually do any damage - so Japan squandered the cream of it's air power for nothing. Attacking targets at long range was exactly what they had planned on doing before the war even started - but it was a mistake. More so than the carrier battles - it was this air offensive that drained Japan of it's aerial strength, especially since the Carrier Air Groups were put ashore to take part in it - and were emasculated. Japans lack of a rotation policy deprived their new pilots of the experience of the veterans and these men were left on the vine to die - which impacted their morale. .
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  10.  @justinpyke1756  Ah ... I can see your point about the size of the A6M - as a smaller aircraft it's structural supports would be smaller - and hence more easily destroyed - even though they provided the same level of structural safety. Yes. Language is so important in being able to do original research. I had 5 semesters of Chinese but ... I have no facility for languages and for my MA had to rely on CIA and Rand Corporation Translations of Chinese news paper articles - which - leaves one open to criticisms that the CIA might just be biased - though not that I could tell. The people I knew from my language classes who really learned how to speak it - lived there for a while. But as a historian ... my lack of audial skill is a real limitation. One of the Sci Fi Writers I really envy - is David Drake. He translates Latin. It was such a joy to read the Penguin Classics translations of Caesar that ... I'd just be in History Nerd Heaven if I could read them in the original Latin ... For PhD. candidates - original research in the native language is a requirement. Eric M. Bergerud has a PhD. and is a professor but I don't know what he did his dissertation on - so I don't know what languages he's studied. Penguin has him listed as "professor of military and American history" so ... if he did his dissertation on American History - he'd been cool in the language requirement. I did note that someone by that name commented in the Pinned Q&A thread for this video, who seems to have a historical background but whether or not it's the same guy I couldn't say. I wrote him once asking if he was going to do Oil On The Water but he said he felt that this area had already had enough done on it (and that the idea that there was a book coming was someone else getting over eager). The thing I really loved about his books Fire In The Sky and Touched With Fire was that they weren't just histories but an analysis. Fire In The Sky has got to be my favorite book of all time - I've read it like 8 times and had to buy another copy because I wore the first one out. I tell you something about this video though - it has proven a gold mine for references. Thank You for that. Just from the research I was doing to make my comment ... I thought to do a search on Amazon for: Robert Sherrod's History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (Hardcover – 1952) And found it ... I read that book like 50 years ago (not an exaggeration) and now - I'm going to own a copy. I have got to stop doing that though ... buying up old books I read decades ago ... like the first book I read on Marine Corps history when I was 10 years old ... is going to put me in the poor house ... I keep saying that but I keep doing it ... Oh ... one more thing. If you are interested in looking at War Diaries and such. The U.S. Government had a lot of those that it captured at the end of WWII. If you can access a Federal Depository - at such as a University Library - they might be able to get you a list of the War Diaries the US Government has - and then - you might be able to find a way to access those War Diaries. Whether they would do an Interlibrary Loan or not - I do not know. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Depository_Library_Program Nick has talked about physically visiting archives in order to access their material but I do not know exactly which archives he was accessing. One thing about Nick - he actually gets paid to do this! Ha! Ha!  .
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