Comments by "" (@BobSmith-dk8nw) on "Guadalcanal Campaign - 1st Savo Island (IJN 1 : 0 USN)" video.

  1. Their problem, however competent their Navy was - was that as a nation - they were in over their head. Mikawa didn't engage the transports - which was what he should have done - because he knew that if he lost any of his ships - they could not be replaced. The Americans made mistakes and lost ships - but they were more than able to replace them. .
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  2.  @mryhdy6266  We'll never know. Their plan was to do what the North Vietnamese did in Vietnam and just outlast us but things were different in WWII. The press in WWII - was on our side - whereas in Vietnam they turned against us. Different people - different times. We should have won WWII no matter what - but - then again - we should have won in Vietnam too. .
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  3.  @augustosolari7721  If the Japanese had truly understood Mahan - he would have taken out the transports - but they didn't. If you look at the RN - whose resources weren't all that great either - THEY - with centuries of Naval Tradition - understood how to use a Navy. When they went after Bismarck - they went all out. They lost the Hood - but - they made a good hit on stopping the Germans from Commerce Raiding with their surface fleet as the Cargo Ships -were what it's all about. But - the thing with the RN was - all their Captains knew - that if they took on the enemy and hurt them - even if they lost their ship - Britain would build another one. The Japanese could never say that. Do you have a source for the exact wording (translated to English) of his orders? And - how would he know what the Army thought? Had the Army thought anything at the point at which he received his orders? The Japanese Army and Navy weren't known for talking to each other that much. Another factor in all this is the Japanese dogma (from the Battle of Tsushima) of The Decisive Battle where in their fleet would take on the US Fleet in this one big battle that would decide the war. That big battle had actually already come - at Midway but they continued to pursue that strategy and preserved The Combined Fleet at Truk - when committing it to the Solomon's could have made the difference. 1942 was the year the Japanese stood the best chance (and not a good one) of winning the war and the time to go all out with all their forces to defeat the Americans. However they persisted in this strategy of preserving their ships and lost. .
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  4. Not at that point. Later - once Henderson Field was activated - then they had aircraft that could and did hit the Japanese (like Hiei) if they were caught in Daylight within range - but here - the only American aircraft in range would have been from the Carriers. They did have some B-17's in the area but they'd never have been able to hit those ships. .
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  5. One thing - it is my understanding that a B-17 also filed a report that wasn't relayed on the Japanese ships as they came down the slot. .
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  6. Thanks. I've done extensive reading on this campaign and you had a lot of details I was unaware of. Good job. It can't be emphasized strongly enough how much peace time standards and attitudes hurt the USN at the beginning of WWII. Of course - such incidents as Kasserine Pass show - this attitude was not confined to the Navy. There were a lot of people who simply didn't cut it and had to be replaced. Mikawa should of course have gone after the transports - but - at this point in the war it can be understood that his attitude towards preserving ships and men that could not be replaced was justified as well. Here - the ingrained idea that they had to preserve their ships - caused the failure of the Japanese at Leyte Gulf - when Kurita preserved his ships - to no purpose what so ever. The Americans learned, promoted people who performed, got in the habit of using their technical advantages over the Japanese - such as radar - and thanks to a pre-war surge in American Ship Building - were able to replace all their losses and more. This series of engagements were WWII for the Japanese. Here - in 1942 - they were able to compete with the Americans and win. After that - no. The reasons it had been suicide to attack the Americans - as they knew - came to bear and they were doing nothing but trying to stave off the inevitable. .
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