Comments by "Mikko Rantalainen" (@MikkoRantalainen) on "Mentour Pilot" channel.

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  71. Actually, you cannot reduce power of a diesel engine by increasing fueling. As long as there're any unburnt oxygen atoms inside the cylinder dumping more fuel will improve power output slightly. However, the black smoke is only caused by unburnt fuel that's not successfully mixed with the oxygen. And of course the efficiency goes down because you're literally blowing unburnt diesel out out your tailpipe. It's my understanding that people doing this think that it looks cool or they imagine that the noise and smoke equals so much more power that it makes sense to do it side-effects. Some seem to do it as a protest against clean engines that somehow damage the brittle ego of the owner of said diesel car. The proper method to increase power output from a diesel engine is to increase fueling while increasing in air intake at the same time. In practice, this means high boost turbo setup with large injectors which gets pretty expensive soon. Dumping just extra fuel and "rolling coal" is the redneck version of improving engine performance. Diesel engines are always running lean because there's no throttle of any kind (the "rolling coal" setup is only version where the engine is not running lean). You always reduce fueling to reduce power. And to increase power you just increase fueling. Those of us that are not rolling coal stop injecting extra fuel when the engine would start to emit black smoke (= partially unburnt fuel which is obviously causes poor economy). Most modern diesel cars can be tuned to emit higher power with just a computer programming – however, the factory programming is selected to match the factory gearbox; unless you swap the gearbox (and maybe clutch) to stronger aftermarket alternative, the changes are high that the gearbox is going to fail pretty soon.
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  80.  @paulfogarty7724  Considering all the crap people are saying about Ryanair, I had to check this. I quickly went through Ryanair's incident history and it indeed appears that there has never been a crash. In fact, the most serious stuff I found was as follows: FR-654 in 2019 had FO incapacitated and captain returned for a safe landing. FR-3918 in 2018 had FO incapacitated and the captain declared Mayday in line with standard operating procedures and diverted to Trapani. FR-7312 in 2018 had loss of cabin pressure, the crew reacted in 2 seconds and initiated an emergency descent as expected. FR-1192 in 2018 had near collision when two planes got within 2.2 nm from each other; the cause was the failure of the PAL sector controller to identify the conflict in time. FR-314 in 2017 Overran runway on landing and came to a stop on the paved surface of the runway. There were no injuries. FR-4060 in 2017 had a tailstrike and returned for a safe landing after burning enough fuel. FR-817 in 2016 declared pan pan because icing caused engine problems. The aircraft made a normal approach and landing at Dublin and all passengers disembarked normally. FR-2446 in 2014 a loss of separation occurred because of controller error. FR-2848 in 2014 had a near collision due controller failure, the separation between the aircraft reduced to 100 feet vertical and 1.4nm lateral. FR-3152 in 2013 had captain incapacitated, FO diverted the aircraft to Faro (Portugal) 160nm southeast of their position for a safe landing on runway 10 about 25 minutes later. FR-3595 in 2013 had the separation between the aircraft reduced to 0.8nm laterally and 650 feet vertically involving a high risk of collision. The cause seemed to be both the controller and the crew not following proper radio protocol (not using their call-sign, not requiring read back). FR-1664 in 2012 had right pitot heating failed without indication causing instrument malfunction and the crew correctly diagnosed the problem and continued for a safe landing. Some flight in 2011 with Boeing 737-800 had FO incapacitated, the aircraft landed safely on Girona's runway 20 about 45 minutes after the first officer handed the controls to the captain. Some flight in 2010 with Boeing 737-800 had to declare mayday after diverting to alternate airport and the crew inadequate decision-making causing the fuel amount dropping below the required minimum reserve fuel. Legal minimum was 1139 kg and after landing the aircraft had only 956 kg. In 2010, a little girl fell through the gap between the handrail and the platform of the stairs during boarding in Spain. The girl received fractures of the ulna and radius of the left forearm. The CIAIAC analysed that although the extendable handrails protect sufficiently against the falls of adults, the gap between the handrail and the platform represents a danger for small children to fall through the gap. In addition to that, there were technical issues causing diversions but I couldn't find anything really serious. For example, FR-7411 in 2019 had to shutdown one engine in-flight due to lack of oil pressure. Seems surprisingly good track record for any airline with similar amount of flights!
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  181. Your video production quality is getting ridiculous high! And I don't mean that it's a problem. As for the content, it seemed that TransAsia had get-there-itis with their captain training program. I would assume that there were cultural issues, too. If I've undertood correctly, denying a request is considered very rude in many Asian cultures and that would make it harder for the Captain A to be denied the type certification. The pilot certification seemed a lot like p-hacking in bad research where you keep retrying until you get borderline acceptable result and then declare the test successful immediately. I fully agree that this was systematic failure within the company instead of the pilot just doing things against better judgement. This was underlined by the fact that the first airline with this person correctly grounded him or her because of multiple problems in training. I'm still wondering how on earth did this captain have successful career in the airforce? I would have expected airforce to be more strict about all pilot abilities than any commercial airline. I think pilot certification should be based on scientific measurements. For example, a valid method would be to decide minimum acceptable success rate for any task during the training, say 95%. And this success rate should be defined while designing the course, not per applicant. And if you fail some task (e.g. engine failure during takeoff in the simulator) you have to then repeat the task so many times that you can exceed the required rate – in practice it would mean that if you fail the task once, you have to then successfully repeat the same task for total of 19 times to get the success rate to 95% or better. And that would just barely demonstrate that you have 95% success rate for correctly handling the situation. It seemed that the Captain A had 25% or less success rate for handling engine failure during take-off even in the simulator. In real world situation the stress level would be even higher so the probability is going to get only worse.
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  250. Great video again! I would suggest a small improvement for future videos: I think it would be easier for the viewer if you repeated the year of the accident later in the video, especially in the part where you discuss how things have changed since the accident. This would make it easier to understand the progress that has been made in aviation safety and also underline how many years it takes to fully implement all the changes recommended in the report, if those recommendations are actually implemented industry-wide at all. And I fully agree that plain 1500 hour limit does very little to improve safety. I would rather have a count of correctly handled incidents in simulators. For example, different scenarios in the sim training could give different points for your pilot skill credit: safely landing a plane in heavy side-wind without working ILS might give you 1 point. And safely landing a plane in low visibility with windshear and an engine failure would give you 20 points. And of course, you wouldn't be told before the sim training what will happen outside the information you would have for any real flights either. And I would give points for correctly diagnosing any failures in the sensors, instrument or flight surface movement. Perhaps sim training should also include situations where the cockpit has been pre-configured before the tested pilot has entered the cockpit and the actual test starts at cruise flight and the pilot must correctly find some mistakes in the pre-configured state to safely land the plane? That would train the pilots to assume unknown mistakes or problems in the aircraft and always re-check things instead of assuming everything is okay.
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  301.  @brodeypecha9233  Jet engines are different from combustion engines because the jet engine is basically a open pipe with multiple fans rotating in it in a configuration where one axle is rotating inside an another one. And the fans closer to the fuel entry location are attached to the axle that's rotating around the another axle. And all the rotation is caused by moving air alone. A jet engine is rotating around 10000–20000 rpm during normal operation but the rotation speed is not directly causing the engine thrust which makes diagnosing the failing engine much harder than with combustion engine. Thrust is combination of fan movement and fuel burning. The dials in the cockpit do not show RPM but percentage of the operational range of that specific axle (labeled as N1 and N2, N2 being the axle that rotates around the N1). I think the biggest problem with old engines like in this aircraft is that they didn't have a dial to show engine vibrations. If you're missing parts of the engine, increasing RPM is not okay. Otherwise it should be okay to try to increase the thrust level if all N1, N2 and EGT are below redline like in this accident for the left engine, which was operating just fine. However, if the engine is missing a fan blade, pushing the power level up might cause the whole engine to explode which may seriously damage the wing if you're unlucky enough. Engines are designed to be strong enough to self-contain even in case of an engine explosion (which is not a guarantee, only a design objective) so I would have pushed left engine to higher power instead of ditching into the ocean even if it could potentially explode because that wouldn't be much worse than ditching into the ocean during the night anyway. That said, the pilots were obviously under much higher stress so making this kind of thinking during the incident might have been next to impossible.
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  307. Great video as usual! I have one question about the visualization show in this video. Shouldn't the attitude indicator show a lot more blue around 37:17? If I have understood correctly, the attitude indicator is driven by laser gyros and cannot be affected by freezing or other external error sources and should be assumed to be correct in case multiple indicators show data that doesn't make sense as a whole. If you're flying in cruising altitude and don't know which indicators are correct, trying to put the attitude indicator to straight on the center should be always the safe option. If you have engines in TOGA position, even if you were stalling initially in that orientation, it should be turn fine after engines can push you forward enough. And the pilot monitoring could verify if all three fully independant laser gyros agree on the attitude if you truly think that attitude indicator is also faulty. You point about the mental loss of hearing because of high stress could explain a lot of this accident. The replies from pilot flying didn't make much sense in the discussion and since the stall warning was also aural only, it could explain the behavior of the pilot, too. Regardless of the flying altitude, reaction to STALL warning should be to push nose down but this pilot didn't do that; not hearing the warning either would explain that behavior a lot better! It also appears that taking over the controls should be trained in simulator. In this case both pilots seemed to press the little red button on the stick without saying anything to the other pilot.
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