Comments by "Mikko Rantalainen" (@MikkoRantalainen) on "Mentour Pilot" channel.

  1. I was aware of the change blindness / selective attention (the original test with gorilla) so I did notice the tail fin. However, trying to be aware of the surroundings caused me to be off-by-one for the juggling so I failed the main task by trying to be aware of the surroundings. It's easy to imagine that under stress you would need focus on the main task so much that you would fail to notice anything abnormal nearby.
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  2. It's interesting that Asiana had company policy to use autopilot at all times possible but still the training didn't result in full understanding of the various autopilot modes. I would have assumed that with such a heavy emphasis on autopilot, fully understanding the autopilot behavior in all modes would be critical.
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  3. Because every thing in airplane can cause failure that might result in crash or fire unless you can turn the thing off.
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  4. This should be the pinned comment.
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  5. Thank you for sharing your thoughts. Could you elaborate a bit on the culture that you think was important background for this accident?
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  6. 6:00 Did I understand this correctly? The red stop bar lighting was diagnosed broken in 1998 and it was still not fixed at the time of the accident? I would understand such problems to exists for a couple weeks in worst case. And in case of broken lights, I would expect the airport to be automatically closed in case of fog because of being unable to execute the tasl safely. If the airport were closed every time there was fog, maybe they would have considered fixing those lights a bit more important?
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  7. 9:20 This makes me think that pilot training should contain tasks where the input data is intentionally so incorrect that the students should be able to figure it out and ask for clarification. If students learn that all input given by somebody else is always correct, they will never learn to always verify if any input they receive seems to make sense in big picture. Of course, such a sanity check cannot fix small problems but those are probably not dangerous enough to create a safety issue, unlike flying in totally incorrect direction and potentially running out of fuel even if they notice the problem later. And if something this happens in mountain range, then it could turn fatal very fast.
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  8. The only reasonable explanation I can see is the "once fuel leak has been confirmed" part above that. If they were only suspecting fuel leak by that point, then you don't need to follow the steps intended for confirmed case. However, when the computer system later confirmed it (even when all the signs already pointed to it) the crew failing to follow the official procedure makes no sense.
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  9. It seems that the problem was within Spirit which is even scarier because it means all Boeing aircraft and some other brands, too.
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  10. Also very stupid: removing automatic safety measures from the plane before trying this.
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  11. If all she got was being blacklisted from future flights, she should consider herself very lucky. That stunt must have caused pretty major costs for the airline.
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  12.  @gumby2241  See the link to official Final Report of the accident investigation in the description of the video. As you probably know, commerial planes have CVR so we have full recording of the conversations in the cockpit. Full transcript is in the Appendix 3 of the report. Among other things the report says this: "More generally, the CVR shows that at no time was there any dialogue or briefing related to a possible anomaly during takeoff, as required in the Air Algérie procedures" which quite clearly points the blame to the captain who should be responsible for procedures to be followed. If we didn't have CVR, then we would need to speculate more.
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  13. I agree. Also, I think that the worst low altitude situation would be system accidentally deploying reverse thrust on the left immediately after the plane has flied over the end of the runway. In that situation engine power is high and altitude is very low. Even if you couldn't figure out that high altitude situation would be bad, the takeoff configuration should have been included in testing at very minimum. (Or even worse situation would be deploying reverse thrust on all engines after the takeoff but that's definitely not possible to fix and shouldn't happen with true redundancy anyway.)
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  14.  @Sergioosh  I would agree with your reasoning in general. However, Boeing has done this enough many times that it appears to be systematic problem with their culture nowadays (and I mention nowadays here because Boeing used to be very safety oriented company maybe 40 years ago but things have gone bad since). It appears that there's great internal pressure for get-there-itis for the design of any new subsystem within Boeing. That doesn't work for single pilot aviation and it doesn't work for big company such as Boeing either. This accident and the whole MAX fiasco would be prime examples of this culture.
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  15.  @hbh3144  After the oxygen masks drop in the cabin you can start a clock. If pilots haven't contacted the crew within 10 minutes, you have MAJOR problems. Waiting for hours before trying to contact the cockpit or entering the cockpit (the locked doors were implemented only ater 9/11) has no sense whatsoever. People will start dying or at least getting brain damage within next 5 minutes once your 10 minute timer goes out so you cannot wait any longer.
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  16.  @liloruf2838  Lack of oxygen causes brain damage rapidly but hypothermia reduces the use of oxygen and other chemical reactions inside the brain so much that the brain damage is caused much more slowly. Of course, hypothermia may also kill you but that's much slower process again.
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  17. That was the captain's way to inform the FO that he's too drunk to fly.
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  18.  @Flightsimmovies  99.9 is same as 50% for most people. Either something is absolutely sure either way or it has 50% change of being either one. If you really understand math, you are not part of the common people nowadays.
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  19.  @hbh3144  If the pilots really understood that the cabin pressure was incorrect they would either fix the pressurization or taken the plane below 10000 ft. They did neither. Nor did they use their own oxygen masks either. It seems pretty clear that pilots didn't have a clue but crew should be able to figure out if the plane took the descent or not. In the end, nobody can know for sure because there are no recordings. However, at least one crew member did understand that he needs extra oxygen so he did also understand that they're flying high without pressurization. And to figure that out, he must used oxygen for the whole flight because otherwise he couldn't have figured that out and would have passed out once first oxygen source went empty.
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  20. I did watch the sequence a couple of extra times and I can see the fin, the pole getting shorter (imagine that being the fuel indicator!) and one of the street signs changing a couple of times. I still cannot see the kitty anywhere – can somebody give a timestamp and color to look for? Update: found it: bottom right corner around 18:05 but it's rendered under the Youtube user interace in case you have the controls visible on the screen. In addition, the graphics is pretty dim so it cannot be seen if you have lots of screen glare.
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  21. I find it really surprising that recommendations didn't include training to trust the attitude indicator. The changes of three separate attitude sensors all failing at the same time are so close to zero that it would be sensible to question every other sensor data you have before that – especially when attitude sensors do not require any input from external sources unlike e.g. airspeed or angle of attack indicators. Had the pilots trusted the attitude indicators, the situation would have been under control pretty fast. Also, I would have expected recommendation to automatically always declare pan pan if an engine is lost at high altitude. Update: loved the "it's always better than your vestibular system"!
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  22.  @CrowPal  I agree that the plane should not be considered safe to fly with this many faults on a single flight even if engineer reports "no fault found". That should be pretty clear indicator that the engineer simply doesn't undestand the issue and shouldn't be making any claims about the safety of the plane. The fact that previous intermittent problems were "fixed" by simply replacing random parts also suggests that the root fault wasn't found.
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  23. @James Thompson By the time they run out of predefined waypoints, every display would have something abnormal on the screen. They weren't even glancing.
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  24. I agree. I expected at least some head damage and maybe permanent brain damage due lack of oxygen because it sure is not easy to breath in such a wind. However, cold environment does reduce the damage due lack of oxygen in brain so it might have helped here.
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  25. Props to the artist that create the comic panels. Or if it was AI, props to the prompter because getting that even results with current AI is really hard.
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  26. You should put your seat belt properly even for the car ride into town (that includes the lower belt not going across your stomach as many overweight people too often use it). Most car accidents happen when the driver is too familiar with the surroundings.
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  27. I agree. I think this captain would have needed a hard lesson about this and the way to proceed with that would have been the FO to say "your controls" after they received the takeoff clearance but the plane was still standing still. There's no way the captain could have taken the flight at that point and they would had have to taxi off the runway to discuss about why things got that far without proper preparations for the flight. Unfortunately, this didn't happen and over a hundred people got killed.
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  28. I too have previously only heard the explanation that load shifted and caused center of gravity to change. Nobody told that it was actually more probable that cargo crashed the back of the plane breaking stuff. And the parts found on the airway clearly point out that the plane suffered huge hardware failure already before the crash. Great content from you as always!
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  29. My thoughts exactly, too. This video made me to think how important it's that the legislation doesn't make rules that cause get-there-itis on the expense of the safety. The actual reasoning behind the change was to make sure that captains do not regularly get too much work without enough rest but if the law is poorly written, it cannot handle special cases like the bombing behind this disaster. Had the law been that if the rest time cannot be followed, the captain is forced to have one day off following the flight, there wouldn't be such a pressure for quick departure.
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  30.  @HenryLoenwind  The problem here was that a plug was signed as door. You cannot open a plug, simply detach it.
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  31. 24:03 I'm not a pilot but when you're flying in clouds and hear "Bank Angle" warning, shouldn't you look at the attitude indicator and maybe backup attitude indicator to figure out what to do, instead of looking or feeling the yoke? When you consider what could possibly fail in a modern jet, attitude indicator is maybe the most reliable data input you can have.
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  32.  @Lovedbychrist1  I agree that the most astounishing part was that nobody noticed extra bolts after putting the door/plug in place. I would be pretty unhappy to find 4 unattached bolts after maintaining a car, let alone an airplane. Did somebody notice those bolts and simply pocket them instead of raising an issue that they found extra bolts but do not know where they belong to?
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  33.  @charleshammer2928  I agree that they should have grounded that plane but they were following Boeing instructions. When a repair was attempted that resolved the issue even for a short time, the 500 hour timer would be reset. I totally disagree with the timer reset – if the fault affects the same system time after time, it's clearly faulty and timer reset must not be done. This problem was caused by Boeing on so many levels, including all the effort to dodge the blame after the accident which required Lauda himself to be really persistant with the investigation.
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  34. Awesome video, as usual! In the end, I can only wonder how on earth this airport was allowed to operate this way? It clearly had lots of things wrong and still was used for commerial flights. I would understand this kind of problems for hobby use and IFR conditions.
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  35.  @Robbedem  Perhaps companies are pushing FAA little to high to lower the bar for new pilots? I understand that companies would like to have more pilots on market to lower the salaries but lowering the bar to entry for the skill required is absolutely the wrong answer.
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  36. Yes, and understanding that humans are very prone to confirmation bias. If things start to go out of expected state, re-evaluate the situation to see if you have misunderstood something seriously wrong.
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  37.  @hairyairey  If this happened today, pretty much every passanger has a GPS + GLONASS enabled device in their pocket which can automatically report location down to 5–10 meters when they call 112 (that's the 911 for Europeans).
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  38. Great video as usual! In addition to the things you mentioned in the video, I think that the tech log should always include constant notice about potentially misbehaving systems in the aircraft. And I think that 500 hour counter reset is not safe thing to do. If the issue cannot be fixed in 500 flight hours, then the plane should be grounded until the fault can be fixed for real. At the minimum the tech log should contain static item saying "Potential reverse thrust deployment in mid-air due unknown fault, maintenance hasn't been able to solve the problem since 17 Sep 1990.". 500 flight hours is roughly equivalent to 25000 km or 15000 miles in a car. If I had a car that had constantly re-appearing fault for so long, I wouldn't simply keep resetting some kind of counter and pretend that maybe it's now okay unless the actual cause has been fixed. The car analog would be ABS system failure or airbag failure randomly appearing every now and then. For sure, if I was lending such a car to somebody, I would tell that it may have some unknown failure of those parts instead of saying that the car is all-ok. And maybe figure out what's the expected end result (can it have total brake failure? is it possible that the airbag explodes on your face while driving?) and how to deal with the situation if that happens even before starting to use it.
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  39. Why wasn't LRD designed to instantly shut down the bleed air valve? If the known side-effect of LDR activation was always dumping 13 litres of oil into the engine which will then get into bleed air, surely the engineers creating this system could have figured out that it's not a good idea to breath the resulting mist??
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  40. That part was interesting to me, too. I guess either (1) they were so stressed by that time that they accidentally pressed the wrong button or (2) it seemed like a solution to start covering their tracks. The fact that cockpit voice recorder breaker was not pulled open after the landing seems fishy, too.
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  41. Landing at speed of 124 nautical miles per hour (about 230 km/h) and trying to brake on slippery road is going to be sketchy no matter how you do it. Even in a passanger car with winter tires, that could require maybe 2000 meters in very slippery conditions.
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  42. It's really interesting that any pilot would even thought that it's okay to fly without fuel gauge. It's not unheard to get fuel leak in the air and without a fuel gauge, there's no way to figure that out in time.
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  43.  @bookcat123  You should explain at least once why you're repeating the instructions. It's a systematic method to avoid accidents caused by yet unknown future miscommunication. And since you cannot know when the future miscommuncation will happen, you have to make it a habit to always repeat the instructions to verify the communcation has been understood correctly. Computer communication systems use checksums for this but humans cannot use that method effectively so repeating the full message or at least the key parts is the only way to verify that the communcation succeeded. The key point is that communication errors happen even between computers so you should never ever assume that communcation between humans would automatically succeed.
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  44. ​@James Thompson It's hard to say for sure because it seems that the pilots were not telling everything but it seems probable that they would have noticed any loud enough sound because they reacted to cabin crew call, too. The question is if cabin crew wouldn't have done anything, would they have kept flying until low fuel sound would have woken them up?
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  45.  @DeneF  Maybe he made clothes from the extra parts?
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  46. If the auto-mechanic floors the engine to diagnose it and the original failure is failing oil pump, that floor it / hammer it diagnosis method will rapidly convert a cheap fix to a very expensive fix.
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  47. 15:50 How on earth tower control or ground control wouldn't be aware of all markings on the taxi roads and runway? Is this assumed to be normal today on other airports?
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  48. I think the first officer should have said "your controls" when they got takeoff clearance. They would then had to taxi back to discuss about why captain had zero preparations done for the flight.
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  49.  @russcampiond05  What I would like to know is did the 3rd pilot notice that the FO started to press buttons and pull speed brake without saying anything? That would have been valueable information to the captain to better understand the situation. Especially when the captain had already taken control you wouldn't expect FO to press autopilot or touch the speed brakes – why didn't the 3rd pilot say anything?
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  50.  @souledgar  737 MAX is a great example why any automation able to control flight surfaces in aircraft should be based on redundant hardware and still be speficially trained for the pilots. Boeing pretended that you can use single point of failure and skip training – only to reduce costs to the airlines and increase profit margins. 346 casualties tell otherwise.
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  51.  @kenbrown2808  One extra flight with the helicopter nearly pays for a full ambulance in the barn. Helicopters are insanely expensive to fly.
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  52.  @Noel_Jaco8  I agree that it was AI assisted at minimum but getting all those frames from AI with prompting only would still seem really hard. As a result, I would guess it was more like "apply this style to these drawings".
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  53. Also lots of evidence for not actually following the already established rules.
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  54.  @larrydavis9582  If you see the original dash cam video, you'll find that the speed of the plane as it's falling is at least the whole length of the plane body per second. As the length and the wingspan of 747 is around 70 m, you can estimate that the speed of the plane is at least 70 m/s. The changes for surviving such an impact with the ground is slim to none regardless of fire.
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  55. There's a great documentary here in YouTube about that accident. Try searching for "When the Soviet Navy Lost 16 Admirals in a Single Accident: The Tu-104 Crash at Pushkin"
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  56. I agree. Great video and I'm pretty sure I wouldn't have been able to use such respectful language about these pilots.
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  57.  @avengingmime  Especially when they had already noticed after first flight that the cargo had shifted. If the cargo shifted even without any incident, it should be pretty easy to guess that if they get into heavy turbulence, the cargo will get loose. And if you have 5 huge vehicles on board with (already known!) borderline straps, having one loose will knock the rest loose with 100% probability.
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  58.  @mickeypopa  Unless I've been mistaken, Alpha Floor Protection would have prevented engines going to idle when the plane was even trying to fly so low and slow. The cause of this crash was basically that the captain applied throttle too late and spooling from idle to full power took longer than the space available. They explicitly disabled the safety systems of the plane to be able to execute the manouver that caused the crash. That was because the safety systems would not have allowed to even try such a manouver.
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  59.  @sebastianwittmeier1274  I was trying to give a possible reasoning to not blindly trust the computer declared emergency. However, you should never assume that computer is the one giving incorrect result. But you shouldn't assume computers are perfect either, especially as long as computers are programmed by humans (or even future AI which is also non-deterministic because it uses randomness in decision making).
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  60.  @supremelord8605  I think the general rule is that if the aircraft doesn't follow expected behavior but still keeps flying, avoid doing any changes to the configuration. As a result, the captain might have wanted to avoid touching the trim switches if simply pulling hard enough kept the plane in the air. When you're having trim not working as expected, it could be failing jack screw for the trim and if you then try to re-adjust it, you could lose control of the whole plane. The whole trim system with the jack screw create a single system without redundancy any more than you could survive missing left wing.
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  61.  @djs2006  Cockpit cannot be separately pressurized because that you need a wall between cockpit and the passanger cabin strong enough to contain the pressurization. It's much simpler to just have oxygen masks for the pilots in the cockpit but of course that requires that pilots understand what's the purpose of those masks are. The pilots for this flight seemed to have so poor training that they failed to understand the need to wear masks.
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  62.  @jimkiser1429  I fully agree. It should be possible to interview the crew to make sure the "fault" is not just misunderstanding. However, once it has been made sure that there was an actual malfunction and the cause wasn't found, the status should definitely be "intermitted fault, reason unknown" instead of "no fault" or "fault has been fixed".
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  63.  @OceanSpirit881  I fully agree that hindsight is 20/20 and it's easy to say that the piping should have been fixed/guarded earlier. I think the manufacturer is to blame here: if they had specified reduced flying hours for the part without the fix, it would have been checked more often or the fix would have been applied. When optional fix is available but not installing it doesn't cause any documented issues, not installing the fix should be the expected outcome. This is no different from computer system where people do not install software or firmware updates unless absolutely necessary.
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  64. Or maybe not loose the remaining three belts so much. If those had been tight enough, there's no way he could have been sucked out of the window alive.
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  65.  @marcellkovacs5452  I agree that it would have been really hard to figure out that the switch is reversed. However, after dealing with multiple broken switches in various things, I've built a habit to try moving the switch full movement range a couple of time if I ever think there's a problem with the switch. In this case, it would have meant that I would have moved the switch full range and maybe noticed that when I go full range to wrong direction, things get better. Even in that case, I'd have assumed that the switch is somehow mechanically broken inside instead of being installed upside down. Moving a switch over full movement range sometimes helps in case there's dust in the switch or if the switch contains sliding carbon parts where carbon deposits may move around inside the switch in case of failure.
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  66. Right. If the flight engineer accidentally turned off the water injection system and realized it, he should have said it out loud so that the pilot flying knows about the issue and the the flight engineer could try to restart the system.
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  67.  @larrydavis9582  The drag matters so much that the height is not the thing that kills. The only thing that matters is the collision speed. This plane did fall sideways for so long that it acquired quite a lot speed and even though the wings were closer to horizontal near the crash, that can increase the drag only a little compared to vertical speed. From the video alone it seems clear that the collision speed was more than 70 m/s and you can compare this to human terminal velocity (that is, the max speed for human body when jumping from a plane without a parachute, somewhere in range 50-90 m/s) the changes of survival in that crash are about the same as hopping on a car from an airplane in cruise altitude. The springs and crushing metal on the car do help a bit but probably not enough.
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  68.  @valerieann8007  Of, interesting to know. I always assumed that any pinned message is a human decision by the channel owner.
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  69. Why did Boing design the auto throttle to not avoid stall in all situations similar to Airbus alpha floor protection? I understand that there needs to be ability to switch it off in case of sensor malfunction but why disable such protection system automatically for normal autopilot mode changes?
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  70.  @CelesteBertin  I think the change to word order for repeat is done to require some mental thinking with those words. If you only repeat the exactly the words, you don't need to understand the meaning of those words so you may immediately forget what was said.
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  71. Actually, you cannot reduce power of a diesel engine by increasing fueling. As long as there're any unburnt oxygen atoms inside the cylinder dumping more fuel will improve power output slightly. However, the black smoke is only caused by unburnt fuel that's not successfully mixed with the oxygen. And of course the efficiency goes down because you're literally blowing unburnt diesel out out your tailpipe. It's my understanding that people doing this think that it looks cool or they imagine that the noise and smoke equals so much more power that it makes sense to do it side-effects. Some seem to do it as a protest against clean engines that somehow damage the brittle ego of the owner of said diesel car. The proper method to increase power output from a diesel engine is to increase fueling while increasing in air intake at the same time. In practice, this means high boost turbo setup with large injectors which gets pretty expensive soon. Dumping just extra fuel and "rolling coal" is the redneck version of improving engine performance. Diesel engines are always running lean because there's no throttle of any kind (the "rolling coal" setup is only version where the engine is not running lean). You always reduce fueling to reduce power. And to increase power you just increase fueling. Those of us that are not rolling coal stop injecting extra fuel when the engine would start to emit black smoke (= partially unburnt fuel which is obviously causes poor economy). Most modern diesel cars can be tuned to emit higher power with just a computer programming – however, the factory programming is selected to match the factory gearbox; unless you swap the gearbox (and maybe clutch) to stronger aftermarket alternative, the changes are high that the gearbox is going to fail pretty soon.
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  72. I agree. The graphics were best this far and the rest of the video was superb as usual, too.
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  73. Awesome video as usual! I had heard about this accident previously but the level of details you had is way above the other sources.
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  74. Any bidding system that requires 150 pages of documentation for end user has so backwards design that it should never ever be used for anything.
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  75. Great video once again! I would have never guessed that perfectly lining up on the runway would be a bad thing but this video clearly explains the risks.
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  76. Just make sure you never travel on Airbus plane because this video only has instructions for Boeing only.
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  77.  @LotusDecember  I failed to understand if you think that it's hard to prompt AI image generators to emit 30 images with the same character for specific scenes. I find it very hard and if you think otherwise, I'd love to see you prompting the same comic book style pictures but this time with a character that looks like the main character from the Fallout TV series. Definitely doable but really really hard.
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  78.  @sebastianwittmeier1274  The discrepancy between calculated and actual fuel usage could also be caused by broken flow meter so I wouldn't call that alone "confirmed" yet.
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  79.  @issakproano  Good point! I just read about TAM Transportes Aéreos Regionais Flight 402 and that's exactly the situation I was thinking. It's interesting that this year 1996 accident had following recommendation in the accident report: "Primary Homologation Bodies a. They are to improve the quality of the analyses of all bulletins, even if considered MINOR CHANGES, regardless of their classification, and are to determine that it is mandatory, for the manufacturers, to remake the FAULT TREE ANALYSIS for every and any proposition of modification in any of the systems, that may in some way interfere with the aircraft's airworthiness." Had this first recommendation followed with MAX, we wouldn't have had those two huge accidents with it.
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  80.  @paulfogarty7724  Considering all the crap people are saying about Ryanair, I had to check this. I quickly went through Ryanair's incident history and it indeed appears that there has never been a crash. In fact, the most serious stuff I found was as follows: FR-654 in 2019 had FO incapacitated and captain returned for a safe landing. FR-3918 in 2018 had FO incapacitated and the captain declared Mayday in line with standard operating procedures and diverted to Trapani. FR-7312 in 2018 had loss of cabin pressure, the crew reacted in 2 seconds and initiated an emergency descent as expected. FR-1192 in 2018 had near collision when two planes got within 2.2 nm from each other; the cause was the failure of the PAL sector controller to identify the conflict in time. FR-314 in 2017 Overran runway on landing and came to a stop on the paved surface of the runway. There were no injuries. FR-4060 in 2017 had a tailstrike and returned for a safe landing after burning enough fuel. FR-817 in 2016 declared pan pan because icing caused engine problems. The aircraft made a normal approach and landing at Dublin and all passengers disembarked normally. FR-2446 in 2014 a loss of separation occurred because of controller error. FR-2848 in 2014 had a near collision due controller failure, the separation between the aircraft reduced to 100 feet vertical and 1.4nm lateral. FR-3152 in 2013 had captain incapacitated, FO diverted the aircraft to Faro (Portugal) 160nm southeast of their position for a safe landing on runway 10 about 25 minutes later. FR-3595 in 2013 had the separation between the aircraft reduced to 0.8nm laterally and 650 feet vertically involving a high risk of collision. The cause seemed to be both the controller and the crew not following proper radio protocol (not using their call-sign, not requiring read back). FR-1664 in 2012 had right pitot heating failed without indication causing instrument malfunction and the crew correctly diagnosed the problem and continued for a safe landing. Some flight in 2011 with Boeing 737-800 had FO incapacitated, the aircraft landed safely on Girona's runway 20 about 45 minutes after the first officer handed the controls to the captain. Some flight in 2010 with Boeing 737-800 had to declare mayday after diverting to alternate airport and the crew inadequate decision-making causing the fuel amount dropping below the required minimum reserve fuel. Legal minimum was 1139 kg and after landing the aircraft had only 956 kg. In 2010, a little girl fell through the gap between the handrail and the platform of the stairs during boarding in Spain. The girl received fractures of the ulna and radius of the left forearm. The CIAIAC analysed that although the extendable handrails protect sufficiently against the falls of adults, the gap between the handrail and the platform represents a danger for small children to fall through the gap. In addition to that, there were technical issues causing diversions but I couldn't find anything really serious. For example, FR-7411 in 2019 had to shutdown one engine in-flight due to lack of oil pressure. Seems surprisingly good track record for any airline with similar amount of flights!
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  81.  @crucifyrobinhood  The water injection only reduces combustion temperature. That allows reading gasoline engine leaner or to reduce risk of burning your pistons with high enough boost. You cannot be rolling coal and then add water injection to fix problems with too little oxygen. Sure, water has oxygen but it has already been burnt to create water.
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  82.  @dredeth  I feel that it was historically used just to explain that weird edge cases can happen in any system. Nowadays it's used to claim that any wild explanation is supposedly still correct despite any contrary evidence – as if any contrary evidence is just some kind of weird edge case that can be safely ignored. As a result, straw man argument is pretty close to the current usage way too often.
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  83. White roof makes a lot of sense for the hotel because they have to cool the building a lot and having white roof reduces the heat input. Adding two red flashing lights would make a lot more sense – probably cheaper to implement and better safety during poor weather.
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  84.  @Delibro  Many people take jobs they don't actually want to do if they pay well...
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  85. Great video as usual! I think this incident should have prompted to introduce a standard method for INOP markers on the controls within the yoke. If a method is not available, the aircraft shouldn't be considered safe to fly with any inoperating control within the yoke.
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  86. I was thinking the same thing. If there was a button that you have to press every 15 minutes, you couldn't be too distracted for an hour. Trains have had dead man's switch for a century because those run nearly automated most of the time. I'd expect similar things to be seen in many more things in the future if we try to keep humans in the monitoring/standby positions.
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  87. It would make sense to improve rules on the sterile cockpit. Maybe define that if parking brake is active, sterile cockipit is not required but minimum switch time from non-sterile cockpit on the taxiway to takeoff is 10 minutes? This would allow pilots to stop chit-chat if they think they could have takeoff in the near future but if they know they are 15th plane in the queue, there's no hurry. And if they think that they might get clearance within next 10 minutes, no chit-chat.
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  88. I think this incident demonstrates that have a LOT of experience in flight hours doesn't mean that the pilot actually understands the aircraft. It seems that both pilots had poor understanding of automatic features of this aircraft in addition to poor communication between the pilots. It was also bit scary that the pilots had trouble figuring out how to get the aircraft out of TOGA LOCK state. It's like having your cruise control force enabled in your car without immediate knowledge about how to cancel it.
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  89. The crazy part was that the maintenance engineer just inspected the plane and said he or she couldn't find any problem with it. So the pilots were sent to new trip with plane full of passangers with zero fixes or explanations. I'm pretty sure I will not be entering any Royal Air Maroc planes in the future. This seems more like company level issue than about skill of these pilots.
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  90.  @OGLizardKing  If you know you're flying high above the sea, just trust your attitude indicators. Those are backed by three fully separate laser gyros in modern aircraft and the wings will rip away at random more often than all those gyros fail at the same time.
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  91. I agree. Running on autopilot with preprogrammed flight path and running out of waypoints should be nearly as bad as autopilot disabling automatically. The sound be different but still equally loud.
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  92. It could have been actually the other way around. If he had been the best maintenance engineer in his team for a long time, he could have turned complacent and not be critical enough to really verify that he has done a good job. Eyeballing the screws points to this direction, too. I wouldn't expect junior maintenance engineer eyeballing any parts or not using torque wrench.
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  93. Good video, again! The only question I have about OFDM is why isn't it made mandatory already?
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  94.  @robjows  Garlic does slightly reduce blood pressure. According to WebMD, taking garlic by mouth seems to reduce systolic blood pressure (the top number) by about 7-9 mmHg and diastolic blood pressure (the bottom number) by about 4-6 mmHg in people with high blood pressure. However, I agree that you must have some kind of allergies on top of that because otherwise the effect it too little to cause dizziness.
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  95. If extra distance for energy management can avoid even one go-around per 10 landings, it will also save fuel because extra distance is very cheap compared to fuel consumption of a go-around.
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  96. 17:40 I guess solar powered bad weather sensors was really green idea.
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  97. I think there should be automated verification of pilot inputted value but I think the pilots should manually input whatever value they think is the correct one. The automatic verification could be against radio altimeter and GPS vertical positioning. And in case of error, tell the pilots that the values do not match. I think it would be good to only tell the pilots how much difference there's is in the different measurements so that the pilots get an estimate about the accuracy of the readings they can see in the instrument panel. If you had minimums of 800 ft and instrument panel says your height is 1400 with possible error of 300 ft, you'd be much more careful about your approach.
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  98.  @Qwertworks  Yeah, one would wonder why the manufacturer put such features in passanger airplane. Whoever accepted that the safety features should be disabled for this passanger flight should deserve a lot of the blame.
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  99. I would put this accident on company policy of always using auto throttle. I guess that's a fine policy but with such a policy, training should include sim runs for auto throttle failure during any part of the flight, including initiating go-around over the runway. Always expect any automated system to fail during the worst possible moment. Had they trained that way, they would have have routine to check if the auto throttle is indeed working correctly and that would have saved from this accident.
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  100. Great video as usual! The whole story sounds like the professional pride of practically everybody affecting this accident was pretty low. If I were maintaining an aircraft that has auto-throttle issues for 8 years and I couldn't fix the issue, it would be time to get somebody more qualified to fix the aircarft instad of keep flying with random attempts to fix it without really understanding the issue. On the other hand, the pilots not accurately reporting split for the autothrottle failures, there's high probability that the maintenance is looking for wrong clues. And the inadequate sim training was definitely not an accident but a company culture, which nobody bothered to fix. And I think company culture was also the cause for the home-made non-default procedure for upset handling that was never confirmed by the manufacturer.
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  101. Great video as usual. One idea for future improvements would be to include the year or even date of the original incident in the description to make it easier to find the correct video when you're searching for specific video on the channel.
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  102.  @marhawkman303  I agree. Instead of "delete all" button they should have "dismiss all" button to clear the screen but not delete the messages forever.
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  103. Well played, sir!
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  104.  @Blazo_Djurovic  The holding pattern that they were supposed to follow would have been perfectly safe is they had kept the minimums specified. I still cannot understand how a pro crew could fail to see such an important data in the map. Did they think that the minimum for the holding pattern means the minimum to enter the holding pattern but you're allowed to fly lower within the holding pattern if ATC gives you permission?
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  105.  @Blazo_Djurovic  Maybe it's just me but I would be aware of status of "have we safely completed briefing" even if I had been interrupted by passager, kid, ATC or a fly. Establishing safe minimums for every part of the flight should be bare minimum required to consider briefing complete before even considering the landing.
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  106.  @Freeeez3  How could a professional pilot try to fly to a previously unknown airfield without carefully studying the map? If that indeed happened, it wasn't a simple mistake they did for one flight, it was a systematic failure in their methodology.
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  107.  @Kaptain13Gonzo  Another good example of relativistic time :D
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  108.  @yungsh0ttalex592  Russia is indeed highly probably sourcing missing parts from unofficial sources. And then can only hope that they get original parts and not some random counterfeit parts because they won't have any way to confirm the parts from the manufacturer. And of course the unofficial sources know this, too, so there's incentive to sell counterfeit parts because the buyer cannot verify the product.
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  109. Interesting video as usual from you! It seems obvious that the major reason for this accident was get-there-itis. Had they executed go-around when runway wasn't visible on minimums, they would have missed the original destination but avoided the accident, which is a book example of get-there-itis.
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  110. The problem is that such monitoring systems would need electricity to work and circuit breakers are supposed to cut electricity automatically. As a result, the pilots are supposed to visually inspect the system and notice the abnormal breakers using the material colors. I guess it would be nice to have to have computer system to automatically warn about failed circuit if such detection can be done using the remaining wiring but pilots cannot trust such warning system to work so the checklist would still need to require manual verification. The same applies for your car but there checking the circuit breakers manually is much more difficult and stopping the car in case of problems is not as hard as stopping a 100 ton aircraft flying 10 km above the land. This incident highlights how well the pilots should/could know their aircraft. If either of the pilots knew that the battery circuit breaker is required for alternative gear out system, they might have tried to activate that breaker, too. It's a bit surprising that the technician didn't know this either!
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  111.  @dredeth  The "exceptions confirm the rule" is just an old expression that's used to deflect any counter arguments after you've decided your mind about something. It's about pretending that whatever was said earlier is true "rule" regardless of some contrary information. I'm not sure if it's more commonly used as a joke or an actual dismissal argument nowadays.
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  112. Even truck drivers have much stricter standards for mandatory rest times and fatigue prevention than medical staff.
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  113. However, they are not going to stress about that too much!
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  114. Great video as usual! I already knew most of the stuff in this video and you could still provide some additional details that I hadn't heard previously. And I really like the fact that you focus on known facts and minimize the interpretations and guesses – this is like the scientific counterpart to many other documentaries that want to tell stories in addition about the accident itself.
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  115. Great episode and superb animations on this one!
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  116. You've definitely earned subscription and a bell! And nice cliffhanger at the outro!
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  117. I think that the elevators were supposed to hang towards the ground when the plane didn't have airspeed so it was in the expected orientation. The problem was that airspeed was supposed to turn the elevator in horizontal orientation but that didn't happen because the hinge didn't move. However, the yoke only moved the control tabs and that part would have worked despite the elevator being jammed. The problem was that there was no standard way to move the elevator at all without the plane moving with enough airspeed.
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  118. Damn.. you're not allowed to park even semi trailers without wedges in Finland. And those trailers have brakes that lock by removing pressure meaning only way to release the brake is to re-pressurize the system. Why would you ever park a plane without chocks?
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  119. Yes, that tells a lot about the usual software quality in planes. A safe way to deal with that would be to assume computer is broken BUT still consider all blamed systems as broken, TOO. It would be safe to assume that you have to complete the flight without the computer or any of the systems that the computer reported as problematic. If losing all those systems is not safe, it's time to start looking for place to land as soon as possible.
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  120.  @fluchschule  After hearing about accidents like this, I'm starting to think that "Dual input" should override even the GWPS warning.
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  121. 25:18 It seems that flight safety routine should include part where the crew says "in case of evacuation, if I see you reaching for your luggage, I'll shoot you immediately without a warning".
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  122. I think the problem is that to be a captain, you should have better success rate for critical tasks than say 10%. If you fail some specific task (e.g. correctly handling engine out during take-off in a simulator) 9 times in a row and then succeed once, you should be considered to have about 10% abilitity to correctly handle the situation. Instead, many training programs assume that you know the task 100% since you executed it correctly!
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  123. And the sound of reverse thrust, too. If you are expecting to hear the sound of reverse thrust immediately after every landing and you would hear normal engine noise instead, you'd know that something is going wrong.
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  124. Great video as usual! I have to wonder how fast the engines fail if you push them to too high power without working water injection? It appears that if they could have pushed the engines for 60 seconds, it would have been enough to get them safely to the sea – would the engines fail before that if they just pushed full power in a case like this? (Obviously that would ruin the engines but it would be much better than a crash.)
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  125.  @moviemad56  Yes, pulling too much power from a jet engine will damage it. The question is how much it will lose power – will it give above nominal max power for 2 seconds or 2 minutes before failing?
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  126.  @VWaudiRULEs  Unless I've misunderstood somehting, the MCAS system using only AoA sensor was intentional decision to avoid FAA rules. FAA rules say that if any aircraft system is built redundant, it will be automatically considered critical. And pilots must have specific training for all critical systems which would have prevented MAX from using the same type training as non-MAX version. And that would have caused major issues for the sales department. So they instead went with "this is not a critical system and as such, even though MAX can be fitted with two AoA sensors, there's no smarts to automatically use only the working one". And even the warning light about sensor disparency was optional because "there's no need for that because this is not critical". And in theory the runaway stabilizer on autopilot was supposed to be similar enough so that pilot could control MCAS failing using the same memory items described in this video. It didn't work in practice because MCAS put the nose down so fast that if you didn't immediately do the correct response there was a change to totally lose control - and pilots didn't have good enough training to handle this in reality. I still wonder why MCAS is claimed to be "software error" when it was fully intentional hack to side-step FAA rules. It was only slightly less cheating than VW adjusting the ECU controls when it detected bonnet open switch to hack the pollution emission tests without really reducing emissions.
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  127. Great video! It's easy to imagine how rapidly the passanger could panic in real situation and have much worse communication than Tom is doing.
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  128. Very good video indeed and I'll definitely watch all videos in this series! I would have added one sentence to intro around 1:33 explaining the final result before going to question "why did this happen?". Something along the lines "The plane stalled and crashed one nautical mile before the runway, killing total of 8 humans onboard and injuring several." That would make it easier to "connect the dots" later when you provide more details.
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  129. I'm not a pilot myself but I can see similar incidents happening on other jobs, too, when automation gets better but not perfect. Every time we have humans monitoring really perfect automation, there's really high risk for the humans to start doing something else but pure monitoring. Even Tesla autopilot is already good enough that there has been casualties because of driver distraction (e.g. watching movies).
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  130. Would have it been possible to steer the aircraft on the runway using asymmetric thrust-reverser power? (Obviously this wouldn't have been the official method but would it have been possible?)
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  131.  @misterflibble9799  It's true that moving the injured person is a risk but that's vs all the other passangers in plane which may need to cabin crew after possible crash landing to evacuate from the plane. Moving the injured person seems like the least worst option here.
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  132. It seems that in many Airbus accidents, the pilots fail to undestand that the aircraft is no longer flying in normal law. Would it help if the whole primary flight display had e.g. bright red or bright orange margins in that situation?
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  133. Great video as always! I was aware of this accident but I didn't know the that forklift had run out of fuel which made things even worse.
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  134. The result of the calculation is the amount you need to have in the tank before starting the engines. Of course, any existing fuel in the tank will be considered for the actual refueling part.
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  135.  @AaaBbb-ff1pn  I think the real problem is that sitting in the cockpit while autopilot is active is counted as flying experience. When somebody has 5000 hours of flying experience as a long haul FO, the amount of actual flying is pretty minimal. If experience were measured as amount of takeoffs and landings in manual mode on the type we would have a much better meter for experience.
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  136.  @schawo2  How slow do you think it is? I understand that it cannot be used to render constantly updated value in the instrument cluster but couldn't it be used to cross-correlate the altitude measurement after minutes following any QNH adjustment? That way you wouldn't get instant warning about incorrect QNH setting but a warning after e.g. 1–2 minutes after setting the value.
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  137.  @hb1338  We are talking about feets above the airfield here. I think commercial aircrafts already do include information about how many feet above sea level the airfield is. Then you can use GPS positioning information to calculate your altitude relative to the airfield. I totally agree that it cannot replace radar altimeter without terrain maps but it would be good to validate QNH.
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  138.  @hb1338  The Boeing explanation for disabling the MCAS is that it's supposed to be handled similar to runaway stabilizer trim so there's no need for extra training. And that's true in reality, too, except that MCAS needs maybe 10–20 faster reactions from the pilots so your training must be spot on (above expected from training) to survive MCAS failure in low altitude. As far as I know, all MAX aircraft did actually have dual AoA sensors but only one was used in reality and the feature to even tell that AoA sensors disagree was an optional extra that most airlines never purchased.
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  139. I think it would be a good idea to list KNOWN RISKS in th QRH. Sometimes aircraft might be experiencing multiple issues at the same time and you cannot follow all the procedures because of the circumstances. In that situation, it would be helpful to have the most important risks in case the procedure cannot be followed to the letter. If the QRH had said "risk of uncontrollable fire" as the most important risk, the decision making would have been different in this case with high probability.
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  140. Try watching the top of the pole with the signs and the text of the signs, for an example. There's also some rendering artefacts where hands go over the signs.
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  141. I think aviation safety would improve a lot if pilot training would include mandatory minium 50 videos watched from Mentour Pilot channel.
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  142.  @MentourPilot  I think the corkscrew analogy was perfect. It nicely explains the forces in effect and makes it easier for laymen to understand why the whole tail can rip off in situation like this.
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  143. 15:30 Confirmation bias combined with hypoxia was the final error they made. However, I cannot avoid thinking that this accident was because of poor training. How on earth the crew didn't know how to react to cabin pressurization failure?
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  144. Great intro!
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  145. I would have expected aircrafts to be maintained in a way where torque wrench is used on every screw in the whole plane. No matter if it's tray on the seat or the windscreen of the pilot. With proper tools it's nearly no extra effort to set the wrench to correct torque and you tighten every screw correctly every time. Some people do this for their private bicycles so it shouldn't be much a requirement for aircraft maintenance engineer.
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  146. One thing I cannot understand is how come they had gear down even after finally pushing the thrust lever to toga position? Also, it seems that they didn't properly understand the autopilot system of the plane during any moment of the flight.
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  147. As far as I know, big planes have so much asymmetrical thrust with one engine shut down that the fuel consumption goes up because the remaining engine must work so much. (You use rudder all the time which results in more drag.)
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  148. If I were to decide, any intermittent problems that haven't been fixed for sure should stay in technical logbook for at least 6 months. It's very probable that there's something wrong which will re-appear again. The fact that the thole ADIRU unit was replaced without resolving the issue suggests that the problem was caused by something else. (E.g. power delivery? I do computer software for living and nearly time any computer fails to be deterministic the issue is power delivery or oxidized connectors – note that I'm considering software race errors as deterministic behavior here.)
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  149.  @TecnamTwin  Except computer programmers who have to compute delta between two timestamps. And if getting the delta correct is important, you absolutely have to consider leap seconds, too. However, typically the correct concept is to forget about computing delta between two timestamps. Timestamps are about stamping events relative to human readable time notation. For actual time differences where getting delta is important, you want alternative purely monotonic time source which is never affected by political decisions such as leap seconds or timezone changes.
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  150. 4:33 I think it would be better to say "-4 degree Celsius" instead of just degrees.
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  151. 34:20 One has to wonder the logic of allowing fuel station to be built next to runway!
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  152. As a non-pilot, I'm wondering why in case of engine problems the failing engine is not identified by individually controlling each engine in sequence. For example, in case of this incident, bringing 1st engine to idle and pushing 2nd engine to go-around power would probably run very nicely, but then trying to run 1st engine on go-around power and 2nd engine on idle should have caused smoke and vibrations. That should have made it obvious which engine is the problematic one. Another idea that immediately comes to mind is why is an engine without engine fire shut down at all? Wouldn't running it at near idle reduce drag and usually avoid the problems with vibration and similar issues with partially failing engine? Bringing such partially failed engine back to use in case the only remaining engine encounters problems later in the flight would be much faster than trying to restart totally shutdown engine.
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  153. How about making similar episode for Air France Flight 447?
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  154. 24:12 Why were the approach and runway lights enabled while the runway wasn't available because of snow blower? Wouldn't it be much safer to turn off any signals that make the runway appear as if it were available for landing?
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  155. It appears that if the pilots are expected to always follow the rule that if reversers have been activated, go-around is no longer an option, it should be enforced by the aircraft software. For example, disable enabling engine forward thrust for 15 seconds.
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  156. This was the result of the cheese theory after rats have eaten all the cheese.
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  157. Awesome shirt!
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  158. I guess ATC requires you to say the magic words "mayday mayday". Simply saying "declaring emergency" sounds just like a polite request for the ATC, instead.
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  159. Great video! It's hard to understand how these professionals fail to trust the attitude indicator. If your inner ear disagrees with the attitude indicator in a modern aircraft, it's always your inner ear that has the incorrect reading. The changes that your inner ear is more accurate than tripple redudant laser gyro is practically zero and you should keep that in mind at all times.
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  160. I guess it just underlines how hours in long routes have very little to do with the landing. I'm more and more thinking that instead of counting hours, the pilot experience should be counted on trips.
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  161. This case sounds a lot like the "standards inspector" status of the captain was more probably result of corrution than actual performance.
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  162.  @thesisypheanjournal1271  Yes, but you should mentally work your way to at least the nearest exit on both sides of the plane because in case of huge fire, your nearest exit cannot be used. As a general rule, you should count the number of seats to two nearest exits so that in case of black smoke filling the cabin you can still count how many seats you have traveled to find the exit. It's also worth thinking how things would change if the cabin were upside down. Could you still get out after opening your seat belt?
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  163. Great video! I think publishing this kind of videos with all the speculation clearly underlined is valuable. All the clues that point to missing AC power seem definitely plausible for this accident.
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  164. Awesome production quality in this video. The only thing I would prefer different is the camera run from 0:07 to 0:16 in the intro where the camera movement seems to lack any kind of inertia (of course, being a simulated video, this is easily possible) and the resulting video looks weird. Other than that, this video has better production quality than most TV shows. Maybe add some acoustic panels to the room you use for the spoken parts to reduce echo, too. That's more like personal preference, the echo makes it sound more like a normal room but makes the speech slightly harder to understand.
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  165. Exactly! I fel that everybody was trusting that "somebody else" is taking care of things so they don't need to care. Especially if having to care would require filling some official form.
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  166.  @HuwRichards-e2z  1974 Health and Safety at Work act sounds great. Here in Finland, it's your duty to only take action if somebody is already harmed (for example, traffic accident or fell in stairs) but we have no requirement to take any preventive action which I consider pretty silly.
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  167. Great video and thank you for underlining the culture effects!
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  168.  @naders1771  How about the angle the strap is tensioned? At least here in Finland, max legal angle is 60 degrees even for road transport and that will have much smaller g-forces than aircraft.
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  169.  @jackielinde7568  I'd expect any marking changes on airports to leave a papertrail roughly visible to moon so ATC should be able to get information about new markings on taxiways.
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  170. But the camera horizontal trimming is slightly off.
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  171. Good point. I was watching this video in somewhat dim room with antigrare display and that part seemed totally okay, but it's easy to imagine well lit room with glossy screen not being able to see anything else but A, B and C and some moving dots in the background.
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  172. Superb video as usual! I was a bit worried already when I didn't see the video as early as I expected.
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  173. The problem with DC80 series was that the yoke didn't move the elevator but control tabs at the rear edge of the elevator. And standard procedure was to verify that yoke moves the control tabs which it indeed did in this accident plane, too. The problem was that the actual elevator was moved by the combination of airspeed and control tabs and that couldn't be tested when the plane was standing still. And that design was selected to avoid needing any hydraulics or electronic motors which could fail, too.
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  174. I think creating more this kind of videos would be valuable. There're already many people creating videos about plane crashes but this angle to plane failures isn't often seen.
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  175.  @boltar2003  It was actually airlines that cheaped on the second sensor because that was optional. Boeing can be blamed for not being straight about what happens if the single sensor fails mid-air. Had they honestly told that having single sensor failure causes so much difference in the flight characteristics that the pilots need different certification no airline would have skipped the second sensor.
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  176. Is there some specific movement that this pilot in training is failing to do or is the level really bad in this sim? For example, are you supposed to raise the lever before moving it or to push it to right before moving it? It looks like the pilot in training raises the lever, moves it but drops the lever downwards before getting it to final position which makes the end of move really ackward.
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  177. I'm also from IT background and in my experience most systems have absolutely awful error messages that make the problem much worse. In most cases no UX designer ever designed any of those messages and you end up sending more or less badly written error messages to end user that is already under high stress already. The changes of the end user understanding the error message correctly are slim to none. Then there's also huge collection of badly written software that reports WRONG errors all the time. I hope that the software that planes have would have at least high enough quality to not report incorrect error messages.
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  178. Great story! I would have wanted to hear a bit more about how the information about the accidents were collected back then? Without cockpit voice recorders, and I assume without flight recorders either, how did they figure out the cause for any crash without survivors?
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  179. Superb video! I thought that the 3D visualisation of the events were great in older videos but this video just raised the bar a lot! Kudos to whoever did the 3D graphics and livery.
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  180.  @MentourPilot  A better design would be one where such physical stops are visible for the walk around inspection and the flight should be cancelled if a physical stop is damaged.
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  181. Your video production quality is getting ridiculous high! And I don't mean that it's a problem. As for the content, it seemed that TransAsia had get-there-itis with their captain training program. I would assume that there were cultural issues, too. If I've undertood correctly, denying a request is considered very rude in many Asian cultures and that would make it harder for the Captain A to be denied the type certification. The pilot certification seemed a lot like p-hacking in bad research where you keep retrying until you get borderline acceptable result and then declare the test successful immediately. I fully agree that this was systematic failure within the company instead of the pilot just doing things against better judgement. This was underlined by the fact that the first airline with this person correctly grounded him or her because of multiple problems in training. I'm still wondering how on earth did this captain have successful career in the airforce? I would have expected airforce to be more strict about all pilot abilities than any commercial airline. I think pilot certification should be based on scientific measurements. For example, a valid method would be to decide minimum acceptable success rate for any task during the training, say 95%. And this success rate should be defined while designing the course, not per applicant. And if you fail some task (e.g. engine failure during takeoff in the simulator) you have to then repeat the task so many times that you can exceed the required rate – in practice it would mean that if you fail the task once, you have to then successfully repeat the same task for total of 19 times to get the success rate to 95% or better. And that would just barely demonstrate that you have 95% success rate for correctly handling the situation. It seemed that the Captain A had 25% or less success rate for handling engine failure during take-off even in the simulator. In real world situation the stress level would be even higher so the probability is going to get only worse.
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  182.  @rutherd9616  Yes, software can have all kind of problems. However, redundant computer systems (like those in flight computers) do not suddenly fail because there isn't a single part where failure could cause failure for the whole computer system. Then there's MAX and MCAS where the system was intentionally programmed to not switch to working AoA sensor due FAA rules.
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  183. I'm also software engineer and my thoughts were exactly the same. However, if I understood correctly, this design was selected to allow having big control surfaces (elevator) without "power steering" (hydraulics or electric motors). In theory that should have resulted in system with less things to go wrong because if you don't need power to control the elevator the power source cannot fail (e.g. loss of hydraulic fluid). The problem was that the walk around could only check that the control tabs (small flaps at the rear of the elevator) move with the yoke becuse the actual elevator was moved by combination of control tab and airspeed. Without enough airspeed, there was nothing that could have enough force to move the elevator so it couldn't be easily tested. The real problem was that there was no standard procedure to verify that the elevator surface is free to move. The elevator hinge was just assumed to be working okay. And the fact that the surface was 9 m above the ground made sure that pilot couldn't just try to move the surface by hand during the walk around. Also, the fact that this plane normally had 3 second latency from control input to actual plane reaction still baffles my mind. How on earth anybody can react to unexpected things with such a latency? Also, pilot induced oscillation would be more than expected with such a latency.
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  184.  @fluchschule  I think the idea of averaging input for dual input is based on assumption that both pilots are trying to input optimal input but they make random mistakes while moving the stick. If that were true, then averaging the inputs should statistically reduce that random error and end up with better input data. However, when pilot has lost situational awareness, the stick input is no longer correct input + random error but totally wrong. The problem for the computer system is that there's no way to tell from the stick movement if the pilot has lost situational awareness. I'm currently thinking that dual input is nearly always so serious problem that warning about it should have priority even over GPWS. If pilot is not in total panic, they should be able to press the little red button in the stick after hearing "dual input" to make it single input again. And GPWS warning could be played after that.
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  185.  @Eternal_Tech  I guess nobody would be reaching for their luggage after that! 😉
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  186. Didn't airplanes during this incident have optical star navigation available?
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  187. 7:55 If you've already landed on the runway with autobrakes, is it possible to do go-around even if you haven't selected reverse thrust? I thought that autobrakes are going to reduce your speed very rapidly even without applying reverse thrust if the traction is good.
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  188.  @masonmunkey6136  That's my understanding, too. However, applying autobrakes with a lot of braking power should cut the speed with deceleration of maybe 0.5-1.0 g and if you release the brakes and try to do go-around, how much time do you have to make the decision until the speed has dropped too much to do that?
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  189. MCAS could not make any extra noise or FAA would have denied the same type certificate for Max. The point of the same "type certificate" is that the operation of the plane must be the same. If 1964 version of 737 didn't make noise or show visual warnings, neither can Max.
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  190.  @mrubin3770  Even the solid state gyroscope in your phone is miles better than anything inside your head. A couple of old Android phones in phone holders would be a good start.
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  191.  @Skarry  Compass cannot tell your flying attitude, only compass direction.
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  192.  @Skarry  They do orient towards the greatest acceleration but if you're accidentally e.g. flying a loop, the greatest acceleration is from the center of the loop outwards and that's where your acceleration based device will point. You need a real gyro based attitude sensor to know the real orientation. Cell phone gyro may or may not be good enough but a simple acceleration sensor will not be enough.
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  193. ​ @VWaudiRULEs  The important point is that MCAS information was witheld because it was required to get the FAA certification. The same reason was why the system didn't have redundant AoA sensor. Blaming "software error" is a lie - probably invented by Boeing marketing department.
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  194. I think MAX should have deserved AD for its AOA sensor failure causing MCAS to run nose rapidly towards the ground. And I guess that wasn't done due financial repercussions.
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  195. Superb video and very nice graphics, too! The message is really important, too, and I feel that preventive mental health treatment is poorly organized all around the world. And I definitely agree that if you know that your career will end if you get diagnosed, that definitely sets really high bar to even seek treatment that could potentially give you a diagnose. And avoiding getting diagnosed while having actual mental issues is a very very bad situation. Final decisions do not work even for criminal punishment (like 3 felonies and you get automatic death sentence) because that only takes off any options from a person that might get himself or herself into situation where that final decision would be automatically applied. It really doesn't matter if it's death sentence, or career ending move in a country without proper social support like the US.
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  196.  @DAndyLord  I think it would be the best to have 1:1ratio chip and always record the full frame. That way you could rotate the image in post production and maybe reframe it a bit if you're lucky. Modern cellphones could easily capture 4096x4096 resolution video.
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  197. Was there any additional info about that engine in later investigation? Was shutting it down really the best option they had?
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  198. Superb video again! Great work!
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  199. Amazing video! I didn't know that the IRS was accurate enough to measure latitude and true north from the earth movement alone while sitting on the field. Do the aircraft systems nowadays allow using GLONASS, BDS or GALILEO in addition to GPS signals?
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  200. I think you get criminally low likes to total viewer count for these videos! These would deserve more likes, too, and not just views.
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  201. I totally agree! Many other video producers have 10 mins worth of content but it's repeated to fill 45 mins.
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  202. 12:55: Also note that the indicated airspeed would increase while passing the vortex caused by the left wing so rotate speed could appear to be exceeded earlier than expected.
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  203. When the aircraft was still on the ground and ATPCS failed to arm, how come they didn't have any checklist to go through? I undestand that some things are memory items but when the plane is still on the ground, you would have time to go through the checklist. And since type 600 was supposed to not be allowed to fly with that failure, the checklist should have been pretty short!
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  204. 4:53 "built on the honestly of the applicant" The applicants were always honest, there wouldn't need to be any kind of official record database. Designing any safety critical system on honestly is a sure failure.
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  205. I think this accident underlines that the minimum acceptable performance for the pilots was set too low. If it had meant that neither the pilot or co-pilot would have passed to continue their careers, it would have been the safe end result.
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  206. Great intro!
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  207. Do you need to dump the fuel for two engine failure?
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  208.  @MrSchwabentier  As Mentour Pilot explained, it's a well known phenomenon that humans can enter into state of no reaction to any aural input under great stress. It would make sense to design the user interface so that you can still understand that the plane is in alternate mode and/or in stall even if you cannot hear anything. In addition, I wouldn't consider it impossible to actually physically lose the hearing in case of catastrophic cabin pressure lost so making everything work without any hearing would be a good objective even if you don't consider mental limitations at all. As for the vision, I think the changes of successfully landing a plane after all pilots have totally lost the vision are slim to to none no matter what kind of user interface you have. As such, visual indicators can be assumed to be available as long as any indicators work at all.
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  209. 5:25 Is it possible that the first officer mistaked overspeed bars with stall bars in the speed display? The recording contains reference to "speed" but if the first officer had actually checked the speed it would have displayed over 220 knots which will not cause stall very easily. However, if you think that overspeed bars actually meant too slow speed and keep pushing nose down in panic, that alone explain this crash. However, I still cannot figure out why the captain didn't take the controls faster.
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  210. Great video! It was interesting to learn that you used to be a firefighter.
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  211. So they did their acceptance flight with passangers? Wow! Edit: the passangers were company engineers as part of the check flight.
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  212. 17:20 Even if they had ground proximity warning system, would it get triggered with landing gear already lowered?
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  213. Is there any case where random GPWS alerts would be okay to ignore? Why doesn't the system automatically keep cockpit voice recordings after getting even a single GPWS alert when the plane is on the ground and engines have been shut down?
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  214. Would it be too much to require every captain to go through mandatory psychological evaluation every two or three years? And if the evaluation were ever failed, they would immediately lose their captain status and work as FO at best until trying to re-certify as captain as any other FO.
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  215. The point about using a mobile phone while sitting at the right seat is really important. The only thing that needs to fail is left seat adjustment and the pilot flying would be immediately out of the game and the pilot monitoring would need to take over without time to prepare. When that "pilot" is actively trying to keep camera focus instead the changes are things would turn real bad really fast.
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  216. 19:00 The fact that the door latch safety systems had at least two modifications to allow partially locked door to be accepted suggests that the maintenance was fully aware of the problems with the door and instead of fixing the door, they practically disabled the safety systems and failed to implement the service bulletin. I hope the decision makers that accepted this were procecuted.
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  217. Good points! Human psychology is poorly considered in many occupations even with life-dangering results. Aviation is on the better end of the scale but even that is far from perfect.
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  218. Superb video once again! As for the future improvements, consider using 60 FPS camera in the studio. Currently the 3D animations (60 FPS) look smoother than the stupio capture because framerate appears to halve whenever Petter is speaking in front of camera (which appears to be 30 FPS).
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  219. 31:32 I hope somebody carefully inspects FAA behavior here. It makes me hard to believe that no-action was chosen because of careful analysis of the risks but as a result of Boeing lobbying instead.
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  220. If the plane is going to crash soon because of losing engine power, it would seem obvious to try to push whatever engines are still rotating to higher power. Even if they truly had dual engine failure, extracting even 30 seconds more power from a broken engine might have helped them to the airport.
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  221. The graphics and visualization of St Elmo’s Fire was awesome!
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  222. 23:05 Didn't Dubai have any radios than could have been tuned to the frequency that the accident aircraft was on? If that would have been option, the only relay message they would have needed to transmit is to tell the frequency the accident aircraft was still using and they could have re-established the communication between Dubai and the aircraft.
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  223.  @jimw1615  I would guess they had battery backup and thinking was "the lack of sun light couldn't possibly last X days".
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  224. As far as I know, lying to FAA e.g. about flight hours is a sure way to lose the license permanently. How come it's okay to start lying when you're senior training captain? I hope that the captain lost his license forever because he's obviously breaking all the rules and when incidents start happening, he starts lying instead of taking the blame.
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  225. Any changes to aircraft are insanely expensive. You might think that screwing 4 small metal pieces in front of four holes in the wings shouldn't cost $5000.
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  226. Great video as usual! One question about this incident: why the fuel filters didn't capture too concentrated Kathon mixture? I would have expected that the filters should catch the slimy stuff out of fuel, too, which would have resulted in glogged filter and cockpit warnings. Of course, the mineral buildup in the engines could still happen because the whole point of such buildup is slow buildup of extra mineral molecules in the fuel.
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  227. Wow! Aircraft maintenance job on pressurization critical part where the inspector/verifier of the work is the same guy that did the job? How on earth he thought that it was okay? Okay, you answered it later that that was actually a problem in the official procedure requirements.
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  228. When you speak about the temperature, it would be good to mention if you speak about degrees Celsius or Fahrenheit. I think you use Celcius in all your videos but that's just implicit assumption.
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  229. Maybe this is not he first take?
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  230. Any such indication system can also fail and requires its own circuit breaker, too. They already had one indication system: the white line visible in the breaker.
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  231. Every new story we get about MAX tells us that FAA should never ever accept any new planes using the type rating of older design. Boeing obviously had incentive to hide information about all these changes from pilots to make sure FAA wouldn't require extra pilot training to switch to MAX pilot, as was advertised by Boeing marketing team from the start.
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  232.  @anjou6497  Pilots are expected to be able to communicate in English using the radio for any international flights. Surely they should be able to read English documentation, too.
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  233. Why doesn't Boeing software automatically start APU in case of engine failure? It would seem sensible to have backup electric power source for all situations and with only one engine running, losing that engine will always result in loss of electricity (except for rare parts of the aircraft with battery backup).
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  234. Considering how small modern accelerometers are, why do they not put a couple in each wingtip? Data from those could be used to measure hits from accidents like this and also measure any twisting motion in the wings which could be used to estimate wing load in general. And the pilots could get automated message whenever acceleration of the wingtip exceeds spec in any moment.
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  235.  @tomstravels520  Yeah, I understand the extra cost of maintenance. However, I think the wing loading would be important metric for metal fatique even in heavy turbulence so those sensors could be used for things other than rare accidents, too.
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  236. Was there a checklist for checking the nose wheel using the lens? Nowadays planes have checklists for everything, right?
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  237. Have I misunderstood something when I though that the most important things to check during the walkaround are flying surfaces and external sensor, namely AoA sensors and pitot tubes? That would logically require checking that all the tubes look okay (e.g. not hit by a bird) and that would require looking at the tube directly. And obviously you cannot tell if the tube looks okay if there's a red cover over it.
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  238. As a non-pilot my understanding is that those big jet engines take so much time to change back from reverse thrusters to normal takeoff thrust that the runway is not going to be enough to get up to speed again. For smaller planes, the action is faster.
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  239. 23:00 Yet another poorly maintained airport in all these accident videos on this channel. It appears to me that the taxiway and runway lights and markings should have improved standards so that airports couldn't skip the security because of the budget issues. Either install proper lights and markings or do not operate commercial flights at all. That said, I agree that confirmation bias was probably a huge factor here. As you explain around 26:30 there were lots of clues that could have allowed the crew to figure out that they were not on the correct runway. Correctly identifiying confirmation bias is really hard but it should be doable.
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  240.  @RobinHood70  The cat is in bottom right corner and it will be hidden by the Youtube on screen controls (the time slider, CC button and gears and stuff) + it's very dark.
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  241. 9:00 In my opinion, the cabin pressurization system being on manual should still glow red or amber because you should be using that mode only if you already have pressurization related failures (e.g. computer that's supposed to take care of correct pressurization is broken).
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  242.  @speedbird9313  If both CPC are inoperative, would you consider the situation as normal?
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  243. In case runaway stabilizer is caused by totally failing jackscrew as in Alaska Airlines Flight 261, is there any way to actually control the plane?
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  244. Loved the "Just teleported in" caption around 17:05.
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  245.  @Blazo_Djurovic  I have only experience fixing this kind of intermittent problems with cars and computer systems but the root cause for nearly any non-deterministic computer system is power delivery for some part: faulty power source causing unstable voltage, faulty connector, crack in solder, crack in wiring. Those things do not get better automatically over time and the maintenance engineer failing to find the problem only speaks about lack of skill for that engineer. Since the issue was experienced only during the flights, I would assume it was causing some wiring to be slightly moving because temperature changes or pressure changes.
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  246. 10:00 It appears insane that any system that can affect any of the flying surfaces could be anything but critical when it comes to risk evaluation! This should be easy rule to include in FAA regulation that would prevent whole class of similar problems in the future.
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  247. Great work! Your production quality was already really high and you just increased it even more!
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  248.  @turricanedtc3764  Yes, I agree that it would have been really hard to find the problem with short maintanence time between regular flights and that's exactly my point. If the problem keeps reappearing, temporary fix is clearly not working and timer reset should not be done. I think the timer should be allowed just as a single time extra period to find the true root cause. If it cannot be done in that time period, the plane should be grounded to give maintenance enough time to find the true root cause. And yes, it would make operating those planes more expensive which is probably the reason why this is not implemented in reality. Instead, you do something to supposedly resolve the issue without ever understanding the actual cause and get another 500 hours to keep operating.
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  249. I was surprised to find out that CVR and FDR failed immediately. Do they do that even today if electricity is lost around the nose wheel?
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  250. Great video again! I would suggest a small improvement for future videos: I think it would be easier for the viewer if you repeated the year of the accident later in the video, especially in the part where you discuss how things have changed since the accident. This would make it easier to understand the progress that has been made in aviation safety and also underline how many years it takes to fully implement all the changes recommended in the report, if those recommendations are actually implemented industry-wide at all. And I fully agree that plain 1500 hour limit does very little to improve safety. I would rather have a count of correctly handled incidents in simulators. For example, different scenarios in the sim training could give different points for your pilot skill credit: safely landing a plane in heavy side-wind without working ILS might give you 1 point. And safely landing a plane in low visibility with windshear and an engine failure would give you 20 points. And of course, you wouldn't be told before the sim training what will happen outside the information you would have for any real flights either. And I would give points for correctly diagnosing any failures in the sensors, instrument or flight surface movement. Perhaps sim training should also include situations where the cockpit has been pre-configured before the tested pilot has entered the cockpit and the actual test starts at cruise flight and the pilot must correctly find some mistakes in the pre-configured state to safely land the plane? That would train the pilots to assume unknown mistakes or problems in the aircraft and always re-check things instead of assuming everything is okay.
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  251.  @my2cents366  I agree. I wrote about the messages in general above. Even without an incident like this, getting multiple messages from the airline HQ and accidentally deleting everything would be a bad UI causing the problem. For this specific incident, deleting all messages is just an interesting detail and shouldn't be considered as proof for anything.
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  252. The behavior of the pilot and co-pilot was shameful here. It seems obvious that they didn't want to accept that they have to return from the departure airfield and face the consequences of their failed navigation.
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  253. Damn, this video has too many comments. You have 666K subscribers but 686 comments in this video. I would have been cool to have 666K subscribers and 666 comments!
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  254.  @andreypetrov4868  How do you know you've lost tons of fuel? Is that some kind of sensor? Could it be broken? The problem is that you can never be sure which sensor is broken when multiple sensors do not agree. And it could be that all sensors are fine and you have a leak. But you cannot know for sure! It's pretty rare that you have multiple sensors broken at the same time but that can happen, too.
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  255. As they had GPS lock with multiple satellites, couldn't the internal navigation system cross-correlate the altitude metering from GPS to altitude metering from air pressure? In addition, the radio altimeter could also be used for cross-colleration automatically, too! As real altitude above ground is critical information, I would expect to hear at least similar level of warning as "dual input" in Airbus aircraft whenever different measurement methods result in different results.
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  256.  @tomstravels520  With correct QNH setting the radio altimeter height should closely match the height on the instrument cluster, right? The dual input has accidentally happened with Boeing yokes, too. As they can be detached if enough force is applied, the pilots should get feedback about the situation whenever that happens. It's pretty rare that yokes get detached without the pilots noticing the problem but it has happened in reality.
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  257. @Basaltic Life With many enough mosquitoes, it would be true. Fortunately, no place on earth is that bad.
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  258. 3. mesh could fail and it or parts of it could enter the engine. Because the mesh has to be really strong, its parts would cause heavy damage. And the stronger you make the mesh, the more it will weight.
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  259. If calling Pan-Pan to ATC on engine failure is not yet mandatory, it should be. There should be zero decision making in the cockpit for this part.
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  260. I hope the modern planes had enough smarts to support company policies better. For example, if Asiana had been able to encode that pilot MUST do go-around if sink rate is above 1000 ft/min below 1000 ft, this accident wouldn't have occurred at all. If I understood the video correctly, they did this kind of rule but it wasn't followed by any of the 3 human pilots in cockpit.
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  261.  @mandowarrior123  Why would you ever want to keep gear down with toga? (I think terrain escape manouver is an exception because there you're not supposed to change anything but throttle.)
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  262. Wow! I write software for living and I cannot understand why Airbus continues to hide the cleared faults when new faults appear. If I were designing that user interface, I would definitely show all faults whenever a new one appears even if those errors had previously been cleared. That would have allowed the captain to reset ELAC 1 and ELAC 2 every time the problem happened and to be fully aware of all the failing systems. You cannot expect humans to remember that some system has failed and then cleared in failed state. The race condition between 30 ms offset clocks and bounce lasting exactly between 1020 ms and 1030 ms was also surprising but a lot of software has programming errors like that. And it's easy to imagine testing to fail such a short failure window. (For comparision, one blink of your eye lasts between 10–40 ms. Any bounce that were that much shorter or longer wouldn't have triggered the problem!) One last thing: would it have been possible to simply reset ELAC 1 or ELAC 2 and restore full control of the plane when it was in mechanical backup mode?
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  263. Yeah, especially every part where there's pressure differential during any part of the flight. I still cannot believe that the windshild was not considered a "Vital Point" even though it's taking care of full pressure differential between the cockpit and outside air and the pressurization is considered critical already.
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  264. Do the air traffic controllers understand how critical QNH is? It's measured in absolute units above vacuum which may make some people to assume that the difference between 1011 and 1001 is 1% at max so as long as you get into correct ballpark, it's still fine. If the QNH were communicated in hPa relative to 1000 hPa absolute, this kind of errors wouldn't happen. I'm sure that the air traffic controller would have understood the difference between 1 and 11 QNH being meaningful. Even better would have been unit as Pascals relative to 1000 hPa. In that case, the difference would have been 100 vs 1100 and that scale would allow for more accurate height measurements. Error of 1 hPa means 8.7 m height difference. And pilot receiving higher QNH number than expected should always request the tower to confirm the number because QNH setting being too high is always a very dangerous situation in low visibility situation.
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  265. I would have preferred no hint images nor sounds. Make it a game and ask for timestamps in the comments for hidden puns!
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  266. Interesting incident and superb story telling! The only conclusion I can make is to always question "could this be caused by fuel contamination?" whenever an unknown fault appars such as the messages on the screen without actions. I think it should be on the checklist of the remote assistance team.
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  267. Great video and the intro was amazing.
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  268. Do the air traffic controllers understand how critical QNH is? It's measured in absolute units above vacuum which may make some people to assume that the difference between 1011 and 1001 is 1% at max so as long as you get into correct ballpark, it's still fine. If the QNH were communicate in hPa relative to 1000 hPa absolute, this kind of errors wouldn't happen. I'm sure that the air traffic controller would understand the difference between 1 and 11 QNH being meaningful.
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  269. If there were extra space available, it would be better just just extend the airway, right?
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  270.  @FredrikGranlundkayaker  The problem with UTC is that it supposedly doesn't have leap seconds but those actually happen in reality. As a result, all UTC clocks are off by a bit around leap second moments for up to 24 hours. Luckily the error is typically around a second but some systems may fail because of that, too, especially when some piece of software sees events from the future compared to its own clock. We still don't have a good international time standard that would be usable for all cases. TAI is probably the least problematic but it doesn't match the apparent noon exactly so politicians don't want to use it.
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  271. 32:25 Have you already heard back from EASA?
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  272. You can bet that these pilots never skipped any part of flight control tests in pre-flight after this incident.
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  273. You have to realize that MD80 series did not move the elevators when yoke is moved. The yoke only moves control tabs that use airspeed to actually move the elevators. This design allowed big airplane without hydraulics or electronic motors to move the elevators but you cannot move the elevators when the plane is not going fast enough. I don't know if it could have been possible to test elevator movement with high taxi speeds but at least it wasn't standard procedure.
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  274. Even if Russia weren't such a bad place because of the war they started, flying with the local pilots seems like a too high risk to take. The local society failing to get rid of the birds was one thing but rest of the story made me think "skill issue" multiple times. The pilots would have definitely needed better training.
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  275. I'm seeing red-blue glass 3D effect on all flight simulator rendered segments. Is there a way to turn off that feature?
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  276. I think the part about thinking about how to get out of the plane when it's upside down and full of smoke should be included in the official briefing. You could also mention about opening the seatbelt in that situation, too. Too many people think that in case there's actual evacuation, they'll THEN look for the nearest exit. The important part to notice is that it may be pitch black and you have to go by feel. And the plane may be upside down or it's side. (Obviously, in crashes where the fuselage ends up on its side or upside down will have much worse statistics than 55% survived. However, getting out of the plane will be faster for easier cases too, if you are mentally prepared for the most complicated situation.)
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  277. Is the audio channel quality between the pilots actually this poor? It's hard to understand what's being said with heavy accent.
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  278. It's sad that pilots even today have trouble understanding how reliable each sensor is relative to each other. Airspeed indicator uses to pressure ports to external air and nothing else so those are really unreliable because any external events may cause sensor malfunction in addition to fault in the sensor itself. The most accurate sensors have no external inputs, the most accurate being attitude indicator based on solid state gyros. The changes of all attitude indicators failing simulatenously is basically zero so putting the airplane in slight pitch up orientation with pretty high engine power should be always the safe option. Exactly as explained at 43:15. This would have saved the flight Air France 447, too.
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  279.  @MentourPilot  That's perfectly understandable. That accident seems (to a civilian) be caused by pilot panic and I think your input on the stress and mental pressure that pilots have in such situations would be valuable. Also, how come they didn't understand the "dual input" warning that must have been going on?
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  280.  @MentourPilot  Also, what's your take on actual pilot experience on commercial airlines vs flight hours? I mean, many pilots may have e.g. 4000+ hours with a specific plane but how much of that's actual manual flying? As long as autopilot is doing pretty much everything, such an experience doesn't have much value.
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  281. Superb video as usual! There are two things I really don't understand: (1) Why on earth aircrafts still use such a poor radios that cannot automatically warn about another radio transmitting at the same time on the same frequency? Even a cheap but modern software defined passive radio could be used to detect other transmissions while you're transmitting. (2) Why didn't the incident report come up with a recommendation that while using pilot-applied visual departure separation the second aircraft cannot start moving before the first aircraft has been seen to be airborne?
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  282. Great video as usual! I have to say that I feel like the pilots were superstitious when they thought that potential 5G interference could affect the TOGA switch behavior. The only feature that could potentially be affected is radio transmission and even there, the 5G interference should result in loss of radio feature (e.g. radio altimeter) in worst case. For example, the attitude indicator uses ring laser gyros and cannot possibly be affected by 5G radio signals, but somehow the pilots imagined that, too.
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  283.  @tomstravels520  5G transmission uses modulation that should behave as increased noise level for other devices using the same frequency so a radio altimeter that computes incorrect height instead of simply reporting lost signal would be a pretty bad implementation overall.
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  284.  @MentourPilot  There's obviously never going to be a structure that cannot fail. However, a well designed mechanism would extend some part out from the hinge by design then the linkage has been overextended. That would have allowed the failure to be correctly identified during the walk around.
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  285. Great video! I think that the simulators should be tuned to be always slightly harder to fly than the real thing. That is, make correct manual trim wheel input more sensitive than in real plane and elevator authority a bit less than in real plane. That way the pilots would be forced to trim accurately at all times so their thinking would always include correct trim setting. In addition, the headset design should be improved to not cause loud noise in case of loose plug, especially during takeoff or landing. And the software that's used to calculate the takeoff performance should be fixed to help doing calculations with contaminated runway. We know that humans are lazy by default and if they can skip the manual work by selecting "wet" instead of "contaminated" there will be strong tendency to do so. If the risks are so high for contaminated runway that automatic calculation is considered unsafe, just calculate the worst case scenario and if the pilots are not table to execute takeoff with the calculated result, they could still do the manual calculation to get performance value somewhere between automatically calculated contaminated runway case and wet runway.
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  286. This kind of compilation video also nicely demonstrates how much your production quality has improved over years: graphics are now better and your mic setup is even better. And the baseline many years ago was already pretty high!
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  287. Yeah, seeing the control cables going into the engines was a big clue. I would have expected engine control to be electronic even when you have mechanical cables to flying surfaces.
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  288. 36:37 Incident investigation not provided all the info sounds really Egyption way to work for me. BEA did miracle work here!
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  289. Well, according to manufacturer testing this was supposed to only happen when wind speeds exceeded 65 kts or 33 m/s. As mentioned, the measured maximum speed was 55 kts or 28 m/s which was way below the maximum allowed speed. The problem was that the measured wind speed didn't consider turbulence which caused higher local wind speeds which caused the failure. You cannot build the plane to withstand any wind that could appear because in F5 hurricane will be powerful enough to tear the plane into pieces if the wind direction is not suitable for the parked plane. As a result, you have maximum allowed wind speeds when parked and flying instead.
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  290.  @ewathoughts8476  I agree that MAX failure was intentional risk taken by Boeing which was assumed to be acceptable but it turned out that pilot training was nowhere close to required level to correctly deal with runaway stabilizer fast enough. The idea was that non-MAX procedure was good enough for MAX, too. The MAX version just went bad faster than non-MAX version on runaway stabilizer. However, for this incident, it seems that Boeing was aware of the potential issue with mechanical strength (and let's be honest here, all mechanical constructs have some kind of strength limit no matter how beefy you make it) and they had defined level for acceptable wind speed (65 kts). However, it turned out that the original testing method to define that speed was too simplistic or safety margins were too thin. The problem with airplanes is that you cannot built it like a tank and you have to make educated guesses about max stress limit for each part. For this particular incident, the design had already worked for 30 years. How long would you test for parts to deem them safe?
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  291.  @ewathoughts8476  I didn't know this same part had failed previously. Could you provide pointers to cases where the hinge failed on some earlier flight?
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  292.  @ewathoughts8476  You do understand that manufacturer does structural testing at the factory while designing the parts. I understood the video to say that this was the result of factory testing and they considered 65 knots the safe limit but the factory testing routine didn't consider any turbulence. That's why I was asking about previous incidents in the real life. I'm not aware of cases of the hinge failing to move before this incident.
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  293.  @Nathan-dt2tu  The sign changed in addition to the whole pole length changing and the red/orange details near the top left area of the frame also changed.
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  294. 28:00 Why the ATC doesn't instruments show all the warnings with the correct terminology? That way the controller would only need to read what's displayed on the screen to transmit correct information to the pilots.
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  295. How about moving the wings to top of the aircraft to get more space for the engines? Similar to Antonov An-225 but with only 2 huge engines?
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  296.  @Philliben1991  The "you get extra 500 hours of commercial flight time without actually fixing the problem" was a big part of the problem, too.
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  297.  @clefsan  If they already mixed the roof of a building with runway, I'm pretty sure a sign without extra lights is not going to help.
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  298. 28:15 This list doesn't sound me as "1 in 100 million hours or more" incidents. According to some estimates, total flight hours per year globally is around 20 million so having 4 incidents should require 20 years. I understood that list list wasn't complete description of all known incidents.
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  299. Can you comment about is there similar smoke hazard in other planes with engines with the LRD feature? Is this result of Boeing not automatically shutting down the bleed air in case of heavy engine vibration or LRD activation?
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  300. You have to understand when company policy is "don't use reverses" and those are pretty much only thing that can slow you down on aquaplaning, you're going to have bad landing.
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  301.  @brodeypecha9233  Jet engines are different from combustion engines because the jet engine is basically a open pipe with multiple fans rotating in it in a configuration where one axle is rotating inside an another one. And the fans closer to the fuel entry location are attached to the axle that's rotating around the another axle. And all the rotation is caused by moving air alone. A jet engine is rotating around 10000–20000 rpm during normal operation but the rotation speed is not directly causing the engine thrust which makes diagnosing the failing engine much harder than with combustion engine. Thrust is combination of fan movement and fuel burning. The dials in the cockpit do not show RPM but percentage of the operational range of that specific axle (labeled as N1 and N2, N2 being the axle that rotates around the N1). I think the biggest problem with old engines like in this aircraft is that they didn't have a dial to show engine vibrations. If you're missing parts of the engine, increasing RPM is not okay. Otherwise it should be okay to try to increase the thrust level if all N1, N2 and EGT are below redline like in this accident for the left engine, which was operating just fine. However, if the engine is missing a fan blade, pushing the power level up might cause the whole engine to explode which may seriously damage the wing if you're unlucky enough. Engines are designed to be strong enough to self-contain even in case of an engine explosion (which is not a guarantee, only a design objective) so I would have pushed left engine to higher power instead of ditching into the ocean even if it could potentially explode because that wouldn't be much worse than ditching into the ocean during the night anyway. That said, the pilots were obviously under much higher stress so making this kind of thinking during the incident might have been next to impossible.
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  302. 29:20 As a software engineer, as cockpit displays can already show the amount of engine vibrations, the software could automatically turn off bleed air from any engine with heavy vibrations. No mechanical changes needed at all. And I'd guess Boeing didn't do this to allow flying MAX with the existing type certificate, similar to the engine changes and MCAS.
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  303. I think the fact that the captain didn't disclose the information about the camera was caused by military culture. He couldn't trust to be treated fairly if he had disclosed the information causing a lot of extra work for the investigators. I think this is a great example why civilian incidents avoid directly punishing the pilots even when pilots openly disclose any mistakes they did.
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  304. Superb video! The animations were spot on.
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  305. Why are these gliders missing an attitude indicator? Is it really that expensive instrument?
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  306.  @dancekeb1308  It seems that SFI (which would have been logically "San Francisco International") was already take for Safi Airport.
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  307. Great video as usual! I have one question about the visualization show in this video. Shouldn't the attitude indicator show a lot more blue around 37:17? If I have understood correctly, the attitude indicator is driven by laser gyros and cannot be affected by freezing or other external error sources and should be assumed to be correct in case multiple indicators show data that doesn't make sense as a whole. If you're flying in cruising altitude and don't know which indicators are correct, trying to put the attitude indicator to straight on the center should be always the safe option. If you have engines in TOGA position, even if you were stalling initially in that orientation, it should be turn fine after engines can push you forward enough. And the pilot monitoring could verify if all three fully independant laser gyros agree on the attitude if you truly think that attitude indicator is also faulty. You point about the mental loss of hearing because of high stress could explain a lot of this accident. The replies from pilot flying didn't make much sense in the discussion and since the stall warning was also aural only, it could explain the behavior of the pilot, too. Regardless of the flying altitude, reaction to STALL warning should be to push nose down but this pilot didn't do that; not hearing the warning either would explain that behavior a lot better! It also appears that taking over the controls should be trained in simulator. In this case both pilots seemed to press the little red button on the stick without saying anything to the other pilot.
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  308. After emergency descend, do the pilots decide where to go by themselves? At least this video suggested that pilots decided to go to Manchester and would just inform the company and ATC about the fact and wouldn't ask permission to act from anybody.
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  309. It seems to me that most of the major accidents are caused by improper maintenance. Mostly about maintenance NOT following official procedure but still signing documents that declare that the maintenance was completed according to the official procedure. For example, if the log had been "tried to fix the problem, couldn't obtain the official procedure in time so did what I think would solve the problem" then the flight crew would have totally different attitude towards the quality of maintenance work and assume that the instrument may still be faulty.
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  310. Segway to ad was perfectly executed!
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  311.  @UnknownUser-j3n  If you don't have the feature "don't assign blame" then many people start trying to cover their mistakes. It's much much better to have truthful information about the mistakes than people making mistakes and pretending that everything is okay.
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  312.  @petep.2092  I totally agree that you want to find the root cause, be it mechanical or human error. The important part is to not have the punishment for human mistakes. Intentional malice shall still be punishable.
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  313. This kinds of events make me wonder why planes do not have multiple cameras pointing to all engines from multiple angles. In case you see engine overheating message, it would be nice to see the engine. If you see that the engine has exploded in pieces or is in fire, you can safely skip many checklist items about adjusting the throttle.
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  314. Why R24 doesn't takeoff in another direction? That would avoid intersecting the go-around and takeoff flypaths, if I've understood the situation correctly.
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  315. Was the simulation at the end just MS Flight Simulator? The graphics were really good!
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  316. I think it might have been worth underlining that you should always wear the seatbelt in airplane if at all possible. That works for both unexpected turbulence and losing a plug from the wall.
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  317. They did care which is why it was tested and 65 kts wind speed limit was put in force. According to the manufacturer testing this failure couldn't happen unless wind speeds exceeded 65 kts. And the maximum wind speed (gust) before this accident was "only" 55 kts, well below the tested limit. The problem was that the manufacturer specified wind speed assumed no wind directing structures nearby.
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  318. 32:00 Wow! Recommendation given in 1989 is still not implemented today and you still have to wait to receive a reason for that... talk about slow action.
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  319. At least here in Finland, it's illegal for even truck drivers to drive more than 8 h without a rest. This legislation has been put in force because of accidents caused by driver fatigue and partial loss of awareness.
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  320. If the illustrations were correct, there was no published holding pattern at all for the runway 12. How was that supposed to work in case multiple planes want to approach the airfield at the same time?
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  321. This whole accident is caused by "broken telephone" effect x 10.
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  322. Awesome animations – you even had cows in the cabin! The thing I cannot understand how come hardware that could support all ILS frequencies wasn't installed? Would it really have been that expensive compared to the extra fuel + salary needed for unneeded diversions because of failing to land using ILS?
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