Comments by "Alan Friesen" (@alanfriesen9837) on "Good Times Bad Times" channel.

@ihl0700677525 You're right. It also didn't prevent either the various wars in Asia that defined the Great Game between Russia and Britain (yes, I'm aware you mentioned the Crimean War), nor did it prevent the Franco-Prussian War between France and Germany. While there was plenty of suffering in these and other conflicts and I'm sure it comes to no comfort for the war dead and disabled, it generally credited with preventing anything on the scale of the Napoleonic Wars until August of 1914—about a hundred years. Whether or not you think this qualifies as successful, I think one could easily question that. I think it is a better blueprint than the unipolar world that we lived through in the nineties (and we Americans seem to be vainly trying to recover) or the bipolar model of the Cold War which we Americans seem to be accepting as the next best option. I think that the Concert of Europe was a little too chaotic, but no powerful country willingly gives up any of its sovereignty so it may be the best choice going forward, or at least that's what the Russians think.
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@ihl0700677525 Sometimes that bar for hurting America is pretty low—nationalizing one's oil for instance, or organizing fruit laborers, electing a left-leaning politician or, what was it Libya did to us again? Americans don't like the words that describe our actions so we don't call wars a war, we don't call coercion coercion, and we don't refer to imperialism as imperialism. We come up with terms like "police action", "sanctions", and "soft power" and we minimize the consequences born by the subjects of our policies and activities. This eases the conscience of the average American and allows them to believe that they are isolationists. But we're not. We want to tell what the world what to do and we don't want any lip from them. After all, that would be defined as hurting American interests.
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@ihl0700677525 Well, most Americans don't think of our empire as an empire, which it most certainly is. Most Americans view extraterritorial role in the world as an intended if not sometimes misguided force for good that helps people in other countries achieve what's most important to them—namely liberal democracy and self determination. There is a genuine sense of isolationism, particularly regarding funding. We don't want our tax money going to foreigners unless it's to help them adopt a politically acceptable form of government which I've already mentioned. Some of the more politically astute Americans recognize that what we use our power and influence for in the world is to maintain our power and influence, and a select few have weaponized the naivety of the general population to personally profit or to undermine political opponents both foreign and domestic. But very few Americans want to see the United States back off it means countries like China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela or Cuba are allowed to make their own decisions unless those decisions move them towards liberal democratic government and supplication to western journalism.
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@ihl0700677525 He's talking about Metternich's Concert of Europe codified at the Congress of Vienna which was established after the Napoleonic Wars and which balanced the strengths of Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia. The idea was that if one power became dominate the other four would unite to keep them in check.
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@ihl0700677525 You've given a long and well thought-out response and I'm afraid I'm not going to return the favor. This is not because you don't deserve a response, but rather because I'm worn out on this conversation. While I continue to disagree with you, I compliment you on your efforts, and your intellectual stamina. Best regards, Alan
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With the exceptions of Japan and Australia, nobody in the region wants to have to choose sides between the United States and China. Siding with the loser in this conflict will have grave consequences, and maybe siding with the winner could as well in the short term. The other country that might actively take a side is Russia, but that probably would not be to the benefit of the United States.
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@ihl0700677525 I'm not sure we think as differently as our little debate indicated. In fact, part of the reason I ducked out was because I felt like I was being forced to double down on arguments I wasn't totally on board with. I also don't like crap-talking my own country, something that I thought was spiraling out of control.
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@the11382 Napoleon took advantage of the lack of a European coalition. Unity of opposition galvanized when he'd attacked enough territory to effect every other major kingdom in Europe. That and the fact that all these monarchies were terrified of the French Revolution that Napoleon was claiming to spread was the glue necessary to defeat the upstart empire. Germany's actions in the nineteenth century were intentionally limited so as not to invoke the Congressional Coalition. By the end of the nineteenth century the Congress of Europe had broken down into two alliance blocks. If you defined the end of the Congress of Europe to coincide with Bismark's establishment of the Three Emperor's League, it still lasted about half a century.
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@electrogestapo I don't think China has any real enemies right now. The closest would be the United States, Australia, Japan and India. I think Australia and India would be negligible military allies except for staging purposes. If Japan opts in, which I think is a very questionable proposition, after all, they have the most to lose, they could bring some fire to the stove. It's possible (and maybe even probable) that other countries would view a forceful Chinese repatriation of Taiwan as grounds for determining China to be an enemy, but most of those countries are a long way from the field of battle and, with the possible exception of Britain, probably unwilling to sacrifice their children to stop it. I don't see Russia siding with the United States against China. To the extent that they get involved at all, it will probably be to supply raw materials to China. Despite what some folks are saying about the feelings of love for America from Russia's youth, Russia's interest will be for the degradation of power in both the United States and China. They'll probably do their best to keep the conflict going and to keep the conflict localized. There are countries that have issues with China in the region, but they are substantially smaller than China in all regards and they're not going to piss in the eye of the local dragon at the behest of an unreliable eagle that lives on the other side of the sea. The more balanced the power between the United States and China, the more careful China's neighbors will be in walking the tightrope between them. If China is not already at war with their neighbors, then their neighbors are not going to go to war with China.
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@ihl0700677525 When you ask, "Why should America allow transgression by other nation when she possesses the strongest military ever exist in human history?" are you asking me that question, suggesting that America should flex its muscle to strong arm countries into abiding by our terms? Or are you answering the question in the negative when you say "America is not the 'protector of the world peace' and 'defender of justice', you know." I really wish your last refutation were true, but it just hasn't played out that way. With the exception of a few Middle Eastern countries we just do not abide a government that doesn't at least superficially match our template. We certainly don't tolerate communism, and probably not theocracy but with only one example out there it may be too little information on which to generalize. I do think that there is a large and growing segment of the population within the general public that is more accepting of ideological apostacy. But that group is not well represented either in the State Department (regardless of party control) or American media outlets.
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I'm not sure that's the case. A lot of countries are not going to want to get involved. China is developing deep commercial ties all over the globe and the United States hasn't proven to be a reliable friend lately.
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@electrogestapo My point is that a lot of these countries may not choose to see China as their enemy.
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@electrogestapo First of all, yes, by a war I am referring to belligerents in combat. Anything short of that is diplomacy. China has complicated relationships with varying countries. The only countries that are actively trying to sabotage China's progress right now are the United States and Australia, and I wouldn't even call them enemies at this stage. We still have too many common interests, too many deep connections, and too many people who aren't interested in mutual suffering. We're more like dirty cheating rivals. If war broke out that could all change. China might find countries lining up against them. I think the U.S. might be surprised though by how few countries, especially local countries, throw their lot in against China. China's unlikely to be destroyed in the war and even if they are unable to take Taiwan they're still going to be the dominant player in their region, only now they'll be angry and vindictive. Countries realize this and they have to look at their bigger picture. I'm sorry you don't care for my use of metaphors. Sometimes I like to add a little color to this otherwise dry debate. I hardly think it indicates lack of intelligence. Your criticism of it is fine—different strokes and all. But your vitriolic approach indicates a disconcerting lack of self-control. I hope at some point you grow out of that.
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Space assets may well prove to be the most vulnerable.
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I don't think the Chinese care about having the highest number. What they care about is having enough assets to do the job, whatever that number turns out to be.
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@tshavfengvang7831 Enemies of the state that might actually field troops (1) USA (2) UK (3) Japan (4) India (5) Australia. I still think Japan is an extreme long shot. India, attacking in the extremely difficult to supply Himalayas, and Australia, with no significant military strength, together wouldn't provide enough force to effect the outcome of a war. A combination of weakness and distance would have the British playing a minor role, but they might still get a speaking part. That leaves the real defense of the island in the hands of the Americans and the residents of Taiwan itself. By the way, I've indulged your description, but not one of those countries you listed are enemies of China at this date. Right now China has no enemies at the state level, though it has several at the state wannabe level.
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@joetheperformer I don't think anyone is suggesting that the U.S. is less competent that the Chinese. What's questionable is how much American experience against minuscule naval adversaries constitutes a significant advantage. The U.S. is more experienced, but we haven't faced a naval peer since World War II, so the experience is not as valuable as it would be had the current generation of sailors been fighting another naval peer power. Until now there hasn't been another naval peer power. The Chinese haven't fought anyone—advantage USN. US naval assets are designed to operate and dominate globally, whereas Chinese assets are purpose-built to drive the USN out of the Western Pacific. Time probably favors China on this, but that depends on a lot of variables, and it may prove not to be the case. China's biggest advantage will probably be proximity, which will allow them to harness continental assets for naval engagements to a degree that the United States will not be able to. China also has a substantial manufacturing edge should the conflict last long enough for replacement to matter. The United States has an advantage in the fact that while China's maritime trade could be blocked if the USN is not knocked out of the game, the U.S. would be virtually impossible to blockade no matter how big the PLAN gets. China wouldn't be choked off completely—a lot of key resources could be brought in overland from Russia and Central Asia—but it would definitely slow things down. As for alliances, on the surface it looks like the U.S. has an advantage, and that may well be the case. Right now Japan and Australia seem like pretty solid U.S. allies. South Korea probably would try to stay out of this. Their involvement runs a serious risk of invasion, and their government swings back and forth regarding relations between themselves and China from election to election. If China can maintain their relationship with Russia, then that would pretty much compensate for the U.S.' Pacific alliances, assuming the same degree of participation. Russia has a strong incentive to make sure the United States doesn't win. Though, from a stab-in-the-back diplomacy perspective, they actually benefit the most by encouraging the conflict to go on as long as possible, draining resources from both superpowers and raising their respective position in the world power hierarchy. Whether or not their friendship with China turns out to be genuine won't be known until the relationship is tested.
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@TheBucketSkill You are definitely at risk of underestimating your opponent.
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@Meinan4370 China is keenly aware of Japan's mistakes. I wouldn't count on them to make the same ones.
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@iandavidvillaloboswong5180 Chinese training has not been as rigorous as American training, partly because U.S. personnel are more familiar with their equipment because of the rapid advances in, and relative newness of, the Chinese fleet assets. This is less the case now than it was a decade ago and it will be less the case in ten years than it is now.
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@silverhawkscape2677 That Pyrrhicc Victory made China a world power. The U.S. didn't take China seriously before that, they took China very seriously after that, even through the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
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@silverhawkscape2677 I'll concede. I think that, upon further reflection, that the term "world player" is more accurate than "world power" during this period. Although I think you're being overly dismissive of China's position during the fifties and sixties, and while American trade played a sizable role in China's return to great power status, it was China that made China a great power again, not the United States.
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@jkc3738 Japan may very well, as probably would Australia. The rest of East Asia would probably think twice, it would certainly be a risky move, and the rest of the world wouldn't matter.
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@jkc3738 I'm not entirely sure what you're getting at. Maybe you are suggesting that the United States won't risk war with China because they haven't done so with Russia yet? If so I hope you're right. I really don't want to see a war with China. If I'm misunderstanding you please let me know.
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@pinky8167 Do you think this would be a fight fought in the middle of the ocean? Because, I don't think anybody else does.
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@pinky8167 "So, middle of the ocean, not really, but just off the coasts? Yes. " That was my point. China's not going to fight where it can't take advantage of continental assets. I agree with you about the disadvantage China bears regarding the blockading of China through the straits of Malacca, and to a lesser extent at the straits of Hormuz. However, China is not as dependent on these routes as they used to be for resources, and in the future this will be even more the case. Also, China is not as dependent on imports of resources as they once were. China can feed itself if they go back to a rice and vegetables diet. That would undoubtedly be unpopular, but not as unpopular as giving up on the reunification of the country. Fuel is available by rail and by pipeline from Russia and Iran, though this would be in lesser quantities, it probably would be sufficient. Mineral resources can be obtained from central Asia or from within China itself. I don't think that the outcome of a war between the U.S. and China is obvious, and I don't think it's in either country's interest to engage in a real world test. Even winning such a war would be extremely costly, and in the case of an American victory, probably temporary, as China's ambition to reunify and their undoubted view of a loss as a return to the century of humiliation would cause them to lick their wounds and start preparing for a rematch.
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The greatest American hardware advantage is in the quantity of combat aircraft.
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Satellite resources will probably be the first things destroyed once it is determined that the United States is participating. Bombers may have the range to come from the states, but fighter escorts are going to require refueling, which they might get. An amphibious assault force will certainly have vulnerabilities, but it only takes a few hours to get across those straits by ship so the bulk of the troops will probably float across before a proper open water defense can be mounted. China also has amphibious aircraft that can bring troops and supplies not just to airfields but to beaches and lakes as well if they can control the skies.
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@badguy1481 I don't share your confidence in the protection of satellites. I don't think China is ready to take Taiwan now, but I think they are close, at least militarily. I think the numbers of ships and boats that China can dedicate to the supply route is sufficient to supply landed troops. I think a lot of them would perish initially, but in the long run I think the supply line would be secure. China's proximity to the battle would prove highly advantageous when it came to aerial support and missile defense. If the US managed to land large numbers of troops on the island and then secured its supply lines on the eastern side then it may become a war of attrition, but that's a challenge as well. I'm not sure how much resistance vs. support China would have from the local population. Most Taiwan residents are Chinese after all. I think many of the more level-headed residents might very well decide to throw their lot in with the PLA.
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@altrabodyltd7328 I don't know that tonnage is the best measure of a navy's effectiveness. Of course, I don't think raw number of ships is either. What the ships can do and whether or not they can protect themselves are the measures by which I think a navy should be measured, specifically in regard to the likely field of battle.
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