Comments by "Alan Friesen" (@alanfriesen9837) on "Alexander Mercouris"
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@michaelkatz275 First of all, the Anglo Texans of the day were given cheap land by the Mexican government with the understanding that they would be good Mexican citizens. When these beneficiaries stabbed Mexico in the back and started agitating for independence the Mexican government took action. The same thing could happen in Taiwan.
As for the events in Xinjiang, the sources for that information couldn't be more dubious. They boil down to Adrien Zenz, an anti-Chinese millennialist who works for Victims of Communism, an agency that has as its primary goal the destruction of China and other communist regimes, the World Uighur Congress, a separatist organization that parades a handful of "victims" around on speaking tours with ever-evolving stories and is funded heavily by the National Endowment for Democracy, an agency whose purpose is to fund clandestine operations targeting our global peers, and ASPI, an exceptionally hawkish Australian think tank that derives all of its funding by arms manufacturers.
Does this mean that there aren't human rights abuses in Xinjiang? No, it doesn't. It just means there is no decent evidence for wide spread human rights abuses coming anywhere near the threshhold one would assume that a term like genocide would require. There are, or at least there were, reeducation centers in Xinjiang. But not every building with a wall around it is a reeducation center. In fact, walled enclosures are as common in China as hurricane fences are in the United States. The idea that there were enough reeducation centers to house a million or more individuals is completely unsupported by facts on the ground. The purpose of the reeducation centers that were in operation were to deradicalize and provide vocational education to at-risk individuals in Xinjiang. I'll except that the compulsory nature of the programs brings rise to legitimate human rights questions, but there is no evidence that these programs were used to de-ethnicize or eradicate Uighurs or any other ethnic group in Xinjiang. And there is not a scintilla of evidence for forced labor among UIghurs who might be in or may have graduated from these reeducation programs. One company, Sketchers, did a detailed investigation of their supply lines in China including those that stretched into Xinjiang and determined that there was no evidence to support claims of forced labor at any point along the chain.
If Taiwan wants to point to Xinjiang as a reason not to reunify then they are doing so in bad faith. They may have reasons for not wanted to reunify, but Xinjiang is not a valid one.
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I think that the frightening situation we find ourselves in is that there are some people in the government of the United States that realize that the longer we wait to go to war with China, the less likely we are to succeed in that war. Because of this I think there are people high up in the intelligence community, and maybe a few in the military, who feel like the best thing to do is to goad China into attacking Taiwan now rather than later so that the United States has an excuse to fight now rather than later when odds of success are much worse. The question is, will China rise to the bait?
I think China is more-or-less aware of this strategy and I think they are going to avoid open warfare as long as they can. The question is, when Taiwan openly declares independence will China swallow it until the force imbalance is stronger with all the domestic disappointment that this would incur. Or will they risk going to war when the odds of total victory are not as overwhelming as the Chinese would hope for? The one thing the United States is doing successfully is we are making China uncomfortable.
As for the way the various wargames are playing out, I'm pretty sure that China could invade Taiwan successfully in the first weeks of combat. They could set up strong beachheads and probably capture some harbors and airports that would give them a strong land presence on the island; they might even conquer the whole island. The US has a 2-1 advantage in combat aircraft numbers though and the Americans would with airfields in Japan, Guam, the Marianas and a half dozen supercarriers operating, probably eventually achieve air superiority, at which point the U.S. military could effectively protect its supply lines into Taiwan and shut off the Chinese (Though if they operate to close to the mainland they'll be at risk of China's superior missile artillery). Then it becomes a production race to see if China can regain air superiority before the PLA is ejected from Taiwan, something that could happen in a relatively short period of time if the PLA didn't secure the whole island or something that could take a long time if the island was secured and the forces in place fought for every inch of ground tooth and nail.
My point is that while wargames might show a Chinese victory (occupation of the island) in the short term, the longer term victory could go either way. But even if China loses, they're not going to give up on Taiwan. They'll lick their wounds and come back two decades later with a strong taste for vengeance.
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I think Putin's description of Russian history is highly revisionist. You can ask the Iranians how aggressively imperialistic the Russians used to be. Having said that though, it probably is appropriate for Russia to start looking east and south as well as west for political connection. Europe is not really a continent. Its continental status is based on the limited geographical understanding of the ancient Greeks. The Greeks saw the world as three lands (Europe, Asia & Africa) divided by three seas (the Mediterranean, the Black & the Red Seas). But Europe is really just the westernmost region of Eurasia. There are four major cultural groupings that have some presence in Europe. There is the Mediteranean (Greco-Romantic), the Germanic, the Slavic and the Turkic. The first two, along with what remains of the Celtic civilization, are very intertwined and together they make up the West. Russia has always been considered a fringe society by the West. Over the last two hundred twenty years Russia has had major conflicts with France, Britain,Germany and the United States and though Russia has frquently bben an ally of convenience, they've never really been treated as equals, especially culturally.
The Eurasian continent has several civilizations on it. It has the aforementioned Western civilization, the Semitic civilization (a substantial percentage of which is in North Africa), the Turkic civilization, the Persian civilization, the Indic civilization, and the Sinitic civilization. There are also Austronesian and Siberian cultures that have strong interactions with the civilizations on their peripheries, but maintain a certain level of distinction. As for Russia, it has tried to be a part of Western civilization and it has had a notable presence in that arena. However, if the Russians choose a more oriental path going forward, which may very well be the best bet going forward, both economically and culturally, then the declaration of a seperate Russian culture might make a lot of sense.
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@antyspi4466 I don't think Beijing fears an insurrection. The CPC has the full faith of the Chinese people and Xi Jinping is solid in the support of the party elite at this time. They're not really worried about secession either. There are secessionist movements in some regions, but they are small. China does worry about terrorism from these groups, but it's more about protecting the population than it is about genuine loss of territory.
These things I understand. What I don't understand is why China makes threatening comments towards Taiwan at every election that it has to realize only strengthens the DPP. There are a couple possibilities, the first is that China's leadership is just stupid when it comes to elections. I don't really believe this, but it's an outside possibility. Another possibility is that it's all for domestic consumption. If the Chinese people believed that Xi or the party were ever to reconcile with the idea of letting Taiwan escape, it might undercut their legitimacy, and this may be a way of signalling to the Chinese people that they still are pushing a hard line. A third possibility is that China is confident that it could take Taiwan back militarily, but that they would prefer to do so after the government of Taiwan declared independence because of how that would play internationally, and by having the DPP in office, the odds of getting that justification for action is higher. I don't think China can yet be confident of a military victory, but I'm nobody in particular and I'm not privy to China's or anyone else's actual assessment of the endgame likelihood. Of these three possibilities I lean heavily towards the second, but I'm not real happy with that choice either. Maybe there is another reason I just can't think of, but I'm dead certain that China is not afraid of Taiwan or any of Taiwan's supporters within the country.
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"Can the United States defend Taiwan?"
I haven't studied the 18 consecutive war games teasing out that scenario to know whether or not they've gamed for a total war scenario where all American assets are in place when hostilities start. I suspect that's not the case.
Could that happen?
It would have to be a coordinated effort between the U.S. military and the government of Taiwan, getting everything placed as independence is declared.
What then?
Assuming China takes the bait, something which I doubt would occur, my understanding is that the United States has about a two-to-one advantage in aircraft in the kind of battle (amphibious assault) where air superiority is one of the most critical factors. If China launched its amphibious attack prior to achieving air superiority, they probably would fail. Could China then goad the United States into fighting over the Taiwan straits without launching the amphibious assault? If so the Chinese could slowly grind down the U.S. air forces with a combination of air assets and land based missile artillery. With restraint, however, the United States might be able to hang the threat of air superiority over a potential landing attempt for some time. Of course China could pulverize Taiwan's airfields, ports and other military assets the whole time. And if a carrier were ever sunk, it would be really difficult for the U.S. to show restraint. Then again, where would China's navy hide during all of this?
I don't think China is going to attack Taiwan until they know they will likely win, regardless of whether or not Taiwan declares independence. I do think that the ferocity with which they eventually do attack and take Taiwan will depend in part on how much crow they had to eat in the years leading up to the attack. And for this reason I still think it is overwhelmingly in Taiwan's interest (not to mention China's and the United States' interest) to negotiate a peaceful return where Taiwan negotiates to preserve the things they find most dear in their current system while pledging to be a loyal province within the PRC. But who's going to listen to me?
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