Comments by "harvey young" (@harveyyoung3423) on "Why is Woke Strongest in English-Speaking Nations? (Prof. Nigel Biggar)" video.

I'm working on why our political logic, eg of the State cannot express archipelago minorities, if that the correct expression. This means International human rights can be a partisan collective for all minorities or a archipelago. So Rights as laws are said to protect minorities form at least 1949. This then is enshrined as universal international law as rights. but the later legal logical basis then make a form for all minorities as if each is only a part of the the State they are in. And so the logic of States cannot express a covariance between minorities of different States. in set theory the whole universe is first then the states in it as parts and the minorities as parts of their respective State. Since in International law States are treated as essential internal relations with external relations between States as contingent, there is no way to express internal relations between minorities of different states. Of course the set theory place of "the universe" is an invention of regulative international law, but it does then provide then an apparent formal trans-state relational Space between different minorities in different States, but without obligations and responsibilities. Internal law then can express and legitimise relations between parts of States that the states themselves cannot express. But the international law is more like a world like form of counter power coalitions of minorities of States. This makes the logic of constitutions and international law are a right mess of confusions. I'm hoping to show this properly using negations here. If a sub set of A and b sub set of B, how to express a and b as a set together when each is only determined "emptily "a"" as minority of A. no a b set can be expressed. The universe set allows this but begins with minorities of states as if only external contingent relations. Thus IL can become a form for a universe of collective minorities of all States, especially since it stands as higher external reflection on States as well. Did no one see this possibility, or did it jsut emerge as an unforeseen possible affordance for such disparate global powers. ie this emerged by virtue of internal laws ie they are productive law constructing a form of international life not able to express that individuals can have real relations not expressible as such in terms of individual rights and so appear not as limits but affordances.
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A bit of context to my above comment that seems appropriate to Prof. Nigel Bigger's framing of the problem. I want to avoid any psychological reduction here, following just now anyway Peter Geach. I want to claim the problem is logic and metaphysics of law and the State. I posted this bellow to Novara Media and Tommy Robinsons YouTube Channel. like all my stuff its a work in progress. For anyone interested, I have been trying to explain why I hold to what might be called a conservative view, as opposed to say a view from the left or the right or the liberal or combinations of those. This small c conservativism then means i am not trying to dogmatically sit on the fence or see from all sides or all points of view, and so escape judgement. But i do not regard this small c conservative as just another point of view. theoretically that makes no sense, since this small c is not a theoretical standpoint. You cannot just apply the Critique of bias to all positions equally or even unequally . This would be the wrong use of the notion of bias. Its naive, and just wrong in the extreme to imagine all the different political positions and say they are all biased. Only the presupposition of scientific c world view and representation could provide just such a criteria, and we are not comparing even apples and pairs here. Since as a small c conservative, i hold to no such scientific transcendent criteria exists, the accusation of bias here is incongruent. Peter Geach, in the 1971 preface to his 1957 book "Mental Acts" wants to correct some mistakes and fill in some omissions in his original 1957 text. "I wholly ignored the fact that whatever one can judge to be so, one can also conceive it to be so without judging it to be so; the internal structure of an assumption (as McTaggart called a non assertoric thought) is the same as that of a judgement....only a background of adult convictions keeps a thought of winged horse from being a judgement that a horse is winged" "When a man can answer a question without thinking we need not suppose there is any judgement; but there is a judgement involved - and this surly agrees pretty well with the ordinary use of words- when a man has to consider how to answer (a sober man needs no judgement to tell a policeman his name and address; for a drunken man it may be a matter of judgement)." There is then a dichotomy between a certain passivity of perception, where "looks" and "is" are conflated, and certain kind of maybe excessive creativity and imagination driven "conception". The former is like an uncritical habitual passivity without reflection, or judgment the later is like the creation of an ideology. But the later then is not a judgement as if in opposition to the former thought of as lacking judgement. They do not divide up in this binary way: this is not the dialectic. The later is more like tactics and technical movements of avoidance of judgement rather than being a judgement. If the former is a deficiency of judgement to passivity, the later is an excess, but not of judgement and reflection, but of ad hoc moves and technicalities. I think its in the first episode of Cracker you know: "L-I-V-E-R-P-double o-L, Liverpool F.C". "Everton. Everton , Everton" The problem is not just the confusion of tactics with judgement and passivity with intentional bias, these cannot be placed in the same epistemic and metaphysical plane. Excessive clever tactics of avoidance and abduction ids not the same as a passive perception of a judgement. Geach is referenced in John McDowell's "Mind and World" and a great deal in Robert Brandon's on line seminars on "In the Space of Reasons with Wilfred Sellars". I will attach in a reply below the issue i was discussing in connection to my orientation in philosophy.
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Geach here is discussed by McDowell in his paper "Sellars's Thomism" in the McDowell collection "Having the World in View". Especially the interesting example there ST pg 240 from Geach "Mental Acts" Psalms, xiv, 1 Hobbes Leviathan "The fool hath said in his heart: there is no God" McDowell with Geach emphasises said in his heart as opposed to spoken out publicly. For us the fool says there is no justice. But i think of Anselm's ontological argument of course.
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