Comments by "harvey young" (@harveyyoung3423) on "73% of Kids Are Taught Race & Gender Theory as Fact. No surprise today's youth hold left-wing views." video.

  1. Drawing on Eric Kaufmann's Wikipedia page an example of Kant's incongruent counterparts would be Gary Becker and Michael Foucault on liberalism (Berkeley lectures 1979-8?) After Foucault death the dialectic or isomorphism was played out between Becker and Foucault's long term assistant mediated by Bernard Harcourt. also I see Becker's response I believe in his MA lectures posted years later on you tube. But i watched them years ago now. Very good stuff.
    7
  2. Drawing on Eric Kaufmann's Wikipedia page: not sure that you could make a demographic argument to a girl friend to get married and have kids. e.g get down on one knee and read Becker's liberal theory to her. Probably ned Gyges's ring after that particular proposition.
    7
  3. individual reason for pleasure, collectively is irrational. Sidgwick's fallacy of composition Criticism of Mill.
    2
  4. Drawing on Eric Kaufmann's Wikipedia page: do all people all ove4r the world consider Religion a Private matter. eg they aren't all post Westphalian's.
    1
  5. In a way Bas van Fraassen is asking which came first the human law then the theology and science or the theology and then the human law and science. democracy. eg the original intertwining of the secular and the religious cosmologies from disentanglement of the concept of law.
    1
  6. @@user-rj1wd9kd6q Nice one. Its a new term for me. I'll check that out thanks.
    1
  7. ​@@user-rj1wd9kd6q Excellent! I was drawing on the Bernard Williams distinction between "Internal and External reasons" and John McDowell's "Might there be External Reasons". but in McDowell, the notion of an external reason is shifted away from behaviourism and its nomological (C. G. Hampel ) and contextual versions. The former is actually a behaviourism and is only possible in a highly controlled framed environment and so becomes a task to frame the situation (reduce degrees of freedom) so as to create the conditions of the possibility of empirical evidence in the real world a task to manufacture since its cannot describe it. while the contextual version of Behaviourism can appear to have evidential support in the real world i hold that it has to "import surreptitiously" non Behavioural content like "intention" aim purpose. Now your point really does open Bandura’s Box. there was an experiment done with two primates in a framed laboratory setting. and one is given a biscuit and is happy with it, until it sees the other has two biscuits. I have taken this to open up a new way of thinking of McDowells "Reasons" in "Mind and World" and justice and equality etc. I have made a few moves with this using the old "Intuitionist" vision of seeing a picture an aesthetic as opposed to dot empiricism (Adorno), and dot "justice" (me).So for example a paradox of experience when two rich women walking to a club in London going on about sexism and inequality while walking past a homeless man. Now this paradox can apparently be solved if we think of policy in action in the world its just an apparent disjunct between policy and their operations in the real world. like in the Vietnam War the Cow being delivered to a out post base when it is been under attack for days and running out of water and ammunition. Thus the vision from the point of view of reason "in" experience is as of disjunctions either or in terms of justice and inequality. My view is it has to mean a "conjunctive or non-disjunctive account of justice and equality in experience. the primates cannot see or do this. So wat is going on here. its of the most central importance. Especially if they are teaching the kids a raw Behaviourism as in Mindfulness. Treating them like Monkeys. But they would need in a Teaching setting of limited degrees of freedom to go into the history of policy in action in the world. it seems to me to mark a limit to Behavioural accounts and so needs a therapy to escape the behaviour paradyme for a more integrated account of justice as right equality and justice as act in the actual situation. this cannot be a modification or addition to Behaviouirism excerpt a surreptitious smuggling of purpose as policy aim (Crit by ). I am trying to bring into McDowell's Hegelian account of reason and motivation a non-disjunctive account of experience. Personally, I was lucky in a way with my encounter and experience of Mindfulness training "forced on me" by a Government mental health and Back to Work" program. Firstly the people who were also forced to do do this program were very good and wise and were very open to my Crtique of it within the legislative constraints. I could perform the Critiq in the lessons because i had studied Philosophy and Behaviourism(s) for 20 years prior to the lessons along with doing, back in 2010, the only course in the world on Stoicism. My teachers were great and now everybody is doing Stoicism and its links to CBT. Problem is the kids at schools will have no such background to do critical reflection and so will be treated like animals reasoning. Solution is to do the CBT in a dialect with justice IN THE SAME CLASS as a dialectic between two concepts of reason of right of justice. this means as a conjunctive account of intuitive justice in experience inequality is impossible a sit would be either an infinity or a zero which is mathematical possible but no a possible reality. Technically for me it means thinking of policy series as not really separable but as unified under a Sovereign legitimacy and responsibility for the experience. this is impossible for a Behaviourism since it requires thinking of single series in abstraction from other series or just imports in intentionality. The philosophical context for this is debates between John McDowell, Crispin Wright, and Michael Dummett, on "Wittgenstein's rule following". McDowell had a long exchange on this with Robert Pippin that ends up a discussion on Kant's notion of unity: that is u8nity of the manifold of experience unity of the proposition (not an S is P subject predicate distinction)I think and the unity of apperception. on the latter we can so to speak see our selves as under causes and open to freedom in the world and so CBT and Behaviours' must be wrong. I had already partly worked this out in an MA on Kant's notion of Unity in the Schematism section of his CPR. only if we de think or analysis experience as originally series that are then put together can we get a semblance of Behaviourism. but of course "the unity is original" and the analysis and synthesis are after the fact of a unitary experience and its disjuncts. Behaviourism as being with series for nomologcvila framing will always be too late and as a practice will have to ignore (silence) lots of features of experience like injustice to work along with framing the kids by breaking them up into series acts. of course they would say the kids do justice and equality in a different class but then they are being fed incongruence. it is a dialect and neds be done in the same class as a dialectics. So were as Williams can deal with intention aims etc away from Behaviourms (from Davidsons causal Critique of Peter Winch's Critique of social Behaviour) and talk of internal reasons for the agent he misses the context, that is even in his examples "Jim and the Indians" etc. this was my argument to my instructors in CBT and Mindfulness. Can you imagine. they were great instructors forced to do a bad training policy. But Williams can account for us having joy and agency even in the most difficult economic situations that behaviourism cannot explain as rational. its similar to the view that agent sacrifice can be rational but is anomalous to agent external centred Behaviourism. McDowell wanted to hold up a Virtue ethics here on real Goods (Anscombe Philippa Foot) but lost sight of Aristotle's notion of justice as a virtue and my conjunctiv9e notion of experience. Thanks for the alert and happy (y-1)mass.
    1
  8. @@user-rj1wd9kd6q McDowell has two lectures on YouTube "Are the senses Silent" and "Can Cognitive Psychology determine epistemology" which addressed these but i think it needs much more. thanks again.
    1
  9. @@user-rj1wd9kd6q the notion of a "Role Model" is difficult because in one Sense Kant and Aristotle agree with this: Kant's Architype and Aristotle's necessity of a teacher for the virtues. the necessity of a moral education BILDER culturalisation as requiring a moral person with the virtues. it probably presupposes trust an original trust before proof or disproof. butthen I wouldn't trust anybody to deliver a "moral " education via Behaviourism cos its about the self and there feelings in the end. I would say Behaviourism is is a rational decontextualized ordinance that is meaty to be universally applicable to all contexts. so suited to an image of the world as being essential decontextualized persons that can move around the world uninhibited by different context so long as they close down there degrees of verbal freedom so they only talk to each other about money and self interest. person as born nowhere or a task to educate people in to being nowhere self interested agent of the planet. Behaviourism is a too for the modern global world of free movement etc that is the Behavioural motivation for people to want to use Behaviourism as universally applicable to all people for all time everywhere. So whereas Behaviourism claims to give a scientific ground to such a person from nowhere as purely economic agents with purely economic reason of self interest, in fact its the other way round : "the scientific image of man" (Wilfred Sellars) requires Behaviours for its own actualisations a task. so its is Becoming before Being if you will or in Heidegger beings before Being the ontic before Ontology (the Ontological Difference). i am really rehashing Husserl's' Critique of this in "The Crisis of the European Sciences" Science is not description of nature (human) or a tool but is rather a process that trys to manufacture people (Educate Bilder!?) to becomes person who see them self externally as behaviourist and this as internal reason is an exculpation and excuse not a responsible reason (Mind and world). you know like i did x because it was my self interest and I am a Behaviourist and only have Stoic CBT beliefs and this is scientific and so i will act according to the behavioural image of my self. end of...i keep reading the latest behaviourist theories to update "who" i am and "who" I can become. its obviously absurd...
    1
  10. @@user-rj1wd9kd6q Behaviourism is the materialist Right counterpart to Left Marxist and neo-Marxist Universal materialism: Kant's incongruent counterparts. there is no recognisable human in either, but both as tasks and projects of becoming are trying to turn us into them we are stuck in the middle being pulled to become these two opposite at the same time.
    1
  11. @@user-rj1wd9kd6q BEhaviourism in practice is mostly concerned with modality of possibly and risk, and equivocates, this: "possibility for empirical probability" (though mass Bayesian data algorithms) into an Aristotelian agent potentiality. its a metaphysical ontology monstrosity. CBT and its versions are via mass data risk just another scientific form of medical control. and any Critique is met with "the evidence" and you need a 1,00 PhDs to even begin to Critique the meaning of the latest bit of empirical evidence manufactured and employed by the psychologists. I mean they even have Behavioural penalties for those who miss Behaviourist class or Criticize the Behaviouirsit educational program, even if they had the educational level requires Behaviour is anominious or has a million unknow scientific authors. Peter Whittle mentions the 50s movie "The Blob" which is a perfect analogy for it, even though the writers had Communism in mind probably. we can't ask the i guess so we need a film critique that is not one of those left ideology Critiques. the left correctly critique the ideology of the self and self interest abstract liberalism but propose to put something worse in its place.
    1
  12. @@user-rj1wd9kd6q in a net shell then SELT is similar to the paying students for good grades as opposed to punishment for bad grades. this is a shift in much the same way as the father of behaviourism Skinner changed prisons form punishment systems to reward systems and got better "outcomes" in terms of control. it doesn't look as bad a behavioural punishment and is more "efficent " and also more degrading since it seems less controlling to use reward not punishment watch the movie "Clockwork Orange". I heard that Skinners students arranged between them selves so that half were smiling as he lectured and half were frowning. and so Skinner unknowingly ended up talking to the smilers.
    1
  13. @@user-rj1wd9kd6q and so if the students get it they can apply the same method to the teachers eg Kant's Categorical Imperative to deal with the young peoples diminished capacity to knowingly consent and so to its legitimacy. but of course this is probably too much for little kids to have the capacity to do
    1
  14. @@user-rj1wd9kd6q So in just direct Kantian terms of possible objective moral maxims the Behavioural SELT not only is a system where we treat others as causal objects but we treat our selves as causal objects to. this is Kants attempt to separate human as according to the laws of causal nature (phenomena appearance) and to treat people as things in themselves noumena reality). Kant though is not saying do to others as they do to you that is not the categorical imperative so probably doing SELT to the teachers is a good tactic but not really a moral agent standpoint in Kant's sense. The "do it to the teacher" tactic like Robispere's execution only affirms though action the SELT standpoint.
    1
  15. @@user-rj1wd9kd6q If you want to get more into this without having to just draw on Kant and ay well ant views is an use an argument from authority, which many people will not take as a definitive complete or even coherent and "liveable" motivational (ought) ground for morality (Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals) and virtue ("Metaphysics of Morals"). Bernard Williams for example is no Kantian but takes the "Absolute Conception" as a task for science but not for an Agent's ethics of responsibility. So if your interlocuter is not a Kantian you have to go deeper since Kant's arguments are relevant but embedded in analogous problems of science and persons of the 18th Century. Its in the Antinomies and the Paralogisms of the CPR and the distinction between mechanism and organism in CJ. its a formidable task to try and applied this to the contemporary view of science and persons directly. if your interlocutor is no Kantian then you will got get them to concede easily, in my experience. I mean just getting people to vote for Kant out of self interest is no proof of the argument, and is contrary to Kant's point. So i took this up from Williams's "Internal and External Reasons" (1981) (in his collection Moral Luck) and McDowell's response "Might there be External Reasons"(1995). A summer of the arguments can e found in a paper free online in "Academia" by John Bruneo "McDowell on External Reasons (2007)". There is a Wikipedia page "Internalism and Externalism " that is a very brief summery but also sorts out a certain equivocation in philosophical terminoonology between Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology, metaphysics, and semantics, not to be confused with Internalism and Externalism is Reason for Action theory, the later is the distinction I am drawing out. I will revisit this and if i can add anything new i will. Happy (y-1)mass.
    1
  16. @@user-rj1wd9kd6q Ok so McDowell is concerned with process in motivational states over time due to a "proper upbringing". That is how he claims contrary to Williams that an external reason can "become" internal reasons later. The reference here to "a proper upbringing" seems question begging, i mean if external reason R is silent for agent A at time t(1), but if they have a upbringing process of P, then R will now be an internal reason, then that just means we either have to take R on trust and P on a method to confirm the trust later, or we are to find ourselves under P and later that we are motivated to R and we agree. but on both views we either trust that R is true but we are not yet motivated or we are in the process of motivation blindly and agree really out of having being drawn into it not knowing what it is and then we would necessarily agree. both look like there is a legitimacy gap, the first we trust in the educator that R is true and wait for motivational training. or we are indoctrinated into P and so think R is true but only by indoctrination. Now this has received Criticism in just this way. but it is according to McDowell due to a bad reading of Aristotle's Virtues, McDowell's point is that ethics and virtue cannot be taught and learned from outside of an already ethical life from outside the virtues of the teachers and there art craft skills. So things like unjustified laws and utilitarian arguments try and do this, they imagine a what i call a neutral person from nowhere who must have a proof outside of themselves that is a given. Such a person is impossible and so the picture here is wrong. ethics has motivation only within an ethical life there is no non ethical "is" here that a non ethical person needs to trust or get to. in a way then, most of philosophy post Aristotle has tried to find external ground for ethics and then force people into it a if the people beginning as "blank persons" ethically "clean white paper souls persons" waiting for ethical co0ntent to be forced on them before choice and consent and so legitimacy. This is my version of McDowell here and it the wrong picture. there can be no blank "persons" no prior state S of a person before any upbringing and so we always begin "in the ethical". this means most of the views on ethics and morality from the Enlightenment to today are caught in this error and so they are apparent attempts to find solutions to a pseudo and incorrect picture of the world. So for example any attempt to get an imagined person in self interest to be motivated even agree to some non self interested reason say from a scientific account or legal account of things will fail because no such self interested and at the same time agent person in action can exist. its similar to Kant's idea of a unity of apperception. but i think this means then the unity of apperception is no deduction that begins with self interested atoms. (Transcendental philosophy ahs to be rethought too). there is no begging in self interest with no virtues no habits no activity. We are already as in action organised in virtue and vice semantics. so i claim here that the enlightenment paradyme from Hobbes has imagie4nd the self interested persona s vice only as vice in abstraction from virtue as if we can have greed and pride without it possible counterpart's. the same is true for justice but now we have to bring in a lot more semantics. Concerning law but here the law aims at the idea of self interest as human nature from science and as right (both universal and person particular as right. ) my view is we need to make law internal too and that i do through a non-disjunctive account (my Double entry book keeping view.) i use Dummett's view on Modesty here but McDowell disagrees with Dummett on this. Now this over turns the psot Hobbians post Cartesian paradymes and all work that is within them to today so it deals with nomologcila atomist Behaviourism but not the Humeian process kind that like Hume begins in the way the world is and works on that. but now it is not really Behaviours but draws on lots of non behaviourist categories it denies. I spent years thinking i could paint Hume into the self interest corner but was convinced by a Humeian expert this was the wrong reading of Hume as an atomist. So what is wrong with the non ontological non self interest Behaviourism? Because it is wedded to the Scientific paradyme of presupposing symmetries and contiunitye4s is sees frames as natural but they are constructed in apparatus. So this means the non Humean Behaviourism actually is caught in the teleological trap of trying to becomes atomist is is a process of atomisation though upbrin9ing. it does not begin with self interested people it tries to manufacture them. So Williams error is to fail to see that the scientific absolute conception of the world ads a process on persons will annihilate his sense of what a person is over time. McDowell has place the notions of legitimacy and consent in the person without the notions of apparatus etc of institutions and law and so no robust notion of legitimacy. McDowell errors on legitimacy justice and law in just the disjunctive way of separations of series he attacks the epistemology of justification on. e.g the other notions of internal and external reasons. that is we think we can understand legitimacy wrt to justice from outside of being already in the law that is two senses of law and an inner and outer and public and private law. a self interest person would be completely private and then law would have to be private law only. not possible abstraction of public and private law. So i am no libertarian here. Now law is negative prohibition on and already living world but conceive its self as operating over self interest or like a Humeian sort of Common law. Hume does not think no ought from an is he really thinks this is the wrong picture not a problem to be solved. it assumes as a thought experiment a person with reference to beings "is" can be empty or transparent to virtue and ethics or be self interested and vice only and so this is impossible. All this means we have to think of legitimacy And argument and policy in a new way to escape the teleology of science and law to turn us into an image of ourselves it thinks it has got to get to expressed as efficiency utility equality and so on all errored cosmological TASKS.
    1
  17. @@user-rj1wd9kd6q If you like Freud or Jung this idea originates in a dream i had as a kid in the late sixties when about 5-8 years old: I fell asleep after listening to The Seekers "Morning Town Ride" I dreamt a space ship with family's on board who were on a trip to a far off planet that would take generations to get there. Problem was the computers or what have you had broken down and no one even knew anymore they were on a ship with a purpose or even from Earth they only knew and could understand the space ship from within. Judith Durham RIP.
    1
  18. @@user-rj1wd9kd6q My point about the CBT systems as a machine is just that the teachers using CBT and positive reinforcement etc are also under the same regime. payment by results outcomes but only in a narrow field of events. and on and on up and up. like salesmen who learn to do this in sales courses don't realise that they are having this done to them in the course and so on and the course teachers and so on. There's an old British movie called "Hell Drivers" that although social critique is also a critique of this liberalism. Plato's ring is an imaginary idea of a purely private hermetically sealed individual but who paradoxically is imagined as still able to act in the world over time. See Putman on semantic and externalism in epistemological and semantic sense not Williams sense. it is better to tell stories i think but the view from nowhere has to assume th kids could be from absolutely anywhere and so stories are prejudiced and biased and probably sexist and racist and so on. they attempt to tech as if the kids are from nowhere. the old blank slate view of education i thought was thrown out decades ago is back surreptitiously. the idea at root is we are behaviourally determined by local economic forces and the policies: just as the Marxist's thought. materialism. this is my interest in van Fraassen in part. that is the root model of a human in behaviourism imports non behavioural content. reward is more pernicious than punishment in a way. but i cant imagine how they can distinguish between say flight and fight without smuggling in non behaviour mental inner states.
    1
  19. A footnote, or a little correction column on page 9 of the paper: I talked to someone close to me, about this, from the era Prof. Eric Kaufmann is talking about UK1950's to 1970's, and they said he is absolutely correct from their point of view. I mean if those closest to you wont side with you, then i guess you must be wrong. All the philosophy and history in the world wouldn't convince them otherwise. Guess I got work to do here.
    1
  20. Watch the fist episode, Pilot, of the 70's US TV Series "The Invisible Man" with the cool David MacCallum. Where, after becoming invisible, he tries to grasp cup of coffee. they maybe drawing on Maurice Merleau-Ponty and "eye and hand" also the "long man argument" in Medieval Islamic Philosophy (BBC Radio 4 "In Our Time")
    1
  21. Culture is shaped by the elite because they act like good will architypes for young people. Guess the young people are gonna be buying suitcases, while the elite will instruct them on counter surveillance. Then like a Greek tragedy, an eternal return, they will become alright, and find, left by the left, the tools ready to hand to policy the whole. I mean if all the people in a office are corrupt, then is not the office itself corrupt. Sidgwick's fallacy of composition Criticism of Mill. Neurath/Quine boat: If all the planks in the boat are rotten then is not the boat rotten. but, can i refer to the boat by some operator on the sum of all the references to the planks. The Ship of Theseus: "We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction." C.f. Husserl's Logical Investigations VI On mereology. When i say I am going to build a Vox AC 30 amp from scratch i don't mean i will be digging iron ore out of the "ground". e.g. fallacy of referential composition. Now does this apply to attitudes, dispositions, eg can we get "institutionally left bias" from observing and testing "individual attitudes for left bias". Should we really be looking to copy the sinister observation and scientific reductions of people the left do as a "matter" of course. Dow e really want to go around testing people for left wing bias, and paying Cognitive Psychologists to construct questionnaires to give spying apparent human legitimacy. We don't want to be lazy and copy the left's tactics and scientific external data groundings, but with "Conservative" as opposed to "Socialism" as the content. "Left" "Right" and "Conservative" can they agree w.r.t. praxis and just disagree w.r.t. content. They can be formally equivalent but they are metaphysically and ontologically incongruent. Like Kant's Left and Right Hands. Does a conservative think of "causing" or "making" someone into a conservative by force on their parts. like Blairs "socialism" of national group self interest from universal group membership self interest. and now we see the result of the praxis metaphysical error here. (inspired in part by percytoplis2335 comment.)
    1
  22. A footnote, or a little correction column on page 9 of the paper: I talked to someone close to me, about this, from the era Prof. Eric Kaufmann is talking about UK1950's to 1970's, and they said he is absolutely correct from their point of view. I mean if those closest to you wont side with you, then i guess you must be wrong. All the philosophy and history in the world wouldn't convince them otherwise. Guess I got work to do here.
    1
  23. I mean the demographic argument.
    1
  24. Cultural referances:. Bob Dylan “Goodbye Jimmy Reed”. No Jones, no Stones?
    1