Comments by "harvey young" (@harveyyoung3423) on "2021 Census Results: Do We Know the FULL Story? Should We Have a "Pandemic Amnesty"?" video.

  1. Part 4: At 19:50 on "de-normalising migration" then. There is an irony here. since the post modern Deconstruction of the metaphysical seems to be a barrier to any internal legitimacy to absolute universal human rights. This is central to Derrida's attack on the "Violence of metaphysics", central as i have previously outlined to Deleuzse Transcendental empiricism, and central in Foucault's relativism or historicism of accounts of human nature from pre modern to enlightenment accounts of man that form a normative but temporary "rule of a historical a priori. "the ends of man". Now i think shift was Derrida's responses to Simon Critchley's discussion of whether deconstruction was void of real normative claims. The turn was Derrida's move to justice particularly in his work on the law and justice. He claims Justice cannot be deconstructed. Now we can view this, as a progressive development in justice and say it is natural law in development an odd conflation of old natural law as the unchanging but an accepted modern view of the progress of rights for example. but it cannot be natural law in any substantive sense since progress and development are here seen as rule based and institutionally achieved entirely. and so the notion of Aristotle's and Aquinas's actualisation/potential and essence and purpose are absent along with responsibility and so on. and the right hear closes off the filed of legitimacy. So it might look like a self contradiction and conflation of instituional normative law and Aristotle's Physics of change. it could be to have one cake and eat it too. maybe it is a case of pour political strategy and tactics like events and actual progress re-shape political commitments and ideologies. its a revolution not a pick nick but even pick nicks can have different food depending on the weather. it is thus the distinction between theory and praxis and the conflict of what metaphysical if any distinctions there is between the theories pre-suppositions and the praxis's pre-suppositions. (see Bernard Harcourt "Critique and Praxis") Also i find Derrida and others shortly after claiming the link between Heidegger's philosophy (theory) and his politics (praxis?) is his move against Plato in a lecture he gave in the 1930s. I want to add that the use of courts as a political tool was an old one. But proximately it in in Catherine MacKinnon's praxis as a lawyer that is the modern genesis of "the jurisprudential turn in politics" which to me implies "the political turn of jurisprudence. thus the fact precedes Derrida's theory or justification. Perhaps i should add that Foucault did courses on Gary Becker's neo liberalism (part of the for runner for the 1980s monetary and free market project) from what i can gather since Foucault died before really expanding on this with Becker was that he saw in the anti metaphycality of the free market the anti state (anti Plato?), not an enemy that the left have traditionally seen it as but as a affordance of freedom. It was claimed some on the left wanted to mirror the free market in their socialism to come strategy. perhaps the link is that of pure a priori right international law then without the need of consent to regulate a international market was the model. in this as in neo liberalism, the free movement of people goes with the free movement of goods and services. the old left of Adorno would surly have felt as would Kant that people become mere commodity's mere objects of another's hypothetical imperatives, instrumentalised, and their being is outsourced, reified into an international institution, anomanyous and answerable to no one cos they have the standard of all of man. for me this link of international free market liberalism and the international socialism project show the apparent dualism and conflict between two supposedly Janus faced groups of the middleclass suggests they are not really in conflict at all just two aspects of the same process masked as a political struggle. This is one of the oldest tricks in the book. don't do totalitarianism by telling everybody should organise according to principle X, get two group to argue between X1 and X2. Arrange the argument with loads of facts and principles loads of history and make it a priori irresolvable metaphysically. then you keep people like me occupied in a meaningless futile dialectic of competing metaphysical claims that Kant et al shows are structurally irresolvable in the CPR. i guess like they seem to read Foucault now as a how to suppress and silence with psychological institutions manual. So they read Kant on pre-Critical metaphysics as a how to maintain conflict division and confusion in the population while they do what they want with apparent struggle. to draw on Kant's metaphor they are in the business of launching us onto that stormy sea with moving sand banks and no position to guide us back to land. The dialectics of international law as conflicting laws.
    2
  2. Part 5: one way the left are trying to re-establish a metaphysical basis for transcendent rights is though the "speculative reason or realism project originating at a conference at Goldsmiths in 2006. there are many varieties but they all seem to think Hegel's transcendent metaphysis as the return of the absolute is what they are doing.
    1
  3. Part 7: Further to ground laying for a discussion of natural law, i want to discuss the two main, "public" moral ethical systems briefly. they are Utilitarianism and Kantianism classed by Sidgwick as opponents as Consequentialism verses Deontology. these are classed as ethical moral theories and as such then address individuals as such that is the private realm if we stick to this public private dichotomy. I call hem both public because their context of emergence can only be understood as from the public realm of economics and welfare and the rule of law. as ethics then they take the public meaning structures of content and present them as private norms or requirements in judgement on action and inaction perhaps too. it is well established that there is the motivational gap here for the ad hominin and "made public" referential act they direct to the subject. this gap is described as a gap of the public and private here or as the attempt to get out of self interest hypothetical action criteria of use. both then hold that they offer a criteria of publicity for the private (Stoic ethic in a sense) or the ethic is the constituting this gap at both ends, the gap and the public private are intertwined semantically thus there is no real escape from pure privacy and no pure publicty to go to if the difference does not preeced the gap or vice versa. that can be pout that no act is ever really purely private and Kant is address Leibnitz passive conception of a apparent gap between this world and the best of all possible worlds, Kant hen links the best world to this world plus categorical action by agent or agents. now they are semantically first public because both emerge first as tests for public policy and proper law, and then the necessary structure that would accompany this like metrical data system of cardinality and ordinality standards criteria and so, and a three parts of the state separation of powers all seem to be abstracted away when given to an individual. this alters how we conceive of the gap. since both these public system would address multiple if not all people. Thus the abstraction to the individual removes all other obligated subject and laces the ethic on them alone. the gap then is really about making one person responsible fro what everybody would be responsible for inn the structure like in a vote or a production of legislation. everything else like the institutions necessary to enact these are left out as is time and context and added in down stream that makes it look as if the public middle class world that enacts it are exculpated from moral responsibility and only he subject bear this weight. Thus the original public responsible middle class is exculpated by its democratic out sourcing to "the people". Its the voters fault stupid. Oddly though the state structure as three part syllogism splits virtue to the middleclass a and vice to the people as they are traditionally conceived from Hobbes as in a pure state of nature in abstraction from the body polity eg as vice of pride or scientific self interest social or psychological. it should be of no surprise that hast both systems are accused of a motivational gap since a public official is meant to be depersonalised and de contextualised. the myth of the motive gap then from an individual is in a nexus with its inability to make sense of specific particular relations like family and friends except as a bias as a prejudice (see Williams). the Utility suffers criteria problems of quantity aggregating material pleasures and pains that have different and incommensurable qualities, and the categorial imperative provides no context for maxims under the test. (see Davidson on the freedom of concepts for events and acts description i discussed earlier) they are then together a kind of double abstraction from natural law and its real policy and law to pure matter and pure law. addressing the synthesis of them then is impossible if you begin thinking they are in themselves originally semantically given. other questions are then raised: what is a private election, must the abstract person rather than being an empty freedom without personality and character (Williams) is really meant as having a competence in all the offices of the state involved within them as legion. and they would surly be in conflict with each other as are parts and institutions the decision problems that beset them are the result of this conflict remaining but as a homogenised mental acts in abstract in the persons private body. in natural law and virtue this double abstraction is never made and so there are no public private in themselves and no givens of content. the political conflict is put into the person and their group and they are presented as of vice self interested and the middleclass as exculpated virtue and altruism. Sociologically we can say disorder and order risk and risk management etc etc so in natural law account we do not give an account of it and then put it in comparison with Mill and Kant as if we have three separate things, since Mill and Kant come out of natural law. that Mill and Kant are not separable also is well established in the literature but i will come to that later as about content and form of practical reason.
    1
  4. Part 8: the last part should have been called Part 8 not Part 7. So now the two Part 7's an abstract state independent international rules (part 7a) and an abstract but governmentally laden abstract person (Part 7b) is rapidly becoming the new international model. Now think about that!
    1
  5. Part 7: I was going to miss out discussing COP27 here but it is a good place to further link and ground lay for a discussion of "natural law" from what i have said here so far on McDowell Williams and the Critique of Platonism. So we might say COP27 is based in seeking the ratification of international rules by member states. This rule ratification is though though just state ratifying rules deduced externally tot hem by science. firstly the science is the product of funded research projects, it s not the result of free independent individuals with the own projects but rather international groups of scientist in a collective project. this is true on the face of it since the papers and report have many authors and involve many institutions. Worryingly to the point of anonymity and loss of responsibility by expanding the authors to a mass. if they are tracing a reality impartially this is fine but of course it is a project with aim and so not simply a tracking of reality not a simple Platonism (Imire lackatosh) . but secondly the science only suggests policies it does not determine them. thus policy as the politically possible is a imaginative creation with one foot in the sciences open to multiple responses and the other foot in political capacity of the state legitimacy (how it sits coherently with other state located policy ) and political capability to deliver it instrumentally through institutions. this mean the image of the need for external ratification by state of rule external to them is false. the rules they are to ratify are not an expression of scientific realism what Williams calls favourably "the absolute conception" and McDowell critically a Rampant Platonism. This false external to the subject and the state rules would appear to create a gap between the rule and its ratification. the gap can be viewed as a possibility gap because it would appear to require and external motivator. the gap is a motivational gap. the Rampant Platonism picture then generates what is called Humeian motivational gap the is ought gap. since i have outlined that the rules are not generated in a radically: external to politics content, but are created already anchored to politically possible motivation to ratify. The image of a ratification motive gap would be like how armature political policy thinkers create abstract rational policy and then after go about trying to get motivation and capability by all sorts of other means. This idea that the rule we are to follow must not be radically created independent of our motivational and life and other policy context has an affinity to natural law and Aristotelianism, that McDowell brings out in that action is not to be seen as separated from the structures of experience there is no "radical is ought gap the Humian gap is due to the false apparent separation of mind and ratification from knowledge. So natural law properly understood would not present us with a gap between the human and a Platonic image of the world an absolute conception God eye view in which the human as such does not exist. (an alternative anti humanist solution would be to keep the Gods eye view and to manufacture the human to actualise the human so as to get the ratification and motive immediacy. A Transhumanism perhaps a new human engineered to act wit respect of the Gods eye view. Williams then saw this gap as essentially unbridgeable. McDowell though sees that there is gapless moment of immediacy of ratification and motivation fort he rule. How this played out with Williams was Williams held that there wee no external to the subject reason for action only radically internal reasons. But this would make the rule redundant, as in my Brian Jones example. McDowell argued that there are internal reasons that is the rules are ought not to be seen as derived from a non human point of view and that then any gap could be filled by argument reason persuasion and mesmeric advertising movies images of apocalyptic weather events and a series of continuous news pieces on the latest catastrophe. i think he means reason then in a fuller sense that a scientific argument or moral argument but more like the tradition of Aristotle and Cicero's rhetoric. there is a question here of this distinguished form propaganda and fear generation for control and passivity capabilities over the population. that is enough fear will ratify anything a rhetoric of pain avoiding action. to be brutal this "naturalised Platonism" of McDowell could look like a good and effective sales manual or a philosophy of the sales man, a pragmatic philosopher of the stateman. McDowell's route into this though was from debate with Kripke and Wright on the proper interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule following paradox. hope to go into this since i have a different view on the nature of the immediacy that gets raised here that links to the political paradox of axiomatic change the anomaly and constitutional change I discussed earlier that ties in with the modesty position of McDowell but through the notions of rules as a whole not the problem of single rule application. policy is always a part of a whole not a series or aggregate of singe rules in abstract. it in the end terminates in an image of the state as double entry book keeping as opposed to the natural law myth of a hierarchy of rules trying to mediate between the state as an in its self and the state as disseminated into an aggregate of external rules. there is no gap but not for the reasons McDowell holds. hi is based on the problem of independent mental content mine on an independent sovereignty what i called, back in he day, a Major Tom Sovereign from David Bowie of course.
    1
  6. Note: the David Bowie reference is to Space Oddity video from the Kenny Everette show 1979, and Ashes to Ashes official video 1980. There is on the one hand the obvious metaphor of a sovereign without apparatus, and a sovereign without a disposition respectively. But also there is the break in communication between earth and the space craft in orbit. But also two more difficult references i think. First is Heraclitus doing the cooking in his domestic realm "The Gods are here too". C.f. The feminist movement to domesticate reason, make the women's experience and capacities and context, that is marginalised, into the centre, a revolution of privileged position (Virginia Held Luci Irigary ) And so the medicalisation of political control particularly in mental health. Perhaps the New Deaf Fascism will be through medicine and the concept of care and risk. And so make it appear to be the very opposite of the myth that fascism must be military and police control that is male institutions primarily. Only female mental health nurses can go to the position of totalitarianism. Even though totalitarianisms of the 20th century have also used mental health in this way. Then there is the reference to the clown Preriot from the medieval French tradition of travailing performers who were supposed to bring the law to the ignorant illiterate masses through moral plays. A supposed purpose which they subverted with comedy. Periot is one out of a set of players and clowns. David Bowie played with this in a conversation with an audience member during one of his gigs.
    1
  7. oops! i found David Bowie's live version of Ashes to Ashes i referred to. its from the isolar tour on you tube. Correction there then on the clown reference, but like, he' was into Nietzsche so he's' just the author. He also says the song is not "worth" trying to figure out, but i guess that might be a point about art and value. Fact checked myself but its not a PhD or a government report, its a you tube post. Don't confuse standards of correctness. I do try and get stuff right but I'm finite.
    1
  8. Part 9: A note of clarification to the David Bowie reference from my Part 7a: The David Bowie reference is to Space Oddity video from the Kenny Everette show 1979, and Ashes to Ashes official video 1980. There is on the one hand the obvious metaphor of a sovereign without apparatus, and a sovereign without a disposition respectively. But also there is the break in communication between earth and the space craft in orbit. But also two more difficult references i think. First is Heraclitus doing the cooking in his domestic realm "The Gods are here too". C.f. The feminist movement to domesticate reason, make the women's experience and capacities and context, that is marginalised, into the centre, a revolution of privileged position (Virginia Held Luci Irigary ) And so the medicalisation of political control particularly in mental health. Perhaps the New Deaf Fascism will be through medicine and the concept of care and risk. And so make it appear to be the very opposite of the myth that fascism must be military and police control that is male institutions primarily. Only female mental health nurses can go to the position of totalitarianism. Even though totalitarianisms of the 20th century have also used mental health in this way. Then there is the reference to the clown Preriot from the medieval French tradition of travailing performers who were supposed to bring the law to the ignorant illiterate masses through moral plays. A supposed purpose which they subverted with comedy. Periot is one out of a set of players and clowns. David Bowie played with this in a conversation with an audience member during one of his gigs. I wander if Bob Dylan has covered this in his new book "The Philosophy of Song". I think I've missed him on tour this time, but I saw him in the 1980's. He did a long set and went off, thought it was the end then came on did a whole new set with his band, and then an encore with Eric Clapton and Mick Taylor and others that was like yet another gig. Loved his contribution to Live Aid with Keith Richards and Ron Wood.
    1
  9. oops! i found David Bowie's live version of Ashes to Ashes i referred to. its from the isolar tour on you tube. Correction there then on the clown reference, but like, he' was into Nietzsche so he's' just the author. He also says the song is not "worth" trying to figure out, but i guess that might be a point about art and value. Fact checked myself but its not a PhD or a government report, its a you tube post. Don't confuse standards of correctness. I do try and get stuff right but I'm finite.
    1
  10. Part 3 note: There was a paper presented to the Aristotelian Society a few years ago, where an argument is made for seeing the data sets as a reflection of natural social kinds. which in a way might be trying to fix this. i would then reverse the comparison and have Kripke and Johnathan Bennett on Kant's realism and refutation of idealism to temporalize it and hen reterritorialize it. this i hope to make some headway with in work i am dong on Kant's Schematism and modality following a recent paper in European Journal of Philosophy.
    1
  11. Part 6: to 28:00 mins end of the first topic. not really happy with this off the top of my head with memory no internet but i post it anyway in case one bit is useful to one person. On what in traditional metaphysics they try and capture terms like "I", "we" , "friendship", "family", "mine" "my" as particulars. in doing so they set them in opposition to universals like right. "they" are not in this picture original but mediated and in relation, or structure. they an e classed as universal particulars perhaps since they have multiple if not universal use. So we have Individual rights mediated by universal law, indigenous rights, cultural rights, rights to a family and so on. in this they are all presented though speculative and infinite reason as projects, legalised "actualisation" (if that's not a monstrous conjunction.)when i make a promise i do not do so by denying doing an infinite number of possible promise breakings i say i will do x not that i will not do not y, not z, not w . Brian Jones was interviewed about getting married and he asks why since if i want to get married i will already be fitted to keeping faith, but if i worried about keeping faith no contract will hold me. i think the point must be that the contract is outwards facing not inward facing. but you cannot make a contract with everybody else in the world who are and will be. the point about indexical is not that they are a short hand a contact with one to do the work of a contract with everybody else. looks logical practical and absurd. But why? (compare with my discussion of Hampel's paradox which i hold turns on the same logical error but more hidden with properties and subjects metaphysics. i think Bernard Williams first made the distinction here as this mediation by the universal as from the point of view of a subject was "external reason", while the reasoning that refers back to the subject as subject is "internal reason". He seems to hold that there were a genuine "external reasons" say from science seeking an "absolute conception" a "Gods eye View" a "View from nowhere" experience understood from a sideways on perspective. if memory serves, the moral problem w.r.t. a subject was that external reasons used by a subject become an anomyinity, I think what McDowell calls an "exculpation". in this he charges both utilitarianism and Kantianism as subject externalising reasons and it is inappropriate in moral reasoning since it does not refer the action to me as its author, only internal reason do this. He understood internal reason in terms of things like "my projects" and my "identity" my "character" my life narrative" the kind of person i take my self to be and the kind of person i want to be. External reasons have no regard for this, in fact they would disrupt any possibility of subject continuity in action across time and space. So while external reasons seem to offer the condition of universal continuity, in practice they would disrupt any attempt to create a narrative for my life with acts i do within it making some narrative sense. the external reasons do not and cannot make a narrative continuity, in a rather Kantian claim only we can do that and its is specific to me (but of course he must claim this universal for all "me's". there is a virtue ethic here but also a liberalism i think they are in tension since say w.r.t. the good or goods if they are my tools for my purposes then they become relative and the virtue tradition that at the time in like Foot and Anscombe i think the task was was to find absolute universal goods as opposed to the liberal position that all goods are contingent and subjective. Foot and Anscombe had as a target R.M. Hare's idea that we were free to choose what goods we want but then they must be expressed universally as prescriptions for all based on the idea that to use a word with reason about say properties was a commitment to universality because of the nature of language and meaning. Now this was in fact explicitly an attempt to move beyond the free for all subjectivisms of A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson, but it was linked nicely with Pareto and Arrow on economics as contract exchange based without a universal. a kind of micro morality. but they seemed to have failed to get beyond mere subjective notions of the goods. this problem remains through out in Rawls and some followers of him, and work in communication linguistics and pragmatics from Paul Grice. and i think it was from here that the political correctness was nurtured. they started off in terms of business communication and derived efficient uses of language and efficient uses of words and then in say international communication certain words are inefficient. Some how from there it becomes joined to a moral context of otherness and then legal definitions examples and costs. it is only very recently that the linguistics area of this has began to look into continuity and modality-the original issue. This years John Lock lectures are on this. They follow a linguistic philosophy series by Robert Brandon, who has done much work on indexicals and such like "context dependent word use". McDowell i think although working with Braddon still thinks this linguistic approach leaves deep issue about the good bellow the threshold of the project. i think one motivation was to establish criteria for welfare a rational for basic needs as such. i think for Williams and McDowell this too is a project that leaves people out of the picture. All relations are externally mediated and anominious without an author. they usually talk about the anominity of long range bombing, but i think the anonimity of long range welfare is actually problematic. One thing is that the logic of indexically and their relations and properties quickly results in contradictions and asymmetries. they do not obey the axioms of nouns and are difficult if not impossible to place in the same metric domains due to their relations. it takes a kind of data fudge to do statistics on them. They are transgressive for external reasons capture and so data statistics. they are odd as representations. Now when it comes to institutions the "COP family meeting" it always looks fishy if some are related as family or are friends even perhaps they say corruption. they have their networks of people but they are in a sense external to indexicals since they are meant to be substitutable ie the institution is not essentially the people but the rules and roles they occupy with varying efficiency. thus in a way they are the antithesis of Williams point in that they are formally animinious and under external rules and laws for all and for their station Williams "thin morality" as de personalised. this implies the subject can be any way in terms of their personal narrative and life projects complete personal life of chaos so long as they follow external regulative and community rules. in reality of course they would not the job if they showed up unwashed so even this is regulated for but informally. it is interesting when they use virtue and vice terms of "character" for "behaviour" in office, since this is a deep philosophical problematic. laws are external and negative, but you cannot teach by negation by lots of don'ts since negations are not determining in the way positive assertion and commands can be. this is i think Hegel's error of speculative reason to put the deed on the same footing as tits negation or prohibition. We begin with privileged denotations and assertions then to understanding their denial and prohibition. one way this has been explored i think is the idea, that we learn a first language in the same way as we learn a second language. this error is held to underlie implicitly much bad ad confused philosophy. Contra Hegel and Derrida there is in the beginning privilege that is beyond the reach of universal reason but rather lies at its basis. Perfect languages were to find this problematic too. i guess this in a way is Keikegaard's critique of Hegel. but its in the bible in the discussion of law and sin and life and death mostly by St Paul. . but does this privileged logic of privilege exist in law understood realistically, the intention of the law is neither an essence of existence, in its self nor an empirical accident of contingent externalities. it seems as such indexical must relate to modality and contingency but be irreducible to them. . Surly the law has a specific and biased obligation in its laws to look after itself its action in action is not in a being and nothing equality. historically is born from violence and injustice and so the ground has to be the destiny to pay back that injustice, legitimacy to come. i guess we have moved beyond institutions being dependent on a particular building a particular country with particular people. unless they are dependent on the people to have no private obligations that could over ride public duty . a familiar moral theme in movies for years right verses good justice verse family. One thing is international banking system and so forth can allow a country to continue under permanent debt permanent negation and it can move just lie money just lie a tunnel diode a hole moving one way is the same as electron moving the other. How the vocabulary of character and law get mixed up here is a complex mess to unpack. i hope to go some way to doing that in my promised piece for another of your discussions about "value free space" and i am going to talk about this and natural law some more. Thank you for the discussion.
    1
  12. Part 1: Upto 7:00 mins in. Yes that was a great conference. i am surprised that it was presentations "thrown together" and even some were "off the cuff". That is because they unfolded over time not as a aggregate, or even a series, but they, together presented parts of a whole. I watched them as they were put on you tube, which was not, i think, the order of the presentations in real time. So it began for me i think with a paper on mathematics and the economy in terms of game theory and rational choice. It invited a discussion on principles of symmetry and time construction through axioms, which i took to mean a synchronic account of diachrony. Among other things this implies a picture involving many "principles" in play for the game, not as a game derived from one principle. this pure formal account then was developed into what call a cosmology of seeing how different areas sit together. i would say it as hermeneutic in this sense of the contemporary as it is ,as many things operating "at the same time together" an original unity if you will. Meaning the various analytically separated areas must be seen as originally together and so the task is not to just try and fit the abstracted parts back into the unity but a different strategy and method altogether. This for me involves a kind of Kant/Hegel approach beginning with the problem of abstraction but unfolding to the whole. So instead of Kant Hegel beginning with epistemology and the abstraction of the given in experience you began from the other end, perhaps like Robert Pippin, to begin with the idea of pure form and unfolding the problem of abstraction from there. for politics i think this is the place to begin and i am sure i commented as such at the time. that is the modern version of pure form is axiomatic game theory or some such like. the whole is constructed as unchangeable ready made w.r.t. the axioms. The abstract problem then is the anomaly, exogeneity, the given, or following my supervisor when i was at university it "appears" to be the problem of changing the axioms or being able to make sense of such a change as a break in time (Marx and many others) . This points not to fixing the model or adding to it ad hoc, but to realise the aponia of the given and axiomatic change invites us to see that the axiomatic presentation of pure form is after the fact after the real, its re-presentation. Its easy to see if we think of rights as an axiomatic system and as a whole a constructional event. of course what was possible before the constitution, is no longer possible after it, in a way like the move in the philosophy of science from: diachronic genealogy: the order of discovery and the world of the lab and scientist and institutions it takes place in; to synchronic representation in a paper under the order of justification or conformational logic. As such then we set as a aporic dialectic what is politically possible now, constitutionally in conflict with the historical notion of possible in some past point in time. This is partly explored in Peter Suber's work on constitutional change as Russell type liar paradoxes, which can be linked for context to Foucault and the French philosopher of mathematics Jean Caviessee, on one side and Phillip Bobbitt on the other. and to contrast work on Bachelard by David Webb and Beatrice Han Pile (Mary Tiles?)This for me means the problem of ""what can be done" is not an axiomatic impasse, but a concrete in the world understanding of degrees of freedom, which are non existant from the axiomatic point of view. As political practice this means, for example the political conflict as been between conflicting principles, which the protagonists see as a winner takes all opponent reduction and elimination issue, is really like the axioms only the re-presentation of a shadow of life in the political world as real. it means first to engage at he level of propositions as in natural law dialectics is to far after the fact. the engagement must be at he level of the real with its various positions with different degrees of freedom. there is no analogue here of propositional negation or abstract substitution, language in the real is held together in an entirely different way to how things hang together in the real. Compare say the construction and use of a genera concept in politics economics and law, with the necessary data symmetries to abide by for metrics, with how these concepts as are related in open use in real life. As such Russell's set theory paradox is not to be solved but rather contextualised form and with the other papers in the conference and the political approached in a different way. Consequences are: Critically: this undercuts the transcendent claim that we can talk of retroactive justice from the past as if the "agents with reasons" at he time could have made moves and judgement only possible now or at some time centuries before. the narrative of such arguments requires a massive amount of abstraction and historical reconstruction and selection in order to even appear to make any sense. Constructively, it means we need to do work on the notion of conservatism to centre this in the cosmological picture. Since there is a synchronic version of this temporal solution for change in capacity as well as here change in capability. w.r.t. topology axioms. A point i wanted to make at the time but had not worked out
    1