Comments by "harvey young" (@harveyyoung3423) on ""Diversity is a Strength" is a Slur on Britons u0026 Europeans. White Flight u0026 the Immigration Agenda" video.

  1. Happy New Year everybody. Part A1: I've been working on this problem for some time now, and focused since the original episode aired. As i wrote in comments directed at Connor Tomlinson, I am approaching this via the problem of certain inconsistencies, contradictions and, some might say, performative hypocrisies that, seem to constantly manifest and re-manifest for the left when we look at more than only one or two of their polices at a time, or bearing on a place. I began and interest in politics as a student in the early 1980's. One of our favourite moves was to point out such contradictions of policy and principle in the manifold of political projects and politicians. We drank deeply from the well of irony that never seemed to run dry. That the contradictions and hypocrisies were easily disclosed from the manifold of events projects suggested some kind of ironic intuition. But of course we were free to cherry pick any policy and event and place them against any other, to generate or disclose the contradictions. But that there is freedom to reveal this from the manifold of processes and events, does not mean the contradictions are constructed by the Critique, ie a subjective imposition on reality. The contradictions are there. Of course just as there is Critical freedom to select and compare, so their is justification or legitimacy freedom to select non contradictory cases and process from the manifold. In practice, what happens in discourse is the Critical side is free to point out contradictions in the others policies and, that other is free to avoid discussing them. It quickly becomes a endless process of competitive auditing, we might say by two creative accountants, but the contradictions are there. They are contradictions of or between two or more policies and or principles, they are thus revealing not the contradictory nature of reality or its absurdity, but contradictions when we look at policies together i.e. projects and processes. In a way i might say from John McDowell that they are only raised when we view a reality from policy projections. (This is a practical version gestured by McDowell's non conceptual content point in "Mind and World"). Thinking back to our student rants in the 1980's we were more like lefty stand up comedians than political Critiques. More Ben Elton, than transcendental idealist. It never occurred to look seriously into this. Not that any of us had the knowledge or experience to even begin to approach the problem. I guess we had an implicit view that politics is basically pragmatic, and with a non homogeneity of the makeup of political parties, each with their own particular project, contradictions are, if not inevitable, at least highly likely. And the game is just to relentlessly point out such contradictions in the other side. it is thus more a method for those out of power than those in power doing polices. I took the problem seriously first from working within Kant's categorical imperative which asks us to reflect on maxims in terms of their legislative possibility. You can get way with a simple reflection if dealing with only one maxim or action at a time. The problems emerges when we have to deploy more than one singular maxim at a time in a place over a case. Thus it might be an Hegelian Critique of Kant along the lines of "Kant's Universal Legislation test, only works, is only apparently practically possible and constant when we deal with one maxims or project at a time and in isolations or abstraction form other polices and projects". As Donald Davidson points out when it comes down to viewing event though the many policies in play the freedom we have to construct policy, also allows us to describe and re-describe events in many possible ways depending on all kinds of reasons of utility affordance convenience even to temporarily avoid a comparison that discloses contradictions.
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  2. Part A2 Now maybe that’s just how it is. Politics is essentially pragmatic and with many policies going on at once consistency is too constraining for real practical politics. There is no truth as correspondence with reality and no truth as coherence of a system of many polices. Its game of creative and manifesting irony. The theatre of this game is primarily the media and the skill is to get your message of disclosing the opponent’s contradictions into the media more than your opponents can do to you. It’s a game of creative triangulations of polices, and whit to get it some media coverage. Of course media institutions also have policies and also manifest such contradictions and hypocrisies. It often is described as bias, and just basic policy and even ideology bias it can be, but often the bias is the result of their attempts to avoid the disclosure of self-contradiction or hierocracy. I have an intuition that the problem here is connected to identity and difference on the one hand and Kant’s view that practical contradiction is accompanied by a loss of the conditions for the possibility of a rational reflective agent to give reasons and actions that constitute their agency and responsibility. I.e. like the loss of the: “I think” accompanying all my representations (Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception). With this connection the exploitation of one’s freedom tactically comes at the cost of agent anonymity and responsibility. The contradictions and the tactics of dealing with them result in the loss of any single space of agency and responsibility. This can be revealed with the classic “That is an issue for the other department” kind of exculpation. Each project policy has its one dimensional linear target responsibility, but when it comes to the whole, all of the polices together, there is no one there. What we get is just a multiplication of many graphs data and spread sheets. ie no authority but then no origin of legitimacy and so only something less than consent is possible. The freedoms exercisable by “the” authority and their subordinates, actually exculpates them from responsibility. That is Hegel’s absolute spirit in freedom is a mere assemblage of pragmatic projects, not a unity. But for the subject this creates a sense of the impossibility of the application of reason beyond just single linear binary mappings on graphs and audits. The freedom of authorities to manoeuvre, results in the loss of the subjects ability to maintain any public identity within these manifolds. There is another possibility that is, rather than the loss of authority with the loss of responsibility being the cost of dealing with the policy project contradictions, it might be the other way round: that the political art is to first avoid responsibility for public policies that go wrong, and it is the practice of this “art” that is the source of the contradictions. I’m currently working on this but on which way to go with it is still unclear. It’s the nightmare before New Year, and I’m hoping to wake up clear headed from it. If not then it’s just a game of who can invocate the most horrors of the other side in the media to trigger the subjects to dis-consent an opponent’s policy an d consent to their polices.
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  3. Part A3: the problem with a acceptance of contradictory pragmatics and the task of getting the most favourable and mesmeric examples for and against, is methods of scientific psycho-social causation replace free subject consent with agentless objects being pushed this way and that by images and project proposals. Am i the only person who feels a sense of vertigo, when the politicians and experts in science and data refer to me via a dot on a graph and causes and effects of policy on that dot, that is me. Have we got so used to this way of experts talking about subjects in their place, as if that place, where they live is the scientist laboratory. Heidegger said the modern world had lost its sense of wander, maybe its lost its sense of being human for being scientifically controlled and even celebrating this. Of course there is psychological advantage for the subjects, they too can claim no responsibility, that the media made them do it "I didn't vote for that" and so on. I mean one can vote for pretty much any party and any policy so long as they have no chance of getting into power. This was true in the 1980's when people went for ridiculous policies , and could then claim to be outside of real politics, while enjoying the benefits of policies they claim to disagree with.
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  4. Part B1: 3 mins Well yes a variety of aims and direction for a multiplicity of policies. So if we stick with just political identity and representation, or its more legal version political advocacy, then we have a determination for each policy, but a diversity of policies as whole. For pragmatics this is just a matter of playing to the demographics in an election. Debates then on policy really go past each other, ie i could donate money to two different polices cast by someone as disjunctive in terms of identity and general concepts, but as projects both can be concurrently run from different institutions and by and for assemblages of different groups. I could give money to everybody and this doesn't cancel out, but just means many policy's go forward at once. you may have a problem that the same person then is split in terms of how the p[policy metric differentially and differently places them in the audit and project (eg Quine's ontologies of values of bounded variables). Now it seems clear to me that in the later half of the 19th century, as Hegel was dominant, the issue of unity problem was revisited but then forgotten again eg by Frege. One way it was articulated was as need for an hegemonic centre or even totality. This lead to the Far Right Hegelianism that becomes 20th century totalitarianism. This issue though was already addressed by Hegel's subjective idealist predecessor Fictre, and his call for unity. it is not recommended. We can at least approach this as a kind of negative theology (some interpreted Wittgenstein this way some years ago). So begin with just policy and its reasons in terms of political demographic strategies, and the rational justification and legitimacy of this. Of course often the justification are just the political demographic strategies. Here though we can end up with strange bedfellows in all the policy reimagining's and exchanges. But what is interesting is when we disclose how we are multiply represented in policy, only an extreme idealist would think there is nothing left over or left behind. The thing is this is pre policy pre science stuff, and often just gets marshalled for more policy transformation. This follows a period of social psychological observation of the populations activity in "behaviour" that has "no yet being taken up as and into a quasi causal science. Conservative policy so far has: on the one hand attempted a kind of subtraction of a particular policy from the neo-liberal capitalist model of the free market. So free market of goods a services but not people, not labour. This subtraction can be justified in free market terms as: it turns out by experiment that the free movement of people has eventually resulted in too high a cost, for too little a benefit. This ratio would be very subjective though and debatable; on the other hand we could look at what the left's State Critique based Social justice programs of minorities when made global "has subtracted". Then we just copy the left but with reference to the subtracted left behinds of Social justice. Now these are appealing and can even be linked. But this presents problems for conservatives that neither the left not the liberal free market views have for their adherents. That both the free market and the social justice version of liberalism involve causal and formal determinations of the subjects. But the commons here is left only as indeterminate (eg "not p"). For analytical Marxism this "not" has to be made policy determinate until its institutions all the way down with no private sphere. For liberal capitalism the "not-part of the productive economy" indeterminant is assessed as a resistance to its utilisation by capitalism, or its replacement by something that can make money for others. you know at some point it was decided that The Beatles residency club "The Cavern" would be better utilised as car park. Then later it was rebuilt somewhere near where it had been. Is The Beatles then heritage for its own sake or just a commodity to make money from. It could be both? I means they were never a charity or a State Owned corporation to start with. Conservativism cannot be about bolting together free market minus free movement, with social justice plus the indigenous straight white man. Axel Honneth in his Critique of John McDowell warned of a conservativism that sees the past as another kind of political project of excavation. its infinite too of course. But really the problem is that conservativism must have a different disclosure of man, or a kind of standing away from and respect for those it represents in general than we find in modern science and law. I don't think a cut and paste job on left and right ideologies is going to make much of a unity or difference. The focus on and deployment of modern science in policy as well as making a capitalist claim on the past or indigenous rights claim on history is not conservativism. Conservatives cannot be, modelled on constructions or reconstructions, like the left. it passive base also cannot be sued as place for retreat and nostalgia alone. So if the base of conservativism is a kind of already their passivity how is policy possible? Traditions, recollection, memory, immediacy, cannot just be either like a term added to an advert for something, or to give pseudo positive substance to something like an anti-communist movement.
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  5. Note I'm sure Michael Murphy knows of Zygmunt Bauman on Solid and Liquid varieties of Modernity with respect to globalisation. I would just read David McCrone's claim that national identity is easily constructed "without much the raw materials of historical straw, and as David Held, Arjun Appadurai Saka Sassen as foregrounding deep problems with this not just as a source of interesting new emergent theory. I think the old model for movement of labour was that globally speaking its a massive increase in human capital unity for the traveller, and it lowers labour costs for the recipient employers, and increases the consumption base. In the equilibrium model of utility difference increase by movement, at some point as more people move, the marginal advantage decreases until its pretty much is stable. I think this model can only work if the numbers moving are small compared to the two populations. But if the numbers are large then the travellers will set up communities that will make the journey more attractive and easier. A kind of positive feed back. On the other hand the places and the communities that the people leave, if they leave in large enough numbers will make that city or country less and less attractive like happened to some large towns and cities in the past that becomes like ghost towns. What the above writers miss though is that the left draw on a version of this like if 10,0000 people all buy a house in a ghost town then collectively the town becomes sustainable and the price of each house increases dramatically, as the costs fall, and possibly attractive to business. it's like small scale Keynesian multiplier. The left from the early 1990's realised they could do this for themselves ie if enough "good and just people" move to a poor area in London, take over the council and the school board, then the area become more attractive to more of the "good and just people" and house prices for all rise. They don't need obviously exclusive and exclusionary private schools, they transform the schools there over time. Others are kept out and now changes to private schooling costs will help slow down the influx of the pseudo middle class the strivers into the proper middle classes. Even with the left its all about find new methods of buildign walls and marking boundaries, and making them not look like what they are. I'm not anti wealth, not at all, I'm anti if it leads them to think they are better than me or doing me a favour or moralising out of some lefty principle or rights or duty. Anyway its all just commonly called gentrification, but it means the numbers or quantity added can change the institutional form over time. The solid liquid distinction of Bauman does not really capture this or that the so called automatic stabilisation supposedly in the equilibrium model has not happened, rather its cybernetic positive feed back the relation changes the relata. This is in addition to the obvious increasing efficiency of moving people once the networks are set up. I've used "The Sociology Book" 2015 Dorling Kindersley Penguin Random House. I can say its a bit post modern optimistic even for a 2015 sociology text book.
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  6. Look i know that Sociology book is a bit low brow, but all my other sociology books were written before 1980. For example functionalism is set up as absolutely opposed to Marxism in those pre Analytical Marxist books.
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  7. Part C1: OK enough of the low brow stuff. I'm going to open up a conversation about "relations without relata". The origin of this term for me was from seminars on Deleuze's "Difference and Repetition" (1968), that i attended in 2001. You see 1968 is still with us. In fact this work was pretty much unknown outside of a select few until the 1990's. its really a book about now, for now, since it took 50 odd years before its ideas had come into effect and the entered into the discourse in left and far left politics. Of course by the time it has become part of pollical philosophy's self consciousness, it was already well in play in the new approach to politics and policy. Indeed part of Deleuze point or project is that much political work can go on, on the ground in realm of the material of socio cultural habit as differential change (difference and repetition), that happens "blindly" or can happen deliberately with reference to existing legal structures. Thus tactics and strategy for action, in the subliminal world, bellow general political self awareness or self consciousness of these changes. That means in terms of the social contract is is pre legitimate and pre policy expression. That doesn't mean its illegitimate though. Now i was lucky that i already knew some of Deleuze work in the early 1990's, because a friend used it to understand how people became members of cults, that was of interest to both of us at the time. They argued from Deleuze that cult membership and a sense of belonging and separation from the public world lay not in the complex and bizarre "cognitive" cosmologies they proclaimed, but rather was emerging just out of the cults organisation of bodily habits like a blind version of army training they said. The metaphor is the frog in a saucepan of cold water, if you slowly raise the temperature, will not jump out, but just slowly cooks. Now in the 2001 seminars my attempt to address Deleuze though Hume failed, and my knowledge of Kant was not sufficient to address him though Kant. Indeed it turned out that Deleuze had developed his work in relation to readings of Hume and Kant and others. So i turned to F. H. Bradley's work on relations, which i was already partly familiar to address Deleuze. My interest in Bradley was from work on Einstein and Mach on gravity and relations in the late 1980's, and Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. . The key problem there is whether a distinction can be made between internal relations and external relations. That was what i tried to use to work on Deleuze in 2001. Now a good way into Deleuze is via Manuel DeLanda's "A new philosophy of society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity". (2006). Here DeLanda straight away links Deleuze's work to the problem of relations: "Today the main theoretical alternative to organic totalities is what the philosopher Gilles Deleuze calls assemblages, wholes characterised by relations of exteriority" (NPS p.g. 11)
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  8. Part C2: This appears to be the metaphysics of substitution and subtraction, but its really the disruption of metaphysical categories like Being, essence, substance, subject, truth, so as to afford a "logic" of process (from Bergson and Nietzsche) or function that allows simple substitution. its not so much that the substitution is argued for, rather the metaphysics that would limit its is rejected on the basis of arguments rejecting the lot via issues about relations. Now it’s curious, I have many Deleuze books and books about Deleuze but not of them have even an index entry for “relations”. Hay it’s a revolution not a seminar they won’t make it easy. The whole point is that only a few select people will understand it, they will be the subliminal vanguard, before its reaches political public awareness and self-conscious simple consent. Its esoteric. Not like the Tractatus is esoteric because it deals with very difficult issues, for which knowledge of modern logic is required even to begin. Deleuze deals with difficult issues for sure but I think makes it deliberately hidden and esoteric for political reasons. I get the feeling the writers of books on Deleuze might not necessarily be in the business of trying to make it easy to understand. One thing is clear, there is no transcendent standpoint in Deleuze, e.g. I might not be here to enlighten you, but here to confuse you, as my political enemies. Delanda is one of a few Continental Philosophers, who also works in Analytical Philosophy. He has many lectures and seminars on the YouTube “European Graduate School” channel. As has also come up in my comments on discussion by Carl Benjamin, analytical philosophy also has it’s arguments in favour of abstract substation and subtraction, though probably more from a liberal capitalist view of global external relations. Where Deleuze draws on Heidegger’s anti metaphysical identity and difference, analytical philosophy has its anti-metaphysical origin in Carnap’s positivism and then onto functionalist views of logic.
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  9. Part C3: For those still attached to ideas of clarity and distinctness in exposition, ie by defining terms in advance and so on, this is obviously not a suitable method here. For example it is clear that in my discussion of say substation, I cannot separate it from all the other metaphysical and post metaphysical terms and structure and traditions. Indeed the Leibnitz’s approach of definitions and axioms is the very thing or method Deleuze is attacking. To claim to reject it because it does not conform to simple atomic definitions, is an incongruent and external critique. Of course this makes the problem of political resistance via policy and legislation with definitions very difficult. In a way what is rejected is the distinction between form and content the general government and local movements on the ground. Look they’ve been very busy for 50 years preforming ant like erosions of rubber tree plants. You can’t just expect a simple argument here can halt this, or a simple opposing instantaneous street movement can deal with this 50 years of sedimentation. That’s to make an abstractive error and substitutional error. Hay if I had my essay on this from those days would that be of help now. Well for one it was not a good essay I gave in, and for another the world has moved on since 2001, and finally the way to deal with this is not to try and write a rational critique, and then employ it as a kind of architectonic onto the world.
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  10. Part D1: Note: Indeed, GBNews have been discussing the policy and legislation problems this afternoon (02 01 25). Their guest a labour guy points out that the problem here is deep. So what's the problem? Well legislative form, or the rule of law, is really a legislation about legal functions. The problem is you can't make laws or functions person specific or group specific. But this is a reflection too that any concept function will in effect try to separate out the bad from the good with concepts. But either the legislation will be too narrow or too wide. Either way it would result in triggering a government response that is excessive in either direction. This can create a police and anti-t*rr*r response that can alienate the target population. eg it can inaugurate a sense that a whole group is pre selected as target risk, or if too wide that policing shifts from consent to excessive control. Indeed there is a long tradition in asymmetric w*rf*re, that has it that the aim of the terror is not to t*rr*rfy the population directly but rather to disrupt the ability to govern. This can be done by the contorted attempt to find legislative solutions and/or results in the populations terror source perceptually switching form the t*rr*rists to the fear of the governments response. The loss of a State of free Consent threatens agreed legitimacy. Into the chaos and void then step in the long prepared far left. This is the revolutionary aim. What is interesting is the legislative shift to risk and control of the population for protection, can also be a useful tool for a middle class to use as an excuse for more controlling educational and medical ordinances, which the middle class themselves would administer. So not only is Deleuze a route to a far left take over, it can also be rout to further separating out the middle class from the rest. this is a difference at the level of the syllogism of agents and patents, not a simple group identity concept. Back in the day I used an analogy from topology here: The surface of a Torus has horizontal lines like circumferences. now if you "puncture" the torus surface, you a make a topological transformation by reaching though the puncture hole and grabbing the torus centre and pulling it out though the hole. This "turns the torus inside out". But now the lines are vertical. eg imagine a pair of vertically striped pyjamas, you stich the end of the legs together to form a kind of tube, then put your hand through the waist opening grab the middle of the tube and pull it out through the waist opening. This topological model suggests such a transformation in reality is impossible, Deleuze says we can do this by other means. Anyway at the moment the discussion has moved to be about the distinction between laws from central government, and laws locally sourced. the local laws are not simply more detailed and narrow scope for the general laws, ie the application of general laws to specifics, or a distinction about gender or racial identity groups. The geographic parts and wholes also deals with local consent, but then hides the fact that the middleclass are in a syllogistic relation in all parts. In some parts they are administering their own local in other parts they are administering another group's local. We are meant to see the middle class as homogeneous and their administrative privileged role as the impartial in the syllogism. Thus it might be impossible in law to distinguish groups, even difficult to distinguish them in terms of police procedure and policy which is always a choice and selection of priorities. however with the local and general distinction, the groups can be so "separated" by geography. While the the middle class can use this to make laws that only cover certain groups but without "mentioning them", and so make laws that the application of which they are geographically insulated from. Against this tendency the local middle class can make laws for themselves with a degree of geographical independence for local consent. This then can appear as a parts wholes conflict between two opposed middleclass agents. In the extreme it means a breakup of the whole into separate parts. That could serve the rich middle class well in less taxation and obligation for the general whole, and the left in enjoying a higher degree of local legislative autonomy to make their own more internationally related or subsumed laws. From general local British we get geographical locals with their own extra state international assemblages. Then these new relations can be represented as world like relations of either covariance contra variance or indeed invariance. the Deleuzians will aways have an "eye" to the wider legislative orders. Indeed that is the aim of the slow moving on the ground differential change. To dissolve existing relations and assemble newer more global and perhaps race or gender or religion specific relations. But who knows which middle class will be in charge here.
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  11. Note to D1: In Deleuze the "no relations without relata" and no relata without relations", is expressed in many ways. The now classic version is Deleuze interpretive or decentring work on Kant's Fist Critique and synthesis. Thus while the process is to change what seems natural, cultural, habitual, this is classed as "passive synthesis". The project then looks like a method for working on the distinction in Analytical Marxism between "relations of production" and "forces of production". G. A. Cohen represented "relations of production" as functions. Now we have a shift from: classic Social functional analysis of "a occurs for b" eg teleological explanation favoured by Conservatives in the past, to "the fact that a causes b causes a". we now have process without an aim. This makes the function kind of autonomous from any foundation in tradition or end utopia. it also means it can be a method of disrupting and changing traditions by using the relations not the ontology or just "this is so" assertions. Thus the foundational "a for b", has a cybernetic mediation, we might call self founding but that's wrong, it is self preserving but also open. Now that means the relata and their relations are not separable and so the "accidents" or views of some relations as external to the object relata are not really accidental at all but strategic opportunists. As passive sites these are taken for granted stabilities but also pre cognitive pre representational. There is then an attack on classical reference and representational theory, but the shift is for many commentators a shift towards the body as the site of action. That is to draw on how habit and feelings are linked to explode the passive synthesis. Feminists in particular took this root to turn political action to direct its efforts on changing habit by feelings. This is discussed at length in the work of Catherine Malabu, but she is critical of Deleuze. she draws a nice point out from Levinas that we see a face as whole not as bits made up and assembled. Stephen Fry has recently problematised this this i think, with examples from the movie "Freaks". More to follow and references. but clearly the political turn towards feelings is not random or accidental but strategic. All those cases of horror we see everyday are designed to effect your feelings and so your habits and change passive relations. its not to make you better more empathetic people or aware of the radical other, its to disrupt passivity for the sake of changing the political order. Those court cases and enquiries are directed at you and us not primarily the defendants or the State. The court is a mediation for political action on our bodily habits by the use of feelings.
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  12. Note to D1: ii) When i first worked on Deleuze and Foucault what struck me was that it appeared to be pure tactics. That is it is devoid of any ethical or moral prescriptions, or maybe then any ethical and moral content can be both cleared and reconstructed in the events ie each event is a possible break or direction "with time" as opposed then to events being "in" time. The anti Aristotelian ethical stance that leaves the future indeterminate "not" Derrida would try to constrain with the idea that justice, the future, telos cannot be given, cannot be deconstructed, but offers strategic a poulaine letter, for multiplicity of forces and affordances. Justice serves then as lie a Kantian regulative idea, though Derrida denies this since in Kant the regulative idea is within the ethical and moral already. Now Malabou's Critique seems to be a similar critique of Deleuze as a kind of blindness towards ends outcomes over tactical affordances and assemblages. It is this absence of an "end" determination that Malabou Critiques, but she does it via subjecting Deleuze to a reading of Hegel on ends telos etc. This would have seemed very unorthodox at the time since the standard view of post modern philosophers was that Hegel was over. Indeed Hegel was their target. Well so they claimed anyway. Malabou, focuses on notions of plasticity and the lack of form, in Deleuze, she traces back to Hegel on Aristotle. The lack of form or a determining end with a plasticity of metamorphosis that is change from one organism to a something we can say in advance, then throws the future into a region of time with no determination or then indetermination. Malabou then moves to claim Hegel is not a mere precursor from the past but a present opponent of this. Her PhD was on this and Derrida was her PhD viva! Now this clearly bites well into Deleuze and others, if tactics and solidarities are the only determinants of action in events, then who knows what might turn up or come to solidity in the future. but of course this Critique would also bite into many different political assemblages if mere aggregate numbers is the only determinate. This makes for a radically different view of time and history. But politically and practically it might be classed as the dialectic between principles aims ideologies on one hand and the praxis necessities of gaining political power. THe Critique of Deleuze then is also a Critique of any overly pragmatic and tactical politics. But in this we cannot presuppose a simple fact/value dichotomy here to make the distinction, for the radical tactic view of under determined time lines would haver no ethic or moral stance from outside of the tactical need and the reasons for choices in the successive or sequenced events. indeed a radical particularism is not appropriate for events "in" time here. I guess its a Critique against a kind of extreme anti-Leninist view that would be not ends determine means but means determine themselves uniquely in each event. This is a general Critique of a kind of political realism or some might say and Machievaliasm, but Machevalims with out a prince or body politic or organic unity.
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