Comments by "Taint ABird" (@taintabird23) on "Knowledgia" channel.

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  21.  @leehallam9365  ‘…so yes I do claim moral credit for Britain in both instances.’ I’m not sure about the claiming of ‘moral credit’ for upholding a treaty and for holding out after the fall of France. That's setting the bar a bit low, isn't it? The treaty existed for geopolitical purposes, and while Britain was expected to fall in the summer of 1940, the Germans still had to press home their advantage. They failed. ‘That was not a moral decision, but the notion that we, or the Irish were choosing between the two, is ridiculous.’ Not from and Irish perspective: 1) There was no moral justification for Ireland declaring war on Germany when it was unarmed, particularly when there was consensus since 1936 that Ireland would be neutral in the coming war. 2) The British and French were Imperial nations and Ireland considered imperialism to be immoral – it is a tenet of Irish nationalism and the Irish of the 1940 did not trust a British leadership that was trying to kill them just a few years before, and partitioned their country; 3) the Irish considered the Nazi racial system to be immoral and indeed was the only country in the world not to send an Olympic team to the 1936 Berlin Nazi showpiece for this reason. 6) Catholic Ireland hated Stalin. Rightly or wrongly, many in Ireland saw a moral equivalence between all sides. ‘Germany was the prime aggressor, it was they who initiated the attack on Poland, who took country after country.’ The UK and France did not go to war against the Soviets when it invaded Eastern Poland because their treaty with Poland only specifically mentioned Germany as the aggressor. Thus they did not go to war for moral purposes but for geopolitical reasons: containing German ambitions. 'Second, this idea about the English not trusting the Germans, it matters little but it is nonsense… it's the French we don't trust.' I don’t buy that. There is a venom towards Germany that does not exist towards the French, it is very apparent, perhaps you have a difficulty admitting it. Militarily the British had an alliance with France in 1914 and 1939 and again in NATO. They went into the Suez with the French in 1956. Within the EU, the British popular belief is that the Germans run the EU, that they alone pull all the strings because Germany has the biggest economy and countries don’t have an equal voice in the bloc because, in their view, it is undemocratic. British people have told me for years that, through the EU, the Germans had achieved economically what they could not achieve militarily, and their resentment was real. ‘But they also believe that they understand the English. I've heard a great deal of it over recent years, lots of analysis about what we think and why, quite hilariously superficial and wrong.’ Wrong? Oh I don’t think so… ‘Third, the substance of your reply about the reasons behind the Irish decision. We have judge these things on the situation at the time, so relections after the event that it might have been for the best are not relevant, you mention that the Irish argued at the time that was the case, but without detailing it.’ You had previously stated that Ireland’s participation was, in the end, not crucial in the war. You then state that such reflections are not relevant when I supplied M15’s assessment supporting the assertion. I claimed that the Irish had made the same argument: that Ireland had little to offer the allies by declaring war on Germany. It had no defences of its own and that these would have to be supplied by the British, who claimed they couldn’t spare very much (it was policy not to supply Ireland, instructions of Churchill). Another issue was the provision RN naval bases in Cork and Donegal – the Cork ports were of little advantage following the fall of France, and the Donegal base was irrelevant because NI was available. Ireland could have provided little more than it already did in secret. ‘But there were many different ways in which Ireland could have been involved, it certainly need not have meant a conscripted army.’ Cecil Liddel did not seem to think so, nor does anyone else from that time that I'm aware of. You don't provide examples of these 'different ways', none of which would relevant anyway as belligerence would not reflect the will of the people. Ireland was involved behind the scenes, and was thanked for it in private. ‘Yet had West Germany been attacked in the 1950s, do you seriously think the UK would have stood by?’ No, you had a treaty with them as part of NATO. Ireland had no such treaty with the United Kingdom. Germany did not partition part of Britain and rule the partitioned bit against the will of the majority in Germany. Britain did not partition Germany, the Soviets did, but they partitioned Ireland. ‘…Is victimhood so weaved into the Irish psyche that even now you haven't noticed that? Ouch! I didn’t see that reversion to type coming! I'm only telling you how it was then. Anti-British feeling, dating from the Anglo-Irish War in the 1920s was still high; while many viewed the NI as an illegal occupation. An alliance with the UK risked serious political instability. De Valera’s public policy of neutrality enabled Ireland to maintain internal political unity. ‘Ireland had a choice, perhaps it's government couldn't choose against public opinion, but that just moves the ownership of the decision from its government to its people. Yes, neutrality was ‘the will of the people’, and under the 1937 Constitution the Irish people are sovereign. Support crossed all sections of society from the old Anglo-Irish unionists and those who volunteered to fight in the British Armed Forces – they all saw it as the only option for Ireland. In the early months of the war the British Government did not suggest that there was anything wrong about Irish neutrality, only that it would prove to be an impractical policy. Nor was neutrality an unusual notion: Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland were all following a respectable and rational policy of neutrality. The United States was also neutral at the start of the European war, and only joined the war when attacked by Japan - Ireland was never attacked by Germany. Had the Germans declared war on Ireland as they had done with the Americans, that situation would have changed. Make no mistake, the Irish people own their neutrality, then as now. The British attitude changed significantly when Churchill came to power. He had no time for neutrals, constantly argued that Irish neutrality was not even legal, did not believe the RN bases in Ireland should ever have been returned to Ireland and he did not trust Ireland. Elizabeth Bowen, the Anglo-Irish writer, friend of Churchill and spy, in a letter to the Ministry of Information saw it thus: ‘It may be felt in England that Eire is making a fetish of her neutrality. But his assertion of her neutrality is Eire’s first free self-assertion; as such alone it would mean a great deal to her. Eire (and I think rightly) sees her neutrality as positive, not merely negative’. ‘You shouldn't be surprised then if Churchill and Roosevelt showed scant respect for Ireland or DeValera after the war.’ Why not? Irish neutrality was a sophisticated deception based on a two track policy: external scrupulousness in maintaining the diplomatic niceties of neutrality and secret de facto co-operation with the Allies. Co-operation with the UK began in 1938 following the return of the treaty ports, and became more focussed from the summer of 1940. Neutrality was a public relations exercise by the Irish Government that convinced everyone at home and abroad that Irish neutrality was unpartisan. There is a good argument that neutrality benefitted Britain, MI5 certainly believed so. Either way Churchill and Roosavelt were fully aware of Irish assistance but never acknowledged it. Their attitude was vindictive and political. They needed to discredit Ireland for their own personal political reasons, which I may or may not have mentioned earlier. 'Had those volunteers and more beside fought under the Irish flag, then DeValera and Ireland would have earned a very different place in the post war world. I think they made the wrong decision, for reasons that are understandable, but are just excuses based on how they felt about the British.' I don’t think de Valera really cared about how the world viewed him, when the Irish Jewish community sought to plant a forest in Isreal in his honour, he only agreed to it on the grounds that there would be no publicity. Like Roosavelt and Churchill he was man of strong will. I genuinely believe that the Irish people didn’t care much for how it was viewed either, they were very proud of their stand. Ireland was blocked from UN membership by the Soviets in 1945 on the grounds that it had been neutral, but the real reason was that throughout the war, while there was no criticism of the UK and the US permitted in the media, Stalinism was constantly criticised throughout. It is often said that Ireland was excluded from the Marshall Plan, but in fact Ireland rejected most, though not all of it. The Irish government did not trust the Americans. You have no excuse for not having a more nuanced view now...
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  22.  @leehallam9365  ‘I did not intend to say you were dishonest, my view was by your own estimation Ireland's neutality was dishonest, it said one thing, and to some extent did another.’ It is certainly the case that Ireland maintained a scrupulously neutral position in public, and behind the scenes provided whatever assistance it could to Britain and to a lesser extent the Americans. It was a balancing act, necessary to maintain political and social cohesion at home and to deter German aggression on the one hand, while assisting the British in secret and keeping them at arms-length at the other. In WW2 Europe, there was no such thing as absolute neutrality anyway. Maintaining that balancing act was where Ireland’s interests lay, and they pulled it off. ‘On Churchill, of course he would not arm a neutral Ireland, we were at war, our supplies were needed for ourselves and our allies, no country would have done that.’ But that was not the reason, the reason was to keep Ireland on a short leash, better to pressurise Ireland into joining the war. ‘As for his failure to guarantee he would not invade Ireland, wasn't he just being honest? No. A feasibility study to invade the former RN bases in Cork Harbour, Berehaven and Lough Swilly was conducted by Montgomery at Churchill's instruction in June 1940, while at the same time the Irish and British militaries were putting a plan in place for a joint defence of Ireland (Plan W) in the event of a German invasion – Ireland was committed to resisting any invasion and the British were keeping their options open. After the attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir, the US Secretary of State informed the UK that such an attack on Ireland would have a disastrous impact on Roosevelts pro-British policy. Churchill told him that the UK would not make the first move. This is more than the UK ever told the Irish at any stage of the war, despite repeated requests after sinking of the French fleet. Churchill congratulated himself in his victory broadcast in May 1945 for not invading Ireland, saying it would have been perfectly justifiable to invade Eire. De Valera’s response highlighted the hypocrisy in the British position from an Irish perspective, as Britain claimed it was in a war for democracy, but was prepared to invade a neutral democracy if it wished to: 'It seems strange to me that Mr. Churchill does not see that this, if accepted, would mean Britain's necessity would become a moral code and that when this necessity became sufficiently great, other people's rights were not to count. It is quite true that other great Powers believe in this same code-in their own regard-and have behaved in accordance with it. That is precisely why we have the disastrous succession of wars-World War No. 1 and World War No. 2…’ You need to brush up on your history of partition. The fact is, from an Irish perspective, the British partitioned the country without consulting the nationalist majority on the island – this is undemocratic. The war in what is now the Republic was not sectarian, but it was in Northern Ireland - and it was not nationalists who brought the gun into Irish politics but the unionists in 1912, and the British government turned a blind eye. The British Empire has a long history of drawing lines on maps and leaving those on either side of those lines to deal with the consequences which have lasted down to this day. Maybe if you had a land border in your country you might feel differently. ‘I do wonder how those demanding an end to partition without the consent of those in the North actually thought it would turn out, we're they really that stupid?’ The British ruled Ireland without consent and they didn’t think it was stupid, did they? As we have seen, Churchill would probably have annexed Ireland in 1940 but for Roosevelts concerns about the Kennedy faction, Ireland would have exploded. Let’s not get carried away with administration of stupidity here. Irish nationalism has matured and evolved since the 1960s. Today you can be Irish and Catholic, Irish and Protestant, Irish and black, Irish and British, Irish and gay and so on. The Irish constitution embraces the notion of a multi-layered identity. Contrary to your claims, I read in today’s Irish Times the headline by Newton Emerson, a unionist commentator ‘Unionists interested in a United Ireland’; it is also the case that since Brexit thousands of unionists now carry an Irish passport; with a declining British Demos, it would appear that the UK is in decline (my personal opinion is that the English will leave it) and Irish nationalists will probably find themselves in the majority in NI after the 2021 census. The Union has lost moderate Irish nationalism since Brexit and Unionists know English nationalism would throw Unionists under a bus in heartbeat if it suited them. A united Ireland is much more likely now than it was in May 2016, the only argument is over what the new Ireland will look like and how long it will take. Yesterday the Orange Order announced it had purchased PPE equipment for hospitals north and south of the border. I had to read the article twice to check. Brexit is changing things. ‘It's about the survival of civilisation, yes they don't know about how evil Hitler is, but they do know he is pretty bad, you've made clear that Irish public opinion and politicians knew who they wanted to win, so Ireland has a choice.’ Yes, they had chosen to be neutral since 1936. Irish public opinion was hardly going to be changed by Churchill. On 13th May 1940, Churchill made is famous ‘Blood, Sweat and Tears’ speech. The reason he gave as to why Britain must win the war was that otherwise there would be ‘No survival for the British Empire, no survival at all for the British Empire stood for...’. Well, as far as the Irish were concerned, they knew what the British empire stood for – why would they Irish fight for the maintenance of an Empire they had to shoot their way out of during living memory and still partitioned their country? There is no logic there. It is not surprising the Irish of the 1940s saw a moral equivalence between the great powers of Europe. Who said, “I do not admit that the dog in the manger has the final right to the manger, even though he may have lain there for a very long time. ...I do not admit, for instance, that a great wrong has been done to the Red Indians of America, or the black people of Australia. I do not admit that a wrong has been done to those people by the fact that a stronger race, a higher grade race, has come in and taken their place... Adolf Hitler? Nope, it was Winston Churchill in 1937 in relation to Palestinian Arabs. Churchill failed to place Ireland in a moral dilemma with such beliefs. There was genuine anxiety in Dublin that if the British came into Ireland the Irish would never get them out again, and these words above explain why. And you we are still stuck with the reality that the democratic will of the Irish people was to stay neutral, a position that was not out of step with most other nations in Europe In this context is difficult to see how the Irish had a ‘practical and moral’ choice to go to war alongside Britain without an attack or a declaration of war by Germany first. I’m reminded of the words of the British spy Elizabeth Bowen, I quoted her in a previous post, who said that Irish neutrality was important to the Irish people, that was not just a negative (one in the eye for the British) but a positive (an expression of sovereignty). That sovereignty, amid the empires, was an important factor. I’ve outlined where Ireland’s interests lay, but the evidence does not suggest there was a moral imperative to abandoning neutrality.
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  24.  @leehallam9365  I retrieved my response. I it had something to do with the length, ‘.. the Germans did use the IRA, I think it unlikely that they didn't know what happened in Ireland.’ The IRA was a banned organisation in 1939, did not recognise the 1937 constitution and they were a threat to Irish neutrality. De Valera rounded them all up and executed six of them. They had no access to the government. Dev made a promise to Chamberlain that Ireland would not be used as a base to attack the British from and he kept it. Not only do the British and Ulster Protestants hate de Valera but Sinn Fein supporters do to. ‘Is Churchill supposed to be intent on taking back Ireland? Or on selling out the Unionists?’ The public feared a German invasion, but what they did not know was the Irish government could not get an assurance that Irish neutrality would be respected from Churchill. This caused anxiety about invasion from Britain in government and military circles. We know that a feasibility study regarding the seizure of the old RN bases was carried out, it was decided it was not worth it. It is also the case that Churchill sent de Valera a telegram offering Irish unity for an abandonment of neutrality. It is a measure of the desperation felt in Britain and Ireland that these actions, offers and fears existed. ‘Britain gave up Ireland after a war with 2000 dead, had it wanted to keep it by force, it could easily have done so, why on earth would it desire to take it by force at massive cost, while fighting Germany.’ Montgomery came to the same conclusion in relation to seizure of the ports, but remember the Irish were unaware of all of this. Furthermore, the value of the ports was much diminished as they were run down and within range of the Luftwaffe following the fall of France…but Churchill kept pushing for them. It was a psychological thing with him from his days as First Lord of the Admiralty, concerned about his exposed Western flank. ‘Perhaps the Irish at the time genuinely thought it likely, though I've seen no evidence of that, but their was no logic to it.’ Its all about trust. The Irish did not trust the British, and had no grounds to do so. The British did not trust the Irish and you put forward the explanation as to why. ‘The reality about Churchill is that this is evidence that he passionately believed in 1940, that ending Irish Neutrality was of vital importance.’ I’m not disputing that. My point was that that maintain neutrality was of vital importance for the Irish. De Valera saw it as being of vital importance to Britain. To be honest, I think if Germany did attack Ireland or even just declare war, the Irish would have had no problem throwing in their lot as Dev could have carried the country. But it never happened. ‘Later judgements might have been that he was wrong, but they had hindsight. Only one thing mattered to Churchill, winning the War, and if that needed him to sink the french fleet, and give the Irish Unity, or if the need arose invade Ireland, he would do that.’ England’s necessity becoming a moral code? I read somewhere that Churchill wanted to use poison gas Ireland if the Germans began an invasion. Ever come across that? ‘My view is that on the basis of what was known at the time it was the wrong choice.’ It was certainly the logical one, Britain was facing defeat. We have an insight from Neville Chamberlain who was still a member of the British War Cabinet in July 1940 when he wrote: “The real basic fact is that it is not partition which stands in the way at this moment, but the fear that Dev and his friends that we shall be beaten. They don’t want to be on the losing side, and, if that is unheroic, one can only say that it is the attitude of the world from the USA to Romania, and from Japan to Ireland.” ‘So yes having Britain between them and the Nazis, was what gave them the moral choice.’ The moral choice between throwing yourself in behind an apparent loser when you are unarmed is neutrality, especially as the British lost so much military equipment at Dunkirk and had little to spare. ‘Its leaders, put their careers and old disputes and historic enmity before the very real threat about to hit them.’ In 1942, a member of Fine Gael called James Dillon, broke with the consensus and advocated Irish entry in the war. He was not in Devs party, but his assessment to the American legate in Dublin who was trying to get Ireland to end neutrality was ‘If de Valera tried to carry the country for abandoning neutrality on the strength of the present British promises, he would be beaten’. He could not have done it, and he would have been overthrown from within his own party. I disagree that they put their careers ahead of the German threat, these were not people afraid to but their lives on the line for their country. But they were not prepared to split the country either. ‘And Ireland was not a possession of the Empire, or even a Dominion, it was part of the UK from 1801.’ Ireland was colonised in stages from the 12th Century, Ulster was planted in the early 1600s and there were various failed plantations in Munster and the midlands. Cromwell dispossessed all landowners, Irish and ‘old English’ who were Catholic, and replaced them with protestant owned estates. It was a colony. It remained a colony after the Act of Union, but differed from the others by having representation in parliament. Unlike the rest of the UK, it had an armed paramilitary police force. The Great Famine provided clear knowledge to Irish people that there were not considered to be the same as English, Scottish and Welsh members of the UK by London. It is no national myth. It was the experience. ‘Finally why are the British more interested in WW2 than other European countries, other than the ones re-writing it?... We stood alone..’ Yes, the last act as a power, that is what I thought myself, and if anything it is growing stronger with the years rather than diminishing. The UK to find its post-imperial place in the world and the EU did not cut it. As you know though, the Canadians and the Australians would dispute that you stood alone!
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  25.  @leehallam9365  Are you suggesting the South might vote against unity? It is quite possible. A poll in November said that most people in the Republic believed there could be a united Ireland in five years. Today a poll says only 30% see a united Ireland by 2030. Its fluid, but these are also polls taken in a vacuum. Any united Ireland will have to be an agreed new Ireland. We have a lot of experience with referenda and its pitfalls. Irish people rejected two EU treaties in protest at the government for reasons that had nothing to do with the EU, so we have form. Hard choices will have to be made: a new flag? A new constitution? A new national anthem? How will it be paid for? Will the loyalists bomb Dublin? Will it be federal? Rejoin the commonwealth? These are issues that have to be overcome and they have not been discussed yet. The first move may have to come from the unionists. ‘Why for example would we want a NI that had declared it does not want to be British in our country?’ That’s a matter for the UK. Also, no Irish government will want to deal with the embarrassment of NI voting for unity and the republic rejecting it (or vice versa). While a 50%+1 vote in NI in favour of unity is enough, no Irish government will want unity unless there is a substantial minority of unionists favour too. And what if the Scots or the English leave the UK and there is no union, will there be time to do things correctly? There are questions to be asked that did not exist in 1920 or 1940, but such is the evolution of Irish nationalism. Under the GFA, unity is no longer simply about unification of territory, it’s about the unity of people. ‘..under the original Backstop EU law including new laws would apply in NI, they would have no representatives to vote on them, and no right to leave the arrangement.’ The original backstop was the suggestion of the British Government, not the Irish government. I’m sure if NI later desired to leave the EU, it would be free to go. ‘I don't understand what you mean about democratic deficit.’ There is no constitutional account for the fact that NI and Scotland voted to remain. Scotland is a nation with its own identity, NI is a territory where two separate identities are given equal standing, both unified under a shared EU identity. That shared identity was what future reconciliation was to be built upon, and the people NI voted to keep it. There are other deficits in the UK: the FPTP electoral system, unelected House of Lords with seats for bishops in it, no codified constitution that the public ever voted on, no devolution for England and so on…you could even include hereditary monarchy! 'You suggest that in a united newly independent Ireland Unionists would hold the balance of power. I'm not sure how that happens, the nationslist divide was over partician. ' The Irish Civil War was actually fought over the Oath of Allegiance as partition was supposed to be temporary. The Oath of Allegiance to the King remained until the 1937 constitution abolished it. It has been argued here that de Valera deliberately avoided doing anything to remove partition because he feared a million unionists voting for their party would it dilute the dominance of his party in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. ‘Isn't it more likely that they would be in the position of the nationalists in Northern Ireland.’ Well, if the experience of southern protestants is anything to go by, then no. And certainly in the south we would be very conscious of not repeating the same mistake. Unionists felt under siege in NI, in a united Ireland, Irish nationalists will not have that insecurity. In 1920, a united Ireland of say 5 million people would have been about 25-30% protestant, with a disproportionate dominance in positions of economic power and the professional classes. That would have given them clout and the excessively Catholic Irish Free State would surely have been blunted. ‘The anger directed at Ireland was in part due to the use made of the border issue by those trying to stop it. The Irish government were quite explicit in their support for this campaign to over turn a referendum decision in another country.’ That is the perception. Brexit Britain had no understanding of the emotional impact that border has in Ireland. The GFA was the perfect compromise. But Ireland never featured in the Brexit debate and it was dominated by a particular type of English person who would expect Ireland to suck it up. What Ireland did was put the border issue straight back on to the British government. It appeared that the Irish were trying to stop Brexit simply because there was no solution. While the British politicians and media were banging on about the economic impact of Brexit on Ireland, to the Irish this was secondary to the political implications of an Irish government watching while a hard border was erected on the island again. Ireland would have to deal with the problem. Fixing the economy would be easier. ‘It was as though it was something we had done to Ireland, it wasn't it was something we are doing for ourselves.’ It did feel like something that was ‘done’ to Ireland. It really did. A thoughtless oversight that we saw coming when we watched your pre-referendum ‘debates’. It took us by surprise because relations between Ireland and the UK had never been better. Brexit meant that the Irish government had to speak up, not only for the Republic but for nationalists in NI. Their grievance in the past was that when they were being shafted by Stormont for decades, Dublin said nothing and that this contributed to the emergence of the IRA terrorism. Once the DUP went into government with the Tories, Ireland hardened its position. Ireland had an obligation under the GFA to speak up, and quietly, moderate unionists were impressed because Varadkar spoke for their interests too. The people of Ireland voted for the GFA, and a decision made largely by English voters on another island changed it. Brexit was just not compatible with realities in life in Ireland. Brexiters had dealt with that problem by not dealing with it because Brexit was supposed to be easy. ‘…firstly we voted as a single nation not as separate entities, and second Wales voted to leave too. Poor old Wales always forgotten as they don't fit the England dragging the Celtic nations out of the EU agenda.’ Yes, you voted as one nation, but it also the case that 15.1 million votes were English. An English academic, Anthony Barnett, pointed out that there is a correlation between those who identified as English only (and English first and British second) in the 2011 census and leave voting areas in England in 2016. These were areas where people had identified as British in 1991. This suggests an assertion of English national identity. The pro-EU SNP dominate in Scotland, while NI returned more Irish nationalist seats than unionist for the first time. There are three nationalisms rising in the UK resulting in the overarching British identity becoming increasingly irrelevant. There is a good argument therefore that the UK is no longer fit for purpose, and that the realignment you mention also includes this rise in nationalisms. ‘England will not leave the UK. I don't even see a constitutional mechanism for that. There is no English Government.’ Why is there no devolution for England? You still have your political class in charge, the same type of people that always ruled, now with notions of an Empire 2.0…what will Brexit change for the ordinary people of England? Like I said before, I know nobody else who agrees with me about an Independent England, and you may well turn out to be right. The election in December saw victories for English, Scottish and Irish nationalism within the UK. Everybody overlooks the Welsh, including me, but Barnett tells us that in the last UK census 12% of the Welsh population identified as English. Apparently, there is a large population of English retirees in Wales, and he argues they took their politics with them. He also points out that unlike Scotland and NI, Wales has a weak local print media, and they are more exposed to their English counterparts. Interestingly, Welsh speaking north Wales provided the highest remain vote of any British demographic – some 80%. Barnett reckons the break up of the UK is not inevitable and that it may instead lead to constitutional reform. ‘How Britain does outside the EU remains to be seen, but don't think that Brexit is loaded with expectations by most Brexit voters.’ Expectations were high in he summer of 2016, but the narrative was subsequently modified to fit the reality that Brexit was not going to make people better off, it would appear. At the moment I’m not seeing anything that suggests it will prove to have been a good economic decision.
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