Comments by "Андрей Борцов" (@Mentol_) on "Military History Visualized"
channel.
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The percentage of allied aid from Soviet production.
Import tanks - 12.3%
Planes - 13%.
Artillery - 2.7%
Ships - 22.4%
Infantry weapon - 0.75%
Food (grain) - 2.8%
Self-propelled artillery - 7.8%
Anti-aircraft guns - 21%
Antitank guns - 9%
Automobile gasoline - 2.7%
Aviation fuel - 40%
Railway rails - 36%
Steam locomotives - 72%
Explosives - 36.6%
Aluminum - 55%
Copper - 45%
Tires - 30%
Sugar - 29.5%
Cotton - 6%
Industrial machine tools - 24%
The percentage of imported cars in the Red Army:
22.6.41 - 0%
1.1.42 - 0,1%
1.1.43 - 5.4%
1.1.44 - 19%
1,1,45 - 30,4%
1.5.45 - 32.8%
It is also necessary to remember that the share of supplies increased slowly. In 1941, only 1% of the total number of goods was delivered, and 1942 - 27.6%. Thus, more than 70% of supplies fall on the period 1943-1945 - the moment when a turning point in the war has already come.
Plus:
In late May 1945, US presidential adviser Harry Hopkins, in a conversation with Stalin, said: "... we never believed that our Lend-Lease assistance was the main factor in the Soviet victory over Hitler on the Eastern Front. It was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army. "
In the report of the US President to Congress on the implementation of the Lend-Lease program until March 31, 1945, it was pointed out that the Soviet armies were supplied mainly with Soviet weapons and materials.
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Arthur Brogden
> A Soviet rifle division in WW2 was roughly 8500 men at FULL STRENGTH. An America infantry division numbered 14-16,000. Why?
Soviet rifle division had 14,500 men at the spring of 1941. As the war started and continued, the number of divisions increased and large losses appeared, so the division’s strength decreased. Same for the Wehrmacht. United States did not fight for own survival in this war, therefore the direct comparison is not correct. Always try to find rational reasons.
> Stalin's murderous regime
For a correct understanding of history, we must correctly understand the historical context. What does this mean? To evaluate Soviet politics, we must use their own perspective, not propaganda from the times of the Cold War. You must discard any of your stereotypes and try to look at the world through the eyes of Stalin. Otherwise you will misinterpret the Soviet agenda, and the vacuum of misunderstanding will be filled with demonization. People who do not understand history often use demonization.
> In 1944 at Yalta he admitted to 8 million total casualties at that point. A laughably low number
At the end of the war, German documents "recognized" the death of 2.5 million people. Why aren't you funny in this case? In fact, accurate data on casualties during the war is difficult to establish. Plus, the fate of prisoners of war is authentically unknown. United States and Britain use expeditionary forces in this war, whose numbers (and losses) are much easier to ascertain.
> At Nuremberg Soviet prosecutors used the figure "over 10 million military" repeatedly.
This does not contradict the known data.
> Glantz, Stahel, Citino cite numbers that average about 12.5 million
This also does not contradict. 7.8 million killed, dead and missing plus 5.5 million prisoners. Total - 13.3 million operational losses. If you use a similar methodology for the enemy, then he lost more than 10 million (including those who surrendered after capitulation). Thus, any speculation regarding the exorbitant price of victory (for USSR) is an unfounded appeal to emotions (element of propaganda).
> Given the shortages of Soviet infantry by Spring 45, that seems about right
If I remember correctly, then the USSR called people into the army at the age of 17-50, and Germany from 12 to 65. Why did Germany use the elderly and children at the end of the war? Because human resources have come to an end. Why did this happen? The result of the war of annihilation. Why, in this case, you do not hear speculations about the fact that the Germans have lost the entire combat-ready nation? Because nobody needs it. Think why.
]v[acGyverFiN
1. After the Soviet defeat in the Cold War, his opponents gained a monopoly in the information space. That is why you appeal to the consensus that has arisen after this point. However, it does not make sense to understand the historical context.
2. Britain received three times more aid from the US than the USSR, but no one talks about it. Think why.
Jagnole101
You do not understand the most important thing: even if 100% of the Red Army were supplied with Western weapons, these weapons would still be used on the Soviet front by Soviet soldiers.
In reality, world war is a coalition war. From the point of view of the Soviet perspective, it would be optimal for him if these weapons and resources were used by the allies to open a second land front in Europe.
But the allies postponed this decision pursuing egositic interests (contrary to coalition interests). At the beginning of 1943, Britain had 5 million soldiers and other personnel plus United States had another 8 million. In total, 13 million people. But only about 1 million (8%) fought against the enemy at that time.
Thus, the Allies preferred to supply the USSR, supporting it in the war, instead of using own an active offensive strategy. This decision can be understood, but after it, any rhetoric about the importance of Lend-Lease immediately becomes ridiculous.
Daniel McGREW
The data for the cars are taken from the automobile control of the Red Army. You can find the video "Великая Отечественная: миф о решающем значении ленд-лиза" where historian Alexey Isaev (at the seventh minute) shows the data from this document. I can not give a direct link because this can be considered as spam.
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The percentage of allied aid from Soviet production.
Import tanks - 12.3%
Planes - 13%.
Artillery - 2.7%
Ships - 22.4%
Infantry weapon - 0.75%
Food (grain) - 2.8%
Self-propelled artillery - 7.8%
Anti-aircraft guns - 21%
Antitank guns - 9%
Automobile gasoline - 2.7%
Aviation fuel - 40%
Railway rails - 36%
Steam locomotives - 72%
Explosives - 36.6%
Aluminum - 55%
Copper - 45%
Tires - 30%
Sugar - 29.5%
Cotton - 6%
Industrial machine tools - 24%
The percentage of imported cars in the Red Army:
22.6.41 - 0%
1.1.42 - 0,1%
1.1.43 - 5.4%
1.1.44 - 19%
1,1,45 - 30,4%
1.5.45 - 32.8%
It is also necessary to remember that the share of supplies increased slowly. In 1941, only 1% of the total number of goods was delivered, and 1942 - 27.6%. Thus, more than 70% of supplies fall on the period 1943-1945 - the moment when a turning point in the war has already come.
Plus:
In late May 1945, US presidential adviser Harry Hopkins, in a conversation with Stalin, said: "... we never believed that our Lend-Lease assistance was the main factor in the Soviet victory over Hitler on the Eastern Front. It was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army. "
In the report of the US President to Congress on the implementation of the Lend-Lease program until March 31, 1945, it was pointed out that the Soviet armies were supplied mainly with Soviet weapons and materials.
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1. In June 1941, the Red Army was equipped with cars for only 36% of the planned capacity. Out of a total of 272,600 cars, trucks accounted for 193,200.
2. To sum up the supply of foreign cars (for each date) is not necessary because they gradually accumulate, and losses amount to a small percentage. In addition, mobilization from the civilian sector can continue. Plus own production.
3. USSR lost from 35 to 40% of own economic power at the end of 1941, not 80%.
4. USSR produced 1,146,700 cars in the period 1928-1941. Plus another 265,000 during the war.
5. Even if the USSR had 100% of foreign weapons, it would be used on the Soviet front by Soviet soldiers. For the USSR, it would be optimal if these weapons and resources were used to open a second front in Europe, and the economic burden on the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition was distributed more evenly. But this was not done - the USSR had to do a significant part of the dirty work on its own. Thus, any attempt to idealize foreign aid without these nuances becomes immoral.
6. Nikita Khrushchev used a lot of lies regarding Stalin’s policies during the struggle with the cult of his personality, therefore his words need to be taken skeptically.
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@chekvb
1. After the Polish campaign, the Germans created "tank groups" that made it possible to break through the defense to a great depth. In these groups there was a good balance between the number of tanks, vehicles, infantry and artillery. Their organization allowed them to operate autonomously even when separated from supply bases.
Another situation was in the Red Army. The Soviet command did not have the experience of breaking through modern defenses (the Finnish war was a specific experience), therefore, in the shock units of the Red Army there was an excess of tanks and a lack of transport, infantry and artillery. In 1941, the Red Army captured German documents and studied them. This made it possible to balance the amount of equipment and at the end of 1942 tank armies were created, which were analogous to German tank groups. For the first time they were successfully used to encircle the German 6th Army near Stalingrad.
2. Infantry losses are affected by the number of artillery shells (where Germany was the leader on the eastern front until 1944) and the quality of education of soldiers and the level of your technologies. When you attack the defense, if it is not broken through, then you usually suffer more losses than the enemy. But if it is destroyed, then the enemy loses its organization and communications, which either compares the losses, or makes them more than those of the attacking side.
In 1943, the Soviet government abandoned the large encirclement of enemy armies for political reasons (Stalingrad was an exception). This led to a more rapid expulsion of the enemy from Soviet soil, but without its complete destruction (the German organization was preserved). This was one of the reasons why Soviet casualties in 1943 were still higher than German ones.
In 1944, the Red Army changed its strategy of driving the enemy out to a strategy of destroying him. In addition, Germany lost its leadership in the number of heavy artillery shells. As a result, German losses increased from 814k in 1943 (killed and captured) to 1756k in 1944. If we add the German allies here, the result will show that the ratio of losses on the eastern front in 1944 became 1 to 1 and rose to 2 to 1 (in favor of the Red Army ) in 1945.
When you need to compare the ratio of losses on the eastern front in 1944, then people usually take Krivosheev's data for the Red Army, which includes all categories of losses and "ten-day reports" for the Wehrmacht, which exclude those who died from wounds, slightly wounded, non-combat losses, missing who were recognized as killed through time, losses of supply personnel, as well as aviation and navy personnel. The German casualty system showed short-term losses for the their high command, but it is incorrect to use ten-day reports for a general comparison of losses. So, for example, according to these reports, the Wehrmacht lost 359k killed on the eastern front in 1944 against 1233k according to Overmans, whose study takes into account these categories.
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The percentage of allied aid from Soviet production.
Import tanks - 12.3%
Planes - 13%.
Artillery - 2.7%
Ships - 22.4%
Infantry weapon - 0.75%
Food (grain) - 2.8%
Self-propelled artillery - 7.8%
Anti-aircraft guns - 21%
Antitank guns - 9%
Automobile gasoline - 2.7%
Aviation fuel - 40%
Railway rails - 36%
Steam locomotives - 72%
Explosives - 36.6%
Aluminum - 55%
Copper - 45%
Tires - 30%
Sugar - 29.5%
Cotton - 6%
Industrial machine tools - 24%
The percentage of imported cars in the Red Army:
22.6.41 - 0%
1.1.42 - 0,1%
1.1.43 - 5.4%
1.1.44 - 19%
1,1,45 - 30,4%
1.5.45 - 32.8%
It is also necessary to remember that the share of supplies increased slowly. In 1941, only 1% of the total number of goods was delivered, and 1942 - 27.6%. Thus, more than 70% of supplies fall on the period 1943-1945 - the moment when a turning point in the war has already come.
Plus:
In late May 1945, US presidential adviser Harry Hopkins, in a conversation with Stalin, said: "... we never believed that our Lend-Lease assistance was the main factor in the Soviet victory over Hitler on the Eastern Front. It was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army.
In the report of the US President to Congress on the implementation of the Lend-Lease program until March 31, 1945, it was pointed out that the Soviet armies were supplied mainly with Soviet weapons and materials.
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1). You do not look at the sources that I give you, right?
2). The error of German intelligence (not Hitler) matters only if the level of the Soviet military potential is underestimated. In the case of tanks - it was just an unpleasant surprise, which did not have much significance for the war in the east (the Wehrmacht had a weapon to fend it).
3). Tanks are not only the thickness of the armor, speed and caliber of main gun. This is also: the quality of optics, the quality of radio communications, the quality of shells and accuracy of guns, the availability of commander's towers, the quality of the suspension and the overall technical perfection of the machine. By most of these parameters, German tanks had superiority over the enemy.
4). Tanks rarely fight tanks. This is mainly done by infantry. Since 83% of the Soviet tanks were obsolete and light, there is no problem for the German infantry to fight them (against the lungs - any guns are suitable, against medium ones - 50 mm cannon and subcaliber shells, against heavy ones - 88 mm and bypass maneuvers).
5). Most German tanks of the new type were modernized after the French campaign (new guns and additional armor).
6). Disadvantages of German logistics (the Germans like to talk about their problems and be silent about the enemy's problems) did not prevent the Wehrmacht from having at the front in the Rzhev area 3 times as many artillery shells (which have the greatest impact on losses). Is my hint clear?
7). The USSR had 1396 tanks of a new type, Germany - 1400. This is parity. But it does not matter because the battle does not take place between tanks, but between army structures, which Germany was fully mobilized and balanced after the previous campaigns. The Red Army did not have rear communications at the beginning of the war because it was not yet fully mobilized.
8). The USSR banned access to information about own economic potential after the completion of the first five-year plan. Thus, Germany thought "This is Russia of the 1920s level plus one five-year plan". Therefore, she believed that to destroy Russia it would be sufficient to destroy the Red Army and occupy the territory to Volga line. If we apply this formula to the Russian Empire in the period of 1914, it certainly surrenders because of the lack of serious industrialism beyond the Urals.
9). To put it bluntly, "The forced modernization of the USSR by the Bolsheviks was Germany's main military defeat, and not Hitler's mistakes, which were just the consequence of this."
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@angiolinobenedetti1678
1. Suvorov’s goal is to prove his theory. What's the problem here? He cites facts in favor of his theory (often false), and he simply ignores those that contradict it. If your task is to research history, then you check all available facts and carefully analyze them.
2. Hitler decided to destroy Poland in April 1939. The Molotov Pact did not change the German plan. This pact did not contain anything at all about military actions against Poland or an alliance with Germany. But Soviet intervention shortened the duration of the war in Poland.
3. The common border between Germany and the USSR was created after the defeat of the Polish army. Even if the Red Army does not begin an operation in Poland, the Wehrmacht still wins and receives a common border, but to the east.
4. A world war is a coalition conflict. The USSR declared its neutrality in such a conflict. The operation in Poland was an intervention without full resistance from the Polish army. The war in Finland was a two-way conflict that was not part of the Second World War.
The USSR was returning territories that had previously been part of the Russian empire, but did not want to become a participant in a coalition war. The return of former territories is not an invasion of Europe, but a matter of Soviet security and influence.
5. The USSR had military cooperation with the Weimar Republic. The Third Reich and Weimar Germany are states with different ideologies. When Hitler gained power, military cooperation was stopped.
Soviet trade with Hitler was beneficial to the USSR because it gave it German technologies that strengthened Soviet industry. Trade does not violate neutral status in a European war.
6. If you want to understand why Hitler started World War II, then you need to study German documents. For example, transcripts of Hitler’s meetings with the generals on November 5, 1937, May 23, 1939 and August 22, 1939. Suvorov ignores this information.
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February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment.
The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!).
1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy!
2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies.
3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people.
4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service.
How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures.
Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites).
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Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21.
Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment.
The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!).
1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy!
2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies.
3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people.
4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service.
How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures.
Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites).
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Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21.
Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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1. You did not provide evidence of the existence of the Soviet suicide order (no details or order numbers).
2. The war of annihilation creates a different morality. This is not a fight for human rights. The more brutal orders are created, the greater the likelihood that your state will survive in this war. Thus, cruel orders are a good during a war of annihilation, not a crime against morality. That is why I consider the modern projection of liberal values on an old history a big mistake.
In reality, it was a war of two different systems and worldviews, but modern liberal morality interprets this war as a battle of two totalitarian regimes, which is also a mistake and violates the historical context. These countries did not consider themselves totalitarian (this is a system for Mussolini, not for them).
3. I do not understand your extensive argument about the immorality of the filtering procedure. In the first message, I showed you detailed statistics where it can be seen that there were a minority of soldiers arrested after filtering. Thus, I see no reason for your reasoning about immorality. The procedure should be carried out so that the state feels safe. This is a matter of state security, and not the fate of individual innocent people. Another context.
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February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment.
The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!).
1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy!
2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies.
3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people.
4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service.
How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures.
Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites).
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21.
Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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On November 14, 1940, analyzing the results of the talks in Berlin, Stalin said: "Hitler's position during the talks, in particular his stubborn refusal to take into account the security interests of the USSR, his categorical refusal to stop the occupation of Finland and Romania - all this indicates that in fact preparations are being made for an attack on our country".
On May 5, 1941, addressing graduates of military academies, Stalin said: "We and Germany do not have friendly relations, the war with Germany is inevitable ... Germany wants to destroy our socialist state built by working people under the leadership of the Communist Party. Germany wants to destroy our great homeland , the birthplace of Lenin, the achievements of the October Revolution, to exterminate millions of Soviet people, and to turn the remaining ones into slaves. Only war with fascist Germany and victory in this war can save our homeland".
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1). Name the number of the Soviet military offensive plan, which was formally adopted as a guide to action in 1941.
Why is this necessary? Because there was a draft of a preemptive strike on eastern Prussia, developed by Alexander Vasilevsky in May 1941, but he was never formally adopted. Meanwhile, the German plan began to be developed in July 1940 and was formally adopted in December 1940.
I have not heard anything about the talks between Stalin and the French Communists (these people do not have power in France) - can you tell about this or call your source of information?
2). The Soviet concept of the world revolution was abolished in 1925 as a result of the inner-Party struggle. A new one was proclaimed-the building of socialism in one country.
In general, the term world revolution only means that the working class in Europe and other developed countries gets power, it does not mean that the USSR "conquers them", because it contradicts the policy of socialism.
According to Lenin's plan: the USSR shows the achievements of socialism >>> the workers of Europe see this and start a revolution in own countries >>> the new government becomes friendly to the USSR and big wars go to the past (Lenin considered them the consequence of contradictions in the capitalist system).
3). What can you say about this?
Lenin recognizes the independence of Poland on December 10, 1917 >>> after the German capitulation (November 1918), the Polish elite wants to return their old colonies in the east (lands of Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians) >>> the Polish army makes an aggression against the Belarusian-Lithuanian SSR on February 28, 1919 near the Shchara river >>> August 9, 1919 Poland occupies Minsk, and May 7, 1920 - Kiev (is not polish national territory) >>> On May 14, 1920, a Soviet counterattack was launched, which was stopped at the gates of Warsaw (this right-wing propaganda calls an "invasion of Poland").
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1). Bro, I expect from you a concrete Soviet offensive plan (number, date) which was formally adopted as a guide to action. I know that in any HQ, different versions of plans are being considered, but not all will be taken in the end result. For example Poland had an offensive plan and what? Nobody accuses her of this, only to USSR address.
2). Here is the transcript of Hitler's first speech to the German generals, which refutes your thesis about the preventive nature of the Barbarossa plan.
February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment.
The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!).
1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy!
2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies.
3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people.
4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service.
How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures.
Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites).
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Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21.
Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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Do not use spam please.
1. The quote of Molotov refers to the period of friendly neutrality between the USSR and Germany. The USSR did not have a military alliance with France or Britain at this time, therefore, was not obliged to use friendly policies towards these countries.
His words of admiration should not be taken literally - this is diplomatic etiquette. In the USSR, the danger of the defeat of France was understood; therefore, on June 26, 1940, the length of the working day was increased from 7 to 8 hours and the labor legislation was tightened. This was done to speed up preparations for a possible clash with Germany.
2. No one denies the positive impact of foreign aid for the Red Army, but it is worth keeping a balance - not to allow idealization (decisive factor of the Soviet victory) and demonization (there was no help). I provided you with detailed data for each category of supply.
The point of view of the USSR on this question I have stated to you. And it was not only Soviet, but even coalition - the sooner the second front in France will be opened, the less the war will continue because defeat Germany means the automatic capitulation of Italy and Japan. Initially, Roosevelt agreed with this, but Churchill was able to convince him to continue to use the peripheral strategy (disembarking in Afrika, then in Italy). This decision increased the overall duration of the war and the disagreement between the USSR and the West.
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February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment.
The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!).
1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy!
2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies.
3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people.
4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service.
How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures.
Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites).
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Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21.
Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment.
The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!).
1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy!
2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies.
3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people.
4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service.
How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures.
Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites).
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Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21.
Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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On November 14, 1940, analyzing the results of the talks in Berlin, Stalin said: "Hitler's position during the talks, in particular his stubborn refusal to take into account the security interests of the USSR, his categorical refusal to stop the occupation of Finland and Romania - all this indicates that in fact preparations are being made for an attack on our country".
On May 5, 1941, addressing graduates of military academies, Stalin said: "We and Germany do not have friendly relations, the war with Germany is inevitable ... Germany wants to destroy our socialist state built by working people under the leadership of the Communist Party. Germany wants to destroy our great homeland , the birthplace of Lenin, the achievements of the October Revolution, to exterminate millions of Soviet people, and to turn the remaining ones into slaves. Only war with fascist Germany and victory in this war can save our homeland".
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Also:
A quote from Stalin's speech (Order No. 55 of February 23, 1942).
"Sometimes they say in the foreign press that the Red Army has the purpose of exterminating the German people and destroying the German state. This is, of course, a stupid nonsense and stupid slander against the Red Army. The Red Army does not and can not have such idiotic purposes. the aim of expelling the German invaders from our country and liberating the Soviet land from the Nazi invaders. It is very likely that the war for the liberation of the Soviet land will lead to the expulsion or destruction of Hitler's clique. We would welcome such an outcome. But it would be ridiculous to equate Hitler's clique with the German people, with the German state.The experience of history says that the Hitlerites come and go, and the people are Germanic, and the German state remains. "
Order №233 (January 19, 1945) "Officers and soldiers of the Red Army! We are on our way to the enemy’s country. Everyone must stay composed, everyone must be brave. The remaining population of the conquered territories, regardless of whether it’s a German, or a Czech, or a Pole must not fall victim to any violence. Those guilty of such conduct will be punished in accordance with the martial law. Any sexual relations with females in the conquered territories are forbidden. Those guilty of violence and rape will be executed".
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February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment.
The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!).
1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy!
2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies.
3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people.
4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service.
How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures.
Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites).
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Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21.
Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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- "The peculiarity of the country and the uniqueness of the character of the Russians make the campaign very specific. The first serious enemy". (Diary of Halder, July 25, 1941).
- "The Fuhrer again sharply criticizes the General Staff ... The Fuhrer is right in saying ... that Stalin timely carried out this reform [purge of the Red Army Command] and therefore now enjoys its benefits. If such a reform is imposed on us today by our defeats, but then for ultimate success it is too late". (Diary of Goebbels, March 5, 1945).
- "On the Eastern Front: the fighting continues. Strong and desperate resistance of the enemy ... The enemy has many dead, few wounded and captured ... In general, very heavy fights are taking place. On the "walk" is out of the question. The Red Regime mobilized the people. To this is added the fabulous stubbornness of the Russians. Our soldiers are barely able to cope. But until now everything is going according to plan. The situation is not critical, but serious and requires all effort". (Diary of Goebbels).
- "The Russians have proven themselves to be skillful, hardy and fearless soldiers, crushing our old prejudices about racial superiority". (Metelman G. Through Hell ... P.288, 294).
- "The new generation in Russia possessed strength and courage ... They often acted mechanically, like robots ... These people believed their power and submitted to it." (Wolfsinger V., "The Merciless Massacre ..." p 99, 100).
- Colonel-General von Kleist: "From the very beginning the Russians showed themselves as first-class warriors, and our successes in the first months of the war were explained simply by the best preparation. Having gained combat experience, they became first-class soldiers. They fought with exceptional perseverance, had astounding endurance and could withstand the most intense battles" - (Liddell-Garth B. "Battle of the Third Reich" ... p. 265).
- General Blumenthrit: "We were confronted by an army that by its fighting qualities was far superior to all other armies we had ever met on the battlefield ... The Red Army of 1941-1945. was a much stronger opponent than the tsarist army, for she selflessly fought for the idea. This strengthened the resilience of Soviet soldiers. Discipline in the Red Army was also observed more clearly than in the tsarist army. They know how to defend themselves and stand to death. Attempts to overcome them cost a lot of our blood". (Liddell-Garth B. "They know how to defend themselves ...", p. 382; "The Battle of the Third Reich ..." P. 271-272).
- "The information from the front confirms that the Russians are everywhere fighting to the last man ... It is striking that few people are surrendering to captivity when capturing artillery batteries, etc." - (Diary of Frans Halder, June 29 +July 4, 1941).
- "Russian soldiers and junior commanders are very brave in battle, even a single small unit always accepts an attack. In this regard, one should not allow human treatment of prisoners. Destruction of the enemy by fire or cold steel must continue until the enemy becomes safe ... Fanaticism and contempt for death make the Russians as adversaries, the destruction of which is compulsory ... ". From the command of the 60th Motorized Infantry Division.
- "The Soviet government in the rear of the enemy organized the struggle of 6,200 partisan detachments with a membership of up to 1 million. The fight against partisan detachments was a monstrous reality ... in July 1943, 1560 railways were blown up in Russia, in September - 2600. That is, 90 per day". (Justus G. "Alfred Jodl is a soldier without fear and reproach. chief of the OKW of Germany ", p.97).
- "The Party and its organs have tremendous influence in the Red Army. Almost all commissars are residents of cities and people from the working class. Their courage borders on recklessness; these people are very smart and determined. They managed to create in the Russian army what it lacked in the First World War - iron discipline. A similar military discipline, which I do not know for pity - which, I am sure, could not be sustained by any other army - turned the unorganized crowd into an unusually powerful weapon of war. Discipline is the main trump card of communism, the driving force of the army. It was also a decisive factor in achieving the enormous political and military successes of Stalin ... Russian remains a good soldier everywhere and under any conditions". (From the book of General Friedrich von Mellenthin "Tank Battle: 1939-1945").
- "The Party's political work sharply strengthened the fighting efficiency of the Red Army. Meetings of the members of the CPSU (b) were held regularly. It is pointless to ignore Stalin's role in the war. Russians for a good thousand years lagged behind in general historical development from other European nations. Stalin set the task to overcome the thousand-year-old abyss in 20 years and in many respects achieved its fulfillment. He became a kind of God". (Haape G.," Grin of Death ... " p. 177).
- "Western concepts of the impassability of the terrain for the Russians are of very limited importance. Here the spirit of the German soldier, his courage, initiative, selflessness fought against the desperate resistance of the enemy, whose strength lay in the favorable terrain, in the endurance and incredible firmness of the Russian soldier, reinforced by the iron system of coercion of the Soviet regime. In addition, the Russians were masters of quickly rebuilding roads. The Russian troops have always fought bravely and sometimes brought incredible sacrifices". (Field Marshal Erich von Manstein).
- "The Russians held with unexpected firmness and perseverance, even when they were circumvented and surrounded. This they won time and used for counterstrikes from the depths of the country more and more reserves, which were also stronger than it was supposed ... the enemy showed an absolutely incredible ability to resist ". (General Kurt Tippelskirch).
- "The wide and cleverly planned operations of the Red Army led to numerous encirclements of German units and the destruction of those that resisted ... The Russian command developed and perfectly carried out this operation. We lost the 100,000-strong army at Koenigsberg". (General O. Fun Lash - commandant of the fortress Koenigsberg).
- "In the Second World War it became evident that the Soviet supreme command also possesses high capabilities in the field of strategy ... Russian generals and soldiers tend to obedience. They did not lose their presence of spirit even in the most difficult situation of 1941 ... ". (from Heinz Guderian's book "Results of the Second World War").
- "During the war, I watched the Soviet command becoming more and more experienced ... It is quite true that the highest Soviet command, beginning with Stalingrad, often exceeded all our expectations. He masterfully carried out a rapid maneuver and transfer of troops, changing the direction of the main strike, showed the ability to create bridgehead and equip them with starting positions for the subsequent transition to the offensive... ". (General Oberst G. Frisner, commander of Army Group "South Ukraine").
- "The fact that the Red Army soldiers continued to fight in the most hopeless situations, completely not caring about their own lives, can be attributed to a large extent to the brave behavior of the commissars. The difference between the Russian Imperial Army in the years of the WW1 and the Red Army, even in the very first days of the German invasion, was simply colossal. If in the last war the Russian army fought as a more or less amorphous mass, a sedentary, devoid of individuality, a spiritual upsurge, caused by the ideas of communism, began to affect already in the summer of 1941". (General Erich Raus).
- "Many of our leaders have grossly underestimated the new enemy. This happened partly because they did not know the Russian people, not even the Russian soldier. Some of our military leaders throughout the First World War were on the Western Front and never fought in the East, so they had no idea about the geographical conditions of Russia and the steadfastness of the Russian soldier, but at the same time ignored the repeated warnings of prominent military specialists in Russia. .. The behavior of the Russian troops, even in this first battle (for Minsk) was strikingly different from the behavior of the Poles and the troops of the Western Allies in the conditions of defeat. Even being surrounded, the Russians did not retreat from their borders. " (General Blumentrite).
- "The General Staff gives me a book with biographical data and portraits of Soviet generals and marshals. From this book, it is not difficult to get various information about what mistakes we made in the past years. These marshals and generals are on average exceptionally young, almost none of them older than 50 years. They are ... extremely energetic people, and on their faces you can read that they have a good people's features... I have to make an unpleasant conclusion that the leaders of the Soviet Union come from better people's layers than our own. I inform the Fuhrer about the General Staff's book on Soviet marshals and generals that was provided to me for review, adding that I had the impression that we are not at all able to compete with such leaders. The Fuhrer fully shares my opinion. Our generals are too old, outlived themselves... which speaks of the colossal superiority of Soviet generalship" - (Diary of Goebbels, March 16, 1945).
- "If you remember that Frederick the Great confronted the enemy, who had a twelvefold superiority in forces, you seem to yourself just an nonentity... This time we have the superiority in the forces! Is not this a disgrace? ". (Hitler's Table Talk, 28. 01.1942).
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1. You did not name the number of steel that the Allies gave to USSR. This means that I can not evaluate your words about "50-70%". I took the number 3.5 million steel from here.
http://www.o5m6.de/redarmy/ll_routes.php
2. Allies gave the USSR 1170 thousand tons of high-octane fuel, while the Soviet production amounted to 1961 thousand tons. Consequently, your thesis that only the US could produce high-octane fuel is false.
3. The Allies delivered 44,600 industrial machine tools (24%) to USSR, while the Soviet production was 168,700.
4. Germany was recognized as the main enemy for the allies, so the destruction of this country was a priority. The war in Africa was a war on the periphery of Europe, and the front in Italy did not pose a serious threat to Germany, because it is protected by the Alps. Therefore, from the point of view of common interests, the Allies had to take risks and open a second front in Europe in 1943.
5. I did not understand your comments on the Soviet pact with Germany. Was it bad? Was that a mistake?
The policy of the USSR in the period 1934-1938 is an attempt to create a system of collective security in Europe. In May 1935 an agreement was concluded with Czechoslovakia and France. USSR condemned the remilitarization of the Rhine, the Anschluss of Austria and the Munich Agreement. Politics changed in August 1939, when the Soviet side and the allies were unable to conclude a military agreement, so the USSR agreed with Germany.
6. "A terrible Soviet government" - from the point of view of the Cold War. I can give you quotes from your (Western) leaders when they called the USSR a fighter for human civilization during the war. It will take time and I do not think that it is important for you because your point of view was originally anti-Soviet.
7. You know that the USSR returned the territory of the Russian Empire in the period 1939-1940 and that this was not an invasion in Europe, right? You do not take seriously the words of Hitler about the preventive war against the USSR, right? After the war, the USSR created a bloc of allied states in Europe to ensure its security in the west.
8. You do not perceive American and British imperialism as a good democratic government, right?
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> Poor tactics created manpower shortages.
Among all the continental enemies of Germany (Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Greece), the USSR had the best loss coefficient in comparison with the Wehrmacht. You can't win a war relying on bad tactics, it's just a myth. The reality is that the USSR turned out to be stronger than Germany in all aspects (military, industrial, moral), and therefore won. That is, this is not an accidental, but a natural victory.
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> That's irrevelant because none of these countries had the human/material ressources of the USSR
For example, France and his western allies had (in May 1940) 3,785,000 people against Germany which had 3,300,000. Moreover, having numerical superiority and “good tactics”, they lost the campaign, and the USSR, which had 3,881,551 (in June 1941) and “bad tactics” against Germany and its allies who had 5,042,100, won the campaign (strategically) and the war as a whole. Of course, the USSR had more material and human resources than France alone, but if the Western allies could stop the Wehrmacht, their economic and human potential would have approximate parity with Germany. And this is even without the United States.
> and were ultimetately defeated on a strategic scale allowing Germany to bag up large numbers of PoW
My numbers of losses for France (1.5 million) do not include prisoners taken after surrender. You can calculate how much they had in the beginning of the war + mobilization + something left after.
> Apologists of the USSR are eager to use any kind of lies and distortions to prove their point, comparing Greece's performance to the USSR's in one of them.
I’m only talking about the fact that if the indicators of other countries are worse than the USSR, but in relation to these countries no one says that they use bad tactics (an element of the information war), as for the USSR, then this is obviously propaganda (as your old thesis that the USSR created a “fake country and fake history” = bias).
> You can't win a war relying on bad tactics, it's just a myth.
> The USSR proved that's possible.
He did not prove it, and you simply believed it based on demonization. In other words, you believed in a dead concept. First you must prove the correctness of your concept (looking for rational factors, but demonization is not such), then you should get consensus from other people and only after that you will have a moral right to say that this is true.
> "Natural" because Germany faced the USSR + USA + British Empire.
The forces of the United States and Britain have nothing to do with the balance of forces (military and economic) on the eastern front. Moreover, the USSR produced more weapons than Germany in the first half of 1941, that is, before the war began. This refutes the myth that it is only thanks to the Lend-Lease of the USSR to produce more weapons than Germany. By the way, German documents (for example, Alfred Jodl’s report of November 7, 1943) also refute your thesis that "Germany waged the main economic war against the USA, and not against the USSR." The report explicitly states that it was only thanks to the large-scale military production of the USSR that Germany was forced to start a total war.
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3. Ukraine is different, not a single organism (for example, during the civil war there were 4 different Ukraine). Yes, there was more collaboration in western Ukraine. But do you know who fought against them? Russians? No, other Ukrainians. I know the statistics here, so I have the right to say that against the background of 6 million Ukrainians fighting on the side of the USSR, 250 thousand on the side of Germany are marginal. The entire Ukrainian nation does not support them. Therefore, they lost twice (first as part of Germany, then as partisans who were supported by the United States).
4. To understand the reason why there were deportations of individual nations in the USSR, you need to read Soviet documents. But you do not do this, you just use your old propaganda about "slave camps" and repression against the most educated people.
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6. Germany is a country with destroyed sovereignty. USSR - no (it was destroyed due to internal problems). When you say that Germany recognizes that the history of the Third Reich is an evil regime, then this is a direct result of the policy of denazification that was used after the war, and not a voluntary decision from the German nation. So you want Russia to also refuse to consider its history continuous and neutral and call it an evil empire. I call this a dictatorship.
And if you compare the criteria for the independence of each nation:
- military.
- economic.
- political.
- ideological.
- worldview.
You will see that the USSR was a more independent group of nations than modern Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic states. Thus, it cannot be said that Russia gained real independence from the USSR. The USSR had every category on this list, and Russia only has a military one, so the vacuum is filled with stronger nations. Therefore, you see Hollywood, fast food, liberalism, homosexual propaganda, and so on.
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1). Sources of oil in Germany (1940).
- domestic production in Germany - 720 thousand tons.
- domestic production in Austria - 354 thousand tons,
- extraction in Poland - 124 thousand tons,
- production of synthetic fuel - 2500 thousand tons of oil equivalent,
- imports from Romania - 1147 thousand tons,
- imports from the USSR - 658 thousand tons.
2). Japan could not attack the USSR because it signed an agreement on neutrality with it in April 1941. This was the result of differences between Germany and Japan after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Japan considered this to be a betrayal of the ideas of the anti-Comintern pact and the old government withdrew to the resignation. The new concluded an agreement with the USSR and sent its aggression to the south.
3). The percentage of imported cars in the Red Army:
22.6.41 - 0%
1.1.42 - 0,1%
1.1.43 - 5.4%
1.1.44 - 19%
1,1,45 - 30,4%
1.5.45 - 32.8%
4). In the counter-offensive near Moscow, 400,000 siberian soldiers out of 1.25 million total, that is, less than half, participated.
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February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment.
The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!).
1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy!
2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies.
3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people.
4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service.
How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures.
Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites).
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21.
Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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@dreamdiction Here are my thoughts.
You are confusing fact with interpretation. For example, the Berlin Wall is a fact, and the fact that its purpose was to prevent people from going west is your interpretation. German documents do not contain such a purpose. The goal of the Berlin Wall was to improve the quality of border controls and reduce foreign provocations.
You also confuse the values of different ideologies. For example, when you say that the USSR punished people by placing them in the gulag, then you mean that it was the wrong policy. But among ideologies, only liberalism prohibits violence as a policy, while pragmatism tells us to use any means to achieve own goal. The communist ideology tells us that we need to restrict the activities of the exploiting classes (the minority) so that the rights of the majority are protected. And liberalism says that any restriction is evil. This is a different worldview.
During the Second World War, countries with different political systems became allies. But contrary to myths, the Soviet system did not deny democracy, but used it in a different sense (social freedom in the USSR vs personal freedom in the West). If you read the discussion in the Soviet government and in the German one, you will see that the USSR adheres to the principle of democratic centralism, while Hitler considers democracy to be a disease that morally corrupts your nation. This is one of the reasons why the USSR and the West became allies, and Nazism as an ideology was condemned in Nuremberg. Because Nazism is an ideology that spreads hatred towards other peoples, and Soviet communism is the idea of equality of all nations. The fact that the USSR was a dictatorship in the era of Stalinism does not mean that it denied democracy because the dictatorship was a form of defense of the Soviet version of democracy. The dictatorship of the interests of the majority over the minority.
Western liberalism destroyed the idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat in communism and created a non-violent version of cultural Marxism. Therefore, it is unprofitable for Western civilization to completely condemn communism (only violence in it) because such an action would mean a rejection of democratic values.
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@dreamdiction Are you serious? The idea of a world revolution was created by Marx and Engels, and then used by Lenin. This idea suggests that the capitalist system strongly binds different states into a single economic market, and when a crisis moment comes, this has a social impact on other states. Then the working class, seeing the successes of the socialist revolution in Russia, will want to do the same in own countries. Lenin used this idea to free the European proletariat from the oppression of the capitalist system. In fact, this is a struggle for social freedom from the economic exploitation of the minority , that is, anti-imperialism.
Why did you call it imperialism? You couldn't even name a scientific definition of imperialism and occupation. Lenin even wrote a book about this - "Capitalism as the Highest Stage of Imperialism." Have you read it? If not, why are you talking about what you have no idea about? Because even if you disagree with this book, then you need normal arguments to refute it.
You even contradict yourself. For example, you say that Russia was a successful country before the revolution. This means that you agree with the fact that Russian imperialism considers the territories of Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic to be part of its empire. In this case, you consider it a "successful country", and when the Bolsheviks want to regain control over the old territories (not politics), then you condemn it as imperialism.
You cannot even quote a single document that shows that the Soviet government has personal control over the means of production and is enriched by this. You call it an oligarchy, but you cannot prove it properly using primary sources.
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@dreamdiction You have not provided scientific definitions for the terms invasion, colonization, imperialism and oligarchy. You cannot give facts that I can check for reliability. You have already been caught in a lie when you said that the idea of a world revolution is part of imperialism, but it is enough to open the works of Mark or Lenin (the primary source) to be convinced of the opposite.
Moreover, you used the term "totalitarian" in a negative light, but its author is Mussolini, and if you open his book "The Doctrine of Fascism", you can understand that he uses totalitarianism as a positive alternative for democracy. And if you compare Mussolini's book with the Soviet constitution, it becomes clear that the USSR was not a totalitarian state.
You see? I give you sources that can be verified for reliability, and you give me nothing, except your anti-communist stereotypes.
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@rick7424 You have outdated data. What is Glantz referring to? In any case, this is a secondary source of information. Because Soviet documents (primary source) show that only 8,122 officers were arrested during the purge for political reasons and 9,859 were dismissed from the army for other reasons (figures include partial rehabilitation in the period 38-39). Your data is also incorrect regarding the number of the total number of officers in the Red Army - in reality, in March 1937 the Red Army had 206 thousand officers, and in June 1941 - 439k.
Source - Игорь Пыхалов, великая оболганная война, стр 35-52 (издание 2015г).
The documents also show that the level of training of the Red Army before and after the purge was the same, and the first period of the war with Finland had planning errors, not a consequence of the purge. Also, the purpose of the purge was Stalin's desire to take into account the mistakes of the republican government in Spain, which allowed political and social instability in their rear during the civil war. This purge did not affect the quality of the Red Army, but perhaps Soviet society became more monolithic because criminals and anti-Soviet elements were removed from it. But the head of the NKVD Yezhov exceeded his powers during purge and therefore was replaced by Beria. After that 280k people were rehabilitated in 39-40.
Sources:
Виктор земсков - Ложь под видом статистики. Об одной публикации в журнале «Социологические исследования». Журнал Столица.
Андрей Смирнов - обезглавил ли Сталин красную армию? Издание 2011г.
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@cristianprisecariu1964 Diary of Frans Halder, July 31, 1940.
"Assumption: We will not attack England, but will smash those illusions that give England the will to resist. Then we can hope for a change in its position. The war itself has been won. France has fallen from the British lion. Italy is pinning down British troops. Submarine and air the war may decide the outcome of the war, but it will last a year or two. England's hope is Russia and America. If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in the strengthening of Japan in Asia. If Russia is defeated, England will lose its last hope. Then Germany will dominate Europe and the Balkans. Conclusion: In accordance with this reasoning, Russia must be liquidated. The deadline is the spring of 1941."
This is not the only document. There is also a transcript of Hitler's meeting with the generals on January 9, 1941, where he confirmed the information from July 31, 1940.
Here's what he said about the second front.
Hitler said at a meeting of the generals on March 30, 1941, “there is an opportunity to defeat Russia, having a free rear. This opportunity will not come again so soon. I would be a criminal before the German people if I did not take advantage of this.”
P. Goszony. Uber die Vorgeschichte des deutschen Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion im Juni 1941.—«Allgemeine Schweizerische Militarzeitschrift», 1966, № 7, S. 400.
The absence of a second front in Europe allowed Germany to use 3.3 million ground army personnel in Barbarossa out of an active army of 3.95 million (Müller-Hillebrand). In the west, the threat of creating a second front remained, but in the next 2 years it was minimal.
Thus, we know Hitler’s real motivation and we can say that his rhetoric about the influence of Bessarabia is an attempt to explain unmotivated aggression to his citizens.
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February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment.
The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!).
1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy!
2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies.
3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people.
4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service.
How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures.
Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites).
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21.
Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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"The German economy was not geared to a political desire to destroy enemies one at a time" - I meant that Hitler planned short campaigns at the beginning of the war so that the German economy was not heavily overloaded from the very beginning. Blitzkrieg -> respite and replenishment of stocks. Then from 1943 the war dragged on and the economy took the total character of production.
"German rearmament was 'the' focus of the National Socialist government and could never be increased enough" - How did Germany manage to create a large army in the period 1933-1939? Only through the use of the collossal industrial potential (the second in the world).
"rather, German rearmament was limited primarily by: 1) lack of indigenous strategic natural resources" - Germany created the army in a short period of time? Yes. Did she produce a large amount of resources? Yes. The only two problems for Germany were: food and fuel. The food had to be captured in the east, and Germany itself produced fuel by 2/3, and the rest - from Romania.
"2) lack of foreign currency to purchase them from abroad;" - Hitler wanted a complete autarky of Germany.
"3) lack of manpower in the armed forces and in the civil sector" - Germany within the borders of 1937 had 11.3 million workers, which was 20% less than England and France together - 13.9 million. But after joining Austria and the Czech Republic - Germany already had 14.4 million workers. One country has more workers than two great powers! This is a huge potential. The German army was the most numerous in 1940-1941, but slightly inferior to the USSR in 1939.
"The reality was that they never had the time to mobilize the conquered peoples" - The seizure of continental Europe gave an increase to the German industrial pontential by about 50% and several times became a large resource for a prolonged war.
"and mine the resources in the quantity required" - Do you think that much resources are required to conduct the war on three fronts: Russia, Italy, France? Great amount. Germany had no problems in resources until mid-1944, when the territory under control (and resources) was rapidly declining. Germany was stronger than each of its enemies alone, but it fought at once with three - the USSR, the United States, Britain. Hitler talked about this in December 1944 to his generals.
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"The early German campaign which resulted in victories followed by lulls in the fighting were not planned by the Germans" - Poland, Denmark and Norway - did not have a great military and industrial potential, so the Germans could count on a blitzkrieg.
"They fully expected the French to stage an offensive against them in the west, and the lack of French enthusiasm for an offensive was not forseen by the Germans" - there are documented statements by Hitler and his generals that France and England are experiencing serious problems at this time (1939-1940), so these countries will avoid active action against Germany. England emerged weakened from the First World War and its military orders are only partially fulfilled - it can not substantially help France or Poland in the near future. In France, the political crisis. Their artillery is obsolete. They are experiencing a demographic crisis. Therefore, France uses only a defensive strategy, avoiding active actions in the first stage of the war (minimum a year).
"The German army was large in manpower by 1939 but was not uniformly equipped by a longshot" - Hitler spoke directly in May and August 1939 that he consciously takes some risk before the beginning of each operation. The biggest risk for him was in March 1936, when the Rhineland was captured. When you list the shortcomings of the German army and economy, you need to understand that it is correct to compare this situation not with the ideal situation (when the readiness reaches 100%), but with the position of enemies of Germany, whose readiness is less than that of the Germans. That's why Hitler starts the war - Germany's readiness for war was higher than that of its opponents and it would be foolish not to use it.
"Food was not initially a serious problem" - was. Germany had a serious imbalance between a high level of industry and a modest level of agriculture, which can not feed 80+ million people. To solve this problem (including) Hitler wanted to conquer a large living space in the east.
"like the industrial potential of Germany and the occupied nations, time and the willing cooperation of the conquered peoples were neccessary for both to become possible- and the Germans never obtained either" - In the west (France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark) - there was a regime of soft occupation, which did not cause serious protest among the local population. In the east there was a war of annihilation, but even in these conditions (for example), the Polish General Governorate worked for the economy of Germany until the end of the war. From the west, Germany hired workers, from the east - slaves.
"It's worth pointing out that if Germany did have the required resources and manpower early in the war, the trade agreements with the Soviets would have been unneccessary" - Germany used the pact with the USSR to prevent intervention of councils against Germany on the side of the anti-German coalition. Hitler speaks directly about this in August 1939.
"the massive use of captured equipment in the army prior to Barbarossa would not have been neccessary" - the use of military trophies speeds up the degree of your readiness for the operation, so it's foolish not to use it.
"the importation of slave labor would have been unneccessary" - The USSR also used a large number of women and adolescents in its industry, but does this mean that its human reserves were limited? Propagandists constantly talk about "the endless human resources of the USSR." Germany used slave and wage labor to make up for those people who were mobilized in the army, but this was done only after the failure of the Barbarossa plan.
"However, the Germans never came close to realizing that potential" - Germany created a large army for the period 1933-1939? Yes. To create it, you need a lot of resources and considerable potential? Yes. Germans consciously create their own army? Yes.
"and transforming it into military and economic growth" - Because their "ceiling of growth" was achieved in the period 1939-1940. Remember when Hitler adopted a four-year plan to prepare the economy for war? August 1936. Plus four years = August 1940. After reaching this deadline, Germany's growth slowed. However, the protracted nature of the war demanded an increase in production, so German industrialists made internal rationalization and began to increase military production from January 1942. That is, the problem was not in the German industry, but in the rationalization of production, which was not needed during the short campaigns of 1939-1941.
"They experienced far too many shortages both before and early in the war" - compare it not with the ideal state, but with the shortcomings of the opponents of Germany, which were more at the beginning of the war. This is what Germany used to make the most of its advantages.
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February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment.
The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!).
1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy!
2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies.
3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people.
4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service.
How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures.
Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites).
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21.
Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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Your version is just conspiracy theory. Here is a fragment of Hitler's speech on January 9, 1941:
"What supports England is the hope for the US and Russia, for the destruction of the English metropolis will inevitably eventually, but England hopes to hold out until it creates a major continental bloc against Germany. Diplomatic training in this direction can be clearly seen.
... The English supports the hope of the possibility of intervention by the Russians. They will only give up resistance when their last continental hope is crushed. He, the Fuhrer, does not believe that the British are "hopelessly stupid"; if they do not see any prospect, they will stop fighting. If they lose, they will never find the moral strength to preserve the empire. If they can hold out, form 30-40 divisions, and if the US and Russia help them, then a very difficult situation for Germany will be created. This can not be tolerated.
Until now, he [Hitler] acted on the principle of striking at the most important positions of the enemy, in order to move one step further. Therefore, now it is necessary to defeat Russia. Then either England will surrender, or Germany will continue to fight against England under the most favorable conditions. The defeat of Russia will also allow Japan to turn all its forces against the United States. And this would keep the latter from entering the war.
Especially important for the defeat of Russia is a matter of time. Although the Russian armed forces and clay colossus are without a head, however, it is impossible to accurately foresee their further development. Since Russia needs to be defeated in any case, it is better to do it now, when the Russian army is deprived of its leaders and poorly prepared and when the Russians have to overcome great difficulties in the war industry created with outside help.
Nevertheless, Russians can not be underestimated right now. Therefore, the German offensive must be conducted with maximum force. In no case should the front be ousted by the Russians. Therefore, the most decisive breakthroughs are needed. The most important task is to quickly cut off the Baltic Sea area; for this it is necessary to create a particularly strong grouping on the right wing of the German troops, which will advance north of the Pripyat Marshes. Although the distances in Russia are large, they are no more than the distances that the German armed forces have already coped. The purpose of the operation should be to destroy the Russian armed forces, capture the most important economic centers and destroy the remaining industrial areas, especially in the Yekaterinburg region; In addition, it is necessary to master the Baku area.
The rout of Russia will be a great relief for Germany. Then in the East it will be necessary to leave only 40-50 divisions, the size of the land army can be reduced and the entire military industry used for the arming of air and naval forces. Then it will be necessary to create a reliable anti-aircraft cover and move the most important industrial enterprises to safe areas. Then Germany will be invulnerable.
Giant spaces of Russia are fraught with innumerable riches. Germany should economically and politically master these spaces, but not to annex them to itself. Thus, she will have all the possibilities for conducting in the future the struggle against the continents, then no one else will be able to defeat it. When this operation is carried out, Europe will hold its breath. "
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1). The difference in the mobilization resource was not too large even before the war. Reich - 114 million people. (Within the boundaries of 1941). USSR - 196 million. Ratio 1: 1.7 Taking into account allies for the Eastern Front (Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Finland) - about 148 million. The final pre-war ratio of human resources is 1: 1.32 in favor of the USSR. Germany knows this and uses the blitzkrieg strategy. By the end of 1941, about 70 million Soviet people remained under the occupation. But managed to take out about 17 million 196-70 + 17 = 143. From this number, it is necessary to subtract a minimum of 3 million irretrievable losses for 1941. In total, by the beginning of 1942 (when the war became a war of attrition), the USSR had about 140 million people. This gives the following ratio of human resources: 1.23: 1 (the USSR versus one Reich) and 1.05: 1 (Axis against the USSR). If we add the human resources of conquered Europe and parts of the USSR - the superiority of the Axis countries will become overwhelming.
When Germany began a new offensive in the summer of 1942 - the maximum number of people (79 million) fell under the German occupation. This was one of the reasons for the appearance of the famous order No. 227, which explicitly states that the USSR no longer has superiority in human and agricultural resources over the enemy, so the Red Army must harden its resistance and keep the enemy from advancing to the east.
2). Some statistics on the main resources (1939).
Steel (million tons).
Germany - 22.3, USSR - 17.6;
Cast iron (million tons).
Germany - 19.7, USSR - 14.5;
Coal (million tons).
Germany - 233.7, USSR - 146.2;
Electricity (billion kW / h).
Germany - 66.3, USSR - 43.3.
That is, it can be seen that Germany within the borders of the beginning of 1939 already has advantages over the USSR in the main types of resources even without control over Europe. Although it is fair to say that a significant part of the German coal was used to create various surrogates, which somewhat reduced Germany's pre-eminence.
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February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment.
The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!).
1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy!
2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies.
3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people.
4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service.
How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures.
Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites).
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Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21.
Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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You never show me document like this.
February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment.
The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!).
1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy!
2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies.
3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people.
4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service.
How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures.
Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites).
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Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21.
Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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"The main force fighting Red Army in Finland was working class" - White government after the victory in the civil war by force suppressed any left opposition and began to pursue its policy (this means the action of propaganda).
"I think, they just didn't want to be liberated by Russians" - The Finnish government did not tell its people about the beginning of pre-war talks with the USSR. Thus, in the eyes of ordinary Finns, the USSR committed an unjustified aggression. For the ruling class, this is good news, because now the government = the interests of the nation.
"Last year Finland was nominated the happiest country of the world" - if you want you can justify almost everything, but why? How should the modern rating (the form of information warfare) testify to the correct course of the Finnish government in the 20th century?
"I can only imagine how mega happy they would be as a 16th Soviet Republic" - as far as I know, the Soviet Union did not plan to annex Finland. This is a form of post-war propaganda: if we can not defeat the enemy (Finland lost the winter war), then we can represent the false goals of the USSR, since if did not annex Finland in this way - it was our victory :)
"Bth, have you been to Finland?" - no. I know what you are going to appeal to. To live well is not necessarily mean to live by justice. Your privileges can be a consequence of someone's limitations. Capitalism means a market economy in which countries are developing unevenly - the privileged west (Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia) and all the rest. Within this system, not everyone can live well: strong countries exploit the weak. Ask yourself why any country in Africa or South America - can not afford a high standard of living? Because in the west it is achieved at their expense and the struggle goes for a place under the sun.
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1). "Did I used red Finns anywhere?" - if you say that the Kuusinen government was a puppet, it means that these people did not have their own opinion. So I asked you - do you deny these people the right to have their own republic which ally to the USSR?
2). "Yes, I know which categories of people went to GULAG" - what kind?
3). "In short, absolutely majority of them were decent peoole, workers and peasants" - Do you have statistics or is it just your opinion? Do you think that the Soviet government condemned these people "just like that"?
4). "How can you be sure that what the Bolshevicks meant what they wrote?" - we can only operate with documents and an understanding of socialist politics, for which imperialist wars are not characteristic.
5). "Just an example - there is no any soviet document to my knowledge justifying or even reflecting the reality of Holodomor" - and what is reality? The Soviet government helped the affected regions, including Ukraine. There are statistics:
In general, from September 1932 to December 1934, Kazakhstan received 5 million centners of grain as food aid. This is 31.2 million poods.
In total, in 1932, Ukraine received 3.2 million centners in the order of food aid, and in 1933 - 5.3 million centners. This is 53.1 million poods in total.
And on the basis of this assistance a large-scale network of canteens was organized. According to data as of May 1933, 8.8 million people ate in rural canteens in the European part of the USSR. In Ukraine, at the same time, there were 20.7 thousand canteens, to which 3 million people were attached. In total, in 1933, catering, including food during field work, reached 39 million people.
6). " All what I know - Bolshevicks wanted to take the extensive amounts (leftovers?) of grain and sunflower seeds from the peasants, to support industrialisation" - there are statistics of Soviet exports, which shows a reduction of ~ 70%.
1931 (there is no famine) - 4.91 million tons of bread.
1932 - 1.32 million tons.
1933 - 1.53 million tons.
This means that the thesis of "selling bread for industrialization" is wrong. Plus, the USSR buys food abroad.
Plus there is information about how much food was seized in Ukraine at this time:
Collected grain in Ukraine - 916 million poods of which 280 million (31%) - took the state in the form of a plan. The plan of blanks was reduced by 40% relative to 1932.
7). "It looks like you are really knowledgeable, may be your sources have more precise information?" - about war or hunger?
8). "No, I don't know if Finnland was occupied by Nazis to the end of winter war" - She was. Later, these divisions were used to strike the USSR and even a part of the Finnish divisions in the north was commanded by the German general.
There are also the words of Stalin who notes this:
On November 14, 1940, analyzing the results of the talks in Berlin, Stalin said: "Hitler's position during the talks, in particular his stubborn refusal to take into account the security interests of the USSR, his categorical refusal to stop the occupation of Finland and Romania - all this indicates that in fact preparations are being made for an attack on our country".
9). "Can you refer me to a corresponding docs?" - yes. http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1001574
10). "And what happened to this "red" Koussinnen, or whatever his name was?" - lived 82 years and died in 1964.
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1). "last link doesn't open" - Poroshenko blocked this also? :)
I just bring here the conclusion of their document in Russian so as not to lose any sense:
Вывод:
а). Установлено прибытие в Финляндию через порты Вааза и Сулу до 4-х тыс. чел. немецких войск, движение по железной дороге до Рованиеми и в дальнейшем по шоссе в направлении Петсамо.
б). Немцы ведут большие работы по превращению области Финмаркен в плацдарм военных действий.
в). Необходимо продолжать изучение хода перебросок немецких войск через Финляндию и установить, следуют ли они для смены войск, находящихся в северной Норвегии, или же для усиления. Одновременно продолжать изучение связей генеральных штабов Германии и Финляндии в смысле выяснения конкретных фактов помощи, оказываемой германским командованием в строительстве финской армии и укреплений, направленных против СССР. В частности, выяснить, что из перебрасываемых немецких войск оседает в самой Финляндии. Уточнить численность немецких войск в северной Норвегии, их расположение, группировку и конкретные объекты строительства, особенно в районе Киркенес.
Начальник Разведывательного Управления
Генштаба Красной Армии
генерал-лейтенант (ГОЛИКОВ)
РГВА. Ф. 29. Оп. 35. Д. 98. Л. 155сс-157сс. Машинопись на бланке. Копия. Автограф. (04.10.1940 ).
2). "Can you lead me to the source, if you know it?" - I'm sorry, but I did not study Lenin's works well enough, I know only the basic points. Such a quote did not hear ...
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@angiolinobenedetti1678
1. The military reason for Hitler’s attack on the USSR is described in the diary of France Halder dated July 31, 1940. Briefly: it was an attempt to deprive England of the last hope of victory in the war. Suvorov ignores this fact.
2. Bessarabia was part of the Russian Empire. Romania annexed it in 1918. Bukovina was not part of Russia, but Ukrainians lived there, which Molotov warned the German side about.
3. According to statistics, the percentage of Soviet oil in Germany’s overall balance in 1940 was 12%.
4. In the USSR, the Polish political regime was officially called fascist. This regime refused to create a military coalition against Germany. From a certain moment, Stalin decided that there was no point in trying to come to an agreement with England and France, but it was better to conclude a pact with Germany and liquidate Poland. The liquidation of the fascist state and the long war between capitalist countries were beneficial for the USSR. But this is not an argument in favor of Suvorov’s theory because the initiator of the war is Hitler, and the USSR remains neutral and benefits from trade with Germany.
5. You need to take information about Soviet airfields from Soviet documents, not from Suvorov’s book. Much of the facts in this book are incorrect.
6. If you open the field manual of the Red Army 1939 (which is available in Russian), you will see that the Red Army can use both defense and offense. Here Suvorov is wrong. The book goes on to say that the Red Army gives preference to the offensive because it allows you to maintain the strategic initiative and defeat the enemy. Static defense is used primarily in secondary sectors of the front.
7. Any weapon can be used offensively or defensively. Suvorov is misleading his readers here.
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@angiolinobenedetti1678
1). The bulk of documents are always aimed at describing internal processes in the state. The government uses this data to run its country properly. A minority of documents are created for propaganda purposes. If you say that all Soviet documents are false, then this means that the Soviet government does not have accurate information about how to manage its economy, army, NKVD and other institutions.
2). I don't need to read American propaganda to know Hitler's goals. All I need to do is read the words of Hitler himself.
Hitler's "table talks", recording dated September 17, 1941.
“The outcome of the struggle for hegemony in the world will be decided in favor of Europe through the possession of Russian territories. And then Europe will become an impregnable fortress, safe from all threats of blockade. All this opens up economic prospects, which, one can believe, will persuade the majority of liberal Western democrats to the new order. At this time, the most important thing is to conquer. After that, everything else will simply be a problem for the organization."
Entry dated October 26, 1941.
“My task is to use the advantages of continental hegemony. It’s funny to think about world politics if you haven’t achieved control over the continent. The Spaniards, the Dutch, the French, and we ourselves learned this from our own experience. If you are the master in Europe, it means you dominate the world. There are 130 million in the Reich, 90 million in the Ukraine. Add to this the other countries of New Europe, and we get 400 million, compared to 130 million Americans."
3). Was Germany economically strong enough to realize such ambitious goals? Well, we have statistics to verify this. For example, let's take the industrial potential of the USSR.
Data of 1939.
Steel (million tons).
Germany - 22.3, USSR - 17.6;
Cast iron (million tons).
Germany - 19.7, USSR - 14.5;
Coal (million tons).
Germany - 233.7, USSR - 146.2;
Electricity (billion kW / h).
Germany - 66.3, USSR - 43.3.
As we see, Germany has superiority in the field of basic indicators of industrial potential over the USSR. As for England, its industrial potential is even lower than the Soviet one. The USSR and England have many natural resources, but England cannot fight against Germany on equal terms without a continental ally, and the USSR has its own weak points in the economy, such as the production of aluminum and gunpowder.
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@angiolinobenedetti1678
1. The problem is that you constantly quote people who are not professional historians. If I refute one of their arguments, then you will simply bring a new one, but will not change your source of information.
2. The number of tanks or aircraft has nothing to do with a political act of aggression. This number only shows what concept of technology the military doctrine of this country uses. France had more tanks than Germany and it even carried out an offensive operation in September 1939. But this operation was not a political act of aggression. Finland had fewer tanks than the USSR, but it also had two options for a plan - passive defense or an offensive operation if the situation allowed.
Weak countries may consider passive defense because they do not have the strength to fight an active war. Strong countries rely mainly on the offensive plan because it allows them to enter the war profitably and maintain the initiative.
The Soviet operation was not created as part of an act of aggression. The Soviet plan was only an outline of the first operations in a potential war and was not worked out for the complete destruction of Germany. The Soviet plan could be implemented even if Germany initiated the war. But the Soviet plan did not assume that Germany could attack immediately with a full mobilized army without a period of deployment and political requirements.
3. There are German documents that say that after the defeat of France, the air and sea war against England was not a big problem for the German economy. Germany had at least 2 years to destroy the USSR before England and Usa could attack in western Europe.
4. To understand the balance of forces, you need to look not only at the number of tanks, but at the balance between tanks/trucks/infantry/artillery. Tanks do not fight on their own, but are part of the organizational structure of the army. The USSR had more tanks and aircraft, but fewer cars, motorized infantry, and worse artillery tractors. The USSR did not have armored personnel carriers. Tanks cannot fight without normal infantry and artillery support. The Wehrmacht completed mobilization and had it, but the Red Army did not have mobilization and did not have time to complete its deployment on the western border. As a result, German divisions with a balance of infantry and equipment defeated Soviet divisions, which had many tanks and little support.Germany had fewer aircraft, but used them several times more intensively (per day), which gave the German army superiority on the battlefield.
5. The principle of strategy says that in order to achieve superiority in the right place, you weaken forces in secondary areas. After the defeat of France, the main potential front for Germany became the Soviet one. The air operation against England was an improvisation.
Hitler's speech at a meeting with generals on March 30, 1941.
“Now there is an opportunity to defeat Russia having a free rear. This opportunity will not come again so soon. I would be a criminal before the German people if I did not take advantage of this.”
Diary of Frans Halder. Entry dated March 30, 1941.
“Only subject to the final and complete solution of all land problems will we be able to fulfill the tasks facing us (in terms of equipment and personnel) in the air and at sea over the next two years.”
Entry dated March 28, 1942 - “the outcome of the war is being decided in the east.”
The absence of a second front in Europe allowed Hitler to use 85% of the ground army and 2/3 of the aviation against the USSR. In the West, Germany went on the defensive, and in Africa, on active defense. Therefore, to understand the German strategy, you need to look at the priority of their fronts, and not at the cost of individual types of weapons, as some publicists do. For example, the cost of a submarine is more than that of a tank, but this does not mean that Germany is delivering its main blow in the west.
6. In any case, you can not answer the previous points, but simply admit that Hitler’s strategy was different from what Suvorov says about it? I brought you several documents, but I see no point in continuing the dialogue until you admit Suvorov’s mistake. The error of his entire concept, and not of individual facts.
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@angiolinobenedetti1678 I cannot ignore your response because you continue to spread misinformation. You ignore the existence of German documents whose authenticity has long been established. Some of these documents were used for the prosecution at the Nuremberg trials.
Anyone can find information that the Wehrmacht used 577,000 vehicles and 680,000 horses in Operation Barbarossa. The Red Army had 148,000 vehicles and 246,000 horses (before mobilization).
Above I quoted Frans Halder's diary, but you simply ignored it. This shows that studying history does not interest you. But I also have another source and I will quote it for those people who will read our dialogue. Your denial of German sources should not mislead other people.
Diary of Joseph Goebbels, entry dated June 15, 1941:
“We must attack Russia also in order to get people. Unbeaten Russia forces us to constantly maintain 150 divisions, the personnel of which we urgently need for our military industry. Our industry must work more intensively so that we can fulfill our program for production of weapons, submarines and aircraft, then the USA will also not be able to harm us in any way. There is material, raw materials and machines to work in three shifts, but not enough people. When Russia is defeated, then we will be able to demobilize several age categories and then build, arm and prepare. Only then can an attack on England from the air on a large scale be launched. An invasion of England by land is hardly possible under all circumstances. Thus, other guarantees of victory must be created."
"We must realize that we have more production capacity, they much larger than in 1914-1918" - Hitler (Meeting with generals, August 22, 1939).
"Today we have superiority over the enemy, as well as numerical superiority in the West, behind the army is the most powerful military industry in the world." - Hitler (Meeting with generals, 23 November 1939).
According to statistics, Germany had 1,707,000 industrial machine tools in 1938. This is the first place in the world.
For comparison.
USA - 827,000 (1940).
USSR - 710,000 (1941).
England - 521,000 (1941).
That is, Germany had more machine tools than England and the USSR together, but it had problems with a shortage of labor and natural resources. After the implementation of Plan Barbarossa, Hitler planned to obtain Soviet resources and give his industry more workers.
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@DeutschwehR
1. You lied about the content of the soviet orders.
2. "We are a people of masters and must rule toughly and fairly. I will take every last thing out of this country. We must realize that the smallest German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times superior to the local population."
Hans-Erich Volkmann (Hrsg.), Das Russlandbild im Dritten Reich, Koln 1994, p. 43.
3. Hitler speech to generals, february 1933.
"How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization".
Source: handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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1. In this article, Ehrenburg cites German letters where German soldiers say how they mocked the Slavic population. Ehrenburg concludes that there is a war of annihilation and that in such a war the German ceases to be just an enemy - if you do not kill a German soldier, he will kill you. This article is simply a reflection of the war of destruction. It contains no calls to oppose the German civilian population.
2. The war in Europe began at the initiative of Germany - that's a fact. There are numerous documents that support this. For example the Hossbach protocol. Nazi propaganda tries to show that Germany was the victim of this war, not the aggressor.
3. The Soviet orders you are talking about do not contain suicidal tactics - that's a fact. You are talking about something that does not exist. When the red army was on the defensive (1941-1942), its losses were greater (2.5-3 to 1), and when it advanced (1944-1945), the losses on the front between it and the Wehrmacht were close to 1-1.5 to 1. This is a proven fact. I specifically quoted the losses of the different armies to you so that you could compare different campaigns, but you just ignored it and said that there was a different tactic here. But Soviet orders do not contain suicide tactics - this is a Nazi myth.
During the entire war, 135 thousand soldiers of the Red Army were sentenced to death. The mobilization potential of the USSR was more than 34 million people. These people were sentenced to death for a variety of reasons, not mythical suicidal tactics. If you look at the Soviet losses in this war (7.3 million in the red army against 3.8 million Axis soldiers), you will see that 135 thousand executed people cannot change the picture much. Thus, Soviet orders have nothing to do with the difference in the number of Soviet losses.
If you carefully read the text of order number 227, you would see that the retreat ban was first used by the German army (!) during the battle for Moscow. The Soviet command decided to use the German experience. By the way, about 20 thousand people were also sentenced to death in the Wehrmacht.
4. Germany had 1.6 million people against Poland, which had 850 thousand. Against France, Germany had 3.3 million on each side (parity). In the war against the USSR, the Axis armies had 5 million people against 3.8 million in the red army. Numerical superiority on the eastern front remained until December 1941. But Nazi myths tell you that the Wehrmacht always fought outnumbered — that's a lie. The number of tanks and aircraft does not play a big role because the Red Army had a different concept of using technology.
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And another important point. You do not understand how the execution of the death sentence takes place. Propaganda tells you that the NKVD simply shoots its soldiers in the back, but in reality, if the soldier has panic, the NKVD stops the panic and returns the soldier to the front (the majority). If a soldier has committed a serious crime, then he can be sentenced to death (minority), but only by a military tribunal that is not on the front line, but behind it. Statistics show that most of the soldiers were simply returned to the front lines (in defense, not to suicide attack as propaganda says). In this case, the NKVD is playing the role of military police.
Document nkvd about the fighting in the area of Stalingrad.
From August 1 to October 15, 1942, 140,755 people were detained by block detachments. Of them:
- Arrested - 3.980 or (2.8%)
- Shooted - 1.189 or (0.85%)
- Sent to penalty battalions - 2.961 or (2.1%)
- Returned to the front - 131.094 or (93.2%).
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