Comments by "Андрей Борцов" (@Mentol_) on "Barbarossa: Why such high Soviet Losses? - Explained" video.

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  4.  @chekvb  1. After the Polish campaign, the Germans created "tank groups" that made it possible to break through the defense to a great depth. In these groups there was a good balance between the number of tanks, vehicles, infantry and artillery. Their organization allowed them to operate autonomously even when separated from supply bases. Another situation was in the Red Army. The Soviet command did not have the experience of breaking through modern defenses (the Finnish war was a specific experience), therefore, in the shock units of the Red Army there was an excess of tanks and a lack of transport, infantry and artillery. In 1941, the Red Army captured German documents and studied them. This made it possible to balance the amount of equipment and at the end of 1942 tank armies were created, which were analogous to German tank groups. For the first time they were successfully used to encircle the German 6th Army near Stalingrad. 2. Infantry losses are affected by the number of artillery shells (where Germany was the leader on the eastern front until 1944) and the quality of education of soldiers and the level of your technologies. When you attack the defense, if it is not broken through, then you usually suffer more losses than the enemy. But if it is destroyed, then the enemy loses its organization and communications, which either compares the losses, or makes them more than those of the attacking side. In 1943, the Soviet government abandoned the large encirclement of enemy armies for political reasons (Stalingrad was an exception). This led to a more rapid expulsion of the enemy from Soviet soil, but without its complete destruction (the German organization was preserved). This was one of the reasons why Soviet casualties in 1943 were still higher than German ones. In 1944, the Red Army changed its strategy of driving the enemy out to a strategy of destroying him. In addition, Germany lost its leadership in the number of heavy artillery shells. As a result, German losses increased from 814k in 1943 (killed and captured) to 1756k in 1944. If we add the German allies here, the result will show that the ratio of losses on the eastern front in 1944 became 1 to 1 and rose to 2 to 1 (in favor of the Red Army ) in 1945. When you need to compare the ratio of losses on the eastern front in 1944, then people usually take Krivosheev's data for the Red Army, which includes all categories of losses and "ten-day reports" for the Wehrmacht, which exclude those who died from wounds, slightly wounded, non-combat losses, missing who were recognized as killed through time, losses of supply personnel, as well as aviation and navy personnel. The German casualty system showed short-term losses for the their high command, but it is incorrect to use ten-day reports for a general comparison of losses. So, for example, according to these reports, the Wehrmacht lost 359k killed on the eastern front in 1944 against 1233k according to Overmans, whose study takes into account these categories.
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  13.  RifleEyez  You do not understand the psychology of the Soviet people. The main reason is that you are using modern sources that distort history by creating a liberal interpretation of events. Why distort? Because the Bolsheviks were not liberals. You need to understand how they saw the world. The Bolshevik government was shaped by the civil war and the idea that terror was a necessary tool to fight for one's own rights. They made this idea part of state propaganda. The result was that ordinary people themselves began to demand increased terror against the kulaks, Trotskyists and other groups. The goal was to gain social cohesion by destroying those who violated it. The rights of the minority must be limited in the interests of the majority. Within the framework of this logic, only a minority could consider Stalin a maniac. Also in the 1930s, a new concept of Soviet patriotism was created which said that a normal communist should take the best of Russian history and improve it with the help of Marxist philosophy. The revolution does not negate Russian history, but complements it. Now it has become fashionable to be a communist. This is the vanguard of the working class. As a result, during the war, many people joined the Bolshevik Party or other communist organizations. The percentage of people with communist beliefs in the Red Army during the war ranged from 30 to 50% (according to Soviet sources). And it wasn't just the Russians. According to statistics, about 6 million Ukrainians fought on the side of the USSR against 250 thousand on the side of Germany and local nationalists. But the German propaganda films were so powerful that people now think that most Ukrainians greeted Germany as liberators.
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  32. February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment. The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!). 1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy! 2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies. 3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people. 4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service. How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures. Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21. Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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  45.  @dreamdiction  Here are my thoughts. You are confusing fact with interpretation. For example, the Berlin Wall is a fact, and the fact that its purpose was to prevent people from going west is your interpretation. German documents do not contain such a purpose. The goal of the Berlin Wall was to improve the quality of border controls and reduce foreign provocations. You also confuse the values ​​of different ideologies. For example, when you say that the USSR punished people by placing them in the gulag, then you mean that it was the wrong policy. But among ideologies, only liberalism prohibits violence as a policy, while pragmatism tells us to use any means to achieve own goal. The communist ideology tells us that we need to restrict the activities of the exploiting classes (the minority) so that the rights of the majority are protected. And liberalism says that any restriction is evil. This is a different worldview. During the Second World War, countries with different political systems became allies. But contrary to myths, the Soviet system did not deny democracy, but used it in a different sense (social freedom in the USSR vs personal freedom in the West). If you read the discussion in the Soviet government and in the German one, you will see that the USSR adheres to the principle of democratic centralism, while Hitler considers democracy to be a disease that morally corrupts your nation. This is one of the reasons why the USSR and the West became allies, and Nazism as an ideology was condemned in Nuremberg. Because Nazism is an ideology that spreads hatred towards other peoples, and Soviet communism is the idea of ​​equality of all nations. The fact that the USSR was a dictatorship in the era of Stalinism does not mean that it denied democracy because the dictatorship was a form of defense of the Soviet version of democracy. The dictatorship of the interests of the majority over the minority. Western liberalism destroyed the idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat in communism and created a non-violent version of cultural Marxism. Therefore, it is unprofitable for Western civilization to completely condemn communism (only violence in it) because such an action would mean a rejection of democratic values.
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  49.  @dreamdiction  Are you serious? The idea of ​​a world revolution was created by Marx and Engels, and then used by Lenin. This idea suggests that the capitalist system strongly binds different states into a single economic market, and when a crisis moment comes, this has a social impact on other states. Then the working class, seeing the successes of the socialist revolution in Russia, will want to do the same in own countries. Lenin used this idea to free the European proletariat from the oppression of the capitalist system. In fact, this is a struggle for social freedom from the economic exploitation of the minority , that is, anti-imperialism. Why did you call it imperialism? You couldn't even name a scientific definition of imperialism and occupation. Lenin even wrote a book about this - "Capitalism as the Highest Stage of Imperialism." Have you read it? If not, why are you talking about what you have no idea about? Because even if you disagree with this book, then you need normal arguments to refute it. You even contradict yourself. For example, you say that Russia was a successful country before the revolution. This means that you agree with the fact that Russian imperialism considers the territories of Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic to be part of its empire. In this case, you consider it a "successful country", and when the Bolsheviks want to regain control over the old territories (not politics), then you condemn it as imperialism. You cannot even quote a single document that shows that the Soviet government has personal control over the means of production and is enriched by this. You call it an oligarchy, but you cannot prove it properly using primary sources.
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  59.  @rick7424  You have outdated data. What is Glantz referring to? In any case, this is a secondary source of information. Because Soviet documents (primary source) show that only 8,122 officers were arrested during the purge for political reasons and 9,859 were dismissed from the army for other reasons (figures include partial rehabilitation in the period 38-39). Your data is also incorrect regarding the number of ​​the total number of officers in the Red Army - in reality, in March 1937 the Red Army had 206 thousand officers, and in June 1941 - 439k. Source - Игорь Пыхалов, великая оболганная война, стр 35-52 (издание 2015г). The documents also show that the level of training of the Red Army before and after the purge was the same, and the first period of the war with Finland had planning errors, not a consequence of the purge. Also, the purpose of the purge was Stalin's desire to take into account the mistakes of the republican government in Spain, which allowed political and social instability in their rear during the civil war. This purge did not affect the quality of the Red Army, but perhaps Soviet society became more monolithic because criminals and anti-Soviet elements were removed from it. But the head of the NKVD Yezhov exceeded his powers during purge and therefore was replaced by Beria. After that 280k people were rehabilitated in 39-40. Sources: Виктор земсков - Ложь под видом статистики. Об одной публикации в журнале «Социологические исследования». Журнал Столица. Андрей Смирнов - обезглавил ли Сталин красную армию? Издание 2011г.
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  64. 1. I use the video as an argument for those people who do not have time to study the books and documents in the original. I don't need this because I know the basic facts. However, I do not know what my opponent knows. 2. Your stereotypes about the USSR are your problems. They are not related to the issue under discussion. 3. We just can not know what will happen to the USSR if Moscow is captured by Germany. What we know for sure - it will be weakened. However, you make a global conclusion based on a simple assumption. This is not a scientific method. In reality, the USSR has built a whole industrial empire beyond the Urals. The weakening of soviet logistics does not guarantee its military defeat. 4. Western aid for the USSR is only a bonus in relation to Soviet economic efforts. Remove the Red Army and Soviet workers from this equation and there will be no one to use these weapons / materials. Here are the details for Lend-Lease. The percentage of allied aid from Soviet production. Tanks - 12.3% Planes - 13%. Artillery - 2.7% Ships - 22.4% Infantry weapon - 0.75% Food (grain) - 2.8% Self-propelled artillery - 7.8% Anti-aircraft guns - 21% Antitank guns - 9% Automobile gasoline - 2.7% Aviation fuel - 40% Railway rails - 36% Steam locomotives - 72% Explosives - 36.6% Aluminum - 55% Copper - 45% Tires - 30% Sugar - 29.5% Cotton - 6% Industrial machine tools - 24% The percentage of imported cars in the Red Army: 22.6.41 - 0% 1.1.42 - 0,1% 1.1.43 - 5.4% 1.1.44 - 19% 1,1,45 - 30,4% 1.5.45 - 32.8% Percentage of total US assistance (100%) for the USSR by periods. 1941 - 2.1% 1942 - 14% 1943 - 27.4% 1944 - 35.5% 1945 - 21%
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  65. 1. You can not use the thesis of the constant lies of the soviet government as proven until you prove it. While I do not even understand in what context you use it. 2. For the entire period of the war, the Allies delivered 4.5 million tons of food to USSR. For comparison - the volume of grain harvest in the USSR was: 1941 - 55.9 million tons. 1942 - 29.7 million tons. 1943 - 29.4 million tons. 1944 - 49.1 million tons. 1945 - 47.3 million tons. Total - 211.4 million tons. Thus, a direct percentage of allied assistance is 2.2% of the volume of the soviet harvest. However, allied canned food was food concentrates so these data should be increased, but as far as - unknown. But even if we increase their share on two or three times, their percentage will still not exceed 10% of the soviet harvest. 3. Nobody argues that the loss of Moscow and Leningrad for the USSR would worsen his logistics. But you say that this means the automatic collapse of the USSR. However, this is only your assumption that we can not check in real life. Only theory. China also had a weak logistics and industry, but its front did not collapse. 4. You yourself said that Stalin asked the allies to open a second front. But then you said that Hitler made a classic mistake - he started the war on two fronts. So Germany fought with two fronts or not (1941-1943)? My opinion is no. Just look at the forces they used in Africa (periphery theater) and in the west. This is less than 40 German divisions that Stalin asked to "distract" from the eastern front. This is also the reason why the Italian front cannot be considered a real second front. It seems you are making another mistake. Do you think that Hitler moved a lot of forces to the west and this relieved the pressure on the USSR. This is true but it happened only in the second half of 1943 (land army) and at the end of 1941 (aviation). Both of these dates were after the Barbarossa plan failed. That is, at first was the defeat of the plan of Barbarossa, and only later - the movement of forces to the west.
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  94. You never show me document like this. February 3, 1933. Berlin. The statements of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, set out before the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and naval forces during the visit of the infantry general Baron Hammerstein-Eckvoda at his apartment. The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!). 1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realized in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy! 2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva; but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies. 3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people. 4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service. How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps—and probably better—the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now—settlement—stopgap measures. Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. They must stay unpolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended—most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Source of English translation: Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21. Source of original German text: Handwritten notes by General Lieutenant Liebmann. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 39; reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, Dokumentation: „Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933“, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), Heft 4, pp. 434-35.
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  108. 1. In this article, Ehrenburg cites German letters where German soldiers say how they mocked the Slavic population. Ehrenburg concludes that there is a war of annihilation and that in such a war the German ceases to be just an enemy - if you do not kill a German soldier, he will kill you. This article is simply a reflection of the war of destruction. It contains no calls to oppose the German civilian population. 2. The war in Europe began at the initiative of Germany - that's a fact. There are numerous documents that support this. For example the Hossbach protocol. Nazi propaganda tries to show that Germany was the victim of this war, not the aggressor. 3. The Soviet orders you are talking about do not contain suicidal tactics - that's a fact. You are talking about something that does not exist. When the red army was on the defensive (1941-1942), its losses were greater (2.5-3 to 1), and when it advanced (1944-1945), the losses on the front between it and the Wehrmacht were close to 1-1.5 to 1. This is a proven fact. I specifically quoted the losses of the different armies to you so that you could compare different campaigns, but you just ignored it and said that there was a different tactic here. But Soviet orders do not contain suicide tactics - this is a Nazi myth. During the entire war, 135 thousand soldiers of the Red Army were sentenced to death. The mobilization potential of the USSR was more than 34 million people. These people were sentenced to death for a variety of reasons, not mythical suicidal tactics. If you look at the Soviet losses in this war (7.3 million in the red army against 3.8 million Axis soldiers), you will see that 135 thousand executed people cannot change the picture much. Thus, Soviet orders have nothing to do with the difference in the number of Soviet losses. If you carefully read the text of order number 227, you would see that the retreat ban was first used by the German army (!) during the battle for Moscow. The Soviet command decided to use the German experience. By the way, about 20 thousand people were also sentenced to death in the Wehrmacht. 4. Germany had 1.6 million people against Poland, which had 850 thousand. Against France, Germany had 3.3 million on each side (parity). In the war against the USSR, the Axis armies had 5 million people against 3.8 million in the red army. Numerical superiority on the eastern front remained until December 1941. But Nazi myths tell you that the Wehrmacht always fought outnumbered — that's a lie. The number of tanks and aircraft does not play a big role because the Red Army had a different concept of using technology.
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