Comments by "D W" (@DW-op7ly) on "VisualEconomik EN"
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Sino-Vietnamese conflicts (1979–1991)
When the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) withdrew from Vietnam in March 1979 after the war, China announced that they were not ambitious for "any square inch of the territory of Vietnam".[3] However, Chinese troops occupied an area of 60 square kilometres (23 sq mi), which was disputed land controlled by Vietnam before hostilities broke out.[4] In some places such as the area around Friendship Gate near the city of Lạng Sơn, Chinese troops occupied territories which had little military value but important symbolic value. Elsewhere, Chinese troops occupied the strategic positions of military importance as springboards to attack Vietnam.[5]
The Chinese occupation of border territory angered Vietnam, and this ushered in a series of border conflicts between Vietnam and China to gain control of the area. These conflicts continued until 1988, peaking in the years 1984–1985.[6] By the early 1990s, along with the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the two countries gradually returned to normality. By 1991, the two countries proclaimed the normalization of their diplomatic relations, thereby ending the border conflicts.
Wikipedia
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Sino-Vietnamese conflicts (1979–1991)
When the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) withdrew from Vietnam in March 1979 after the war, China announced that they were not ambitious for "any square inch of the territory of Vietnam".[3] However, Chinese troops occupied an area of 60 square kilometres (23 sq mi), which was disputed land controlled by Vietnam before hostilities broke out.[4] In some places such as the area around Friendship Gate near the city of Lạng Sơn, Chinese troops occupied territories which had little military value but important symbolic value. Elsewhere, Chinese troops occupied the strategic positions of military importance as springboards to attack Vietnam.[5]
The Chinese occupation of border territory angered Vietnam, and this ushered in a series of border conflicts between Vietnam and China to gain control of the area. These conflicts continued until 1988, peaking in the years 1984–1985.[6] By the early 1990s, along with the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the two countries gradually returned to normality. By 1991, the two countries proclaimed the normalization of their diplomatic relations, thereby ending the border conflicts.
Wikipedia
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In Defense of Socialism, 1990–1991
After the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, the VCP chief and defense minister sought an ideological alliance with China.
As Party Chief Nguyen Van Linh explained to the Chinese ambassador to Vietnam on June 5, 1990, the situation was marked by the West’s offensive to eliminate socialismand concurrently the difficulties of the Soviet Union in defending socialism.
In this situation, Linh concluded,
“China should raise high the banner of socialism and stick to Marxism-Leninism.”
Linh and Defense Minister Le Duc Anh hoped that China would take the leadership of the world’s socialist forces;
they indicated to the ambassador that they were ready to meet Chinese leaders to discuss solidarity between the two states to fight imperialism.
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On September 2 that year, Vietnam’s Independence Day, the party and government chiefs did not stay in Hanoi to celebrate the 45th birthday of their state but instead flew to Chengdu, China, for a secret summit with Chinese leaders, the first since the mid-1970s.
The Vietnamese understood that their acceptance
of the time, place, and participants was a sign of deference to China.
Participants included Vietnam’s elder statesman Pham Van Dong but not China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping; Foreign Minister Thach was excluded.
During the meeting, the Vietnamese also let the Chinese dictate the terms of negotiation;this should be seen against the background of a decade-long hostility between the two countries.
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The Vietnamese had urgent reasons for taking this approach. At the time, the counterweight of the Soviet Union was no longer available and Vietnam was still isolated, regionally and globally.
In China, Vietnam faced a disproportionately powerful neighbor, and in order to prevent Chinese aggression, Hanoi had to pay deference to Beijing.
It appeared to be the calculation of Pham Van
Dong and, to some extent, Prime Minister Do Muoi.
Yet, as discussed above, General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh had different concerns and priorities.
His primary intention at Chengdu was to discuss how to protect socialism from the West, led by the United States.
Although the Chinese refused to play the solidarity game, Linh and his successors over the next decade kept trying to reestablish the Sino-Vietnamese relationship on an ideological basis.
Scribd
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In Defense of Socialism, 1990–1991
After the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, the VCP chief and defense minister sought an ideological alliance with China.
As Party Chief Nguyen Van Linh explained to the Chinese ambassador to Vietnam on June 5, 1990, the situation was marked by the West’s offensive to eliminate socialismand concurrently the difficulties of the Soviet Union in defending socialism.
In this situation, Linh concluded,
“China should raise high the banner of socialism and stick to Marxism-Leninism.”
Linh and Defense Minister Le Duc Anh hoped that China would take the leadership of the world’s socialist forces;
they indicated to the ambassador that they were ready to meet Chinese leaders to discuss solidarity between the two states to fight imperialism.
.
.
On September 2 that year, Vietnam’s Independence Day, the party and government chiefs did not stay in Hanoi to celebrate the 45th birthday of their state but instead flew to Chengdu, China, for a secret summit with Chinese leaders, the first since the mid-1970s.
The Vietnamese understood that their acceptance
of the time, place, and participants was a sign of deference to China.
Participants included Vietnam’s elder statesman Pham Van Dong but not China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping; Foreign Minister Thach was excluded.
During the meeting, the Vietnamese also let the Chinese dictate the terms of negotiation;this should be seen against the background of a decade-long hostility between the two countries.
.
.
The Vietnamese had urgent reasons for taking this approach. At the time, the counterweight of the Soviet Union was no longer available and Vietnam was still isolated, regionally and globally.
In China, Vietnam faced a disproportionately powerful neighbor, and in order to prevent Chinese aggression, Hanoi had to pay deference to Beijing.
It appeared to be the calculation of Pham Van
Dong and, to some extent, Prime Minister Do Muoi.
Yet, as discussed above, General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh had different concerns and priorities.
His primary intention at Chengdu was to discuss how to protect socialism from the West, led by the United States.
Although the Chinese refused to play the solidarity game, Linh and his successors over the next decade kept trying to reestablish the Sino-Vietnamese relationship on an ideological basis.
Scribd
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Sino-Vietnamese conflicts (1979–1991)
When the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) withdrew from Vietnam in March 1979 after the war, China announced that they were not ambitious for "any square inch of the territory of Vietnam".[3] However, Chinese troops occupied an area of 60 square kilometres (23 sq mi), which was disputed land controlled by Vietnam before hostilities broke out.[4] In some places such as the area around Friendship Gate near the city of Lạng Sơn, Chinese troops occupied territories which had little military value but important symbolic value. Elsewhere, Chinese troops occupied the strategic positions of military importance as springboards to attack Vietnam.[5]
The Chinese occupation of border territory angered Vietnam, and this ushered in a series of border conflicts between Vietnam and China to gain control of the area. These conflicts continued until 1988, peaking in the years 1984–1985.[6] By the early 1990s, along with the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the two countries gradually returned to normality. By 1991, the two countries proclaimed the normalization of their diplomatic relations, thereby ending the border conflicts.
Wikipedia
1
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In Defense of Socialism, 1990–1991
After the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, the VCP chief and defense minister sought an ideological alliance with China.
As Party Chief Nguyen Van Linh explained to the Chinese ambassador to Vietnam on June 5, 1990, the situation was marked by the West’s offensive to eliminate socialismand concurrently the difficulties of the Soviet Union in defending socialism.
In this situation, Linh concluded,
“China should raise high the banner of socialism and stick to Marxism-Leninism.”
Linh and Defense Minister Le Duc Anh hoped that China would take the leadership of the world’s socialist forces;
they indicated to the ambassador that they were ready to meet Chinese leaders to discuss solidarity between the two states to fight imperialism.
.
.
On September 2 that year, Vietnam’s Independence Day, the party and government chiefs did not stay in Hanoi to celebrate the 45th birthday of their state but instead flew to Chengdu, China, for a secret summit with Chinese leaders, the first since the mid-1970s.
The Vietnamese understood that their acceptance
of the time, place, and participants was a sign of deference to China.
Participants included Vietnam’s elder statesman Pham Van Dong but not China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping; Foreign Minister Thach was excluded.
During the meeting, the Vietnamese also let the Chinese dictate the terms of negotiation;this should be seen against the background of a decade-long hostility between the two countries.
.
.
The Vietnamese had urgent reasons for taking this approach. At the time, the counterweight of the Soviet Union was no longer available and Vietnam was still isolated, regionally and globally.
In China, Vietnam faced a disproportionately powerful neighbor, and in order to prevent Chinese aggression, Hanoi had to pay deference to Beijing.
It appeared to be the calculation of Pham Van
Dong and, to some extent, Prime Minister Do Muoi.
Yet, as discussed above, General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh had different concerns and priorities.
His primary intention at Chengdu was to discuss how to protect socialism from the West, led by the United States.
Although the Chinese refused to play the solidarity game, Linh and his successors over the next decade kept trying to reestablish the Sino-Vietnamese relationship on an ideological basis.
Scribd
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Weaponizing Water: How China Controls the Mekong
Despite these record lows for the Mekong river in Southeast Asia, the upper Mekong in China’s Yunnan province received above-normal rainfall. Even though climate change does play a role in the Mekong’s fading banks, it is the construction of dams, not a lack of rain, that is most detrimental.
As of now, China has completed 11 dams with many more at various levels of planning and competition. Laos has two operational dams on the river with plans to build at least seven more while Cambodia has two in various stages of construction. The dams in both Laos and Cambodia are financially backed by China through its Belt and Road Initiative and intend to export much of this electricity to China. This shows China’s influence and determination to produce electricity from the river at any cost and its ability to pressure other nations, whose people want the river undammed, to comply.
Through the damming of the Mekong, China is using what has been termed “hydro-diplomacy” to exert control over Southeast Asia, bringing the threat of further economic and environmental ruin to its southern neighbors. With China’s dams in the Yunnan province alone, China can withhold some 47 million cubic meters of water from flowing downstream. This has the potential to cripple the lifeline of much of Southeast Asia in one swing which China both knows and utilizes to influence the region — especially when it comes to exerting power over America.
DavisPoliticalReview
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