Comments by "Nicholas Conder" (@nicholasconder4703) on "Military History Visualized" channel.

9:20 I suspect there are 3 reasons why a lot of intact Russian equipment was left behind: 1) Logistics - lack of fuel and maintenance 2) Speed of the withdrawal - tanks and other equipment were considered too slow and were left behind, and 3) Poor training - troops not taught to destroy equipment rather than let it fall into enemy hands.
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I have heard that one thing the Churchill excelled at was climbing slopes. My father once told me that it could climb hillsides thought too steep for tanks. Is this correct?
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@uncletimo6059 No, this is quite true. If you read accounts of the retreat to Dunkirk, the Belgium Army suddenly surrendered, leaving a 30-mile gap in the Allied line. Knowing how he had drilled 3rd Division, Alanbrooke ordered Montgomery to take his division out of line and, with an open flank (i.e., no troops defending his flank while he was on the march), move his division at night and get the men into position to plug the gap before morning. He then needed to cover an extra 13 miles using ad hoc forces. You can read the account from this online source: https://www.wargamer.com/articles/general-montgomery-and-the-fighting-retreat-to-dunkirk-may-1940/ So Montgomery was a very good general. The problem is his ego and treatment of others created a lot of enemies and detractors who always seem to focus on his faults and failings while diminishing his very real successes. Do I hero worship him, no. But I do feel he gets the short end of the stick.
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7:30 One youtube channel host "The Enforcer" calculated back at the beginning of March 2022 that the Russian offensive would stall out because they lacked the logistical support to carry out the offensive. Matters were made worse by Ukraine deliberately attacking Russian supply convoys, destroying much needed fuel and other supplies. He also pointed out that Russia was tied to the railways for logistics, and that cutting the railways will severely impact Russia's ability to carry out offensives. This is different to how the US and NATO handles logistics, as they rely far more on truck transport on roads for bringing supplies long distances to the front. This analysis seems to have been borne out in the recent Kharkiv offensive. Once Kupyansk was threatened, the Russian rail supply to Izyum was cut and the Russians had no choice but to withdraw. The same thing will happen in the Troitske-Starobilsk railway gets cut - the Russians will be forced to withdraw from large sections of the Luhansk region.
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@88porpoise It would be nice to see some actual documentation on this, rather than anecdotal evidence. Do you know of any references that indicate this?
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@georgep.6118 Actually, this might help explain why Montgomery had issues when trying to encircle the Afrika Korps after El Alamein, at Falaise, and a few other times. Even at Homs he had to bully his divisional commander to keep up the pressure on Rommel to prevent him from re-establishing a defense line in the hill east of Tripoli. The battle plans that he proposed would have likely worked if he had been in command of German or American troops, but the training and doctrine of the British Army in Europe made it difficult to execute such maneuvers. It also goes a long way to explaining why, for the most part, the British Army was a bit "sluggish" on the advance. And, by 1945, care had to be taken because Britain was scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel.
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TIK does some very good videos explaining the economic reasons for Germany's invasion of Russia. In a nutshell, it boiled down to oil (Germany was consuming more oil than it could import) and food (again, import issues). In the Nazi's eyes, the only way to ensure Germany would be a self-sufficient, self-reliant state was by taking the resources in Russia. Given their fuel consumption issues, the Wehrmacht would have had even greater issues with fueling the panzers and Luftwaffe planes in 1942 than they did in 1941, hence the timing of Barbarossa.
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I think this video missed the mark. I think the real question is whether a hit by an 88 would be virtually guaranteed to kill any tank that was on the battlefield. Range and other factors will affect accuracy (as any former artillery man would admit), but what effect did an actual hit have on a given target? Could any of the Allied or Soviet tanks take an 88 hit and have a very good chance of surviving?
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