Comments by "Nicholas Conder" (@nicholasconder4703) on "Jake Broe" channel.

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  105. I can explain the F-16s in one word, TRAINING! My sister worked in an air force squadron, and she gave me a breakdown on how long it takes to train fighter pilots. It takes about 1 year to transition from one type of fighter to another, and half to a full year (at least) for operational flight training (i.e. air-to-air combat, ground support, evasion of missile defenses, etc.). Then you have to add extra time because of the language issues - pilots need to be able to instantly understand commands (plus read and instantly understand the electronic displays) and hit the right switches without hesitation or they're dead! Remember that NONE of the manuals or instructions for the F-16s are currently written in Ukrainian, so this too has to be done. Then there is maintenance. Good maintenance crews take 2-5 years to train, way longer than the pilots. Then you have to accurately translate all the ordinance, avionics, ari frame, engine and flight manuals. This is a herculean task. The pilot's flight manual for the F-16A is 400+ pages long (I know, I looked it up online and read portions of the manual as a PDF). Then you need the hardened facilities so a Russian Iskandar with cluster rounds doesn't take them out. One other likely reason for the delay in deployment is that for full effect Ukraine will need to activate at least 3-4 squadrons of F-16s almost simultaneously. This will give them enough fighters for flying standing air patrols, flying top cover AND launching ground attack SEAD missions to take out most of the remaining Russian air defenses. A mass of F-16s needs to be deployed all at once, not a few planes here and there. Using the latter option gives the Russians the ability to work out tactics to use against the F-16s. Flying 3-4 squadrons of F-16s for their first missions (especially if it is not announced right away) would give the Russians a nasty shock. It could deliver a lethal blow to their aviation, either through shooting down a large number of aircraft, by destroying the Russian pilot's morale, or both. Catching the Russians flat-footed and causing the Russian Air Force to have a "Donetsk Turkey Shoot" could cripple any chance Russia has to hold onto the territory they have stolen from Ukraine. I understand your frustration, I want to see them deployed in large numbers as well. However, training the pilots and maintenance crews, establishing well defended and protected air bases with hardened aircraft hangars and maintenance facilities, developing the logistical supply chains for keeping those planes in fuel (good NATO fuel, not the engine-destroying black-exhaust creating stuff used by Russia), ammo and spare parts takes TIME. And frustrating as it may be, we will have to wait patiently for the deployment of the F-16s. They are being delivered, and I trust Ukraine will decide wisely when to first use them.
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  119.  @paulmakinson1965  What you say is true, but it is nowhere as easy as one might think. NATO countries can send all the heavy equipment you like, but you have to train the crews how to use them, then train the junior officers (lieutenants and captains) how to make the most out of this equipment. Then the mid-range officers (majors and lieutenant colonels) need to learn how to coordinate the various types of weaponry at the brigade level, and the senor officers (colonels and generals) need to learn how to maneuver all these units to have the greatest impact on the battlefield. You then have to remember that it is not enough to have the equipment - HIMARS or Abrams tank make great paperweights if you don't have the ammunition, fuel and spare parts for them (the Russian's lack of these is the reason why Ukraine's farmers are becoming one of the best equipped armies in the world). You also need to have people trained in how to repair this equipment. Then you need a sufficient number of trucks with fuel of their own to get all of these supplies to the front lines, plus the people to load and unload the trucks, and officers who can keep track of what shipment goes where by the most efficient means and route. Don't forget that you also need to ship food and small arms ammunition as well, plus replacement combat gear, rifles, etc. Ukraine's army has expanded probably 10-fold from its pre-invasion size. All those people need proper training if Ukraine is going to stand a chance against Russia. Interestingly enough, not all the equipment that was listed as being sent to Ukraine has been seen in videos. I suspect that some has been held back to create an armored fighting force for major offensives. It will be up to the generals to decide when they think they have sufficient forces to launch said counter-attack, and where they will attack. Ideally, they will want to conceal any buildup of forces until the last couple of hours before any offensive starts to have tactical and strategic surprise over the Russians.
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  124.  @KimYoungUn69  The complaint about ATACMS is somewhat justified, although the US wanted its replacement available in case they needed to use them against China. The complaint about F-16s is NOT justified, because it takes AT LEAST 6 months to a year for a trained combat pilot to transition from one aircraft type to another. And that is IF English is their first language. The fact that they Ukrainians will be receiving F-16s by December indicates they have been covertly training since last year. Don't forget that all the training manuals have to be translated (the flying manual for the F-16 is over 500 pages long - I looked it up online). Then the maintenance crews have to trained, and all their manuals (air frame, electronics, avionics, engine, weapons, etc.) have to accurately translated as well. This training then has to be sandwiched in amongst all your regular training and flight checks for your own pilots. All this has to be done properly and thoroughly, otherwise we would see the Ukrainian Air Force flying into the ground or losing aircraft due to poor maintenance on a more regular basis than the Russian Air Force is currently doing. It is NOT an easy task, but this is (understandably) not well known or understood by people who have no contact with modern air forces. It is why, if you watch things carefully, you will see it has taken YEARS for the US Air Force to transition from F-16s, F-18s and other fighters to the F-35 once production got underway. Same problem minus the language issue.
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  250. Nice to see you on "The Enforcer" last night. Glad you decided to sit in on the live stream. Last year in February I had my doubts that Russia would invade Ukraine, mostly because I didn't think Putin was THAT STUPID! Obviously, one year of war has proven that Putin IS that stupid. Having watched shows like "The Caspian Report" and "Good Times Bad Times" I have come to the conclusion that Putin felt he HAD TO take Ukraine for multiple reasons, mostly economic with some imperialistic geopolitics thrown in for good measure. I think Putin has always dreamed of recreating an imperial Russia that occupies the same borders as the USSR, or perhaps even including the Slavic Warsaw Pact nations as well. He has been working towards this by fostering discontent, infiltrating agents to sow misinformation and distrust, and propping up puppets in places like Belarus and Ukraine. Everything was going fairly well, in spite of the westward leanings of Belarus and Ukraine, because he had corrupt pro-Russian rulers in both places (Lukashenko and Yanukovych). All the plans for a gradual takeover of Ukraine then flew out the window when large oil and gas reserves were discovered in Ukraine in 2012. Suddenly there was another country right next door with enormous hydrocarbon reserves that could sell these products to the EU that Putin did not directly control. Development of these reserves would do two things: 1) create a large dent in Russia's oil and gas revenues, threatening the Russian economy, and 2) undercut the political leverage that Putin figured he was obtaining by getting the EU hooked on Russian oil and gas supplies. Also, gaining these reserves would mean Russia would have access to hydrocarbons that were easier and cheaper to extract than their own reserves. At this point Putin may have panicked, especially because Ukraine was developing closer ties to the EU. He put pressure on Yanukovych to drop association with the EU, only to have the Euromaidan Revolution throw his puppet out of power. Now Putin really panicked, and went all in to gain control of Crimea and Donbass (where the bulk of these reserves are located). Unfortunately for Putin, he didn't have any real war plans concocted, and the operation appears to have been more improvised than planned. However, because Ukraine was still in turmoil politically and militarily, the insurgents were able to seize Donbass and the Russian special forces captured Crimea. Although Ukraine was able to stabilize the situation, they could not effectively counter it, especially because of the lukewarm reaction of Europe and, to a certain extent, the US. However, this did not resolve Putin's problem. He now sat on top of what he considered the biggest threat to Russia's economic future, but he had a major problem. In the course of their planning Putin and his generals had overlooked something that threatened to undermine their invasion of Crimea, the North Crimea Canal. As you probably know, this canal runs from the Dnipro River from just behind the Nova Khakovka Dam to reservoirs and irrigation ditches in Crimea. According to Wikipedia, "A 2015 study found that the canal had been providing 85% of Crimea's water ... 72% went to agriculture and 10% to industry, while water for drinking and other public uses made up 18%." Well, after Russia stole Crimea, the Ukrainians blocked this canal, leading to severe water shortages in the region. Putin went ahead and built up the military infrastructure so Russia could dominate the northern Black Sea Region, only to realize that everything would turn to naught because there was insufficient water. Ukraine had Russia over a barrel, a water barrel. Between 2014 and 2022, even with severe water rationing, the reservoir capacities in Crimea went from 100% to just 7% in January 2022. All attempts to create work-arounds for this problem failed. So Putin decided he must secure the water supply for Crimea from Ukraine, and to prevent this from happening again, install a puppet regime in Kyiv or just annex the country. This may also explain why he made a big fuss about annexing those regions back into Russia. Besides, I suspect part of the reason for this invasion in because Ukraine has had the temerity to stand up to Putin for 8 years. It must hurt his psychopathic ego.
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  311. Based on the videos I saw relating to the first two weeks of this war on "The Enforcer" youtube channel, Russia's plan was to infiltrate special forces units into Kyiv and Kharkiv, take over key areas of these cities, kill or incapacitate the government and army command, and let the army roll in. The US was able to warn Ukraine about some parts of the plan, so Ukraine was able to put blocking units in strategic locations and blow bridges along main routes into these cities to slow or halt the Russian advance. Meanwhile, militia and regular units of the Ukrainian Army tracked down and eliminated the infiltrators in both Kyiv and Kharkiv. One battle took place a School #134 in Kharkiv (there is a video out on this battle that is very interesting if you can find it), where a Russian special forces unit tried to block the main route used for logistics to the front line. The school had been prepped with weapons and ammo before the Russians arrived. A second battle, that lasted several days, took place at the Kyiv Zoo. There is no direct video of this as far as I know, but there were definitely firefights in places in Kyiv during the first few nights of the war. It was the ability of Ukraine to block both the military advance and destroy the infiltrators before they could do any harm that saved Ukraine from being overrun by Russia. But as the Duke of Wellington said after the Battle of Waterloo, "It has been a damned nice thing — the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life."
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  490. Jake, I disagree. One of the biggest hurdles faced with supplying weapons to Ukraine is training. It isn't just training the crews of the tanks, HIMARS and AFVs how to use their equipment, but more importantly training the officers on how to coordinate all those moving parts to form a cohesive offensive package - a combined arms army. Remember that Ukraine has increased its army at least 5-fold. This means that at least 5 times the number of troops have to be trained on NATO equipment under NATO trainers. This is no mall task. Think of your old high school, and in the midst of your school year the teachers are suddenly called upon to organize classes for foreign students who have a marginal understanding, if any, of English. However, you have to use the same classrooms and gym, but they can't upset your school's class schedule too much, while attending school during the standard school day. Now add to this that Ukraine also now needs at least 5 times the officers to lead those troops into battle and coordinate all their activities properly. In NATO countries this is taken as a given, because our officer corps has been doing this for decades. Add to this the fact that Ukraine is used to Soviet doctrine, so now they are suddenly learning a whole new way of waging war. Think how much trouble you would have organizing the logistics, training and equipping of entirely new units. For a comparison on how difficult this is the best comparison is the dilemma faced by the US back in 1941-1942. The US Army had rapidly expanded, and green troops were sent into initial operations like Torch and the Battle of Kasserine Pass with a new officer corps. In both cases, especially the latter, the operations were near fiascos, even with the regular army divisions and a pre-war officer corps taking part. Ukraine's problems are even worse, because they haven't had the extra year to train officers. So I would disagree with John Sweeney. The real issues are bottlenecks caused by logistics and training. The equipment is being sent as soon as crews are available, but they cannot be sent before the training is complete. Otherwise all you do is present Russia with a wonderful target-rich environment of parked NATO vehicles and equipment.
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