Comments by "Nicholas Conder" (@nicholasconder4703) on "Professor Gerdes Explains 🇺🇦 " channel.

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  4. One thing I did to calculate the possible Russian death toll was to take the estimates of the total number of Russian troops who were sent into Ukraine, and subtracted the number currently estimated to be fighting in Ukraine. Given that Russia was completely incapable of really countering either the Wagner mutiny, the Freedom of Russia forays into Russia, and the fact that border troops from the China border are now reported in Ukraine, I came up with this approximation: Initial Russian forces Feb. 24: 280,000 Wagner Forces: about 10-20,000 DPR and LNR Forces: about 60,000 Spring 2022 recruitment: 134,500 Mobilization: 300,000 Fall 2022 recruitment: 120,000 Kaliningrad garrison: 10,000 Far East Units: 10,000-20,000 So, adding these figures together we get a minimum of 924,000 Russian soldiers have served in Ukraine to date. We might be able to add another 60K LPR and DPR press-ganged soldiers and 30K prisoners fighting for Wagner and the Russian MOD, plus perhaps other regular Russian units from other regions. Now, I may have this wrong, but from what I recall from one online program, the Russian MOD currently have the following troop strengths in Ukraine: Luhansk Front: 150,000 Donetsk/Bakhmut Front: 50-100,000 Zaporizhzhia Front: 150,000 Kherson Front: 50,000 This gives us a total of 450,000 troops, more or less. So, where are the remaining 500,000 Russian troops, given that we have evidence that there has been no leave or rotation of units, and no reserves in Russia itself? The numbers suggest that Russia has suffered at least 500K casualties, of which 150,000 are KIA and a further 300-350,000 WIA (using WW2 ratios of killed to wounded). And given that I have lowballed some of my figures, that Russia has been tossing construction workers into the front lines and cleverly concealing recruitment drives, this could be much higher.
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  11. I somewhat disagree with your analysis. What you say about Putin being in an echo chamber that is reflecting what he thinks and wants to hear is true, but it is only part of the picture. It only provides the reason why he felt he could pull it off. Personally, I think the reasons WHY he invaded Ukraine are as follows: 1) Putin has delusions of grandeur, and wants to recreate the Russian Empire, much as Napoleon III and Charles de Gaulle dreamt of recreating the French Empire. 2) Geopolitical, in that to achieve this dream he needs the strategic position that Crimea gives him. 3) Geopolitical, in that when Crimea was stolen from Ukraine in 2014, Ukraine blocked the North Crimea Canal and deprived the Crimean Peninsula of 85% of its water for all uses (potable, industrial and agricultural). Water reservoirs were, by February 2022, at 7% capacity, meaning most people would have had to evacuate Crimea. All of Putin's dreams would have gone down a proverbial toilet. So he attacked Ukraine to secure the water supply for Crimea. Of course that was messed up by Russia's ham-fisted handling of the Nova Khakovka Dam, so now the clock is once again ticking on Crimea. 4) Economic, in that Crimea and Donbass potentially have large reserves of natural gas and oil that Russia needs. Russia may have large petroleum reserves, but they are getting expensive to extract and ship, while Ukraine's are relatively easy to tap in comparison. 5) Economic again, but this time a Ukraine that is part of the EU could undercut Russian hydrocarbon exports, reducing their income from trading partners in the EU. So, taking Ukraine removes this threat to Russian markets (at least it did until the EU reduced dependence on Russian oil and gas). 6) Geopolitical. I suspect that Putin dreamed of getting the EU over a figurative barrel with dependence on Russian oil and gas (at least he did until the EU reduced dependence on Russian oil and gas). 7) And finally, Ukraine upset Russia's long term plans for the region by throwing out Russia's puppet and holding free elections. The invasion of both Crimea and Donbass strike me as being improvised affairs that only worked in 2014 because Ukraine was in disarray politically and militarily following the Euromaidan.
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  25. Professor, something that speaks against Ukraine doing this is that they will lose the ability to navigate up and down the reservoir and strike wherever they want. It also cancels their gains downstream of the dam. However, I don't think Russia did it either. Blowing this dam will likely result in the draining of the North Crimea Canal. This canal supplies around 85% of the water used in Crimea for human consumption, industry, and agriculture. It would be like chopping off your own leg to threaten someone. It makes no real sense. Losing this canal means that in 8 years Russia will have to move the bulk of the population and military forces out of the Crimea and turning it back into a backwater Region. It would be the same as Putin eliminating one of his primary war aims, because he has little chance now to hold onto Crimea with any meaningful way. Looking at the water levels in the video, I think the most likely scenario is that the Russians didn't open the floodgates, or didn't allow the engineers to open the sluices, to reduce the water levels in the lake behind the dam. Either the dam was overtopped, or suffered a structural collapse due to the excessive amount of water exceeding the design limits of the dam. Considering the Russians blocked the primary sluice gate with earth and rubble so they could continue resupplying their troops in Kherson last fall, I suspect they had no way to empty the reservoir of excess water. So, it is a Russian-caused disaster, caused more by their own stupidity and thoughtlessness than direct action.
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  37. I suspect that Prigozhin probably caught wind of the Kremlin wanting to arrest him. Prigozhin was probably also in contact with other disaffected members of the military and oligarchy. So, I think this was in the works for a while. It is likely, in this scenario, that Prigozhin caught wind through his contacts that Shoigu and Putin were planning to arrest him with the usual made up charges. So he was forced to act a bit earlier than he planned. The Wagner Group staged the attack to give themselves justification. Reasons I think this: 1) The damage from the "attack" looked far too small and concentrated for it to be a major attack killing hundreds of Wagner soldiers (a few scorched trees and a fire in a trench, I mean really?). There were no impact craters. No buildings were seen to be hit either. So I think this is a "false flag" by Prigozhin. 2) Wagner family members received calls from their men that they might not see them again, 24 hours before this "attack" as far as I can tell. 3) The FSB surrounded the Wagner compound near Moscow almost as soon as Prigozhin made his initial broadcast. This is way too fast a reaction time for the FSB, unless they were already planning to do it. 4) The Wagner forces were already on the road and moving to Rostov and Moscow almost as soon as the broadcast was made, if not sooner. The speed of this reaction, and the fact the tanks were already loaded onto flatbeds suggests it was pre-planned. So basically, I think that Prigozhin and the Kremlin were both plotting against each other. What we are seeing is the result of Prigozhin and Wagner beating Putin and Shoigu to the punch.
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