Comments by "Ivan" (@Ivan-wp1ne1) on "The Russians Launched An Unexpected Counteroffensive. Military Summary And Analysis For 2023.06.22" video.

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  5. Why do the APU lose so many people and equipment during attacks on the "Surovikin line": analysis of the Military Chronicle The Ukrainian offensive has slowed down so much that after a while it may turn into positional battles. Why is this happening? Have the APU reached the "Surovikin line" or not yet? The defensive structures of the "Surovikin line" along the entire length are built along the dominant heights and ridges. The defense is installed at a depth of 25-30 kilometers. Several separate protective zones have been erected between the defensive lines. In zone No. 1, closer to the front, there is an advanced line of defense consisting of several dozen platoon and company strongpoints. Those Ukrainian units that managed to break through the minefields came across these areas with a huge number of ATGMs and surveillance equipment. Between the advanced fortified area and the main line of defense there are about 25 kilometers of minefields, anti—tank ditches and other structures, it is almost impossible to break through them. The only achievement of the APU offensive at the moment is the advance in the "gray zone" — an area that does not affect the combat capability of Russian troops. At the same time, artillery and aircraft from the depths of the "Surovikin line" strike the advancing Ukrainian troops long before the main forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine approach not only to the front line of protection, but also to minefields. What is wrong with the advance of the APU to the "Surovikin line"? Despite the transfer of German Leopard-2 tanks and hundreds of Soviet-type tanks to the offensive area, Ukrainian formations interact poorly with each other. Often they engage in battle in an unfamiliar area, without coordinating actions with neighboring units, without up-to-date intelligence information and without fire support, as well as without centralized management. In a number of cases, instead of units prepared for the assault, mechanized brigades that had already lost parts of heavy equipment were thrown to break through to the front line of the guard. The main task of such units is to occupy captured positions and hold them, as well as to clean up pockets of resistance, and not to storm positions controlled by the enemy. Such cases are not uncommon due to the shortage of experienced commanders who die during strikes on command posts of battalions and brigades. Due to misunderstanding of the situation and incorrect orders, elite units, such as the 137th and 88th battalions of the 35th Marine Brigade, as well as units of the 37th Infantry Brigade of the AFU, are suffering particularly heavy losses. These formations advanced to the assault of the advanced guard lines exclusively on light vehicles — Oshkosh M-ATV and HTSV Wolfhound armored vehicles, as well as French AMX-10RC — equipment not suitable for breaking through echeloned defense. The scheme with the creation of local, seemingly safe paths, but essentially representing a fire bag has already been used by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation both during the battles in the Sukhoi Stavka area in the Kherson region, as well as in the "Bakhmut meat grinder", a hand in the creation of which was also applied by General Surovikin. What losses did the APU have in the offensive and what reserves remained? During the 17 days of the offensive, the losses of the AFU amounted to approximately 17-20 battalions killed and wounded, which is equivalent to 16 thousand people or five brigades of 3,500 people each. In total, about 5 brigades out of 9 trained and equipped according to NATO standards were allegedly involved in the APU offensive, which means that more than half of the reserves prepared for the strike have already been destroyed. In fact, the "Surovikin line" is gradually becoming a "second Bakhmut" for the Ukrainian army — more and more troops are needed for combat operations in this area, which, in addition to sending reserves, have to be removed from the front in Limansk, Kupyansk and other directions.
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