Comments by "ODDBALL SOK" (@oddballsok) on "TIKhistory"
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I get the point you are making (not being an economic specialist..or, more importantly , not interested in these subjects..yuch)..but all the hammering on socialism and socialists, make you seem the capitalists..and especially the UNREGULATED capitalists seem to be the archangels for humanity.
I am sure if the capitalists can do whatever they like< then children would still be working from the age of 10, we would have 7 or 6 days workweek of 12 hours a day, and all men would be laid off by the time they reach 35 becoz the capitalists will find more cheaper and more hard working laborers elsewehere in ever desolate places..
Moderate and competent regulation is the answer..but as in all isms, once a force gets the upper hand, there is no stopping it gaining more and more control over society.
Power corrupts, whether it is socialism, communism, capitalism... it is a human thing..
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In addition to the shortsighted hindsighting blame on Gavin, 82nd, 508th; Getting the Nijmegen main bridge LAST makes sense if you consider this; The planners expected NO germans at the betuwe Island. The planners DID learn that SS corps was at Arnhem before the 17th but EXPECTED the SS to be HELD up IN Arnhem (by the 3 british columns arriving at the north ramp and thus TIGHTLY secure the ramp so that not even a tank or halftrack (as they would!) could pass).
At Nijmegen, there was LITTLE defense expected, but the planners DID expect german reinforcements coming straight from GERMANY; Kleve..thus THROUGH the Reichswald, and THUS through Groesbeek.
Thus Gavin HAD TO MAKE SECURE his LZ and defenses against strong enemy troops coming from THE EAST.
All the bridges on his west could be taken AT ANY STAGE as long as there weren't SS troops getting FROM Arnhem to Nijmegen (and even so they were supposed to be battle fatigued..).
As the smaller bridges at Grave and Mook could be EASILY blown up (and were already prepared..this info must be known by dutch resistance and thus allied intelligence), it was MORE IMPORTANT to get those IMMEDIATELY and the Nijmegen bridge last (Nijmegen bridge was NOT prepared for explosives, especially when Model would not have it!).
Decisions to assembly, organise and march to hither or tither are done BEFORE the jump. So naturally the movements of the 508th are explained with the above assessment in mind.
Unfortunately, it TURNS OUT (and that information only slowly filters through the ranks) , that the SS WERE able to move a stream of armoured vehicles PAST FROST to NIjmegen, and more importantly, more SS troops were able to get FERRIED
over in a CONSTANT STREAM via the pannerden ferry.
And THAT was the killer in the MarketGarden project; the planners simply did not think of possibilities for the germans to insert troops inbetween Arnhem and Nijmegen.
Had the planners dropped paratroops on the island (near Elst) on 17th sept than THAT would have been the key of success; the whole "island" would be (more or less) a secure supply LZ for the british and the 82nd if need be. And any attempt to ferry over german troops along the pannerdencanal would be sighted, harrassed and finally stopped by troops and called in airsupport (if radios would work)).
If one is a simpleton (John Burns), you may even blame FROST for letting Graebner (and kampfgruppe Henk!) PASS by his defense positions at the Arnhem north ramp to get to Nijmegen which eventually would prove to be too strong for the first men of 508th arriving at the Nijmegen ramp.
But in reality it is the planners to blame...
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0:48...it is not "just" bending a corner and go after the Ruhr..it is find your allied Armies (those under Montgomery and not Bradley to be more exact!) in a lucrative unobstructed position to fan out in all directions into nazi germany; the manufacturing heart the Ruhr, but also straight towards the east to Berlin, and straight towards the North Hamburg/Denmark...ALL of it would be open for...Monty !
Locking up german (secondary) troops in Holland is only a small advantage. There never was serious thought of allied armoured fights/progress into Holland (too many obstructing waterways, too many civilians, no strategic bonus).
But by going towards the Zuiderzee alone, there won't be any improvement in clearing Walcheren and the Schelde for Antwerp or getting Rotterdam harbour.
Germans were still there, demolitions were still there, bunkers and guns were still there.
There is or was no need for further "support" from germany. (But it could have lead to a psychological effect that german troops other than the absolute necessary (demolition engineers) would have pulled away over the Afsluitdyk...but that takes some time, and would not be noticed in Walcheren until months later)
The only important "support" that would be cut off is that of NEW V2 rockets that were sent to The Hague area and fired on London. But later it showed that the Germans fired V2 from Friesland (near Leeuwarden) in the North of Netherlands.
Still, RAF bombardments of V2 sites were effective enough, so there was no imperative need to adjust a landbased thrust towards potential V2 launching sites. Besides V2s could still be moved over Friesland over the Afsluitdyke past Amsterdam to Den Haag still with a closed Zuiderzee end at Arnhem..
No, if the allied wanted a big sea port asap, then Market Garden was a waste of time, effort, materials and casualties. Matter of fact was that clearing Schelde project was not planned, and developed until AFTER market garden failure.
Then it "suddenly" dawned upon them that for any further push (over a broad front) they'll need a big port closer by.
And Antwerp was thought to be liberated and functional, but its approach proved to be dangerous.
Market Garden and the north salliant thrust was simply a too good to let go opportunity for Monty personally based on the reports of German panic in the west. Any negative comment or resistance report or recon photo was dismissed because the benefits of a success were too great.
I don't blame Monty and the other planners for looking away from a single recon photo of "a" tank, of "a" report of SS in the area (that were hammered and on the run before and thus needed refitting and rest), on splitting the drops over three days; speed in starting the project was of the essence, the para brigades were sitting idle in UK ; it was a luxury for Monty and he knew it.
To NOT use all that reserve and missing out on a great opportunity would be wrong.
It was a gamble, the allies (Ike included) lost, and the HQ carried on with the normal war progress.
But this time Bradley and Patton claimed most of all further resources.
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check this critique on Poulussen book:
http://www.go2war2.nl/artikel/2411/Lost-at-Nijmegen.htm
quote translated:
With "Lost at Nijmegen" author R.G. Poulussen especially revived the discussion about the developments in Nijmegen and he closely monitors the first 24 hours of the fighting in and around Nijmegen. The conclusions go far for the sources and the burden of proof. With the same simplicity, a completely different conclusion can be drawn from the text of the booklet. The 508th PIR had all the freedom and possibility to undertake an attack on the Waal Bridge. This also happened in the first 24 hours and twice. Both attacks were rejected by the Germans. Could they have done more? Possibly, but the source information in the book is not convincing enough. That the late taking of the Waal Bridge had an effect on the development of Market Garden is actually an open door. But that precisely this delay was crucial for Market Garden is also not convincingly demonstrated in the book. With equal ease, other delays in *Market Garden can be identified as just as crucial*.
(!!!!!!!)
It is praising the author that he is trying to revive the debate around Market Garden 'new' life with this work. His work can contribute to the overall picture of Market Garden. His conclusions go too far, however, to be able to determine on the basis of the contents of the book. The
book lacks a good source account for this (an indication of the source
is not given, it is only from the notes that some sources have been
used) and it is mainly limited in its sources. By quoting other primary sources, a *completely different picture can be outlined*. It is precisely these other sources that have not or hardly been used. This involves sources of non-American origin that can explain the German and British positions in their entirety. The book does not reveal the positions and numbers of British troops that entered Nijmegen. Nor is it supported with sources which German troops were present in
the Betuwe, in Nijmegen and the Reichswald or could be transported there
quickly.
This
does not mean that the author would be wrong in his conclusions, but
that the book gives me insufficient sources, say proof, to support the
conclusions.
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*****
aha..and there you make an assumption you can't make.
The success of shooting up Graebner men on the Arnhem north ramp in my opinion can't be copied over the south ramp of Nijmegen.
1) Arnhem had houses nearby and a bridge sentry house ..nijmegen didn't; a lot more difficult to defend in concealment.
2) Graebner was a fool..oh no, that is depicted in the movie..experienced Graebner REALISing the danger of concealed enemy infantry positions in the houses knew you can't STOP in front of them, and could not do harm with MGfire from further on the bridge (and being exposed to possible 6 pdr guns elsewhere along the Arnhem north banks or allied airplanes) decided to RACE past them and end deeper in arnhem to join up with the other SS troops.... unfortunately the halftrack drivers had no clear view on the bridge road, had difficulty avoiding mines, looking out for them means EXPOSING your body up from the halftracks, smoke, etc..and when one stopped , the rest got stuck as well, with clear view from the brit paras ON TOP of them, then it was prize shooting.
The same thing would be more difficult to achieve for 82nd on Nijmegen (and that would have to be EARLIER on the day than Frost did his trick on Arnhem..).
Earlier means less prepared, less troops in position, less material brought in , less mines...even Frost let the 1st Graebner recon group pass by without firing shots....obviously!
There is a difference between ARRIVING at a position and having CLEARED or PREPARED or SECURED a position
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The 508th was not able to overcome the garrison and flak teams on the bridge, AND move over many (??) 6pdrs in Lent, dig trenches and make a sound "cordon" , meanwhile fending off SS infantry and halftracks..in the space of couple of hours on the 17th sept.
Let alone stave off the further reinforcements on the 18th.
You MIGHT want to fantasise over what if ALL the 82nd troops that were at Groesbeek heights had moved to >Nijmegen and ABANDONED the LZs for the drops of 18th (moved to 19th) september:
Well, maybe yes, gavin would have the Nijmegen bridge....for ONE day.
The ragtag piecemeal troops form the reichswald WOULD have overrun the LZ , hence the next drops would be shot at /obliterated, totally LOST.
But Gavin would be holding the Nijmegen center and south ramp.
Fine. The XXXcrps arrives neatly from the SW.
The NORTH ramp however he would NOT be able to hold, or control.
Too much SS poured in Elst and maybe as close as Lent from the Pannerden ferry (Just a ridiculous 7 km = 5 mile distance!! straight EAST) with armoured cars, stugs, 88s and finally Tigers.
Any concentration of Sherman tanks over the bridge would be knocked out (from distance 88s , 75 At, Artillery barrages, Panzerfausten in Lent, and finally a tiger tank) when sighted.
Sighted on the bridge, sighted going out of Lent on the dykes...all-the-time.
XXX would or could clear out Lent, Elst, the island and Driel, but that would take MANY DAYS.
And even so, a couple of Shermans arriving at the south ramp of Arnhem ramp would NOT be able to support Frosts men. And frosts men would not be able to support the shermans if trying to run OVER the Arnhem bridge (already full with rubble).
The perimeter around the Arnhem north ramp was already so small, it had no effective meaning for the original plan. The Arnhem center was full of SS, tanks, heavy tanks, artillery screen, Tigers; there is NO way that XXXcrps could DO anything.
In fact, if the XXXcrps were so supernatural, they would have done so on the 21st, 22nd or 23d..after all, XXXcrps is brimming with tanks, and what did the germans have in Arnhem to stop them ??
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John, it is actually YOU who put all assumptive blame on Gavin without having prove and morever without DELVING into arguments to support or disprove yourself.
I started out in thinking, that it can't be so simple as you brits (TK included) portray it.
A gut feeling (and I am dutch, no particular yankee lover, nor brits affectionado..I'd like to squash BS arguments).
And lo and behold, gradually I read more (Try It never snows in september of Kershaw..OH ? YOU CLAIM YOU HAVE READ IT ?) on books and websites, find out about EXACT times per day that this or that report or action or sighting took place. And based on that information anyone sane must come to a different conclusion than you guys do.
A group of 508th of 82nd DID attempt in 17th evening to take the bridge . Yes much later than 15.00 hrs when they landed and started taking their first objectives (prepare roadblocks)..but Gavin must have reminded them or Lindquist in a epiphany suddenly remembered ?.
But the german garrison at the bridge would have been SUFFICIENT to defend against a mere 50 men of 508th that could be spared at the 17th eve or afternoon.(There were A LOT of tasks to be acquired by the 82nd !!!).
EVEN IF the 50 bold men had displaced the garrison (say loss of 10 men ?), then they would be NO MATCH for the reinforcements that came from north later the afternoon 17th.
Prove "at 20.30 hrs the 508 tried to attack Nijmegen but were REPULSED).
MORE and MORE germans and SS poured in and that WHOLE Kampfgruppe managed to do an attack FROM Nijmegen to the LZS of 508th and PUSHED that sector AWAY.
So if ZE germans are CAPABLE of doing THAT on the 18th morning, how would the 508th with 40 men be able to keep them from retaking the nijmegen bridge IF they had installed themselves on the bridge (in houses? in ruins ?NO , there is NOTHING to gain cover in a 150 m radius around the ramps!!!)
Instead of frolicking over Gavin you should ask yourself WHY isn't there a paradrop or glider drop planned on the Betuwe Island in the first place ??
Any landed troop there has the advantage to help take the bridge ramps of BOTH Arnhem and NIjmegen.
Reserves could be sent NORTh AND SOUTH depending on the battle situations. (and added bonus : stop german reinforcements coming from the pannerden ferry..perhaps)
It is INCREDIBLE that that did not take place.
That location was the key for success,
The brits gliders (jeeps, carriers, AT) should have landed near Elst and a few coup d etat parachuted paras could have landed in the Arnhem park at the north ramp and Nijmegen hunnerpark ..et voila..the few 20 mm flak guns would perhaps hit a couple of dakotas but place a good concentrated number on that and the job would have had a better probability of succes.
AndWHO were the ones that denied the planes to get too close to the bridges ??
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Finally a detailed book! Poulessen? I have to look out for it, appears to have many fine detailed reports.
Though it specifies more precise where the miscommunications and inefficient time usage was about, it shows simply more of the habitual "cock-ups" that happen in war. And those happened with all the other battalions as well.
In the end , the few hours delay and the too few men deployed didnot matter; (1) were there no SS reinforcements (few of them came via the Arnhem bridge when FROST WAS ALREADY THERE but let them pass) then the one battalion could still take the bridge.
(2) were there so many SS coming over the Nijmegen bridge north side (that they were too much to be attacked as historical on 17th and even attacked on 18th) then no one or two or three US battalions would hold out at Nijmegen ramps for two days (maybe one day, and only the city buildings NEAR the south ramp, but NOT the northh ramp at Lent).
It takes some time (couple of HOURS) to dig in, and especially set up the few 6 pdr guns...if they were able to deploy them there in short time (508th PIR had ATs?).
And even IF 50% of first drop 82nd had been moved on Nijmegen north and south ramps...WHERE would the accumulated SS troops in Lent be doing all the time on 17-18-19-20 sept ?
Let's assume for a fact that the 82nd would even hold the LENT side:
Then the SS would surely make a SCREEN around it...few STUGS would be deployed (via Pannerden or even past Frosts men as they didNOT hold the Arnhem ramp..only a few HOUSES around the ramp)..the SS artillery would hammer the unprotected 82nd until 30crps arrival.
But MOST SURELY the excess SS would be turned on Frost 's men and they would have been pushed out days EARLIER.
So that when the 30crps FINALLY arrived in Nijmegen 19th sept they would find a thick cordon in/around Lent, a strong german artillery ..and an Arnhem that would be totally CLEAR of british airborne troops.
The Polish that would land later at Driel would ve been cleared up even faster.
Not even a chance for a "bridge head" in Oosterbeek for Urquhart.
As for the 30crps shermans that are idle;
The Guards Armoured's Coldstream Guards Group still was needed as a reserve for the Airborne division.
What does this mean ? as a RESERVE ? As in drinking tea ? as in doing nothing ? as in hanging around in the back waiting for further notice and developments ? as in drinking tea?
This left but two armoured groups to go across the Waal. Even those did not make it until next day, D plus 4,
21 September, primarily because of diehard German defenders who had to be ferreted out from the superstructure and bridge underpinnings."
Superstructure of a bridge ? That is the metal works - The span ! That is maybe a few snipers or pioneers laying charges (like in the movie BtF..which witnesses told us was fake....)
Bridge underpinnings ? That is indeed the location to set charges; pioneers; infantry thus.
Why is that so hard to deal with ?
Again proof that yet ANOTHER unit is SLOW and NOT AGILE enough to fight to the MAX.
Hence it is very hypocrite to lay the blame of the WHOLE MG project on just the men of Gavin.
(I was at the "celebrations" in Arnhem and Nijmegen last week..on the matter I only got to talk to elder guides and museum historians and they all have the same answer that the project failed on many accounts, and most of it in the planning...but one could not blame a single unit or person for it..).
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I haven't got the exact hours , but I find thison Frundsberg alone.
:
18 September, 1944: Kampfgruppe "Frundsberg" is blocked from crossing
the Arnhem Bridge and begins to ferry personnel and equipment across the
Pannerdern Canal (fyi Pannerden is CLOSER to Nijmegen Waal river than Arnhem Rhine river!!). Components of Kampfrguppe "Frundsberg" include 4
Panzer Mk Ivs, Kampfrgruppe "Reinhold", Kampfgruppe "Euling", and
Kampfgruppe "Henke".
19 September, 1944: British XXX Corps reaches Nijmegen.
20 September, 1944: Division defending positions along the Waal River,
Nijmegen; Kampfrguppe "Hanke" captures Fort Hof Van Holland. At 1500,
2nd battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (US 82nd Airborne Division)
begins amphibious assault crossing of the Waal River, and their attack on
Hunner Park is repulsed by Kampfgruppe "Euling". British Grenadier Guards
clear Fort Valkhof of elements of Kampfgruppe "Euling" and cross the Waal
River between 1800 and 1900 as elements of Kampfgruppe "Frundsberg"
withdraw from Nijmegen and ready for the defense of Arnhem.
As the nijmegen bridge was not assaulted or taken historically on 18 sept , there obviously was no need or order for any german (ragtag) reinforcement to be directed to Nijmegen.
HAD the 82nd taken positions on the Nijmegen bridge on 17th then OBVIOUSLY the germans somewhere somehow would have sped things up in the direction of Nijmegen.
Reserves from where I hear you ask?: well from the ferried over elements ON THE 18Th september.
Or do you REALLY think those guys and 4 tanks (and later the 2 Tigers) just HANG around in Pannerden and wait 48 HOURS until ALL the men and ALL 4 tanks are ferried over IF THE SITUATION would be dire at Nijmegen bridge ?
You guys make the mistake(that allied commanders did all the time) that once a situation is cast in stone and you change one vital element you expect the germans/oponents to NOT react or NOT change their decisions and orders ?
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*****
What is the point ?
Let's assume the photo of Brian (and listed in Bridge Too Far book (print of 1980ies) was a fake.
1) if coming "from Germany" is the statement, it is unimportant; German border is only few miles away...so near enough.
2) you claim liberally there is no proof, but you also present no proof of WHERE they were EXACTLY .
3) You canNOT disprove the obvious conclusion or assumption (if you like) that the SS troops more , or less ? had troops placed and refitted in , near Deelen airfield.
Now Deelen was seen as pretty important. By the german HQ, by the allies as well.
The most logical location for at least quite a substantial concentration of troops would be Deelen.
That is pretty immediate near Arnhem.
As for the other assumption you make; brits paras did not meet tanks on day 1"therefore" there were no tanks in Arnhem..consider this:
Day 1 was only half a day.
The first info germans COULD have there were paras IN ARNHEM was....? after about 18:00 hrs. Dusktime.
Up and until then it is thought that ordinary infantry is capable of pushing para infantry out of houses. Sending in "a tank" in streets, between houses, to clear infantry, at night time...is NOT a sound order.
So OBVIOUSLY even if tanks/stugs were at the edge of Arnhem, they would not get the order to ENTER and approach the bridge ramp.
The germans TOO had a code of "honour" not to destroy (occupied, "befriended") civilian property if it was NOT necessary!
So you may state correct facts, but you make incorrect conclusions.
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in addition to the shortsighted hindsighting blame on Gavin, 82nd, 508th;
Getting the Nijmegen main bridge LAST makes sense if you consider this;
The planners expected NO germans at the betuwe Island. The planners DID
learn that SS corps was at Arnhem but EXPECTED the SS to be HELD up IN
Arnhem (by the 3 british columns arriving at the north ramp and thus TIGHTLY secure the ramp so that not even a tank or halftrack (as they would!) could pass).
At Nijmegen, there was LITTLE defense expected, but the planners DID expect german reinforcements coming straight from
GERMANY; Kleve..thus THROUGH the Reichswald, and THUS through Groesbeek.
Thus Gavin HAD TO MAKE SECURE his LZ and defenses against strong enemy troops coming from the east.
All the bridges on his west could be taken AT ANY STAGE as long as there weren't SS troops getting FROM Arnhem to Nijmegen.
As the smaller bridges at Grave and Mook could be EASILY blown up, it was MORE IMPORTANT to get those IMMEDIATELY and the Nijmegen bridge last.
Decisions to assembly, organise and march to hither or tither are done BEFORE the jump. So naturally the movements of the 508th are explained with the above assessment in mind.
Unfortunately, it TURNS OUT, that the SS WERE able to move a stream of armoured vehicles PAST FROST to
NIjmegen, and more importantly, more SS troops were able to get FERRIED over in a CONSTANT STREAM via the pannerden ferry.
And THAT was the killer in the MarketGarden project; the planners simply did not think of possibilities for the germans to insert troops inbetween Arnhem and Nijmegen.
HAd the planners dropped troops on the island (near Elst) on 17th sept than THAT would have been the key of success; the whole "island" would be a secure LZ fro the british and the 82nd if need be.
If one is a simpleton (John Burns), you may even blame FROST for letting Graebner (and kampfgruppe Henk!) PASS his defense positions at the Arnhem north ramp to get to Nijmegen which eventually would prove to be too strong for the first men of 508th arriving at the Nijmegen ramp.
But in reality it is the planners to blame...
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Stalin did not plan an attack in 1941...because, because...
But in 1942 ? More build up, more trucks, more training, more heavy tanks....and germany more wasted against England (blockades Germans)...Less and less oil and material from Russia..Molotov was already demanding more and more (territory here and there) for its oil....politically it would crack up anyhow.
When ? when Stalin would be CONFIDENT.
Also, I learned (and neglected this data) the russians had INSANELY much amphibious tanks. AMPHIBIOUS !
WHY ?.
To cross rivers in an AGRRESSIVE attack..amphibious tanks are rarely intended for DEFENSES behind rivers...
And there were a lot of crossing rivers in poland and germany.....aaaaaand going further to Holland, Belgium and France !!!!!
And what about ALL The PARATROOPERS that Stalin built up.
PARATROOPERS !!!!! That is NOT DEFENSIVE!
Keitl agressive on France, Norway etc...yes.
BUt hey, Stalin aggressive on Finland, baltics, Ukraine, Poland...........WOoooooooaaaah!
If your opponent neighbour has guns and axes laying around, and is tinkering on a machinegun..(not at all "defensive weapons) and you had and used a pistol before....and you decided to strike first ..yes , judiciary you are the agressor...but factually, if then you discover in his house so much more weapons (mortars, grenades, kegs of powder, poison)..then yes you have PROOF he was up to something evil pretty soon.
So that idea you have not taken away.
You rely on published documents in commercial books. You REALLY think you find anything the COMMUNISTS would indict themselves is published or available now ??
(and really?"you don't have documents of Stalin's HC so therefore you have NO PROOF"...there are SPIES everywhere and all the time..and one can DEDUCT intentions from many other docuements and actions...).
The hardware speaks for itself.And stalin had the (economic) trumps in his hands...also TIME was on his side.
And he BELIEVED in his communism ideal, and KNEW there are many many idolate communist followers IN WEST EUROPE waiting for him to liberate them. Sometimes up to 50% (Greece, France) communists and socialists.
Time would only enhance this. And the more nazi occupation, the more this would grow.
Of course Keitl told anything to favour his case in the Nurenburg court.But THAT in itself also doesNOT take away the obvious notion that Stalin was building up to an invasion (or call it global revolution) at some point in the future..
How much does a bunker(system) cost..and how much do tanks and planes cost ?
Stalin did not build bunkers...why ? it could have started way back in 1935 like the french..and it could have coverd much more and more consistent line of defense (and not having a "belgium gap").
The failure of the Maginot (incuding belgium gap) only showed in 1940.
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You, strong adult, and young kid who is fast, find yourselves in a building on fire. You have the idea that within 5 minutes the house will be consumed in fire and you will die.
You both head for an escape door. Behind which maybe are some criminal elements.
YOU carry a heavy AXE, intended to SMASH through the door.
Your kid is much faster and reaches the door in the first minute.
The kid is expected/supposed to use the HANDLE and open the door, so that you both can escape at minute 3.
But dear, oh dear. In the 2 more minutes it takes you heavy , old, strong adult to reach the door, you SEE that your kid is NOT touching the handle. He is afraid for the criminals on the other side.
Then arrives minute 3 and BOTH of you stand at the closed door.
Now the door has been LOCKED from the outside.
What do you do ?`???
BICKERING at your kid for not opening the door in time ???
WASTING more minutes scratching your ARSES ??? Drinking TEA ???
NO!
ANY SANE adult would USE his AXE which was the WHOLE PURPOSE of carrying the damn thing, and BREAK THROUGH THE GODDAMN DOOR !
Read; adult = XXXcrps. , kid = 82nd airborne, door = Nijmegen bridge, criminals = SS troops, Axe = TANKS and all artillery you can muster.
Oh, and i forgot the analogy; you as an adult walk verrrryy slllooooooow. Absolute NO URGENCY given the burning building. and had the kid opened the door too soon, he would have been killed by the criminals.
Is it more clear now ?
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axis powers is more than just the tripartite pact..it is but an agreement of cooperation in a shape or form.
Any form of cooperation and aiding the mainly german war effort is being part of an axis "realm".
Thus..not only germany, italy , japan...(how big is the cooperation between japan and germany anyway in 1941-1942????)..but also finland, vichy france (that is 40% of France!!!), Hungary, rumania, kroatia, bosnians...but also Thailand/Siam (on paper occupied..but effectively left the door wide open and cooperated with Japan from day one), Korea too...on paper occupied from 1920s, but Koreans ARE a different people , and boy did the koreans participate in the WORST atrocities against western POWs and indonesian locals,..
and what to think of Argentina and Chili...already during mid 1940s starting putting feelers out.
and last but not least< the Vatican !
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