Comments by "ODDBALL SOK" (@oddballsok) on "TIKhistory" channel.

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  5. well..that is too simple stated. In fact Frost and the lack of support from the other british batallions prove that it isn't and wasn't a simple matter of "go to the bridge and hold it a couple of days. Around Arnhem there was enough german forces to kick the shit out of the british paras even if ALL the intended battalions had arrived in Arnhem center. So too were there enough german troops and called in reinforcements around Nijmegen center had Gavin sent all his (say half) first day troops into Nijmegen center. By the time XXX corps would have arrived as it did the germans STILL would have disrupted and harassed any combination of handful US paras with spearhead of XXX corps armour in the rubbled center of Nijmegen. The carnage that historically happened in Nijmegen WOULD JUST AS MUCH TAKE PLACE in Nijmegen had Gavin moved his paras immediately to the nijmegen center. And as XXX corps PROVED historically that it would NOT move armour and vehicles further over the bridge to reach Arnhem, so too would XXX corps not advance further if Nijmegen would not have been cleared for a radius of say 5 kms. You must realise that the use of paras to "take" a bridge is NOT to be able to "hold"the bridge against inf and tank attacks (they are incapable of), the ONLY tactical advantage of para s taking a bridge in surprise is to SAVE it from being BLOWN UP by enemy engineers. And in case of Nijmegen bridge luckily this happened, but not to the grace of the US rivercrossing feat, but through a heroic dutch resistance that cut the wires further inland away from the bridge.
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  37. In addition to the shortsighted hindsighting blame on Gavin, 82nd, 508th; Getting the Nijmegen main bridge LAST makes sense if you consider this; The planners expected NO germans at the betuwe Island. The planners DID learn that SS corps was at Arnhem before the 17th but EXPECTED the SS to be HELD up IN Arnhem (by the 3 british columns arriving at the north ramp and thus TIGHTLY secure the ramp so that not even a tank or halftrack (as they would!) could pass). At Nijmegen, there was LITTLE defense expected, but the planners DID expect german reinforcements coming straight from GERMANY; Kleve..thus THROUGH the Reichswald, and THUS through Groesbeek. Thus Gavin HAD TO MAKE SECURE his LZ and defenses against strong enemy troops coming from THE EAST. All the bridges on his west could be taken AT ANY STAGE as long as there weren't SS troops getting FROM Arnhem to Nijmegen (and even so they were supposed to be battle fatigued..). As the smaller bridges at Grave and Mook could be EASILY blown up (and were already prepared..this info must be known by dutch resistance and thus allied intelligence), it was MORE IMPORTANT to get those IMMEDIATELY and the Nijmegen bridge last (Nijmegen bridge was NOT prepared for explosives, especially when Model would not have it!). Decisions to assembly, organise and march to hither or tither are done BEFORE the jump. So naturally the movements of the 508th are explained with the above assessment in mind. Unfortunately, it TURNS OUT (and that information only slowly filters through the ranks) , that the SS WERE able to move a stream of armoured vehicles PAST FROST to NIjmegen, and more importantly, more SS troops were able to get FERRIED over in a CONSTANT STREAM via the pannerden ferry. And THAT was the killer in the MarketGarden project; the planners simply did not think of possibilities for the germans to insert troops inbetween Arnhem and Nijmegen. Had the planners dropped paratroops on the island (near Elst) on 17th sept than THAT would have been the key of success; the whole "island" would be (more or less) a secure supply LZ for the british and the 82nd if need be. And any attempt to ferry over german troops along the pannerdencanal would be sighted, harrassed and finally stopped by troops and called in airsupport (if radios would work)). If one is a simpleton (John Burns), you may even blame FROST for letting Graebner (and kampfgruppe Henk!) PASS by his defense positions at the Arnhem north ramp to get to Nijmegen which eventually would prove to be too strong for the first men of 508th arriving at the Nijmegen ramp. But in reality it is the planners to blame...
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  38. ***** in fairness, we are talking about few hours of "delay" (in yr view) or rather wait for sequential preconceived orders. What are a few hours ? Seriously,ask yourself: WHat difference would a few hours make in terms of getting your men in force (columns) to a battle location, and equal what does a few hours mean to the enemy to get his troops lined up in their positions ? It's not as if you have 2000 men marching and 5 seconds before 18.00 hrs there is none, and 5 seconds after 18.00 hrs you have the whole 2000 in position... On each and every second you can compare number of men versus the other and be able to tell: americans arrive earlier yes they have more than germans: 200 yanks overcome 40 flak germans;yanks win. Or the reverse: Kmfgr Henk arrives in part 300 germans, versus 50 yanks; Germans win. But in BOTH occasions  you MUST continue counting until your maximum number of men have arrived and see the balance shifted; But hey sorry; German SS drip in , later by more massive numbers: 2000 men...and the 508th and perhaps other reserves ? Not more than 400: Result is THE SAME: Germany wins. Your fantasy is to have moved ALL OF 82nd and the HQ of Browning with guns in their hands to the goddamn bridge; how much ? 4000 ? Then all the germans may be stuck in Lent...but next day the germans come out ofthe woods; Reichswald,Groesbeek,the second drop gets shot from the skies and on the fields...result 82nd surrounded in Nijmegen. Day laterXXXcrps arrives somewhere at Grave bridge which has been abandoned for Nijmegen, and gets blown up: End of Market garden. Monty's fallus ends at Grave instead of Driel.
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  44. jesusss you uploaded this nonsense again ? Failures: planners (under Monty and Browning who took 10 essential planes on the first day with nonessential staff that cld hve been filled with US 82nd troops that COULD have taken and HELD the Nijmegen bridge); they FAILED to understand that the germans had a HUGE insertion point via Pannerden (and Looveer) ferry to put SS troops AND ATguns AND tanks to the "island" and up the Arnhem bridge and DOWN the Nijmegen bridge and south ramp. No 82nd rifle group could EVER hope to stop the steadily growing influx of german troops there and then on sunday and following monday. The majority of 1st Airborne SHOULD HAVE LANDED on the Island from day one. At least the para dropped infantry.... the poles managed 4 days later... And lest not forget Brereton who DENIED the troopers more than 100 more transport planes that CERTAINLY wld have made the difference, even WITH the extra SS troops and tanks at hand. If the building sucks at the foundation (Browning, Brereton) then any construction fails.. ...and of course 30th crps was BLOODY SLOW !! "no sense of urgency"....it is proven by the fact that the few tanks that went across the nijmegen bridge did NOTHIng afterwards...because INFANTRY were still busy fighting at the "west" side of the south ramp, and HUNDREDS of shermans were lying IDLE miles SOUTH of Nijmegen doing FUCK ALL!! Nobody ever wondered how 5 shermans could get across the bridge (east side of south ramp) , then BLOODY SEND MORE OF THE SAME after them ?????
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  51. 0:48...it is not "just" bending a corner and go after the Ruhr..it is find your allied Armies (those under Montgomery and not Bradley to be more exact!) in a lucrative unobstructed position to fan out in all directions into nazi germany; the manufacturing heart the Ruhr, but also straight towards the east to Berlin, and straight towards the North Hamburg/Denmark...ALL of it would be open for...Monty ! Locking up german (secondary) troops in Holland is only a small advantage. There never was serious thought of allied armoured fights/progress into Holland (too many obstructing waterways, too many civilians, no strategic bonus). But by going towards the Zuiderzee alone, there won't be any improvement in clearing Walcheren and the Schelde for Antwerp or getting Rotterdam harbour. Germans were still there, demolitions were still there, bunkers and guns were still there. There is or was no need for further "support" from germany. (But it could have lead to a psychological effect that german troops other than the absolute necessary (demolition engineers) would have pulled away over the Afsluitdyk...but that takes some time, and would not be noticed in Walcheren until months later) The only important "support" that would be cut off is that of NEW V2 rockets that were sent to The Hague area and fired on London. But later it showed that the Germans fired V2 from Friesland (near Leeuwarden) in the North of Netherlands. Still, RAF bombardments of V2 sites were effective enough, so there was no imperative need to adjust a landbased thrust towards potential V2 launching sites. Besides V2s could still be moved over Friesland over the Afsluitdyke past Amsterdam to Den Haag still with a closed Zuiderzee end at Arnhem.. No, if the allied wanted a big sea port asap, then Market Garden was a waste of time, effort, materials and casualties. Matter of fact was that clearing Schelde project was not planned, and developed until AFTER market garden failure. Then it "suddenly" dawned upon them that for any further push (over a broad front) they'll need a big port closer by. And Antwerp was thought to be liberated and functional, but its approach proved to be dangerous. Market Garden and the north salliant thrust was simply a too good to let go opportunity for Monty personally based on the reports of German panic in the west. Any negative comment or resistance report or recon photo was dismissed because the benefits of a success were too great. I don't blame Monty and the other planners for looking away from a single recon photo of "a" tank, of "a" report of SS in the area (that were hammered and on the run before and thus needed refitting and rest), on splitting the drops over three days; speed in starting the project was of the essence, the para brigades were sitting idle in UK ; it was a luxury for Monty and he knew it. To NOT use all that reserve and missing out on a great opportunity would be wrong. It was a gamble, the allies (Ike included) lost, and the HQ carried on with the normal war progress. But this time Bradley and Patton claimed most of all further resources.
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  53. ***** BEF Dunkirk IS a retreat. Mersh Elkabir sinking ruthlessly a partner fleet (and the french admiral kept his word in 1944 to keep fleet from german hands). Brits developed the Englandspiel because of incompetence. Norway: retreat. Britsih lost GREECE. British lost Krete (even though having more men at the island). British drew troops and equipment away from Libya when they were in an advantage to CLOSE the deal..instead they (churchill !) squandered their resources in Greece. Luftwaffe had to redeploy airforce for the upcoming events in Barbarossa and were not defeated...it simply was concluded it was not efficient to continue given the barabrossa campaign coming. Uboat (and luftwaffe) threat on convoys and shipping NOT contained or thwarted UNTIL the receipt of dozens of american destroyers. Singapore, malaysia, Birma: incompetence on incompetence.  Repulse and Pr of Wales againt the Jap combined fleet: idiocracy. Italy: after fall of mussolini the germans occupied and set up defenses WITHIN DAYS..the brits (and americans) werent able to pass the practically handfull of germans in over TWO YEARS to get to Austria. RN fleet was always 5 times bigger than KM. Big deal to win sinking of a single battlecruiser at a time. Germany got their stuff overland. Imports via shipping was not a big deal for germany once west europe and middle europe was occupied.The only thing mattered was oil. That was always and before the critical thing. Really, not one British high ranking officer impressed with better than expected resullts. Monty was good, knowledgable but too safe playing. He never delivered MORE or FASTER than expected (like the likes of Rommel, Guderian, yamashita). Alanbrooke did his good on strategic and logistics level, but could not undo the incompetences of the generals in the field. Ultimately he too failed on the Poles (what did he say to Stalin vis a vis the Poles?...exactly NOTHING). W.Slim did his best in Burma (re)introducing jungle guerilla warfare ..but the scale was too limited, too late and it took too long. (and he may have molested  young boys ?).
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  59. Another clarifying thought about opportunities and dropped opportunities: Once the british were present on "the island" in full force, feeling secure enough to consider it "under control". (say, 22nd sept). WHY didn't they set up actions to CROSS the maas left and right of Arnhem ? After all, the river is quite SMALL there (so much smaller and slow streaming than the Waal at nijmegen) , and easily passable by any mediocre swimmer. Once the military is present IN FULL FORCE with tons of artillery. It should be a textbook excercise to cross a damned little river ?!?! Right ? The germans were able to ferry over quite a few tiger tanks over the Pannerden ferry. Let alone the many halftracks , trucks and SS men. Certainly the germans on the north bank would NOT be able to defend ALL along the maas against crossing brits all over the place ? With also full command of the skies ?!?!? Nope, they DECIDED to BLOW UP the Arnhem bridge . !!!!! The british command conceded that they do NOT wish for further advancement, and made sure the germans would not try anything bold (raiding?) going south either. This shows the british were NOT INTENDING to land in Arnhem with Frost hanging to his fingers and FIGHT INSIDE ARNHEM CITY like they just experienced in NIJMEGEN. Their idea was to enter Arnhem and SPEED THROUGH to the Ijsselmeer. UNRESISTED and UNCHALLENGED. In other words, ONCE it became clear that there was german RESISTANCE in Arnhem (17th and 18th sept), there was NO POINT in reaching Arnhem fighting. Frost or not. The british command had ALREADY given up on Frost !!!
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  69. check this critique on Poulussen book: http://www.go2war2.nl/artikel/2411/Lost-at-Nijmegen.htm quote translated: With "Lost at Nijmegen" author R.G. Poulussen especially revived the discussion about the developments in Nijmegen and he closely monitors the first 24 hours of the fighting in and around Nijmegen. The conclusions go far for the sources and the burden of proof. With the same simplicity, a completely different conclusion can be drawn from the text of the booklet. The 508th PIR had all the freedom and possibility to undertake an attack on the Waal Bridge. This also happened in the first 24 hours and twice. Both attacks were rejected by the Germans. Could they have done more? Possibly, but the source information in the book is not convincing enough. That the late taking of the Waal Bridge had an effect on the development of Market Garden is actually an open door. But that precisely this delay was crucial for Market Garden is also not convincingly demonstrated in the book. With equal ease, other delays in *Market Garden can be identified as just as crucial*. (!!!!!!!) It is praising the author that he is trying to revive the debate around Market Garden 'new' life with this work. His work can contribute to the overall picture of Market Garden. His conclusions go too far, however, to be able to determine on the basis of the contents of the book. The book lacks a good source account for this (an indication of the source is not given, it is only from the notes that some sources have been used) and it is mainly limited in its sources. By quoting other primary sources, a *completely different picture can be outlined*. It is precisely these other sources that have not or hardly been used. This involves sources of non-American origin that can explain the German and British positions in their entirety. The book does not reveal the positions and numbers of British troops that entered Nijmegen. Nor is it supported with sources which German troops were present in the Betuwe, in Nijmegen and the Reichswald or could be transported there quickly. This does not mean that the author would be wrong in his conclusions, but that the book gives me insufficient sources, say proof, to support the conclusions.
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  89. ***** aha..and there you make an assumption you can't make. The success of shooting up Graebner men on the Arnhem north ramp in my opinion can't be copied over the south ramp of Nijmegen. 1) Arnhem had houses nearby and a bridge sentry house ..nijmegen didn't; a lot more difficult to defend in concealment. 2) Graebner was a fool..oh no, that is depicted in the movie..experienced Graebner REALISing the danger of concealed enemy infantry positions in the houses knew you can't STOP in front of them, and could not do harm with MGfire  from further on the bridge (and being exposed to possible 6 pdr guns elsewhere along the Arnhem north banks or allied airplanes) decided to RACE past them and end deeper in arnhem to join up with the other SS troops.... unfortunately the halftrack drivers had no clear view on the bridge road, had difficulty avoiding mines, looking out for them means EXPOSING your body up from the halftracks, smoke, etc..and when one stopped , the rest got stuck as well, with clear view from the brit paras ON TOP of them, then it was prize shooting. The same thing would be more difficult to achieve for 82nd on Nijmegen (and that would have to be EARLIER on the day than Frost did his trick on Arnhem..). Earlier means less prepared, less troops in position, less material brought in , less mines...even Frost let the 1st Graebner recon group pass by without firing shots....obviously! There is a difference between ARRIVING at a position and having CLEARED or PREPARED  or SECURED a position  
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  90. ***** Good to have books quoted, but like you said each is merely a single point of view of a single writer. It is strange that your 2 quotes are diagonally opposite (american vs british), but in favor of the americans (devils advocate if you like) i say these things which is PURELY logic: 1) To march off parainfantry that got a heavy beating, crossing the Waal and almost out of ammo ELEVEN MILES to Arnhem at night is MORE STUPID than to have the same men RIDING the shermans in that direction. The logic option must have been the units TOGETHER not just the one single. But even IF chosing EITHER tanks or EITHER infantry then OF COURSE tanks would fare BETTER. And why ? the PROOF IS that the 6 tanks got LUCKY and THROUGH the mayhem of SS in Nijmegen..which PROVES they can get by dug in enemy infantry (without panzerfausts) without a hassle. And if there are not german 88s in Elst..(and John Burns says there wasnt..and who cares about the tigers..they were INSIDE arnhem , right ?) then WHAT IS STOPPING THEM ? 2) I have a REALLY HARD TIME believing that veteran 82nd troopers who made it through the Waal crossing are KISSING AND HUGGING ordinary sherman tanks. and would be likely to say "i have to surrender to you " when the first british tank commander walks in the commanders defense post as to MISTAKE him for a german ???? Please do a STUDY and find out WHERE in the whole damn world did an AMERICAN  elitist officer EVER acted the SAME ?? Maybe the first US -DAK encounter in Tunesia ? but those were GREEN soldiers untrained in anything. And not even THERE you had these displays. (edit) Oh there is a much better example!!:  The relief of the airborne troops at BASTOGNE when they were relieved by the TANKS of PATTON !! Wow, if there EVER is a reason ad opportunity to KISS and HUGG tanks then it is that moment with your OWN countrymen tanks!!! And yet; NO SUCH THING HAPPENED. Gosh , I wonder why ?!?? I have no proof of either story, but neither has you..but we can at least USE OUR brains and logic to assess each version. Please!
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  91. ***** Aahhhh!!!!! so if there WERE three Tiger tanks  on the island and you make it seem IMPOSSIBLE for 30crps and the 4 shermans  to overcome that obstacle, then HOW could the 30crps  race simply through the very same Island to Arnhem if the boys of 82nd somehow had managed to keep the bridge all the days before..in waiting for the 30crps. More on the point, if the claim is there were 3 Tiger tanks (and do we presume they were solitary or were there SS SUPPORT TROOPS too ???) how do you expect the 82nd remnants to MARCH OFF towards them without the shermans ?? Anyway, you didnot answer the TWO points I was making about the "kissing the tank" statement  and the which makes more sensible advance; tanks or infantry or combined given the information of the ACTUAL battle moments BEFORE. Becoz how do you tell there are Tiger tanks if THERE HASNT BEEN CONTACT WITH THEM before ? Carrington didnot know. Harmel didnot know. The 2 broken shermans were malfunctioning and one hit by a pak gun. So WHERE does  the commander of the 4 shermans get the info that there were Tigers ? The same info that Gavin got that there were panzer elements in the Reichswald ? The information that you guys frown upon as myths and old men and children ? Proof enough that you guys do SELECTIVE PICKING in order to absolve the 30crps ill performance. Hell, even your hero FRost blamed the bad performance of the Guards when he visited a memorial at Nijmegen in the 1950's. (I recently read about it on a dedicated website).
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  92. I show you reasoning: 1) If first you claim three tiger tanks (and do you guess they were operating closeby or dispersed on 3 different locations ? ) are too dangerous for the 3 shermans and handfull of 82nd men, but the next day you say lots of Guards and many more tanks and at least a couple of Challengers were able to knock out the three tigers..then why didn't those "lots of tanks" and "challenger tank" were sent over the bridge the day before ? Oh right; they were witheld as RESERVE. (read = drinking tea). = choice of commander to keep them in the back = FAILURE of 30crps Horrocks to push out ALL HE HAS GOT up the bridge WHEN THE IMMEDIATE OPPORTUNITY AROSE. .. 2) If the "lots of tanks" and "challenger tanks" were involved in dispersed battle actions "all over the nijmegen place" fighting SS that CAME FROM THE ISLAND to Nijmegen area and held up the 30crps for a COUPLE OF DAYS..then how would it differ if these SAME SS OF THE ISLAND PLUS 3 TIGERS would have assembled and concentrated on Lent and DENIED 30 crps and their "lots of tanks" and "challenger tank" a pass through to Arnhem ? .. The ONLY DECISIVE FACTOR of the succes of Market Garden is the 30crps deployment. If a paratrooper has a bridge or not, loses it and retakes it, or loses it again is IRRELEVANT IF the bulk of the 30crps MANAGES to get their shit in arnhem. Whether they fly over the river, they swim over the river; irrelevant. The paras getting and KEEPING the bridges is nice, but if it WOULDNT then it is the job of 30crps to get the PONTOONS, the Baileys bridges out in top speed and get the shit moving. The SOn bridge PROVES  the correct mindset, but not the URGENCY and PREPARATION (it took TWELVE HOURS to get the elements forward and bridge 30 mtrs?!) . Urquhart TRYING to hold on to a bridgehead in OOsterbeek where there is NO BRIDGE and the rail bridge was lost, proves the SAME CORRECT MINDSET as a 30crps in full force in Driel with all the aircover and engineers and artillery WOULD BE ABLE to biuld pontoons over the Nederrijn. Yet it is the 30crps to FAIL in the URGENCY to send in their mass of troops into the Island to establish the last link. I read in another link that originally there WERE supposed to be britsih airborne troops on the island on day 17th but those were removed in favour of Ginkel heith... whoever made that decision should have been courtmartialled.
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  95. The 508th was not able to overcome the garrison and flak teams on the bridge, AND move over many (??) 6pdrs in Lent, dig trenches and make a sound "cordon" , meanwhile fending off SS infantry and halftracks..in the space of couple of hours on the 17th sept. Let alone stave off the further reinforcements on the 18th. You MIGHT want to fantasise over what if ALL the 82nd troops that were at Groesbeek heights had moved to >Nijmegen and ABANDONED the LZs for the drops of 18th (moved to 19th) september: Well, maybe yes, gavin would have the Nijmegen bridge....for ONE day. The ragtag piecemeal troops form the reichswald WOULD have overrun the LZ , hence the next drops would be shot at /obliterated, totally LOST. But Gavin would be holding the Nijmegen center and south ramp. Fine. The XXXcrps arrives neatly from the SW. The NORTH ramp however he would NOT be able to hold, or control. Too much SS poured in Elst and maybe as close as Lent from the Pannerden ferry (Just a ridiculous 7 km = 5 mile distance!! straight EAST) with armoured cars, stugs, 88s and finally Tigers. Any concentration of Sherman tanks over the bridge would be knocked out (from distance 88s , 75 At, Artillery barrages, Panzerfausten in Lent, and finally a tiger tank) when sighted. Sighted on the bridge, sighted going out of Lent on the dykes...all-the-time. XXX would or could clear out Lent, Elst, the island and Driel, but that would take MANY DAYS. And even so, a couple of Shermans arriving at the south ramp of Arnhem ramp would NOT be able to support Frosts men. And frosts men would not be able to support the shermans if trying to run OVER the Arnhem bridge (already full with rubble). The perimeter around the Arnhem north ramp was already so small, it had no effective meaning for the original plan. The Arnhem center was full of SS, tanks, heavy tanks, artillery screen, Tigers; there is NO way that XXXcrps could DO anything. In fact, if the XXXcrps were so supernatural, they would have done so on the 21st, 22nd or 23d..after all, XXXcrps is brimming with tanks, and what did the germans have in Arnhem to stop them ??
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  98. John, it is actually YOU who put all assumptive blame on Gavin without having prove and morever without DELVING into arguments to support or disprove yourself. I started out in thinking, that it can't be so simple as you brits (TK included) portray it. A gut feeling (and I am dutch, no particular yankee lover, nor brits affectionado..I'd like to squash BS arguments). And lo and behold, gradually I read more (Try It never snows in september of Kershaw..OH ? YOU CLAIM YOU HAVE READ IT ?) on books and websites, find out about EXACT times per day that this or that report or action or sighting took place. And based on that information anyone sane must come to a different conclusion than you guys do. A group of  508th of 82nd DID attempt in 17th evening to take the bridge . Yes much later than 15.00 hrs when they landed  and started taking their first objectives (prepare roadblocks)..but Gavin must have reminded them or Lindquist in a epiphany suddenly remembered ?. But the german garrison at the bridge would have been SUFFICIENT to defend against a mere 50 men of 508th that could be spared at the 17th eve or afternoon.(There were A LOT of tasks to be acquired by the 82nd !!!). EVEN IF the 50 bold men had displaced the garrison (say loss of 10 men ?), then they would be NO MATCH for the reinforcements that came from north later the afternoon 17th. Prove "at 20.30 hrs the 508 tried to attack Nijmegen but were REPULSED). MORE and MORE germans and SS poured in and that WHOLE Kampfgruppe managed to do an attack FROM Nijmegen to the LZS of 508th and PUSHED that sector AWAY. So if ZE germans are CAPABLE of doing THAT on the 18th morning, how would the 508th with 40 men be able to keep them from retaking the nijmegen bridge IF they had installed themselves on the bridge  (in houses? in ruins ?NO , there is NOTHING to gain cover in a 150 m radius around the ramps!!!) Instead of frolicking over Gavin you should ask yourself WHY isn't there a paradrop or glider drop planned on the Betuwe Island in the first place ?? Any landed troop there has the advantage to help take the bridge ramps of BOTH Arnhem and NIjmegen. Reserves could be sent NORTh AND SOUTH depending on the battle situations. (and added bonus : stop german reinforcements coming from the pannerden ferry..perhaps) It is INCREDIBLE that that did not take place. That location was the key for success, The brits gliders (jeeps, carriers, AT) should have landed near Elst and a few coup d etat parachuted paras could have landed in the Arnhem park at the north ramp and Nijmegen hunnerpark ..et voila..the few 20 mm flak guns would perhaps hit a couple of dakotas but place a good concentrated number on that and the job would have had a better probability of succes. AndWHO were the ones that denied the planes to get too close to the bridges ??
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  104. Finally a detailed book! Poulessen? I have to look out for it, appears to have many fine detailed reports. Though it specifies more precise where the miscommunications and inefficient time usage was about, it shows simply more of the habitual "cock-ups" that happen in war. And those happened with all the other battalions as well. In the end , the few hours delay and the too few men deployed didnot matter; (1) were there no SS reinforcements (few of them came via the Arnhem bridge when FROST WAS ALREADY THERE but let them pass) then the one battalion could still take the bridge. (2) were there so many SS coming over the Nijmegen bridge north side (that they were too much to be attacked as historical on 17th and even attacked on 18th) then no one or two or three US battalions would hold out at Nijmegen ramps for two days (maybe one day, and only the city buildings NEAR the south ramp, but NOT the northh ramp at Lent). It takes some time (couple of HOURS) to dig in, and especially set up the few 6 pdr guns...if they were able to deploy them there in short time (508th PIR had ATs?). And even IF 50% of first drop 82nd had been moved on Nijmegen north and south ramps...WHERE would the accumulated SS troops in Lent be doing all the time on 17-18-19-20 sept ? Let's assume for a fact that the 82nd would even hold the LENT side: Then the SS would surely make a SCREEN around it...few STUGS would be deployed (via Pannerden or even past Frosts men as they didNOT hold the Arnhem ramp..only a few HOUSES around the ramp)..the SS artillery would hammer the unprotected 82nd until 30crps arrival. But MOST SURELY the excess SS would be turned on Frost 's men and they would have been pushed out days EARLIER. So that when the 30crps FINALLY arrived in Nijmegen 19th sept they would find a thick cordon in/around Lent, a strong german artillery ..and an Arnhem that would be totally CLEAR of british airborne troops. The Polish that would land later at Driel would ve been cleared up even faster. Not even a chance for a "bridge head" in Oosterbeek for Urquhart. As for the 30crps shermans that are idle; The Guards Armoured's Coldstream Guards Group still was needed as a reserve for the Airborne division. What does this mean ? as a RESERVE ? As in drinking tea ? as in doing nothing ? as in hanging around in the back waiting for further notice and developments ? as in drinking tea? This left but two armoured groups to go across the Waal. Even those did not make it until next day, D plus 4, 21 September, primarily because of diehard German defenders who had to be ferreted out from the superstructure and bridge underpinnings." Superstructure of a bridge ? That is the metal works - The span ! That is maybe a few snipers or pioneers laying charges (like in the movie BtF..which witnesses told us was fake....) Bridge underpinnings ? That is indeed the location to set charges; pioneers; infantry thus. Why is that so hard to deal with ? Again proof that yet ANOTHER unit is SLOW and NOT AGILE enough to fight to the MAX. Hence it is very hypocrite to lay the blame of the WHOLE MG project on just the men of Gavin. (I was at the "celebrations" in Arnhem and Nijmegen last week..on the matter I only got to talk to elder guides and museum historians and they all have the same answer that the project failed on many accounts, and most of it in the planning...but one could not blame a single unit or person for it..).
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  126. 59:07 yes Pienaar is reluctant..but look at this map with unbiased eye and you see "AGAIN " that england has thrown its dominion forces as cannonfodder in the jaws of the enemy: New Zealand and S.Africa....and WHERE are the english troops ? I only see gatehouse.... And Pienaar probably saw this too, felt it too, remembered the sacrifice of the other SA brigade.. The sentiment no different from 1940 when churchill URGED the french to keep on fighting in a political union IN FRANCE against ALL THE NAZI might while the english stayed high and dry in Britain (keeping their RN intact up in scotland, and more importantly their fighters and bombers UNUSED "prepared"for defense of ONLY britain... "political union"..mon cul), and would gobble up all the french dominion possessions around the globe..for "free". Result: ' non mercy'... edit: if you wld counter it with pointing to the split tank assaults of the english in the beginning assisting the south africans in the middle of the cauldron...then you forget to point out that EXACTLY the bulk of the english INFANTRY was KEPT behind out of fear of german counter PANZER attacks. The english TANKS were supposed to deal with the DAK panzers. Sort of like noble cavaliers 'rescueing'the SA troops in the middle. SA infantry butchered, and english tankers snatching the VICTORY. But why then, weren't the ENGLISH infantry sent in into the cauldron too ? And if german panzers are 'unhealthy' for english infantry, wouldn't that be true for SA infantry too ? I am sure Pienaar was present when all these decisions were taken at the expense of the first SA infantry sent in the cauldron...
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  127. I am no food expert, but I dont think your end conclusion is right. a) if DL not go to war with RU..then still hunger and DL people starve in 1944 anyway..even if west allies wld not have landed in france. =wrong. If no DL army active in RU then a lot less soldiers were drafted and lot less military wld have to be fed. a german worker requires LESS FOOD than a german soldier...including OVERHEAD (staff, civil servants). german soldiers demobilized and working in DL on fields wld yield MORE food. also, during the RU invasion, a great number of polish and russian POWs worked on german farmfields..less effective perhaps..but farming could take place on paper. so why the HUGE drop in farming produce? goebbels mentioned it, and it is a god given certainty: WAR IS HUNGER...always ! But interestingly goebb diary shows that there were TWO YEARS of BAD harvest in germany and in ukraine. That is nature..and this happens today as well. The DIFFERENCE is that (1) DL had no big food diversity: if weather is bad for crops then and potatoes AND wheat AND carrots etc = wasted. No alternative foods. and more importantly (2) DL could NOT TRADE with the rest of the world to BUY foods from elsewhere on the planet to compensate. .. and that is why TRADE and PEACE are prerequisites for good food supply on a strategic scale. a war can last only as long as you cld muster stocks....in 1940s techniques and national scale ...only a year at max. if not attacking RU..DL cld still continue to BUY wheat from RU (with functioning farms)...and DL wld yield also more food (cows, pigs). Facing only UK and the sea route blockades...
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  132. I think to define "superior technology" is not to tick temporary better equipment that lasted a year or two..and count who has the most. Better it is to declare certain arms technologies in which a certain country was CONTUINUOUSLY better, as it CONTINUOUSLY developed better models IRRESPECTIVE of what is encountered at the battlefields from the enemies. Germany: ahead in SUBMARINES (there was no "need "for the XXI uboot , they simply DID)... ...ahead in jet fighters (again, no NEED for jetfighters in 1941..yet developed it hard). ..ahead in ballistic Rockets ..ahead in STG assault rifle ..tanks..mwah..Panther and Tigers came as a REACTION to the russian T34 and KV1..but from then on..massive focus on improving beyond the others. ..ahead in propeller fighters (the FW109 surprised the allies...). ..ahead in (vicious) infantry and tank mines Japan: ahead in SUBMARINES ..ahead in major Battleships (notwithstanding LOW production output vs the americans..but THAT is NOT the criteria). ..ahead in Naval flyboats ..ahead in torpedoes..(though not sure about later developments of their torpedos in 1944). Italy: ..ahead in manned mini submarines.(many other operational developments...) UK: ..ahead in radiology (radar, asdic , etc.) ..ahead in prop fighters (and its ENGINE). ..ahead in heavy areal ordnance ..ahead in decryption not sure who to give medical technology (USA or UK ?) and not sure to grant the UK the radio sets technology improvements..cause more than not their radio sets FAILED in the field (ärnhem"..ahum) ..it is too late for me now..USA and SU must come later..
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  158. The case of the Gavin blunder is a mistake, but not one that made the market garden fail. His erratic decision simply doesn't matter: in fact Frost and the lack of support from the other british batallions prove that it isn't and wasn't a simple matter of "go to the bridge and hold it a couple of days. Around Arnhem there was enough german forces to kick the shit out of the british paras even if ALL the intended battalions had arrived in Arnhem center. So too were there enough german troops and called in reinforcements around Nijmegen center had Gavin sent all his (say half) first day troops into Nijmegen center. By the time XXX corps would have arrived as it did the germans STILL would have disrupted and harassed any combination of handful US paras with spearhead of XXX corps armour in the rubbled center of Nijmegen. The carnage that historically happened in Nijmegen WOULD JUST AS MUCH TAKE PLACE in Nijmegen had Gavin moved his paras immediately to the nijmegen center. And as XXX corps PROVED historically that it would NOT move armour and vehicles further over the bridge to reach Arnhem, so too would XXX corps not advance further if Nijmegen would not have been cleared for a radius of say 5 kms. You must realise that the use of paras to "take" a bridge is NOT to be able to "hold"the bridge against inf and tank attacks (they are incapable of), the ONLY tactical advantage of para s taking a bridge in surprise is to SAVE it from being BLOWN UP by enemy engineers. And in case of Nijmegen bridge luckily this happened, but not to the grace of the US rivercrossing feat, but through a heroic dutch resistance that cut the wires further inland away from the bridge. (Jan Jozef Lambert van Hoof)
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  165. did so. But in terms of losing momentum by losing bridges immediately; you have bridge at Son, railway bridges at Arnhem and >Nijmegen..all blown up by detonation or 88guns. The son bridge actually stalled the XXX progress. THAT was vital. Was it the 101st to blame ? Horocks ? Or rather the naive optimistic planners ? Same goes for Nijmegen. There is enough (i add page numbers later) to show that north of Nijmegen was soon filling with sufficient german reinforcements that would nullify any 82nd battalion or platoon attempt on taking the bridge. Any clearing of these SS would HAVE to be done by XXXcrps. Either INSIDE nijmegen (as per history) or over the bridge in Lent, Elst, whole of Betuwe Island. The 82nd would be incapable of going out IN the island area. History has shown that XXXcrps  FAILED to do this job in full force "hell bound", and VITAL hours slipped away in which a more aggressive spearhead /commander would have sent his good troops forward PAST the SS that were shooting out of windows (what else can they do in Nijmegen??? the Nijmegen ramp is CLEAR for 100 mtrs) and go the SAME route as the 6 to 4 shermans that went before them. Follow up on them and go via side roads (not via Elst)  to Driel to Arnhem and fire some rounds into Arnhem (and that's it...). I never found arguments or reasons why the XXXcrps as a WHOLE halted in Nijmegen and wasted time in clearing up Nijmegen center for 18 hours ? I suspect it is simply a matter of wrong or incomplete orders and procedure: "do not advance until cleared". And while 1000 guards at the spearhead do the clearing, the rest BEHIND them...do ..NOTHING. And THAT was the last blow to the hope of Arnhem.
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  166. By luck I have the right Kershaw book; 1)page 100 1st patrol in nijmegen 18.30 17 sept. Frundsberg brigade afternoon 17th in nijmegen incl Reinhold, Euling..euling turned via Pannerden..graebner 19.00 Elst on to Nijmegen (20.00?) Henkewas there ALREADY. 2) Graebner turned BACK after reports of frost fights at arnhem (note had 508th attacked EARLY then they wld face graebner troops TOO..by arriving LATER they encountered LESS troops: only Henke ;) STILL 508th could NOT overcome garrison and Henke…stalemate until more elements of 10th SS arrived over the night: page 101. 3) HENCE 508th would only be perhaps capable of pushing bridge flaks away, but not be fit to hold against Henke (when did he arrive by the way ??) nor the later 10th SS coming in at night. 4) Note that the “very easy”bridges Grave and Heumen were secured in what ?30 minutes ?? No!! 3 hours and six hours (page 119) . And you think “a” huge bridge like nijmegen would be secured in 30 minutes?…muhahaha. 5) Page 119 Occupation of the 300 m hill SE of nijmegen . this “took precedence even over the capture of the main bridge over Nijmegen”. If you have been there you can confirm this to be true. 6) Page 123 The lost LZ had to be retaken (on 18th) planes had taken off at 10.00 and were expected to arrive at 13.00 hrs. Compn were extracted from reserves and further US soldiers detached FROM NIJMEGEN to overcome this CRISIS. orders were given to CLEAR the northern and southern LZs! Only the paradrop of 18th sept tipped the balance. also of note page 194 Zonnenstahl, on your website http://www.defendingarnhem.com/Sonnenstuhl.htm sonnenstuhl; Forward artill observ brought down fire to within 100 mtrs of our own positions (Nijmegen, Elst).Therby overcoming CRITICAL moments...this id MUCH to sustain confidence and morale.It may well have been a factor slowing the rate of allied advance towards Arnhem... (I remember there was sentence where it showed that when shermans started to move out for an attack (ELst or LEnt ?) the german arti barrage made them stop immediately...so effective was the sperrbarrage.).
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  172. That is a nice website link. Thanks. Anyways, how I come to look upon this MG project in terms of achievable success is like you consider the bulk of the german army as a container of ketchup up in the woods NE of Arnhem and the bulk of the allied army (XXXcorps) as a container of mayonaise starting south of Valkenswaard. The roads going over the various bridges as conduits and the areas around towns as other containers, and towns as more difficult to fill containers. The bridges are chokepoints and one way valves controlled by this or that paratroop or garrison fraction. Those one way valves can get displaced or removed if enough fluid pressure acts on it , over "some" time. If a bridge is blown then the valve is broken. A ferry or moving by boats across is a trickling valve. At 17 september you start building the pressure of the two containers. In this view the mere fact that there was enough and more than enough german heavy and battle hardened troops at Arnhem and having access to the "island" south of Arnhem is clear evidence the MG project had to fail in Arnhem. The bridge was simply a bridge too far. Only if thru some miracle if Frost (+ backup) could hold on the original perimeter (of some 1 km across) north of Arnhem ramp and the XXXcrps would make it on time (4 days?) and deploy its tanks onto that bridgehead of 1 km (and support of artillery on the south end of the arnhem bridge) it would be viable. But any wargame with realistic troops depictions would tell that with the given battalion of Frost and the given SS troops in the area (and having access to the "island") etc.. it wouldn't work.
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  173. I haven't got the exact hours , but I find thison Frundsberg alone. : 18 September, 1944: Kampfgruppe "Frundsberg" is blocked from crossing the Arnhem Bridge and begins to ferry personnel and equipment across the Pannerdern Canal (fyi Pannerden is CLOSER to Nijmegen Waal river than Arnhem Rhine river!!). Components of Kampfrguppe "Frundsberg" include 4 Panzer Mk Ivs, Kampfrgruppe "Reinhold", Kampfgruppe "Euling", and Kampfgruppe "Henke". 19 September, 1944: British XXX Corps reaches Nijmegen. 20 September, 1944: Division defending positions along the Waal River, Nijmegen; Kampfrguppe "Hanke" captures Fort Hof Van Holland. At 1500, 2nd battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (US 82nd Airborne Division) begins amphibious assault crossing of the Waal River, and their attack on Hunner Park is repulsed by Kampfgruppe "Euling". British Grenadier Guards clear Fort Valkhof of elements of Kampfgruppe "Euling" and cross the Waal River between 1800 and 1900 as elements of Kampfgruppe "Frundsberg" withdraw from Nijmegen and ready for the defense of Arnhem. As the nijmegen bridge was not assaulted or taken historically on 18 sept , there obviously was no need or order for any german (ragtag) reinforcement to be directed to Nijmegen. HAD the 82nd taken positions on the Nijmegen bridge on 17th then OBVIOUSLY the germans somewhere somehow would have sped things up in the direction of Nijmegen. Reserves from where I hear you ask?: well from the ferried over elements ON THE 18Th september. Or do you REALLY think those guys and 4 tanks (and later the 2 Tigers) just HANG around in Pannerden and wait 48 HOURS until ALL the men and ALL 4 tanks are ferried over IF THE SITUATION would be dire at Nijmegen bridge ? You guys make the mistake(that allied commanders did all the time) that once a situation is cast in stone and you change one vital element you expect the germans/oponents to NOT react or NOT change their decisions and orders ?
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  184. ***** What is the point ? Let's assume the photo of Brian (and listed in Bridge Too Far book (print of 1980ies) was a fake. 1) if coming "from Germany" is the statement, it is unimportant; German border is only few miles away...so near enough. 2) you claim liberally there is no proof, but you also present no proof of WHERE they were EXACTLY . 3) You canNOT disprove the obvious conclusion or assumption (if you like) that the SS troops more , or less ? had troops placed  and refitted in , near Deelen airfield. Now Deelen was seen as pretty important. By the german HQ, by the allies as well. The most logical location for at least quite a substantial concentration of troops would be Deelen. That is pretty immediate near Arnhem. As for the other assumption you make; brits paras did not meet tanks on day 1"therefore" there were no tanks in Arnhem..consider this: Day 1 was only half a day. The first info germans COULD have there were paras IN ARNHEM was....? after about 18:00 hrs. Dusktime. Up and until then it is thought that ordinary infantry is capable of pushing para infantry out of houses. Sending in "a tank" in streets, between houses, to clear infantry, at night time...is NOT a sound order. So OBVIOUSLY even if tanks/stugs were at the edge of Arnhem, they would not get the order to ENTER and approach the bridge ramp. The germans TOO had a code of "honour" not to destroy (occupied, "befriended") civilian property if it was NOT necessary! So you may state correct facts, but you make incorrect conclusions.
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  188. in addition to the shortsighted hindsighting blame on Gavin, 82nd, 508th; Getting the Nijmegen main bridge LAST makes sense if you consider this; The planners expected NO germans at the betuwe Island. The planners DID learn that SS corps was at Arnhem but EXPECTED the SS to be HELD up IN Arnhem (by the 3 british columns arriving at the north ramp and thus TIGHTLY secure the ramp so that not even a tank or halftrack (as they would!) could pass). At Nijmegen, there was LITTLE defense expected, but the planners DID expect german reinforcements coming straight from GERMANY; Kleve..thus THROUGH the Reichswald, and THUS through Groesbeek. Thus Gavin HAD TO MAKE SECURE his LZ and defenses against strong enemy troops coming from the east. All the bridges on his west could be taken AT ANY STAGE as long as there weren't SS troops getting FROM Arnhem to Nijmegen. As the smaller bridges at Grave and Mook could be EASILY blown up, it was MORE IMPORTANT to get those IMMEDIATELY and the Nijmegen bridge last. Decisions to assembly, organise and march to hither or tither are done BEFORE the jump. So naturally the movements of the 508th are explained with the above assessment in mind. Unfortunately, it TURNS OUT, that the SS WERE able to move a stream of armoured vehicles PAST FROST to NIjmegen, and more importantly, more SS troops were able to get FERRIED over in a CONSTANT STREAM via the pannerden ferry. And THAT was the killer in the MarketGarden project; the planners simply did not think of possibilities for the germans to insert troops inbetween Arnhem and Nijmegen. HAd the planners dropped troops on the island (near Elst) on 17th sept than THAT would have been the key of success; the whole "island" would be a secure LZ fro the british and the 82nd if need be. If one is a simpleton (John Burns), you may even blame FROST for letting Graebner (and kampfgruppe Henk!) PASS his defense positions at the Arnhem north ramp to get to Nijmegen which eventually would prove to be too strong for the first men of 508th arriving at the Nijmegen ramp. But in reality it is the planners to blame...
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  189. Like I said; it was Frost who let Graebner including Henk pass by Arnhem north ramp to the south without a shot fired . Good riddance for Frost personally, but it meant extra SS forces on Nijmegen bridge before the 508th got there. I haven't found an exact time when Henk Kamfpruppe was there but in tracking the timing and movement of Graebner it must have been well before 18.00 hrs. The 508th battalion (400 men max in total ..but sent off party at best 100 men) could not do the task of setting blockades at Beek and reach Nijmegen before 18.00 hrs. Even if splitup, sending off 100 men straight to Nijmegen they MIGHT arrive earlier than Henke, but would not be able to set up solid defense positions against the arrival of Henke AND Graebner. Digging trenches for men and a possible 6pdr AT gun and filling up the sandbags TAKES TIME. Hence the signal "position secured" is HOURS away from "position arrived". In fact as frost let the SS pass under his noses, you might as well blame Frost for the failure. Instead what to think of the SIXTY (yes 60) sherman tanks that were in and around Nijmegen  as per Battle order on 19th and 20 th sept and DID NOT PUSH THROUGH over the Nijmegen bridge ?!? For 18 hours! If 6 tanks can make it over the Nijmegen bridge against the background of shooting SS and Guards infantry..then why not 16 ?? or 36 ?? or indeed 60 ?? YOu say they were held up in fights "all over the Groesbeek heights" fighting what ? Old men and children ? SO why were they WASTED there ? Never asked yourself this ? Where were the 54 shermans of Horrocks ?
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  219. Stalin did not plan an attack in 1941...because, because... But in 1942 ? More build up, more trucks, more training, more heavy tanks....and germany more wasted against England (blockades Germans)...Less and less oil and material from Russia..Molotov was already demanding more and more (territory here and there) for its oil....politically it would crack up anyhow. When ? when Stalin would be CONFIDENT. Also, I learned (and neglected this data) the russians had INSANELY much amphibious tanks. AMPHIBIOUS ! WHY ?. To cross rivers in an AGRRESSIVE attack..amphibious tanks are rarely intended for DEFENSES behind rivers... And there were a lot of crossing rivers in poland and germany.....aaaaaand going further to Holland, Belgium and France !!!!! And what about ALL The PARATROOPERS that Stalin built up. PARATROOPERS !!!!! That is NOT DEFENSIVE!  Keitl agressive on France, Norway etc...yes. BUt hey, Stalin aggressive on Finland, baltics, Ukraine, Poland...........WOoooooooaaaah! If your opponent neighbour has guns and axes laying around, and is tinkering on a machinegun..(not at all "defensive weapons) and you had and used a pistol before....and you decided to strike first ..yes , judiciary you are the agressor...but factually, if then you discover in his house so much more weapons (mortars, grenades, kegs of powder, poison)..then yes you have PROOF he was up to something evil pretty soon. So that idea you have not taken away. You rely on published documents in commercial books. You REALLY think you find anything the COMMUNISTS would indict themselves is published or available now ?? (and really?"you don't have documents of Stalin's HC so therefore you have NO PROOF"...there are SPIES everywhere and all the time..and one can DEDUCT intentions from many other docuements and actions...). The hardware speaks for itself.And stalin had the (economic) trumps in his hands...also TIME was on his side. And he BELIEVED in his communism ideal, and KNEW there are many many idolate communist followers IN WEST EUROPE waiting for him to liberate them. Sometimes up to 50% (Greece, France) communists and socialists. Time would only enhance this. And the more nazi occupation, the more this would grow. Of course Keitl told anything to favour his case in the Nurenburg court.But THAT in itself also doesNOT take away the obvious notion that Stalin was building up to an invasion (or call it global revolution) at some point in the future.. How much does a bunker(system) cost..and how much do tanks and planes cost ? Stalin did not build bunkers...why ? it could have started way back in 1935 like the french..and it could have coverd much more and more consistent line of defense (and not having a "belgium gap"). The failure of the Maginot (incuding belgium gap) only showed in 1940.
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  328. @TIK yeah...but now serious on this man's statement.. He only states that the railway tracks and roads combined over the northern route is limiting the whole of the invasion forces and logistics if all the germans forces were assembled along this route. "but is this really the case ?" At least I 'd like him to tell us what is the max capacity of its railway tracks(and wagons)..at least some anecdotes of logistics officers of them running against their limits..etc. Now it is only a poor statement. I can imagine it is so, but I dont see proof of that it is so. So far I imagine that up till the "end" of the railtracks e.g. 1000 units can be deployed/supplied. From that point units up till 300 can get deployed on foot/horse/wheels up to 300 kms from that depot. There is no horse/wheel supply capacity for the other 700 units to venture out outside the railway depot. So ...why is there this statement that the 300 or 500 or all 1000 units are very well able to venture out 500 or 1000 km laterally to the depot and that the 300 units can't even push further forwards (only on basis of lack of supply train..not looking at the enemy opposition) ? How is this "logical" ? Maybe, you can argue that "laterally" there is no thick enemy defense than those deployed in line with the main thrust towards moscow. But that is no argument for the "logistic" statement (well, apart from "heavier fighting = larger logistic losses and strain"). Now, of course Moscow was an important hub and thus the soviets could (re-)supply their front better and quicker than the germans..and they got that opportunity with fresh reserves from siberia...but that is not part of the argument of this Crefeld man.
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  443. I had a look on google map on what this Alban hills look like, and more importantly how "easy" it could be reached and held by a group "of twenty good men". I suggest all you guys to do the same. I have the impression : 1) It is NOT simple and NOT fastly reached...even under peace time it would take a full day to get AT THE BEST positions (you'll only know when you are there if something is good or not). Steep slope, fully grown wild forrest. only a few (in those days) paths. 2) What good is a handfull of infantry and or spotters on that ridge ?..to have it being an EFFECTIVE occupation of the hilltop and an EFFECTIVE artillery post set up..you 'll need 500 men up that hill AAAAAND at lower parts of the slope to defend any enemy advancement. That means some artillery pieces up the hill and wired communications placements...yes ? how many miles ? through what terrain ? = DIFFICULT. 3)By pinpointing a few spots on google maps i find there is no SUPREME location that overlooks "it all"..Rome, main road between Rome and Monte Cassino, the beachhead, etc. Let alone things are NOT CLEAR all the time; there is fogg, mist, etc. Again this means a SUBSTANTIAL presence is needed ALL ALONG the intended defense perimeter. That means substantial IN NUMBERS and equipment (there wasn't) and substantial in allotted TIME (the germans and fascist italians made sure that was also not possible). 4) Hence ..acting like "a wildcat" was simply a too difficult task. Might I remember you all on how Montgommery at Normandy and Caen also did not act like " a wildcat"..... despite NO luftwaffe, NO (concentrated heavy) German Panzers, No crack german troops at the beaches ..but tons and men on ratio 10 to 1 for the allied side.......
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