Comments by "ODDBALL SOK" (@oddballsok) on "Mistakes at Arnhem Bridge | Battle Storm 3/8 | Operation Market Garden" video.

  1. In addition to the shortsighted hindsighting blame on Gavin, 82nd, 508th; Getting the Nijmegen main bridge LAST makes sense if you consider this; The planners expected NO germans at the betuwe Island. The planners DID learn that SS corps was at Arnhem before the 17th but EXPECTED the SS to be HELD up IN Arnhem (by the 3 british columns arriving at the north ramp and thus TIGHTLY secure the ramp so that not even a tank or halftrack (as they would!) could pass). At Nijmegen, there was LITTLE defense expected, but the planners DID expect german reinforcements coming straight from GERMANY; Kleve..thus THROUGH the Reichswald, and THUS through Groesbeek. Thus Gavin HAD TO MAKE SECURE his LZ and defenses against strong enemy troops coming from THE EAST. All the bridges on his west could be taken AT ANY STAGE as long as there weren't SS troops getting FROM Arnhem to Nijmegen (and even so they were supposed to be battle fatigued..). As the smaller bridges at Grave and Mook could be EASILY blown up (and were already prepared..this info must be known by dutch resistance and thus allied intelligence), it was MORE IMPORTANT to get those IMMEDIATELY and the Nijmegen bridge last (Nijmegen bridge was NOT prepared for explosives, especially when Model would not have it!). Decisions to assembly, organise and march to hither or tither are done BEFORE the jump. So naturally the movements of the 508th are explained with the above assessment in mind. Unfortunately, it TURNS OUT (and that information only slowly filters through the ranks) , that the SS WERE able to move a stream of armoured vehicles PAST FROST to NIjmegen, and more importantly, more SS troops were able to get FERRIED over in a CONSTANT STREAM via the pannerden ferry. And THAT was the killer in the MarketGarden project; the planners simply did not think of possibilities for the germans to insert troops inbetween Arnhem and Nijmegen. Had the planners dropped paratroops on the island (near Elst) on 17th sept than THAT would have been the key of success; the whole "island" would be (more or less) a secure supply LZ for the british and the 82nd if need be. And any attempt to ferry over german troops along the pannerdencanal would be sighted, harrassed and finally stopped by troops and called in airsupport (if radios would work)). If one is a simpleton (John Burns), you may even blame FROST for letting Graebner (and kampfgruppe Henk!) PASS by his defense positions at the Arnhem north ramp to get to Nijmegen which eventually would prove to be too strong for the first men of 508th arriving at the Nijmegen ramp. But in reality it is the planners to blame...
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  2. ***** in fairness, we are talking about few hours of "delay" (in yr view) or rather wait for sequential preconceived orders. What are a few hours ? Seriously,ask yourself: WHat difference would a few hours make in terms of getting your men in force (columns) to a battle location, and equal what does a few hours mean to the enemy to get his troops lined up in their positions ? It's not as if you have 2000 men marching and 5 seconds before 18.00 hrs there is none, and 5 seconds after 18.00 hrs you have the whole 2000 in position... On each and every second you can compare number of men versus the other and be able to tell: americans arrive earlier yes they have more than germans: 200 yanks overcome 40 flak germans;yanks win. Or the reverse: Kmfgr Henk arrives in part 300 germans, versus 50 yanks; Germans win. But in BOTH occasions  you MUST continue counting until your maximum number of men have arrived and see the balance shifted; But hey sorry; German SS drip in , later by more massive numbers: 2000 men...and the 508th and perhaps other reserves ? Not more than 400: Result is THE SAME: Germany wins. Your fantasy is to have moved ALL OF 82nd and the HQ of Browning with guns in their hands to the goddamn bridge; how much ? 4000 ? Then all the germans may be stuck in Lent...but next day the germans come out ofthe woods; Reichswald,Groesbeek,the second drop gets shot from the skies and on the fields...result 82nd surrounded in Nijmegen. Day laterXXXcrps arrives somewhere at Grave bridge which has been abandoned for Nijmegen, and gets blown up: End of Market garden. Monty's fallus ends at Grave instead of Driel.
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  3. so where is proof or your socalled " facts" ? 1)assembled ready at 3 pm 2) drinking coffee 2 hours (on the exact same landing point?) 3) doing nothing, having no activities at all Please quote references to books, pages and year it was written and on what those references were based on.. Good luck. And while you are at it: Find out where the 54 shermans (60-6) of XXXcrps were doing (drinking TEA?) on sept 20 in Nijmegen ?
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  4. No they weren't. Merely stating the fact "late order to send a party to the bridge from Beek as Gavin was furious" is no proof of 1), 2) or 3). Interestingly, the 508th DID achieve THE MOST IMPORTANT feature of a paratrooper attacking a bridge on sept 17th: DISARMING eplosives of the said bridge; they attacked the Postoffice in Nijmegen which held the eplosives controls (being set up). No doubt this information was pointed to them FROM THE dutch underground (or do you think paratroopers have an 7th sense smell for this?). I assume that given the german opposition (with a MG42 set up) the few 508th there had NO SENSE OF URGENCY to get up the bridge as 82nd reinforcements and 30crps would SURELY follow up in a day (but of course, they didn't). In HINDSIGHT you may blame them for not sacrificing themselves on sept 17th...but in reality you can't blame them for not pushing hard enough at that early stage. So much MORE allied troops did NOT PUSH HARD ENOUGH on the 17th and 18th  and 19th and 20th. And many of them were british. Can you guess who ?
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  5. hear hear geronimo..
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  6. Finally a detailed book! Poulessen? I have to look out for it, appears to have many fine detailed reports. Though it specifies more precise where the miscommunications and inefficient time usage was about, it shows simply more of the habitual "cock-ups" that happen in war. And those happened with all the other battalions as well. In the end , the few hours delay and the too few men deployed didnot matter; (1) were there no SS reinforcements (few of them came via the Arnhem bridge when FROST WAS ALREADY THERE but let them pass) then the one battalion could still take the bridge. (2) were there so many SS coming over the Nijmegen bridge north side (that they were too much to be attacked as historical on 17th and even attacked on 18th) then no one or two or three US battalions would hold out at Nijmegen ramps for two days (maybe one day, and only the city buildings NEAR the south ramp, but NOT the northh ramp at Lent). It takes some time (couple of HOURS) to dig in, and especially set up the few 6 pdr guns...if they were able to deploy them there in short time (508th PIR had ATs?). And even IF 50% of first drop 82nd had been moved on Nijmegen north and south ramps...WHERE would the accumulated SS troops in Lent be doing all the time on 17-18-19-20 sept ? Let's assume for a fact that the 82nd would even hold the LENT side: Then the SS would surely make a SCREEN around it...few STUGS would be deployed (via Pannerden or even past Frosts men as they didNOT hold the Arnhem ramp..only a few HOUSES around the ramp)..the SS artillery would hammer the unprotected 82nd until 30crps arrival. But MOST SURELY the excess SS would be turned on Frost 's men and they would have been pushed out days EARLIER. So that when the 30crps FINALLY arrived in Nijmegen 19th sept they would find a thick cordon in/around Lent, a strong german artillery ..and an Arnhem that would be totally CLEAR of british airborne troops. The Polish that would land later at Driel would ve been cleared up even faster. Not even a chance for a "bridge head" in Oosterbeek for Urquhart. As for the 30crps shermans that are idle; The Guards Armoured's Coldstream Guards Group still was needed as a reserve for the Airborne division. What does this mean ? as a RESERVE ? As in drinking tea ? as in doing nothing ? as in hanging around in the back waiting for further notice and developments ? as in drinking tea? This left but two armoured groups to go across the Waal. Even those did not make it until next day, D plus 4, 21 September, primarily because of diehard German defenders who had to be ferreted out from the superstructure and bridge underpinnings." Superstructure of a bridge ? That is the metal works - The span ! That is maybe a few snipers or pioneers laying charges (like in the movie BtF..which witnesses told us was fake....) Bridge underpinnings ? That is indeed the location to set charges; pioneers; infantry thus. Why is that so hard to deal with ? Again proof that yet ANOTHER unit is SLOW and NOT AGILE enough to fight to the MAX. Hence it is very hypocrite to lay the blame of the WHOLE MG project on just the men of Gavin. (I was at the "celebrations" in Arnhem and Nijmegen last week..on the matter I only got to talk to elder guides and museum historians and they all have the same answer that the project failed on many accounts, and most of it in the planning...but one could not blame a single unit or person for it..).
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  7. hear hear akgeronimo
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  8. ha..I thought I was the only one dealing with TIK and some snob John Burns about this misplaced accusation of Gavin and the nijmegen bridge "failure". Turns out 4 mnths before a proper (modern) para was fighting the same battle..
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  9. akgeronimo501 hastings who ? This hastings ? http://russia-insider.com/en/weasel-history-secret-intelligencce-wartime/ri12534
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  10. German fallschirmjäger success at Belgian fort(complex) Eben Emael...but Kurt Student's Fallschirmjägers LOST it at the operations around The Hague at three small airfields Ypenburg, Ockenburg and Valkenburg. All lost against growing resistance of dutch infantry, inexperienced and with obsolete rifles..yet they won. Because of TIME and because of ARTILLERY. That is the lesson Student learned (and at Crete again) Once the paras are localised and STATIC , then more and more numbers of even the poorest quality infantry will overrun your paras. The absolute killer is the artillery and mortars. (At Crete the brits didnot have the influx of more reserves and their artillery was detected by the Stukas (good coordination/communication paras and luftwaffe)..).
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