Comments by "ODDBALL SOK" (@oddballsok) on "German Logistics (or lack of) in WW2 Eastern Front | TIK Q&A 11" video.

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  3. @TIK yeah...but now serious on this man's statement.. He only states that the railway tracks and roads combined over the northern route is limiting the whole of the invasion forces and logistics if all the germans forces were assembled along this route. "but is this really the case ?" At least I 'd like him to tell us what is the max capacity of its railway tracks(and wagons)..at least some anecdotes of logistics officers of them running against their limits..etc. Now it is only a poor statement. I can imagine it is so, but I dont see proof of that it is so. So far I imagine that up till the "end" of the railtracks e.g. 1000 units can be deployed/supplied. From that point units up till 300 can get deployed on foot/horse/wheels up to 300 kms from that depot. There is no horse/wheel supply capacity for the other 700 units to venture out outside the railway depot. So ...why is there this statement that the 300 or 500 or all 1000 units are very well able to venture out 500 or 1000 km laterally to the depot and that the 300 units can't even push further forwards (only on basis of lack of supply train..not looking at the enemy opposition) ? How is this "logical" ? Maybe, you can argue that "laterally" there is no thick enemy defense than those deployed in line with the main thrust towards moscow. But that is no argument for the "logistic" statement (well, apart from "heavier fighting = larger logistic losses and strain"). Now, of course Moscow was an important hub and thus the soviets could (re-)supply their front better and quicker than the germans..and they got that opportunity with fresh reserves from siberia...but that is not part of the argument of this Crefeld man.
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