Comments by "ODDBALL SOK" (@oddballsok) on "Montgomery vs Eisenhower on Operation Market Garden's True Purpose | History Debate" video.

  1. huh? There are many strange assumptions....I come back on this later...... uffff.
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  2. 0:48...it is not "just" bending a corner and go after the Ruhr..it is find your allied Armies (those under Montgomery and not Bradley to be more exact!) in a lucrative unobstructed position to fan out in all directions into nazi germany; the manufacturing heart the Ruhr, but also straight towards the east to Berlin, and straight towards the North Hamburg/Denmark...ALL of it would be open for...Monty ! Locking up german (secondary) troops in Holland is only a small advantage. There never was serious thought of allied armoured fights/progress into Holland (too many obstructing waterways, too many civilians, no strategic bonus). But by going towards the Zuiderzee alone, there won't be any improvement in clearing Walcheren and the Schelde for Antwerp or getting Rotterdam harbour. Germans were still there, demolitions were still there, bunkers and guns were still there. There is or was no need for further "support" from germany. (But it could have lead to a psychological effect that german troops other than the absolute necessary (demolition engineers) would have pulled away over the Afsluitdyk...but that takes some time, and would not be noticed in Walcheren until months later) The only important "support" that would be cut off is that of NEW V2 rockets that were sent to The Hague area and fired on London. But later it showed that the Germans fired V2 from Friesland (near Leeuwarden) in the North of Netherlands. Still, RAF bombardments of V2 sites were effective enough, so there was no imperative need to adjust a landbased thrust towards potential V2 launching sites. Besides V2s could still be moved over Friesland over the Afsluitdyke past Amsterdam to Den Haag still with a closed Zuiderzee end at Arnhem.. No, if the allied wanted a big sea port asap, then Market Garden was a waste of time, effort, materials and casualties. Matter of fact was that clearing Schelde project was not planned, and developed until AFTER market garden failure. Then it "suddenly" dawned upon them that for any further push (over a broad front) they'll need a big port closer by. And Antwerp was thought to be liberated and functional, but its approach proved to be dangerous. Market Garden and the north salliant thrust was simply a too good to let go opportunity for Monty personally based on the reports of German panic in the west. Any negative comment or resistance report or recon photo was dismissed because the benefits of a success were too great. I don't blame Monty and the other planners for looking away from a single recon photo of "a" tank, of "a" report of SS in the area (that were hammered and on the run before and thus needed refitting and rest), on splitting the drops over three days; speed in starting the project was of the essence, the para brigades were sitting idle in UK ; it was a luxury for Monty and he knew it. To NOT use all that reserve and missing out on a great opportunity would be wrong. It was a gamble, the allies (Ike included) lost, and the HQ carried on with the normal war progress. But this time Bradley and Patton claimed most of all further resources.
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  3. so you felt what it was like in 1944 ?
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  4. 12:33 because there were no reserves ready to make the whole deployment into the Ruhr. After a successful bridgehead between Arnhem and Zuiderzee, the British allies army had to be refitted, rearranged..there were anyway logistical problems with supplies from Cherbourg, more american allies in France needed also huge supplies...obviously you need the time to clear Antwerp approaches. If you reverse the order ; FIRST the Canadians would be attacking Walcheren, clearing the area (september ; better weather instead of the storms of Oktober)..then for the germans it is obvious where to solidify defenses against any future british thrusts into Germany... More certainly any and all the bridges over Rhine and Waal would be ready for detonation. Any attack in east direction after Walcheren in horrendous october and november autumn weather would seriously hamper Monty's progress...and he CERTAINLY would not get the benefit over Bradley and Patton in the fight for resources. Even when Antwerp is closer to his zone. Using paras behind enemy lines is a tactical surprise (instead of advancing on the frontline as such)...likewise the para project market garden was a strategic surprise: it was stepping over a logical step and catching the germans off guard.
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