Comments by "ODDBALL SOK" (@oddballsok) on ""Arnhem" by Antony Beevor Book Review" video.

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  2. Another clarifying thought about opportunities and dropped opportunities: Once the british were present on "the island" in full force, feeling secure enough to consider it "under control". (say, 22nd sept). WHY didn't they set up actions to CROSS the maas left and right of Arnhem ? After all, the river is quite SMALL there (so much smaller and slow streaming than the Waal at nijmegen) , and easily passable by any mediocre swimmer. Once the military is present IN FULL FORCE with tons of artillery. It should be a textbook excercise to cross a damned little river ?!?! Right ? The germans were able to ferry over quite a few tiger tanks over the Pannerden ferry. Let alone the many halftracks , trucks and SS men. Certainly the germans on the north bank would NOT be able to defend ALL along the maas against crossing brits all over the place ? With also full command of the skies ?!?!? Nope, they DECIDED to BLOW UP the Arnhem bridge . !!!!! The british command conceded that they do NOT wish for further advancement, and made sure the germans would not try anything bold (raiding?) going south either. This shows the british were NOT INTENDING to land in Arnhem with Frost hanging to his fingers and FIGHT INSIDE ARNHEM CITY like they just experienced in NIJMEGEN. Their idea was to enter Arnhem and SPEED THROUGH to the Ijsselmeer. UNRESISTED and UNCHALLENGED. In other words, ONCE it became clear that there was german RESISTANCE in Arnhem (17th and 18th sept), there was NO POINT in reaching Arnhem fighting. Frost or not. The british command had ALREADY given up on Frost !!!
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  4. check this critique on Poulussen book: http://www.go2war2.nl/artikel/2411/Lost-at-Nijmegen.htm quote translated: With "Lost at Nijmegen" author R.G. Poulussen especially revived the discussion about the developments in Nijmegen and he closely monitors the first 24 hours of the fighting in and around Nijmegen. The conclusions go far for the sources and the burden of proof. With the same simplicity, a completely different conclusion can be drawn from the text of the booklet. The 508th PIR had all the freedom and possibility to undertake an attack on the Waal Bridge. This also happened in the first 24 hours and twice. Both attacks were rejected by the Germans. Could they have done more? Possibly, but the source information in the book is not convincing enough. That the late taking of the Waal Bridge had an effect on the development of Market Garden is actually an open door. But that precisely this delay was crucial for Market Garden is also not convincingly demonstrated in the book. With equal ease, other delays in *Market Garden can be identified as just as crucial*. (!!!!!!!) It is praising the author that he is trying to revive the debate around Market Garden 'new' life with this work. His work can contribute to the overall picture of Market Garden. His conclusions go too far, however, to be able to determine on the basis of the contents of the book. The book lacks a good source account for this (an indication of the source is not given, it is only from the notes that some sources have been used) and it is mainly limited in its sources. By quoting other primary sources, a *completely different picture can be outlined*. It is precisely these other sources that have not or hardly been used. This involves sources of non-American origin that can explain the German and British positions in their entirety. The book does not reveal the positions and numbers of British troops that entered Nijmegen. Nor is it supported with sources which German troops were present in the Betuwe, in Nijmegen and the Reichswald or could be transported there quickly. This does not mean that the author would be wrong in his conclusions, but that the book gives me insufficient sources, say proof, to support the conclusions.
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