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ODDBALL SOK
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Comments by "ODDBALL SOK" (@oddballsok) on "The REAL Operation Market Garden | BATTLESTORM Documentary | All Episodes" video.

well..that is too simple stated. In fact Frost and the lack of support from the other british batallions prove that it isn't and wasn't a simple matter of "go to the bridge and hold it a couple of days. Around Arnhem there was enough german forces to kick the shit out of the british paras even if ALL the intended battalions had arrived in Arnhem center. So too were there enough german troops and called in reinforcements around Nijmegen center had Gavin sent all his (say half) first day troops into Nijmegen center. By the time XXX corps would have arrived as it did the germans STILL would have disrupted and harassed any combination of handful US paras with spearhead of XXX corps armour in the rubbled center of Nijmegen. The carnage that historically happened in Nijmegen WOULD JUST AS MUCH TAKE PLACE in Nijmegen had Gavin moved his paras immediately to the nijmegen center. And as XXX corps PROVED historically that it would NOT move armour and vehicles further over the bridge to reach Arnhem, so too would XXX corps not advance further if Nijmegen would not have been cleared for a radius of say 5 kms. You must realise that the use of paras to "take" a bridge is NOT to be able to "hold"the bridge against inf and tank attacks (they are incapable of), the ONLY tactical advantage of para s taking a bridge in surprise is to SAVE it from being BLOWN UP by enemy engineers. And in case of Nijmegen bridge luckily this happened, but not to the grace of the US rivercrossing feat, but through a heroic dutch resistance that cut the wires further inland away from the bridge.
14
PFF John Burns...repetition,repetition,repetition.. You must be Stalin; repeat the same lie thousand times and the people will believe it for truth.. tssk
3
pfff. so much bullshit in one message: just because YOU write a post, it is supposedly the 'truth' ?? pfffffrt.. you failed on references..everytime..and the ones you forward, prove not what you claim. And Monty WAS in the planning. Monty DID SANCTION the splitting up in 3 airlifts...there he SHOULD HAVE stand foot against Brereton (who was the actual incompetent dick that screwed up the chances of success of the WHOLE project).. How old are you Burns ? 16 ? So full of pro brittania ?? All british generals were top ? So explain then how brits failed in 1940, 1941, half of 1942..and only with MASSIVE equipment deliverd by USA and MASSIVE crews (bombers, destroyers, convoys, ) were inching their way ...in Egypt ?? In terms of men and material less than 10% what is deployed in Russia. WHERE WERE THE BRILLIANT ENGLISH COMMANDERS ? Where were they in Malaya ? Allenbrook was perhaps the only smartest of the lot. Horrocks FAILED in the clearing of the west Rhine banks (Kleve, in 1945)..and was TERRIBLY SLOW. And all the germans could place there were a number of skilled paratroopers..and they were mostly GREEN !!
3
***** BEF Dunkirk IS a retreat. Mersh Elkabir sinking ruthlessly a partner fleet (and the french admiral kept his word in 1944 to keep fleet from german hands). Brits developed the Englandspiel because of incompetence. Norway: retreat. Britsih lost GREECE. British lost Krete (even though having more men at the island). British drew troops and equipment away from Libya when they were in an advantage to CLOSE the deal..instead they (churchill !) squandered their resources in Greece. Luftwaffe had to redeploy airforce for the upcoming events in Barbarossa and were not defeated...it simply was concluded it was not efficient to continue given the barabrossa campaign coming. Uboat (and luftwaffe) threat on convoys and shipping NOT contained or thwarted UNTIL the receipt of dozens of american destroyers. Singapore, malaysia, Birma: incompetence on incompetence. Repulse and Pr of Wales againt the Jap combined fleet: idiocracy. Italy: after fall of mussolini the germans occupied and set up defenses WITHIN DAYS..the brits (and americans) werent able to pass the practically handfull of germans in over TWO YEARS to get to Austria. RN fleet was always 5 times bigger than KM. Big deal to win sinking of a single battlecruiser at a time. Germany got their stuff overland. Imports via shipping was not a big deal for germany once west europe and middle europe was occupied.The only thing mattered was oil. That was always and before the critical thing. Really, not one British high ranking officer impressed with better than expected resullts. Monty was good, knowledgable but too safe playing. He never delivered MORE or FASTER than expected (like the likes of Rommel, Guderian, yamashita). Alanbrooke did his good on strategic and logistics level, but could not undo the incompetences of the generals in the field. Ultimately he too failed on the Poles (what did he say to Stalin vis a vis the Poles?...exactly NOTHING). W.Slim did his best in Burma (re)introducing jungle guerilla warfare ..but the scale was too limited, too late and it took too long. (and he may have molested young boys ?).
3
John Cornell Monty retreated in Dunkirk. and Dunkirk..was a 'successfull' retreat..hmpf..now who is using Hollywood (or Pinewood) bravado ..? The blitz bombing was meant to get Uk to signing peace/out of the war. There was never a plan to invade england. As it was never planned and studied BEFORE the invasion of France. The laklustre attempt to put together a rough sketch of Sealion at teh moment of opportunity was just that. Again, for you to bring that up is using a myth. To pretend to the world (to FDR) that UK was strong and really invincible (please support us big US of A..because we are actually NOT so big and invincible after alll...but pssst).
3
Fred Klein so you say what we already know: the Island is difficult to cross or conquer with tanks IF it is in hands of a smart adversary. And it was the germans that had it FIRST. British (tanks and armored troops) would therefore NOT have an easy walk over of even the slightest number of germans at ambush with only a handful of ATguns..
2
dude John and TIK, you are both heavily biased. Even when your quoted books TELL and SHOW a different thing. In all the other places I supported my case where 82nd is not to blame for the whole operation as such. (Let that sink in; ONE of FOUR huge armies (3 para and 1 column) is to blame for a WHOLE operation...: IMPOSSIBLE!... in factt here are FIVE huge armies: the airtransport is the fifth...THEY held the key to failure or success of this mission...).. It really seems you british are sour losers, very unsportive.
2
again..check your own copy of Kershaw and look for 508th, and Henk, and Graebner..and Sonenstuhl or Zonnenstuhl.
2
***** aha..and there you make an assumption you can't make. The success of shooting up Graebner men on the Arnhem north ramp in my opinion can't be copied over the south ramp of Nijmegen. 1) Arnhem had houses nearby and a bridge sentry house ..nijmegen didn't; a lot more difficult to defend in concealment. 2) Graebner was a fool..oh no, that is depicted in the movie..experienced Graebner REALISing the danger of concealed enemy infantry positions in the houses knew you can't STOP in front of them, and could not do harm with MGfire from further on the bridge (and being exposed to possible 6 pdr guns elsewhere along the Arnhem north banks or allied airplanes) decided to RACE past them and end deeper in arnhem to join up with the other SS troops.... unfortunately the halftrack drivers had no clear view on the bridge road, had difficulty avoiding mines, looking out for them means EXPOSING your body up from the halftracks, smoke, etc..and when one stopped , the rest got stuck as well, with clear view from the brit paras ON TOP of them, then it was prize shooting. The same thing would be more difficult to achieve for 82nd on Nijmegen (and that would have to be EARLIER on the day than Frost did his trick on Arnhem..). Earlier means less prepared, less troops in position, less material brought in , less mines...even Frost let the 1st Graebner recon group pass by without firing shots....obviously! There is a difference between ARRIVING at a position and having CLEARED or PREPARED or SECURED a position
2
***** Good to have books quoted, but like you said each is merely a single point of view of a single writer. It is strange that your 2 quotes are diagonally opposite (american vs british), but in favor of the americans (devils advocate if you like) i say these things which is PURELY logic: 1) To march off parainfantry that got a heavy beating, crossing the Waal and almost out of ammo ELEVEN MILES to Arnhem at night is MORE STUPID than to have the same men RIDING the shermans in that direction. The logic option must have been the units TOGETHER not just the one single. But even IF chosing EITHER tanks or EITHER infantry then OF COURSE tanks would fare BETTER. And why ? the PROOF IS that the 6 tanks got LUCKY and THROUGH the mayhem of SS in Nijmegen..which PROVES they can get by dug in enemy infantry (without panzerfausts) without a hassle. And if there are not german 88s in Elst..(and John Burns says there wasnt..and who cares about the tigers..they were INSIDE arnhem , right ?) then WHAT IS STOPPING THEM ? 2) I have a REALLY HARD TIME believing that veteran 82nd troopers who made it through the Waal crossing are KISSING AND HUGGING ordinary sherman tanks. and would be likely to say "i have to surrender to you " when the first british tank commander walks in the commanders defense post as to MISTAKE him for a german ???? Please do a STUDY and find out WHERE in the whole damn world did an AMERICAN elitist officer EVER acted the SAME ?? Maybe the first US -DAK encounter in Tunesia ? but those were GREEN soldiers untrained in anything. And not even THERE you had these displays. (edit) Oh there is a much better example!!: The relief of the airborne troops at BASTOGNE when they were relieved by the TANKS of PATTON !! Wow, if there EVER is a reason ad opportunity to KISS and HUGG tanks then it is that moment with your OWN countrymen tanks!!! And yet; NO SUCH THING HAPPENED. Gosh , I wonder why ?!?? I have no proof of either story, but neither has you..but we can at least USE OUR brains and logic to assess each version. Please!
2
***** Aahhhh!!!!! so if there WERE three Tiger tanks on the island and you make it seem IMPOSSIBLE for 30crps and the 4 shermans to overcome that obstacle, then HOW could the 30crps race simply through the very same Island to Arnhem if the boys of 82nd somehow had managed to keep the bridge all the days before..in waiting for the 30crps. More on the point, if the claim is there were 3 Tiger tanks (and do we presume they were solitary or were there SS SUPPORT TROOPS too ???) how do you expect the 82nd remnants to MARCH OFF towards them without the shermans ?? Anyway, you didnot answer the TWO points I was making about the "kissing the tank" statement and the which makes more sensible advance; tanks or infantry or combined given the information of the ACTUAL battle moments BEFORE. Becoz how do you tell there are Tiger tanks if THERE HASNT BEEN CONTACT WITH THEM before ? Carrington didnot know. Harmel didnot know. The 2 broken shermans were malfunctioning and one hit by a pak gun. So WHERE does the commander of the 4 shermans get the info that there were Tigers ? The same info that Gavin got that there were panzer elements in the Reichswald ? The information that you guys frown upon as myths and old men and children ? Proof enough that you guys do SELECTIVE PICKING in order to absolve the 30crps ill performance. Hell, even your hero FRost blamed the bad performance of the Guards when he visited a memorial at Nijmegen in the 1950's. (I recently read about it on a dedicated website).
2
I show you reasoning: 1) If first you claim three tiger tanks (and do you guess they were operating closeby or dispersed on 3 different locations ? ) are too dangerous for the 3 shermans and handfull of 82nd men, but the next day you say lots of Guards and many more tanks and at least a couple of Challengers were able to knock out the three tigers..then why didn't those "lots of tanks" and "challenger tank" were sent over the bridge the day before ? Oh right; they were witheld as RESERVE. (read = drinking tea). = choice of commander to keep them in the back = FAILURE of 30crps Horrocks to push out ALL HE HAS GOT up the bridge WHEN THE IMMEDIATE OPPORTUNITY AROSE. .. 2) If the "lots of tanks" and "challenger tanks" were involved in dispersed battle actions "all over the nijmegen place" fighting SS that CAME FROM THE ISLAND to Nijmegen area and held up the 30crps for a COUPLE OF DAYS..then how would it differ if these SAME SS OF THE ISLAND PLUS 3 TIGERS would have assembled and concentrated on Lent and DENIED 30 crps and their "lots of tanks" and "challenger tank" a pass through to Arnhem ? .. The ONLY DECISIVE FACTOR of the succes of Market Garden is the 30crps deployment. If a paratrooper has a bridge or not, loses it and retakes it, or loses it again is IRRELEVANT IF the bulk of the 30crps MANAGES to get their shit in arnhem. Whether they fly over the river, they swim over the river; irrelevant. The paras getting and KEEPING the bridges is nice, but if it WOULDNT then it is the job of 30crps to get the PONTOONS, the Baileys bridges out in top speed and get the shit moving. The SOn bridge PROVES the correct mindset, but not the URGENCY and PREPARATION (it took TWELVE HOURS to get the elements forward and bridge 30 mtrs?!) . Urquhart TRYING to hold on to a bridgehead in OOsterbeek where there is NO BRIDGE and the rail bridge was lost, proves the SAME CORRECT MINDSET as a 30crps in full force in Driel with all the aircover and engineers and artillery WOULD BE ABLE to biuld pontoons over the Nederrijn. Yet it is the 30crps to FAIL in the URGENCY to send in their mass of troops into the Island to establish the last link. I read in another link that originally there WERE supposed to be britsih airborne troops on the island on day 17th but those were removed in favour of Ginkel heith... whoever made that decision should have been courtmartialled.
2
***** I have another LOGIC puzzle for your John Burns; IF the 30crps "with lots of tanks and a challenger tank" in FULL deployment in the island was capable of THRASHING the germans , SS and Tigers and what all not, then WHAT WAS STOPPING THEM FROM SIMPLY ROLLING OVER THE ARNHEM BRIDGE INTO FOKKING ARNHEM ???? Frost was gone YES..but they only held a number of houses. The bridge was STILL INTACT. The SS in arnhem were , as you put it, old men and children and secondary soldiers , cooks and stomach diseases battalion. The challenger tanks were INVINCIBLE ?!? So go then ? Over the bridge !? Take Arnhem by storm ! The guards were such superheroes ? not ? OOOOoooh riggghht! It was the 30crps that BLEW UP THE ARNHEM BRIDGE !! And WHY is that Burns ? Can you think of a solid military REASON to blow up a bridge, the VERY bridge that the WHOLE MARKET GARDEN project was about (actually not ;) ) ??!? No ? Because to SAVE THE ASSES of the 30crps against the "weak" SS in arnhem. The 30crps was STRETCHED and were having a TOUGH time fending off all kinds of attacks on the sailliant further down the road, and were having a DIFFICULT time to advance in the boggy fields east of Elst to clear out the germans: it took WEEKS (oktober-november). Hardly an image of a powerfull british army ?! Explain that Burns..
2
and isn't it ironic that the biggest Rhine bifurcation was the WAAL at nijmegen and the 30crps effectively HAD crossed the Rhine and all they had to do is do the same as the germans at Pannerden ferry:PUT TANKS ACROSS THE pannerden and you were in free accessible german tank land ! Only a small river Oude Ijssel at Doetinchem (which was there too after Market Garden ;p ) and go go go into das deutsche Reich?! Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944. So tell me, how come ? How come germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over , under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks could NOT do the same ? Not in september, not in october and not in november.. Just look at it at google maps: the river looks like nothing...
2
Gavin still made the incredible error of at least not sending scouts to the Nijmegen bridge on day one to see if there are explosives prepared on the bridge and/or harass the engineers that would prepare those. But I know he DID have immediate contact with dutch resistance (there was a dutch liaison jumping with him) and thus he could be informed that there were no preparations at all OR the resistance had their men already ready for cutting the wires (I would expect that !). But there is another rumour that a dutch resistance double agent was with Gain and MAYBE he made Gavin believe that a german assault was to be expected from the Groesbeek woods. And it did..but later, and (through the help of the 3rd dropped paras !!) pushed away. But HOW is Gavin or the resistance to KNOW how strong or how experienced the set up german assault would be if you HAVE NO GERMAN INSIDE INFORMATION ? How do you think INTELLIGENCE works on the HQ of the 82nd in the Groesbeek woods ???? Hindsight should not influence your judgement. 49:10 is a very bad assessment TIK.
2
John, it is actually YOU who put all assumptive blame on Gavin without having prove and morever without DELVING into arguments to support or disprove yourself. I started out in thinking, that it can't be so simple as you brits (TK included) portray it. A gut feeling (and I am dutch, no particular yankee lover, nor brits affectionado..I'd like to squash BS arguments). And lo and behold, gradually I read more (Try It never snows in september of Kershaw..OH ? YOU CLAIM YOU HAVE READ IT ?) on books and websites, find out about EXACT times per day that this or that report or action or sighting took place. And based on that information anyone sane must come to a different conclusion than you guys do. A group of 508th of 82nd DID attempt in 17th evening to take the bridge . Yes much later than 15.00 hrs when they landed and started taking their first objectives (prepare roadblocks)..but Gavin must have reminded them or Lindquist in a epiphany suddenly remembered ?. But the german garrison at the bridge would have been SUFFICIENT to defend against a mere 50 men of 508th that could be spared at the 17th eve or afternoon.(There were A LOT of tasks to be acquired by the 82nd !!!). EVEN IF the 50 bold men had displaced the garrison (say loss of 10 men ?), then they would be NO MATCH for the reinforcements that came from north later the afternoon 17th. Prove "at 20.30 hrs the 508 tried to attack Nijmegen but were REPULSED). MORE and MORE germans and SS poured in and that WHOLE Kampfgruppe managed to do an attack FROM Nijmegen to the LZS of 508th and PUSHED that sector AWAY. So if ZE germans are CAPABLE of doing THAT on the 18th morning, how would the 508th with 40 men be able to keep them from retaking the nijmegen bridge IF they had installed themselves on the bridge (in houses? in ruins ?NO , there is NOTHING to gain cover in a 150 m radius around the ramps!!!) Instead of frolicking over Gavin you should ask yourself WHY isn't there a paradrop or glider drop planned on the Betuwe Island in the first place ?? Any landed troop there has the advantage to help take the bridge ramps of BOTH Arnhem and NIjmegen. Reserves could be sent NORTh AND SOUTH depending on the battle situations. (and added bonus : stop german reinforcements coming from the pannerden ferry..perhaps) It is INCREDIBLE that that did not take place. That location was the key for success, The brits gliders (jeeps, carriers, AT) should have landed near Elst and a few coup d etat parachuted paras could have landed in the Arnhem park at the north ramp and Nijmegen hunnerpark ..et voila..the few 20 mm flak guns would perhaps hit a couple of dakotas but place a good concentrated number on that and the job would have had a better probability of succes. AndWHO were the ones that denied the planes to get too close to the bridges ??
2
You know the idiom; it is in restraint that the master is revealed.? The mentioned Rommel, Yamashita, etc..have SHOWN their masterly skills with LESS men and material but BETTER skilled operational moves. Monty, in his succes times NEVER was hvaing less men or material. He was ALWAYS having a 2 to 1 majority and at the point of attack it HAD to be something like 5 to 1 majority. No surprise you can advance "without" reatreat. But a true MASTER would have advanced faster, and stronger and further with the same deployment of men and material as Monty had. And that is what Patton showed. PERSONAL drive ! Monty is typical to all the other british commanders; command FAR in the rear and NO intervention during the battles (until perhaps days later when the moments of opportunities are well lost...).
2
John Cornell tauchpanzers; a flimsy link to an obscure website is no proof. Tauchpanzer were already concepted for crossing small rivers. And in order to prepare for the opportunity to perhaps land at some beach (cliffs ???) in Kent some engineers probably tested and extended the air hoses. But it is not proof that it has been ordered for HUNDREDS of tanks and INSTALLED on them and those tanks we DIRECTED at the canal ports. And Dunkirk "escape" was because the panzers were put on hold, (for one or other maintenance or regrouping or tough on HQ directive or chance to negotiate with english reason), not because the english and french made such a formidable defense... The situations (hatred!) with Stalingrad and bataan were COMPLETELY different . Oh I forgot the "Horrocks Shermans were split all over the place to attack german INFANTRY around 82nd dropzones" yeah right...go and learn about WW2 tank tactics...
2
nonsense...all the 10th and 9th SS inf kampfgruppen, then armoured cars, then stugs, pz4 and finally Tigers coming over via the pannerden ferry already on DAY ONE (17th sept) shows that the island between Nijmegen and Arnhem came more and more in strong german hands. Proof are the tough resistance of SS INSIDE Nijmegen between 17th-21 st (if they were kept in Lent; impassable defense for 82nd and XXX spearhead), the tough hold up in Elst 22nd - 26th (XXX crps tanks and guards could roam "freely"over the island yet could NOT pass onto Arnhem. Why? concentrated SS artillery Sperrfeuer. (Sonnenstuhl). So no, there would have been absolutely no easy walk over. Taking a bridge is not a game of "dibs, I got here first , now you are out, na na naa naaah". No, the opponent CAN and WILL come back and have another try with more REINFORCEMENTS. The question is who can throw in the most troops in to shift the balance in his favour; Horrocks or Bittrich ? In the end itwas the BRITISH who decided to BLOW up Arnhem bridge....despite "all the shermans and guards ???". That is telling enough!
1
The question is how can hindsight foil you ? How is Gavin to KNOW that the german troops coming from the Reichswald (they were coming) were uncoordinated and poor quality ??? Can you answer this: why were the 82nd dropped on the EAST of Nijmegen ? Inbetween Nijmegen and germany's Fatherland Reichswald ? Ever though about that ? If the german soldiers in Holland were supposed to be old men and secondary sentry troops...why RISK your men and LZ in a much more dangerous position with threat coming from the east ?? It would be all the more easier landing in the west (southwest) ? There was even and old airstrip near Grave bridge ! Pretend you use your brains, you are paratrooper planner in the week ahead of MG and you choose EAST. WHY ??
1
Keent airfield...
1
I think it is because the 82nd should act as a shield against "anything" the germans could throw at the column from their nearest german access points; Kleve etc. The allied intelligence knew "sufficiently" what was in Holland (West) of the corridor, but was in the dark what cld be expected from the east. Hence Gavin had to expect the worst and prepare for the worst.
1
Or why not land 1st Airborne immediately at Deelen airfield ;). Somehow allied intelligence figured there would be sizeable german forces there... (I think they knew there were refitting SS troops there (hullo Enigma), but didnot want to scare the paras, scare the public that the policy makers should take responsibility, just play the fool). Since when was Enigma decoded ? 1941 ? If you know the SS is there (but unsure of their actual operational strength) then it figures to not drop ANY para closer to Arnhem bridge (on south side, or nearer to the railway bridge), but choose a "safe" distance near Renkum.
1
What is telling, or bothersome to me is that although Montgomery is all over responsible for the plan, and even though he is taking responsibility for the failure, excuse 90% success, I don't see or read that he is involved in the operation during the days that it took place. Where was he ? What was he doing between 17-22 sept ? HE could take drastic measures to fix things if there were cock ups (like pushing brereton for more flights even during darker hours, even during a slow dissipating fog in UK or in Holland...kick some ass). It seems because he anticipated the SS there , he'd pull away his involvement so that if a loss occurred he could blame his staff under him, but if it were a success, he would take all the credit and exploit the situation. ... If the MG project in potential creates a stunning strategic bridgehead for future operations in Germany, then at least you would see more attention from Monty in that crucial first week. But I read nothing of interest in his diary (published..so maybe pages are missing..)
1
reeeeaaallly ?you have a wild fantasy.... try a reference or quot e from REAL books ?
1
The case of the Gavin blunder is a mistake, but not one that made the market garden fail. His erratic decision simply doesn't matter: in fact Frost and the lack of support from the other british batallions prove that it isn't and wasn't a simple matter of "go to the bridge and hold it a couple of days. Around Arnhem there was enough german forces to kick the shit out of the british paras even if ALL the intended battalions had arrived in Arnhem center. So too were there enough german troops and called in reinforcements around Nijmegen center had Gavin sent all his (say half) first day troops into Nijmegen center. By the time XXX corps would have arrived as it did the germans STILL would have disrupted and harassed any combination of handful US paras with spearhead of XXX corps armour in the rubbled center of Nijmegen. The carnage that historically happened in Nijmegen WOULD JUST AS MUCH TAKE PLACE in Nijmegen had Gavin moved his paras immediately to the nijmegen center. And as XXX corps PROVED historically that it would NOT move armour and vehicles further over the bridge to reach Arnhem, so too would XXX corps not advance further if Nijmegen would not have been cleared for a radius of say 5 kms. You must realise that the use of paras to "take" a bridge is NOT to be able to "hold"the bridge against inf and tank attacks (they are incapable of), the ONLY tactical advantage of para s taking a bridge in surprise is to SAVE it from being BLOWN UP by enemy engineers. And in case of Nijmegen bridge luckily this happened, but not to the grace of the US rivercrossing feat, but through a heroic dutch resistance that cut the wires further inland away from the bridge. (Jan Jozef Lambert van Hoof)
1
well...then analyse the reality: You send 50 paras to the bridge..shoot some 20 germ guards away...you are left with 40 capable men. So, where on and around the Nijmegen bridge would you place them ? problem: 1) no near houses around the ramps (like in Arnhem). 2) If a german armoured column would move down from North over the bridge.(or east from Kleve or Emmerich).how would these 40 men stop them ? Do they carry a bazooka with 5 rounds each and every paratrooper ? Hmm ? Would the , say 4 paras with 4 bazookas not be noticed on the pavement around the ramps ?(and be bombarded with ample mortars and light artillery) In short: wouldn't the "defense" of the "entire" nijmegen bridge by a handfull of paras be "a joke" in military defense terms ? and cleared up in a matter of a few hours ? The key is which concentrated force of armoured vehicles arrives first :the germans or the XXX spearhead. The 82nd on the bridge on the days before is irrelevant. It is ONLY relevant to deny german engineers to place explosives. And yes, that is a risk Gavin and Browning seriously missed.
1
(1) such a 6 pdr gun is only as good as it gets the first shot(s) (with success) but after that is located and gets mortared...end of its use. (2) choosing between setting up the 6 pdr in ambush in wooded area against expected tanks around Groesbeek (landing zones), versus in a streetcorner in Nijmegen ...fully exposed when pulling it in the city by jeep..able to be sniped from all directions; the choice is obvious: leave it at Groesbeek and have only Piats or bazookas or mines in nijmegen.
1
The panzerfausts find is luck. You (or Gavin) cannot plan on that. Btw having found a store full of panzerfausts is proof that it is reserved for ..? quite a substantial number of german garrison men. And where were these men ? Far far away, or rather (on patrol ? excercise?) nearby ? Nijmegen is a very important city in the eyes of the germans. It is unthinkable it would be void with troops (otherwise, the dutch resistance would have a ball there....).
1
Those are the facts..now use the brain to analyse: where would the 10th SS be on day 2 if some of Gavins men were scattered on,over, below , north and south of the bridge ? what would the 10th SS do ? And, If two Tiger tanks were ferried across on the island and given the situation :Handfull British paras contained on Arnhem bridge north ramp by ample german troops and stugs, and US paras untested on Nijmegen bridge and south ramp...a column of british tanks and vehicles moving closer to Nijmegen south. Where would you (or german command) send the 2 tigers (and support) ? Again racing over Arnhem bridge, or rather down to squash resistance in Nijmegen ?
1
In logistics terms the paras have no effect or meaning for the end success of market Garden; what determines the new front/border/stalemate is where will the bulk of the military material and men of the XXXcorps meet the bulk of the military material and men of the Germans. Even IF Gavin had the Nijmegen bridge on day 1, and even IF the XXXcorps would push on to Nijmegen on day 2 end, and even IF XXXcrps would move vehicles OVER the Waal on day 3, by that time the germans had ENOUGH SS troops and material (tanks and artillery) in the area around Elst and Arnhem to stop XXX crps in its tracks. Even IF XXXcrps would push on more and more material on the island and do successful manoeuvres (note: Oct-March the same british could NOT achieve easy breakthroughs in the swampy cold areas around the Waal and Rhine!) that would take AT LEAST 10 more days..then STILL no british tank would be able to cross the Arnhem bridge in September/October.. The frontline would have settled. Settled in practically the same frontline as it did historically. Period.
1
None other than MajGenJames M. Gavin, commanding the 82nd Airborne Division, during Operation Market-Garden, was extremely critical of Browning, writing in his diary on 6September 1944, (prior to the operation), that he "...unquestionably lacks the standing, influence and judgement that comes from a proper troop (readairborne combat) experience.... his staff was superficial...Why the British units fumble along... becomes more and more apparent. Their tops lack the know-how, never do they get down into the dirt and learn the hard way".
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did so. But in terms of losing momentum by losing bridges immediately; you have bridge at Son, railway bridges at Arnhem and >Nijmegen..all blown up by detonation or 88guns. The son bridge actually stalled the XXX progress. THAT was vital. Was it the 101st to blame ? Horocks ? Or rather the naive optimistic planners ? Same goes for Nijmegen. There is enough (i add page numbers later) to show that north of Nijmegen was soon filling with sufficient german reinforcements that would nullify any 82nd battalion or platoon attempt on taking the bridge. Any clearing of these SS would HAVE to be done by XXXcrps. Either INSIDE nijmegen (as per history) or over the bridge in Lent, Elst, whole of Betuwe Island. The 82nd would be incapable of going out IN the island area. History has shown that XXXcrps FAILED to do this job in full force "hell bound", and VITAL hours slipped away in which a more aggressive spearhead /commander would have sent his good troops forward PAST the SS that were shooting out of windows (what else can they do in Nijmegen??? the Nijmegen ramp is CLEAR for 100 mtrs) and go the SAME route as the 6 to 4 shermans that went before them. Follow up on them and go via side roads (not via Elst) to Driel to Arnhem and fire some rounds into Arnhem (and that's it...). I never found arguments or reasons why the XXXcrps as a WHOLE halted in Nijmegen and wasted time in clearing up Nijmegen center for 18 hours ? I suspect it is simply a matter of wrong or incomplete orders and procedure: "do not advance until cleared". And while 1000 guards at the spearhead do the clearing, the rest BEHIND them...do ..NOTHING. And THAT was the last blow to the hope of Arnhem.
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By luck I have the right Kershaw book; 1)page 100 1st patrol in nijmegen 18.30 17 sept. Frundsberg brigade afternoon 17th in nijmegen incl Reinhold, Euling..euling turned via Pannerden..graebner 19.00 Elst on to Nijmegen (20.00?) Henkewas there ALREADY. 2) Graebner turned BACK after reports of frost fights at arnhem (note had 508th attacked EARLY then they wld face graebner troops TOO..by arriving LATER they encountered LESS troops: only Henke ;) STILL 508th could NOT overcome garrison and Henke…stalemate until more elements of 10th SS arrived over the night: page 101. 3) HENCE 508th would only be perhaps capable of pushing bridge flaks away, but not be fit to hold against Henke (when did he arrive by the way ??) nor the later 10th SS coming in at night. 4) Note that the “very easy”bridges Grave and Heumen were secured in what ?30 minutes ?? No!! 3 hours and six hours (page 119) . And you think “a” huge bridge like nijmegen would be secured in 30 minutes?…muhahaha. 5) Page 119 Occupation of the 300 m hill SE of nijmegen . this “took precedence even over the capture of the main bridge over Nijmegen”. If you have been there you can confirm this to be true. 6) Page 123 The lost LZ had to be retaken (on 18th) planes had taken off at 10.00 and were expected to arrive at 13.00 hrs. Compn were extracted from reserves and further US soldiers detached FROM NIJMEGEN to overcome this CRISIS. orders were given to CLEAR the northern and southern LZs! Only the paradrop of 18th sept tipped the balance. also of note page 194 Zonnenstahl, on your website http://www.defendingarnhem.com/Sonnenstuhl.htm sonnenstuhl; Forward artill observ brought down fire to within 100 mtrs of our own positions (Nijmegen, Elst).Therby overcoming CRITICAL moments...this id MUCH to sustain confidence and morale.It may well have been a factor slowing the rate of allied advance towards Arnhem... (I remember there was sentence where it showed that when shermans started to move out for an attack (ELst or LEnt ?) the german arti barrage made them stop immediately...so effective was the sperrbarrage.).
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on the british capabilities vs Tigers and in rubbled cities like Caen. Yes, but that took a LOOOONG time. And if so superiour; what took XXXcrps so long in Nijmegen then ? And what took XXXcrps so long in negotiating Elst ? And why cldnt XXXcrps go assault the Arnhem bridge AFTER frost had surrendered ? No, really.the germans , even weak , even untrained, even unorganised were no walkover. That is nothing to be ashamed about, it simply takes time to overcome enemy resistance...strong or weak. short or long time. It costs time, material, men....logistics.
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By the way on 51:20 day three morning you SHOW that the germans move up TIGERS from the SOUTH side of the arnhem bridge. They were FERRIED over the pannerden river near Het Looveer. This means and PROVES that even if Gavin had his airborne troops at the Nijmegen bridge at day one, the german SS would still have control over AT LEAST the north ramp of the Nijmegen bridge. Say the SS inf troops were not capable of pushing the 82nd away from the south side of the Nijmegen ramp on day 2, then for sure the arrival of the XXX spearhead would NOT be able to cross the Nijmegen bridge ! Tigers and 88guns would blast all allied vehicles off the bridge and could do so from relatively far away hidden and protected (against jaBo attacks) positions along the river bank. The allied push would just as much be stalled on Nijmegen and further polish para drops on the island would not have mattered other than as it already did. For all the allied air superiority it is amazing they did not know (dutch resistance would be able to tell) and did not see, and did not REACT on the ferrying of heavy german reinforcements over there. PLug the holes of the enemy push, and put pressure on your own push...that is all there is to warfare logistics. So the failing of feeding your own push (the airlift; Brereton is to blame) and the too slow pushing up the XXX corps is the obvious scape goats. Its all logistics people...
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I believe there was a 17 pdr antitank gun landed at Oosterbeek (by a Hamilcar)..but no such heavy AT at Groesbeek. The 6 pdr does nothing against a Tiger (or even a Stug) front. Only hope is perhaps a hidden ambush and aiming at the rear.
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That is a nice website link. Thanks. Anyways, how I come to look upon this MG project in terms of achievable success is like you consider the bulk of the german army as a container of ketchup up in the woods NE of Arnhem and the bulk of the allied army (XXXcorps) as a container of mayonaise starting south of Valkenswaard. The roads going over the various bridges as conduits and the areas around towns as other containers, and towns as more difficult to fill containers. The bridges are chokepoints and one way valves controlled by this or that paratroop or garrison fraction. Those one way valves can get displaced or removed if enough fluid pressure acts on it , over "some" time. If a bridge is blown then the valve is broken. A ferry or moving by boats across is a trickling valve. At 17 september you start building the pressure of the two containers. In this view the mere fact that there was enough and more than enough german heavy and battle hardened troops at Arnhem and having access to the "island" south of Arnhem is clear evidence the MG project had to fail in Arnhem. The bridge was simply a bridge too far. Only if thru some miracle if Frost (+ backup) could hold on the original perimeter (of some 1 km across) north of Arnhem ramp and the XXXcrps would make it on time (4 days?) and deploy its tanks onto that bridgehead of 1 km (and support of artillery on the south end of the arnhem bridge) it would be viable. But any wargame with realistic troops depictions would tell that with the given battalion of Frost and the given SS troops in the area (and having access to the "island") etc.. it wouldn't work.
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I haven't got the exact hours , but I find thison Frundsberg alone. : 18 September, 1944: Kampfgruppe "Frundsberg" is blocked from crossing the Arnhem Bridge and begins to ferry personnel and equipment across the Pannerdern Canal (fyi Pannerden is CLOSER to Nijmegen Waal river than Arnhem Rhine river!!). Components of Kampfrguppe "Frundsberg" include 4 Panzer Mk Ivs, Kampfrgruppe "Reinhold", Kampfgruppe "Euling", and Kampfgruppe "Henke". 19 September, 1944: British XXX Corps reaches Nijmegen. 20 September, 1944: Division defending positions along the Waal River, Nijmegen; Kampfrguppe "Hanke" captures Fort Hof Van Holland. At 1500, 2nd battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (US 82nd Airborne Division) begins amphibious assault crossing of the Waal River, and their attack on Hunner Park is repulsed by Kampfgruppe "Euling". British Grenadier Guards clear Fort Valkhof of elements of Kampfgruppe "Euling" and cross the Waal River between 1800 and 1900 as elements of Kampfgruppe "Frundsberg" withdraw from Nijmegen and ready for the defense of Arnhem. As the nijmegen bridge was not assaulted or taken historically on 18 sept , there obviously was no need or order for any german (ragtag) reinforcement to be directed to Nijmegen. HAD the 82nd taken positions on the Nijmegen bridge on 17th then OBVIOUSLY the germans somewhere somehow would have sped things up in the direction of Nijmegen. Reserves from where I hear you ask?: well from the ferried over elements ON THE 18Th september. Or do you REALLY think those guys and 4 tanks (and later the 2 Tigers) just HANG around in Pannerden and wait 48 HOURS until ALL the men and ALL 4 tanks are ferried over IF THE SITUATION would be dire at Nijmegen bridge ? You guys make the mistake(that allied commanders did all the time) that once a situation is cast in stone and you change one vital element you expect the germans/oponents to NOT react or NOT change their decisions and orders ?
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additionally : waffen-ss.no/SS-Panzer-Division-Frundsberg.htm The armoured reconnaissance battalion SS-Panzer Aufklarungs Abteilung 9, under SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer Grabner, had already crossed the Arnhem Bridge southwards when news of the Allied attacks arrived, and raced to secure the road through Nijmegen. On finding the defense of the Nijmegen Bridge well organized, it had returned to Arnhem, (that was the 18th) (I cant vouch on the truth of all of it, but neither can you on your sources..) Note: WELL ORGANISED. I suppose a SS officer would know how to assess a bridge garisson of non SSunits against the risk of uncoming american paratroopers...
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additionally: Frundsberg units then moved to their allotted task of supporting the German defenses at Nijmegen, and later slowing the advance of the British XXX Corps armor after it cross the Waal. Considerable casualties were inflicted on the British during the stubborn German defensive fighting. Frundsberg’s Kampfgruppe Knaust and SS-Pz AA 10 stubbornly defended the town of Elst, the capture of this town would be the only hope for the British of rescuing the beleaguered 1st Airborne Division. So all these SSmen were already in the "island"area on 18th and 19th. And they proved they CAN harass the XXX crps in /around Elst.
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check also this on http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/CARL/nafziger/944GIAD.pdf page 2 "Nijmegen defense force 17-20 sept" and add up the "already present" and "reinforcements of 10th SSand what day they were "there". Also further on page 4 "Build upof Kampfgruppe 10thSS 18-21 sept..crossed EARLY on 18 sept am in pannerden. I don'tknow how you understand this, but to me it shows that ALL the SS (and pioneer) troops that gave the allies a hard time in Nijmegen center would already be in place and prepared for any move OVER the Nijmegen bridge of XXXcrps at midday 19th if the 82nd paras would not already have been pushed away by Grabner on the 18th (when he "checked" nijmegen bridge..). And it is likely the 82nd could not make a carnage on the nijmegen ramp like Frost men did on the Arnhem ramp because there weren t enough housings nearby....
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remember your own suggested (and not finished ) website ? http://www.defendingarnhem.com/Sonnenstuhl.htm Look at the above page (with all kinds of maps and info from KERSHAWs book) and see the Map of the Artillery Blocking Line created by Sonnestuhl in Sept. 1944. Readthe superlatives of his commanding officer: To achieve this, Sonnenstuhl created a Sperrfeurlinie (Artillery Blocking Line) which can be seen on the map below. It meant the forward observers only needed to provide a number and the whole Artillery Regiment would decend into that area in a short period. This of course halted any attack by the Allies and boosted the confidence of the defending Germans. Even the commander of Artillery OB West was impressed by this solution that he visited Sonnenstuhl's command post to see it in action for himself so he could pass this method onto other units. And all the artillery pieces were IN PLACE by 19th sept ... No 6 pdr crew would survive a well placed concentrated barrage....and Sonnenstul only has to go from one AT gun to another to wipe them all of. I am not boasting about german or british capabilities and who is better..the conclusion you DO can take is that for either side it was NOT going to be a walkover in the island region on 19th sept IF the Nijmegen bridge had been kept in hands of the 82nd. and the bloody HISTORY of Elst as is proves it
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More than 2/3 ds of the britsih 1st para did NOT do their job: Reach arnhem bridge...neither of them captured the arnhem RAILWAY bridge: 100% failure. 101st airborne did not get Son bridge; and they held up XXXcrps 24 hrs..... Talking about failures. The Son canal is a mere 30 meters ...you can piss over it..yet engineers took 24 hrs..why ? Because british Horrocks did not have them AT THE FRONT of the column. That too is a GRAVE mistake that hurted the timetable. In my opinion more idiots and naive narcissistic optimists were involved in the planning and execution of this project Market Garden on the british side (Hullo Browning!) than on the American side (Hullo Brereton!).
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***** Nay, of course the trucks are not next to the fighting spearhead ...but as a leader of the XXXcrps column you MUST anticipate the likely possibility that a bridge would be blown and the paras were not successfull. What is your priority then ? HAve the bloody bailey or pontoonbridges near and ready! ...It strikes me as naive to have those engineers coming over from the rear of the column all te way from Belgium. 24 hrs - 12 hrs..yes, I did not have the exact hours at hand. But still...TWELVE HOURS ??! TWELVE HOURS ??? have you witnessed engineers builidng a small! bailey bridge (30 mtrs!)..in an environment where thy were not shot at (Son was cleared)...less than 2 hrs you have that bloody bridge... WHere were the other 10 hrs wasted on ? Indeed; getting the stuff from the rear. THAT is poor planning. British on Arnhem: British did not "have" Arnhem bridge. Tanks could run past it (Tigers on Arnhem, Shermans on Nijmegen) whilst para infantry covered "a" ramp. You "have" a bridge when you control the ramps on both(!) ends and have a secure cordon screen around it.
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what is "Nijmegen: U. S. 82nd Airborne Division - 1944" other than a statement we already know ? A book ? a DVD documentary ? a board game ?
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A very worthwhile website that discusses ALL Market Garden books from all perspectives, and mentions ALL their mistakes: http://www.kritischhistoricus.nl/414964211 You have to google translate it. And yes, even kershaw and Ryan books are having some serious mistakes...
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what about the one(s) from Brian Urquhart ?
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***** What is the point ? Let's assume the photo of Brian (and listed in Bridge Too Far book (print of 1980ies) was a fake. 1) if coming "from Germany" is the statement, it is unimportant; German border is only few miles away...so near enough. 2) you claim liberally there is no proof, but you also present no proof of WHERE they were EXACTLY . 3) You canNOT disprove the obvious conclusion or assumption (if you like) that the SS troops more , or less ? had troops placed and refitted in , near Deelen airfield. Now Deelen was seen as pretty important. By the german HQ, by the allies as well. The most logical location for at least quite a substantial concentration of troops would be Deelen. That is pretty immediate near Arnhem. As for the other assumption you make; brits paras did not meet tanks on day 1"therefore" there were no tanks in Arnhem..consider this: Day 1 was only half a day. The first info germans COULD have there were paras IN ARNHEM was....? after about 18:00 hrs. Dusktime. Up and until then it is thought that ordinary infantry is capable of pushing para infantry out of houses. Sending in "a tank" in streets, between houses, to clear infantry, at night time...is NOT a sound order. So OBVIOUSLY even if tanks/stugs were at the edge of Arnhem, they would not get the order to ENTER and approach the bridge ramp. The germans TOO had a code of "honour" not to destroy (occupied, "befriended") civilian property if it was NOT necessary! So you may state correct facts, but you make incorrect conclusions.
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Just fantasising here, as you may do too; Enigma was broken in ..1941, 1942. So in all likelihood it MUST have been KNOWN to MI6 that "some" SS troops with cannibalized armour are stationed in or near Arnhem. Now, imagine, you are MI6. You canNOT give clues to the Germans that you cracked enigma...but you kinda wanna warn Monty that there is a potential threat up there at Arnhem...what do you do ? 1) continue the drop..but put yourself as major commander in the background 2) supply yr british landing party with some more AT capability (17 pdrs in stead of 6 pdrs) and many Piats. 3) drop them at a far more safer distance; say 15 miles to the east away from the SS ? 4) destroy ANY reference to possible incriminations that you as commander may have known about the SS there. You DESTROY air recon photos that show tanks or even vehicles. You send Brian U. on sick leave, and you state then and after you "were absolutely surprised the germans were refitting there, we had absolutely no knowledge of them...and 'of course' the dutch resistance couldnt be trusted"..hear, hear. That may be a more reasonable explanation on the things at hand than yours. Enigma cracking... that is the key.
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just spinning here; maybe, just maybe Carrington HAD to stop continuing with his few tanks at NIjmegen because HE was instructed not to progress further otherwise the German may have guessed that Enigma was cracked.....Bilderberg conference and such....Prince Bernhard...Carrington invited...oompa loompa..
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in addition to the shortsighted hindsighting blame on Gavin, 82nd, 508th; Getting the Nijmegen main bridge LAST makes sense if you consider this; The planners expected NO germans at the betuwe Island. The planners DID learn that SS corps was at Arnhem but EXPECTED the SS to be HELD up IN Arnhem (by the 3 british columns arriving at the north ramp and thus TIGHTLY secure the ramp so that not even a tank or halftrack (as they would!) could pass). At Nijmegen, there was LITTLE defense expected, but the planners DID expect german reinforcements coming straight from GERMANY; Kleve..thus THROUGH the Reichswald, and THUS through Groesbeek. Thus Gavin HAD TO MAKE SECURE his LZ and defenses against strong enemy troops coming from the east. All the bridges on his west could be taken AT ANY STAGE as long as there weren't SS troops getting FROM Arnhem to Nijmegen. As the smaller bridges at Grave and Mook could be EASILY blown up, it was MORE IMPORTANT to get those IMMEDIATELY and the Nijmegen bridge last. Decisions to assembly, organise and march to hither or tither are done BEFORE the jump. So naturally the movements of the 508th are explained with the above assessment in mind. Unfortunately, it TURNS OUT, that the SS WERE able to move a stream of armoured vehicles PAST FROST to NIjmegen, and more importantly, more SS troops were able to get FERRIED over in a CONSTANT STREAM via the pannerden ferry. And THAT was the killer in the MarketGarden project; the planners simply did not think of possibilities for the germans to insert troops inbetween Arnhem and Nijmegen. HAd the planners dropped troops on the island (near Elst) on 17th sept than THAT would have been the key of success; the whole "island" would be a secure LZ fro the british and the 82nd if need be. If one is a simpleton (John Burns), you may even blame FROST for letting Graebner (and kampfgruppe Henk!) PASS his defense positions at the Arnhem north ramp to get to Nijmegen which eventually would prove to be too strong for the first men of 508th arriving at the Nijmegen ramp. But in reality it is the planners to blame...
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Like I said; it was Frost who let Graebner including Henk pass by Arnhem north ramp to the south without a shot fired . Good riddance for Frost personally, but it meant extra SS forces on Nijmegen bridge before the 508th got there. I haven't found an exact time when Henk Kamfpruppe was there but in tracking the timing and movement of Graebner it must have been well before 18.00 hrs. The 508th battalion (400 men max in total ..but sent off party at best 100 men) could not do the task of setting blockades at Beek and reach Nijmegen before 18.00 hrs. Even if splitup, sending off 100 men straight to Nijmegen they MIGHT arrive earlier than Henke, but would not be able to set up solid defense positions against the arrival of Henke AND Graebner. Digging trenches for men and a possible 6pdr AT gun and filling up the sandbags TAKES TIME. Hence the signal "position secured" is HOURS away from "position arrived". In fact as frost let the SS pass under his noses, you might as well blame Frost for the failure. Instead what to think of the SIXTY (yes 60) sherman tanks that were in and around Nijmegen as per Battle order on 19th and 20 th sept and DID NOT PUSH THROUGH over the Nijmegen bridge ?!? For 18 hours! If 6 tanks can make it over the Nijmegen bridge against the background of shooting SS and Guards infantry..then why not 16 ?? or 36 ?? or indeed 60 ?? YOu say they were held up in fights "all over the Groesbeek heights" fighting what ? Old men and children ? SO why were they WASTED there ? Never asked yourself this ? Where were the 54 shermans of Horrocks ?
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drinking...TEA ?!?!
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Maybe his cellphone didn't work ? Or the doves to deliver messages weren't dropped ? Or the chain on his bicycle was off, and he didn't feel like walking up and down 2x 15 miles ? maybe he was fully occupied with many other tasks and attention points ? hmm. you know, being a general and so on... (sarcasm)
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John Cornell "why didnt gavin check.." Because it was 1944..decades before cellphones and internet. Telephones didnt work (cut lines) so they either had to be installed (ropes and ropes of lines) or the walkietalkies didnt work or its signals were obstructed (germans were no idiots in that field). And once you GIVE an order , you EXPECt it to be done. And given it to be hostile territory, you don't get alarmed if there aint a messenger or wardove or indian smoke message coming from the extreme ends of your troops to say what has or hasn't been achieved...in the VERY FIRST hours of the day. cock-up ; yes..extraordinary cock ups ? No. That is warfare , and many more units involved in the MG project made them... Question is was it crucial to the entire success?; answer no. It didnot matter GIVEN all the surge of SS material and troops passing by Frosts battalion, and ultimately Pannerden canal (which is a low running stream !?..and the brits could NOT USE THE SAME CROSSING POINT towards germany a week later ?!??!).
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John Cornell So the XXXcrps tanks split up all over the place (I guess attacking german TANKS??!??) is the fault of Gavin ? (twat)
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John Cornell Compare the experiences the same paratroopers had on Dday: contact with units were lost; assumed DEAD or surrendered. What do you do as commander ?? If you have tons of men to spare; send other groups. If you DONt (and something and you yourself tells us there wasn't enough men to do all the first moment chores) it depends on the time, priorities, spare men that report to be idle, etc. There is chaos . ALWAYS. Maybe less then the shit in normandy.. but make no mistake; the landing zones on DDAy were yes in the dark, but were in the hinterland where normally NO GERMAN soldiers were stationed..they TOO marched in to seek the paratroopers. In Groesbeek too, the germans were THINLY dispersed...BUT the daylight made IMMEDIATELY clear the US landed there and so german reinforcements are QUICKER to go in the right direction. At least gavin had to be prepared for that.And that TAKES TIME and ATTENTION. Compare it to the british airborne at Oosterbeek; only ONE battalion was lucky to reach the bridge ramp (and NOT CONTROL IT)..ALL the others FAILED. And also Frost could NOT GET IN TOUCH with Hartenstein HQ. (Only a relay to the next closest team that evening, but when those were killed/routed..the next days communication was lost).
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***** 101st: lost Son bridge...101st did not repair the bridge.They can't. result: FAIL. Only because there were some engineers in BELGIUM that had bailey (or pontoon) bridges the XXX cld advance TWELVE HOURS ?!?! later. (12 hrs is very very very very looooooong time to build a stupid 30 mtrs bailey bridge...there you see a logistical fail of Horrocks..who was still in Belgium at that time ..). Had Nijmegen bridge been situated next to Eindhoven, then XXXcprs wld also take the bridge if 82nd had not yet taken it.. (WHY ? because the damn bridge is then CLOSER to XXXcrps starting point...simple logistics). Nimegen bridge blown up ?No, to the credit of 82nd 8and dutch resistance). Nijmegen rail bridge? Blown. Arnhem rail bridge ? BLOWN UP. Arnhem bridge blown up ? Not yet. but blocked by wreckage. Ultimately BLOWN UP by british !
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