Comments by "Digital Nomad" (@digitalnomad9985) on "Drachinifel" channel.

  1. "Battleships were obsolete" They were no longer the top surface combatants, but they were most efficient at providing cheap fire support to invasions and coastal flanks up to 20+ miles inland. Indeed, in every major conflict from the end of WW2 (Korea, Vietnam) to Operation Desert Storm, a WW2 BB or 2 were brought out of mothballs to support ground operations with naval gunfire, which is cheaper than air strikes, (both financially and logistically) even when you don't lose any aircraft. All good things must come to an end, but the Marines miss them already, and will continue to do so until the Navy can deploy rail guns, or something of the sort, to support ground operations. And more carriers would not have helped without more carrier aircraft to arm them and more pilots to man them. Not everybody is cut out to be a carrier pilot. Capital ship production may be fungible, but it isn't interchangeable with aircraft production. Both were at capacity at the time. Also, this vid mentions in passing the Battle of Surigao Strait, where for perhaps the last time in history a naval line of battle "crosses the T" of an enemy battle line and destroys it. This is a decisive battle because the battleships prevented the Japanese Navy from achieving its overall objective, the destruction of the troop transports and the beachhead, which the Japanese Southern Force battleships could have accomplished on its own if not checked. Concerning the Central Force/Taffy engagnement, the Japanese commander should not have disengaged when he did; not only because he was wrong about facing fleet carriers, he should not have withdrawn even if he WAS facing fleet carriers. When a WW2 battleship force manages to bring enemy WW2 carriers into VISUAL range (which they could not ordinarily have done to these small carriers except for the Taffy task force's need to draw the Japanese away from the transports and the beach) ALL of the advantages of the carrier over the battleship are negated, and as long as they can be held in visual range the battleship holds the whip. The carrier has the advantage of air recon and air superiority to deny a battleship's spotter plane their air recon, and also the striking range advantage. In open sea, so long as a carrier has planes left and room to maneuver, the carrier CAN find and (usually) strike the battleship and the battleship can do neither to the carrier. In visual range the recon and range advantages are lost, and armor and firepower come to the fore, checkmate blue. The Japanese fleet was under air attack, but leaving the Navy a deck to launch from only made his withdrawal more costly
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  2. So, we have finally uncovered the American's clever ploy! (Before you get mad at somebody else, I'm an American.)
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  3. "Midway-level critical hit" Yes, the situation immediately put me in mind of the first carriers the Japanese lost at Midway in a similar state with a strike fueled and armed on deck, ubiquitous damage control training making the difference.
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  4. "Oh, I wouldn't worry son, I THINK THEY'VE LEARNED THEIR LESSON!"
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  5.  @logion567  " the only victory there was waiting for the USSR to implode. " So Dems say now but at the time they were saying that the USSR was invincible and perpetual and it was folly to think of overcoming it. When what they said was impossible was a accomplished, the party line was it was no big deal, and forget what I said before. Regardless of how obvious it was or was not challenging the Soviet Union was a Reagan policy vehemently opposed by his critics and by the elites. Saying the USSR was a paper tiger to minimize Reagan's accomplishment is historically naive. It is a tacit admission that he was right when the curators of the then CW, including may of the same individuals doing the post-Cold-War minimizing, were wrong.
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  6. What if it helps us get along with each other?
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