Youtube comments of (@keitumetsemodipa3012).

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  9.  @SamsonZionist  Yeah I mean we understand Christ to be the whole point of the TANAKH and so when we look at Melchizedek we see the typography of Christ, namely being the eternal priest of Most high as well as being the King of Peace as in: Isaiah 9:6 (NKJV): 6For unto us a Child is born, Unto us a Son is given; And the government will be upon His shoulder. And His name will be called Wonderful, Counselor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace. in: Psalm 110 (NIV): Psalm 110 Of David. A psalm. 1 The LORD says to my lord: “Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies a footstool for your feet.” 2 The LORD will extend your mighty scepter from Zion, saying, “Rule in the midst of your enemies!” 3 Your troops will be willing on your day of battle. Arrayed in holy splendor, your young men will come to you like dew from the morning’s womb. 4 The LORD has sworn and will not change his mind: “You are a priest forever, in the order of Melchizedek.” and Genesis 14:17–20 (ESV): 17 After his return from the defeat of Chedorlaomer and the kings who were with him, the king of Sodom went out to meet him at the Valley of Shaveh (that is, the King’s Valley). 18 And Melchizedek king of Salem brought out bread and wine. (He was priest of God Most High.) 19 And he blessed him and said, “Blessed be Abram by God Most High, Possessor of heaven and earth; 20 and blessed be God Most High, who has delivered your enemies into your hand!” And Abram gave him a tenth of everything.
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  55. ​ @chemquests  I’m sure you’ve encountered objections to Kant’s epistemology, particularly those raised by Orthodox Christianity, which has long critiqued similar epistemological frameworks within Catholicism and beyond. These objections apply broadly to most foundationalist views on knowledge. For instance, the claim that "we cannot view reality as it is but only through our senses" is inherently circular. This critique forms a core part of my argument against naturalism: it is circular in a way that fails to resolve the fundamental epistemological problems it seeks to address. To illustrate, consider a caveman who has never stepped outside his cave, yet insists that "all that exists is this cave." Could it not be the case that this prima facie belief is part of what sustains intriguing but ultimately restrictive worldviews such as naturalism or Platonism? The cave, in this analogy, represents the limits of sensory perception or theoretical frameworks that preclude access to transcendent realities, which Orthodox Christianity critiques as an unwarranted restriction of knowledge. At the end of the day I would personally be on a journey to really put these beliefs in serious scrutiny: "We cannot view reality as it is but only through our senses" "All knowledge is contingent on what we learn next, and what we take to be knowledge today can be false tomorrow with the appropriate discovery" "it can’t be fully justified..no claim can be." Not in the domain of science but of reasoning, I believe that Orthodoxy doesn't have these issues but it's not why I'm Orthodox
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  95. For the people curious about the Christian position, in order to show that The Messiah is God, I first have to show that God is Triune (God is speaking here, saying that God sent him and his Spirit) Isaiah 48:12–16 (ESV): 12 “Listen to me, O Jacob, and Israel, whom I called! I am he; I am the first, and I am the last. 13 My hand laid the foundation of the earth, and my right hand spread out the heavens; when I call to them, they stand forth together. 14 “Assemble, all of you, and listen! Who among them has declared these things? The LORD loves him; he shall perform his purpose on Babylon, and his arm shall be against the Chaldeans. 15 I, even I, have spoken and called him; I have brought him, and he will prosper in his way. 16 Draw near to me, hear this: from the beginning I have not spoken in secret, from the time it came to be I have been there.” And now the Lord GOD has sent me, and his Spirit. and Jesus said in John 8:24 (ESV): 24 I told you that you would die in your sins, for unless you believe that I am he you will die in your sins.” The Christian position is that God is Triune, and that the second person of God who is sent by God, came to fulfill the Law because he was the whole reason for the Law to begin with, you can see the Angel of the Lord / Word of the Lord throughout the whole Bible, we just believe that God keeps his promises and came to give us salvation by taking on a human nature in order that it may be perfected after what happened in the fall
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  106. @AustenDenning I think there’s a difference in how we’re using the term “logic.” For me, logic is conceptual—it exists within the mind and doesn’t have an independent representation outside it. This seems to contrast with how you’re describing it. What you’re outlining seems to involve two sequential events that might have a causal relationship but don’t necessarily have to. For all we know, the light turning on could be entirely unrelated to the switch. It’s possible that the light switched on spontaneously at the exact moment someone flipped the switch, with the switch itself playing no causal role. This kind of scenario reflects the broader concern of radical skepticism. Turning to probability doesn’t fully resolve the issue either. As Hume pointed out, past events don’t justify future ones. Probability itself relies on patterns observed in the past, which doesn’t guarantee future consistency. Additionally, assigning probabilities requires a gradation between two absolutes (e.g., 0 and 1), along with a judgment to justify those gradations. But this judgment itself needs justification—a justification that skepticism challenges. This issue of justification extends into many scientific fields, where rules of incompleteness often apply. For example, scientific theories operate within certain limits and make assumptions that can never be fully verified. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems in mathematics, for instance, demonstrate that even within a formal system, there will always be truths that cannot be proven within that system. In summary, the concepts of causality, probability, and even scientific reasoning require presuppositions that skepticism questions. Without a way to justify these presuppositions, we can’t guarantee their reliability.
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  121. ​ @vex1669 I agree that comment sections aren't the best platform for in-depth discussions, but I'll address your points succinctly. First, I disagree with your characterization of "faith." It’s entirely possible to choose to trust in nothing and no one, including oneself—this is often referred to as "radical skepticism." However, where is the concept of "gradation" coming from in your argument? Gradation inherently relies on transcendentals, such as a standard and a method of delineation between extremes or absolute points. A particular mind, without reference to something beyond itself, cannot account for these transcendentals. Second, I would argue that "radical skepticism" or nihilism is the natural conclusion of atheism, but that's another topic altogether Third, there’s no inherent reason why one "ought" to avoid being led astray. Why is being led astray "wrong"? The term "wrong" is another transcendental category that presupposes an epistemic criterion, a method of delineation, and an absolute value judgment. If one denies these foundations, then "wrong" becomes inapplicable to any realist theory of value—particularly to questions like whether one "should" commit a crime. (I'm just pointing this out, not accusing you of saying / believing this) Lastly, I’m unclear about what you mean by "faith in religion." It’s possible you might be committing a quantifier shift fallacy here, depending on what you mean by "in the context of religion." To align with my apophatic theology, I’ll explain what faith is not according to Orthodoxy: faith is not fideism, nor is it an obligation. Faith is an optional participation, with obligations arising only after the decision to participate has been made.
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  124. ​ @vex1669  I was referring to the "God is imaginary" discussions, not specifically to you, regarding the defense of beliefs. What do you consider to be the correct method to use, epistemically speaking? The question of why I should be an atheist is intended to address how moral imperatives are "pre-logical and pre-philosophical." It highlights the point that engaging in logic and philosophy already assumes certain moral presuppositions— which Quine’s paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" touches on Even if one dismisses worldview comparisons as an epistemically valid method, there remains the task of justifying moral imperatives and judgments such as: "Worldview comparison is a 'bad' method, epistemically speaking." "You 'shouldn't' use it—if you value sound reasoning." "Faith, as epistemic justification, is not a 'good' method either." "Debate strategies bordering on 'dishonest' behavior should be abandoned." All these moral judgments and imperatives, even when expressed colloquially, still demand justification and accountability. Addressing worldview comparisons is only one aspect of presuppositional argumentation. The broader aim is to explore the preconditions for concepts like truth, moral imperatives, and moral judgments—examining how they are justified and accounted for. Interestingly, Unsolicited Advice engages in what seems to be, a growing trend to respond with statements like, "Well, you face the same issue as we do, so there’s no real solution." Personally, I see this as more of a concession than a substantive response. For one, it seems to rely on tu quoque reasoning and ad hoc claims, while also being circular: - We know things through the senses. - There are certain things we cannot know. - Through the senses, we come to realize there are certain things we cannot know. If this circularity is not problematic—or if circular reasoning, in general, is deemed acceptable—then the discussion shifts to distinguishing between valid and invalid forms of circularity. This brings us to philosophers like Cornelius Van Til and Kant among others regarding circularity
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  125.  @vex1669  I was referring to the "God is imaginary" discussions, not specifically to you, regarding the defense of beliefs. What do you consider to be the correct method to use, epistemically speaking? The question of why I should be an atheist is intended to address how moral imperatives are "pre-logical and pre-philosophical." It highlights the point that engaging in logic and philosophy already assumes certain moral presuppositions— which Quine’s paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" touches on Even if one dismisses worldview comparisons as an epistemically valid method, there remains the task of justifying moral imperatives and judgments such as: "Worldview comparison is a 'bad' method, epistemically speaking." "You 'shouldn't' use it—if you value sound reasoning." "Faith, as epistemic justification, is not a 'good' method either." "Debate strategies bordering on 'dishonest' behavior should be abandoned." All these moral judgments and imperatives, even when expressed colloquially, still demand justification and accountability. Addressing worldview comparisons is only one aspect of presuppositional argumentation. The broader aim is to explore the preconditions for concepts like truth, moral imperatives, and moral judgments—examining how they are justified and accounted for. Interestingly, Unsolicited Advice engages in what seems to be, a growing trend to respond with statements like, "Well, you face the same issue as we do, so there’s no real solution." Personally, I see this as more of a concession than a substantive response. For one, it seems to rely on tu quoque reasoning and ad hoc claims, while also being circular: - We know things through the senses. - There are certain things we cannot know. - Through the senses, we come to realize there are certain things we cannot know. If this circularity is not problematic—or if circular reasoning, in general, is deemed acceptable—then the discussion shifts to distinguishing between valid and invalid forms of circularity. This brings us to philosophers like Cornelius Van Til and Kant among others regarding circularity
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  132. ​ @TheDrink69420  Yeah, the answer is ok for either or both, Your question is interesting, but from an Orthodox perspective, the proposed dilemma doesn't hold up for several reasons: God and Truth: To assert that "God lied" is incoherent because God grounds truth itself. As the source of all truth, any contradiction between God and truth is a category error, it also doesn't work because God doesn't have propositional knowledge but that's another topic. God as Creator: The claim that God didn’t design us also fails, as nothing that exists was created apart from Him. This is affirmed in Scripture, which states, “All things were made through Him, and without Him, nothing was made that has been made” (John 1:3). God and Existence: The suggestion that "God doesn't work" misunderstands God’s nature. God is existence in a predicative sense, not as a being among beings but as the ground of all being. Thus, the dilemma you propose doesn’t fully account for the Orthodox understanding that God created humanity perfect and that human reasoning can still be flawed. These truths are complementary, not contradictory, within the Orthodox framework. Moreover, the question also fails to address the nature of logic. Logic, from this perspective, is not merely an abstract system but an act of the will, performed by persons who exercise said will. However, logic is also shaped by the person’s worldview. For instance, a materialist may consistently avoid fallacies while reasoning, yet their worldview itself presents glaring problems because it cannot adequately account for transcendentals such as truth, logic, or moral imperatives. By failing to consider both the ontological grounding of logic and the influence of worldviews, the dilemma misses the complexity of how truth, logic, and human reasoning intersect in Orthodox theology. The difference here of course being the meaning of perfect, which I'm ok with any definition you wish to give
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