Comments by "Harry Mills" (@harrymills2770) on "Ukraine Changed the Course of the War with KURSK Offensive" video.

@jlo7770 I thought I saw a report of F16 use and one F16 downed.
4
@efghggdxlmfn33 I think there's more to it than that. The incursion is great "bulletin-board" material for Putin (Something a team puts on the bulletin board to inspire its players against the next opponent. An insult/slight or provocation.) It could favor Ukraine, if it were just a matter of getting more checks from the West, but all the checks really do is prop up the Kiev regime's operating budget and bring Kiev more equipment. I don't think it solves Ukraine's dreadful manpower situation, and if it triggers a massive military build-up in the West and the sending of Western troops (which Ukraine REALLY needs), then Western governments will fall. The people are fed up with government misfeasance, malfeasance, and fecklessness. Going to war and reinstating military conscription will be the straw that breaks the back of a Western political class with very little connection to the needs of the people.
3
@vesnakrka4130 I thought this video was very helpful, because he gave us a nice synopsis of the incursion. Too few do that, offering us skirmish-level detail, without much or any kind of strategic context. History Legend is a legend.
2
@HavanaSyndrome69 He's pretty unbiased. When either side takes losses, he always says "unfortunately." I think an unbiased observer would sound very pro-Russian to a pro-Ukrainian person. I don't think Russia has any problems with unbiased observers, because the strategic situation is so lopsidedly in Russia's favor. #1 NATO's gone woke. #2 NATO is broke. #3 NATO is flexing, while blithely ignoring #2, after decades of voluntary, systematic deindustrialization. NATO nations are upside-down on their debt. People watch this war in detail, but without context. You can pick whatever side you want and find plenty of willing takers to present your side in a favorable light. But my math specialty is analysis, which devotes itself to the question "How big is it?" and I just can't find any scenario, here, that is better for the West and its proxy than the situation for Russia and the Global South.
1
@TorianTammas I'm hearing that from more than one place. You're probably right, insofar as any of us can be. smh I'd rather be arguing with people about the best permaculture methods for their soil and climate zone!
1
Excellent compilation of articles. Much info in little time. I think the Kursk "incursion" is bad for Ukraine. If they don't get a huge infusion of foreign support, they will collapse. If they DO get a huge infusion of support, they can last a little longer, but the amount of help they need is beyond the West's ability to provide, and trying to help more is just sapping their fragile economies. The collective West is built on finance, and in spite of its absolute dependence on manufacturing, it's out-sourced major manufacturing sectors. It's regulated much of its resource-extraction and manufacturing out of existence. Oh, we still get manufactured goods, but we buy them from abroad. We are not at all configured at present to fight any kind of sustained war. We can certainly make a big splash, somewhere, but we would lose a battle of attrition against the Russia, China, and the Global South. India wouldn't take part, directly, but they're going to buy as much cheap Russian oil as they can, and they're good friends with Russia, despite their ties to the West. I feel like the USA is living on borrowed money and borrowed time. I think our economy is fragile, while Russia's was built under duress and thrives under duress. The West, not so much. We're very enamored of finance and controlling the world through finance and access to credit, but our spending sprees over decades were purchased on credit, and to try to match the rest of the world, we would need to borrow very heavily, and the credit is drying up.
1
@matthewadkins7973 I made an argument. You failed to refute any of it. Is that how you argue all the time, or just when you're out of your depth?
1
@martinjacobsen2992 By "plenty Ukrainians left," you mean there are about 20 million left in 2024 of the 38 million in 2022.
1
@corvusduluth They're not bringing enough manpower to secure "won territory," nor are they bringing in the equipment needed to fortify those gains.
1
@BoyBoyhaere50 I think he understands quite a bit, but he looks at every skirmish in isolation, as if it's strategically important, and ignores the larger conflict. If Ukraine lost 10,000 men in one day, but won a skirmish in a lopsided regiment versus platoon confrontation, the entire West would hear about the skirmish, and sweep the 10,000 under the carpet.
1
@gerardslontgezegendezalige4836 Reported use of F16s in ground support operations would seem to suggest that Russian air defenses in that area are weak. On general considerations, they probably are weak. I think Russia invited this incursion, for the political capital to expand their mission in Ukraine. ECM and anti-ECM is the next-level competition. It sounds like some of that $61 billion went to new air defenses and ECM units. And they're trying them out where the Russians don't already have similar capabilities. I think the new ECM equipment is copying what the Russians appear to be doing in the South. They're much more aggressive with their armored vehicles and we're hearing more reports of Russian aircraft flying more classic ground-support missions, which you can only do when you've eliminated or neutralized enemy air defenses. Ukraine's taking advantage of the soft spot up North, but I think it will backfire on them, because it escalates the Russian response one or two more notches. It activates trained but as-yet-unactivated "garrison troops they have dispersed almost everywhere. The Ukrainians having given them the excuse to not only build up in that soft area, but to also go beyond the Ukrainian border. Ukraine might be getting some good press right now, but Russia's friends are going to believe Putin's only reacting to provocations, and using great restraint. This plays good to China, India, and the Global South. The Ukrainian gainst, in the short term, plays good to Western audiences.
1
@BoyBoyhaere50 It's pretty clear who's trying to learn and inform and who's trying to win a pi$$ing contest.
1
@matthewadkins7973 Germany was a generation or two ahead of the Allies in aircraft and tank technology, but what defeated them was mass production of "good enough." A plane that can out-duel another plane is shot down like any other plane when the surface-to-air missile strikes, or is simply outnumbered by cheaper planes. A tank that can out-duel another tank is still going to lose to a drone or if it's surrounded by cheaper tanks. I think we sort of picked up where the Nazis left off, trying to make planes and tanks, perfect, when the lesson of WW II was mass production of something that's not terrible that can be fielded in much greater numbers. We're in an era where we put so much into the platforms, when it's the munitions they carry that are advancing the fastest. Lighter armored vehicles and unarmored vehicles in vast numbers, armed with modern weapons, can reach out and destroy much higher-priced battle tanks at a fraction of the cost.
1
@matthewadkins7973 So obviously Russia is losing. That's not how it works.
1
@matthewadkins7973 Missile production and stockpiles. Tank production and stockpiles. Artillery production and stockpiles. Those not aligned with the West have cumulative GDP greater than that of the West. The West is busy fighting culture wars and de-industrializing itself. Maybe that will help. Oh yeah. The West is upside-down in debt, and facing financial collapse.
1
@matthewadkins7973 I think the West could give a good accounting in the first round of the festivities, but there's nothing behind it. The industrial capacity just isn't there. Russia's not trying to fight in the USA's back yard. The USA is trying to fight in Russia's back yard. But maybe you're right. I just hope neither of our theories is put to the test. It's time to make peace and stop meddling around the world.
1
@matthewadkins7973 I think I replied to this, already. Yes. The ME 262 was too little, too late, and it diluted other efforts. Same with Tigers. I think Hitler's mixed feelings and hesitancy about invading England probably sunk his boat. Certainly the need to cross the Channel and get back home severely limited what the Luftwaffe could do over England. They outnumbered and could have dominated the then-RAF over Europe, but radar and advantage of home turf gave England a huge force multiplier in the air in the Battle of Britain. The main advantage the Allied side had was that the USA had a bigger economy and more industrial capacity than all of the other combatants, combined. It wasn't small tech advantages, here and there. I don't think it's a matter of plane versus plane. I think it's a matter of air defense or its lack, and the ability to manage and replace losses. I think the West has a blind faith in "miracle weapons," much as the elites in Rome and Nazi Germany.
1
Ukrainians are trying to push their air defenses forward as quickly as possible, but they're not keeping up with their deepest penetrations. But they're still pretty far forward. Short term, Russia's putting more aircraft in jeopardy, blunting the Ukrainian charge being more important than the loss of said aircraft. What I'd like to know is the progress of the fortifications between Kursk and the Ukrainian salient. I only saw one little blurb suggesting massive fortifications being built well ahead of the deepest penetration by Ukraine. We know how fast Russia can dig trenches and throw down dragon's teeth (Very fast). Unless Ukraine is doing something to hamper that, it will go pretty much as things are going in Donbass, and I'm guessing they already got a big chunk of it done in the first few days. Russia will systematically build up and slowly crush the forces on Russian soil. I don't think Ukraine has the same rate of fortification building. I don't think the token few thousand men and few hundred armored and other vehicles mounting this 2nd campaign in the North have the men or the equipment to actually do much in the way of fortifying any of their gains. I fear they will be decimated and pushed back, rather easily, except insofar as the towns, themselves, are big enough to constitute "instant fortifications."
1