Comments by "Harry Mills" (@harrymills2770) on "Military Summary"
channel.
-
46
-
43
-
28
-
20
-
15
-
14
-
14
-
11
-
10
-
9
-
9
-
8
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
5
-
@Homobikerus Russia is holding Ukraine at bay on Ukrainian territory, while its mobilization and training of new recruits continues at a rapid pace. And their arms manufacture, which was already greater than the combined production of NATO, is accelerating.
Russia COULD make an all-out assault, but every day, they are growing stronger. They weren't BUILT to execute the kind of overwhelming offensive you're talking about. One of the ways Putin got Russia's fiscal house in order was to shrink the military down to size. That was one of his keys to turning the Russian economy around, building up massive gold reserves, and improving the lives of the Russian people, with actual laissez-faire economics. Oh, the state will still intervene at its pleasure, but it largely pleases his government NOT to intervene. They have the system in place to take it all away any time they want, but functionally, the Putin government is less interventionist than the USA's, imho
And, while I wouldn't say Russia is an American-style Republic guaranteeing its people many if any rights, the security state is also expensive, and not something Putin leans into. They're still autocratic to a great degree, but by and large, his government doesn't generally exercise its full powers. The Russian people enjoy a lot of functional freedom, and are even allowed to dissent to some degree, certainly more than under Soviet rule.
In some ways, Russia is more American than America. Putin celebrates his Russian Orthodox faith and encourages traditional (Christian) family values. While this no doubt has its uses as a system of control, that used to be an American thing, and the Soviets were explicitly atheist. Meanwhile, in the USA, uppity Catholics and parents who complain at school board meetings are on terrorist watch lists, with the FBI surveilling them and looking for any excuse to round them up.
Makes me think. Maybe that's why Hollywood always de-constructs all its heroes. It's a reflection of the lie that America has become. Worse than that, a lie it tells to itself, to its ruin.
5
-
My 'nuanced' take on this is that it's possible for Prigozhin, Popov, Gerasimov, Shoigu and Putin to ALL be right at the same time. I think the brass have an excellent strategy, but even in the best of conditions, the front lines are going to be placed under a lot of pressure. Big picture is primary military objectives were achieved at minimal cost. If they'd done a full mobilization prior and done it "right," Ukraine would've had time to dig in and fortify. Also, they would've had more time to accumulate aid from NATO nations. This trickle has been murder, but imagine if Russia had waited and that trickle was already started months before and Ukraine had ALL of it on Day 1, with time for more people to get trained-up, also.
It would've been much tougher going, with much higher losses and ammo expenditure. Ukrainians could be the ones with multi-layered fortifications and be fighting in a gray zone on the Russian border, itself, in spots (maybe).
The trouble is, those early gains must be expanded on and at least defended, while the general mobilization continues. The skeleton force they've been using to hold what they took and inflicting maximum damage to the Ukrainian military, which is forced to counter-attack at minimum cost to the Russian military, OVERALL. But it comes at great cost and to no apparent purpose to the men on the front lines. They expect to CRUSH the enemy, not fight at the enemy's level.
I think the Russian brass have to balance the fatigue of their experienced fighters with the losses that green troops will suffer if rushed to the front lines prematurely. Every week the front remains static is another week of training for just-mobilized recruits. They have quite a few, now, who can start getting their feet wet, but it's got to be gradual, or the situation can deteriorate very rapidly. They're bigger than Ukraine, but the death-dealing capability of modern weapons is such that small mistakes can snowball.
Assuming the above is close to reality, then Prigozhin and Popov popping off is a not entirely unexpected phenomenon. I think the advent of StormShadow, Himars and other stand off weapons changed the calculus for the Russian brass, and they're adjusting on the fly. But there were logistical snafus for both Prigozhin and Popov. But that's just war. It doesn't mean anybody miscalculated. What matters is how they adjust, and to my amateur eye, it looks like they're adjusting as well as they might be expected. I wouldn't expect the frontline commanders to LIKE it very much, but the overall strategy is sound, and what's more, there isn't a whole lot of adjusting they can do, until the Muster of the Rohirrim is complete or at least more complete.
Even though they're taking losses against Ukraine's final roll of the dice, the counter-offensive has devastated Ukrainian forces. And you're starting to see more and more of the young 20-somethings who will essentially take over from the more experienced (and exhausted) veterans that've been doing all the heavy lifting. They're pushing those guys to the breaking point. They're giving the new recruits as much time as possible to finish training and rotate to the front. The more time they can give them to develop, the better they will be, albeit at great cost to the original fighters.
Is Prigozhin (his commanders) out of line? Somewhat. But he's also right. And any good commander ALWAYS takes care of his men, and becomes skeptical of Command when they're given insufficient manpower or artillery, or are ordered to play patty-cake, without gaining territory or fighting for the same territory over and over. Nobody wants to be cannon fodder in a war of attrition, even if their side is "winning," especially when half the guys you started with are dead and wounded.
5
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
Putin had to cut personnel dramatically in '98-'99 to get Russia's financial house in order. I think he was wildly successful, considering the state of Russia in 1998. He still kept building up arms and equipment, but on a budget, and by avoiding war. Sell? Yes. Use? No.
Not everything is Putin's way, but I think the general plan is solid. Prigo and Popo probably don't like it, because the strategy comes at the expense of the professional soldiers while they're building and training a citizen army. I think the basic calculation still holds up, and even though Ukraine is doing some damage from long range, the scale of the damage is not huge, and needs to be weighed against the potentially huge losses suffered when you rush green troops to the front before they're ready.
I think Russia can already make out OK with massive reinforcements of green troops, but the strategic brain trust doesn't want to suffer higher losses. Fighting retreat and coordinating artillery strikes requires well-trained and experienced troops. Even if it's the optimal strategy to be patient, your Prig's and Pop's might not be happy about it.
4
-
3
-
3
-
Failed offensive. Failed meeting in Vilnius, which was the POINT of the offensive. Now, with their forces vitiated, I think Russia's about ready to end this, by force. Ukraine's still not making it easy, but the build-up and forward staging of overwhelming forces is well underway. I think we're already seeing them begin to rotate the most battle-weary troops. First, Wagner made a theatrical exit, stage left. Popov's crew are getting reinforced and I'm guessing rotated out, without Popov.
If I didn't know any better, I'd say that Popov and Prigozhin drama is all orchestrated. What was the result of the drama? Russia rotated those forces out of the front lines and there're fresh troops and more artillery in those places. They're not as good, man for man, but the artillery and air advantage is growing.
3
-
Different tactics are called for in different circumstances. The situation in 1944 was very different from the situation in 1941. Russia has massive manpower and artillery advantage, but the manpower advantage is only now really making itself felt. Russia began the smo with a relatively small standing army. They're experiencing and will experience the difficulties of growing an army by leaps and bounds not unlike the Red Army in the 1930s and 1940s. (Forget the purges, which were exaggerated. Most of those officers remained in the Red Army, but there was still a great shortage of experienced commanders.)
The $oviets, like the Russians of today, were continually training and developing their troops. That meant green troops and commanders in the field. it was brutal, but by the end, in 1945, they were possibly the best army of all time (and no surprise, the Allies were shaking in their boots, looking across the boundary between E and W Berlin).
It's just sad that our side didn't act gracefully when the wall came down. Big opportunity for lasting peace and prosperity, but a lot of people in the security business would've had to find real jobs. They had to have a boogey man to keep their little ecosystem thriving. That's one of the reasons people like Trump. He'd be a monster in trade negotiations, not putting up with cheating and making trade partners pay a hefty tax that made treating people and the environment poorly less profitable than doing things the right - or at least a better - way.
It's called constructive engagement, and it's a good idea, but none of our leaders seem capable of finding a middle path that is strong and peaceful.
3
-
3
-
3
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2