Comments by "Vikki McDonough" (@vikkimcdonough6153) on "Forgotten Theatres - The Indian Ocean, Naval Strategy and Setup (1921-1941)" video.

  1. 1. How fast could a Richelieu-style Hood (with two quad turrets superfiring forward rather than two superfiring pairs of twin turrets) have gotten with the extra machinery space freed up by consolidating the entire main battery forward? 2. In the 1930s and 1940s, the U.S. placed a great deal of emphasis on battleship-deck-armor penetration via plunging fire at very-long-to-extreme ranges. How did apparently no one realize that this was unworkable in practice due to the ranges involved (beyond 25-30kyd) resulting in shell flighttimes so long that (as you've pointed out multiple times on this channel) the ship being targeted can just dodge (and, as you've also pointed out, even if the target sails obligingly in a straight line, WWII-era battleship guns simply aren't inherently accurate enough to land a battleship-killing number of hits on a battleship-sized target at these extreme ranges before the battleship they're on runs out of shells), and that realistically all they were doing by using things like the 16" Mk. 8 Super Heavy shells was compromizing U.S. battleships' ability to punch through belt armor at realistic battle ranges? 3. When one of Iowa's propeller shafts was bent sideways by the shock of a large wave impact while riding out Typhoon Cobra, why didn't the whirling effect of a massive spinning thing abruptly becoming badly unbalanced rip open the bulkheads along the shaft's length, flood the adjacent compartments clear forwards to its engine room, and sink the ship a la Prince of Wales? 4. Why didn't the U.S. destroyers at Friday the 13th ram Hiei when they saw that their torpedoes weren't significantly affecting her?
    2