Comments by "TruthWarrior" (@Truth-warrior-j3e) on "British Stand"
channel.
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@terryfoster1706 probably not the wisest move. If someone decided to pay their energy bill minus £300 in protest at the removal of the winter fuel allowance, they would likely face several consequences:
1. Accrual of Debt: The unpaid £300 would be treated as debt by the energy supplier. This would lead to an outstanding balance on the account, which the supplier would eventually demand be paid in full.
2. Late Payment Fees: Many energy suppliers charge late payment fees when bills aren't paid in full. These fees could increase the amount owed over time.
3. Credit Rating Impact: Unpaid bills, including energy bills, are often reported to credit reference agencies. This could negatively affect the person’s credit score, making it harder to obtain loans, mortgages, or other forms of credit in the future.
4. Threat of Disconnection: If the debt accumulates and remains unpaid, the energy supplier might threaten to disconnect the person's energy supply. Before this happens, suppliers usually offer payment plans or install a prepayment meter, where the person pays for energy in advance.
5. Legal Action: In extreme cases, if the debt continues to go unpaid, the supplier could take legal action to recover the money owed. This could involve court proceedings and additional legal costs.
6. Prepayment Meter: Suppliers might opt to install a prepayment meter in the customer’s home to ensure they can only use energy that has been paid for in advance.
It’s worth noting that while protests like these may feel like a stand against a policy decision, they often harm the individual more than they pressure the government or energy suppliers to make changes. Alternative forms of protest, such as petitions or lobbying, might have more meaningful impact without these negative consequences.
1
-
@moonstone5565 There was! Yes, in the past it was possible for pensioners to reject or opt out of receiving the Winter Fuel Payment. Some pensioners, who felt they did not need the additional financial support, chose to decline it. However, the process for opting out wasn't widely advertised, and most people simply accepted the payment automatically.
While some may have chosen to donate their allowance to charity instead, the automatic nature of the payment meant that actively rejecting it required specific action, such as contacting the relevant government department to opt out.
In practice it was often deemed to complicated and, a bit like negative insurance clauses in documents where you have to tick a box NOT to have something, a lot of people didn’t bother. The alternative, to opt in, would be even worse since that would require the most disadvantaged to do so causing no end of issues, quite apart from the cost of administering such a scheme.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@elliegoldie6140 You seem to be confusing different things. Members of Parliament (MPs) do not receive a second Winter Fuel Payment for having a second home. Like other citizens, they are only eligible for one Winter Fuel Payment based on their primary residence, assuming they meet the age and residency criteria. MPs do not receive special treatment or additional allowances for this payment.
In the U.K., the Winter Fuel Payment (WFP) is generally provided to individuals who have reached the State Pension age and meet specific residency criteria. However, second homes do not qualify separately for the Winter Fuel Payment; it is tied to the person, not the property.
If you own more than one property, the payment is only made to the address that is registered as your main residence. Therefore, second homes do not get an additional allowance.
Perhaps you are thinking about MPs living expenses if they claim for another property by virtue of their constituency being far away from parliament. These expenses are nothing to do with WTP. MPs do not receive a specific "heating allowance" for a second home. However, they can claim certain expenses related to maintaining a second home or accommodation in London to perform their parliamentary duties. This includes costs for rent, utilities (which may cover heating), council tax, and other necessary expenses, as per the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) rules.
These allowances are designed to support MPs who need to live in two locations: one in their constituency and another near Parliament. However, the expenses claimed must be within set limits and are subject to transparency and regulation.
1
-
1
-
@ABM750 except that good does come from it:
1. Workforce Participation:
• According to a 2020 report by the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), migrants (including undocumented ones) are overrepresented in low-skilled sectors like hospitality (30%), construction (14%), and social care (17%). These sectors often rely on migrant labor due to difficulties in recruiting UK-born workers.
• In sectors like agriculture, illegal immigrants are often crucial to maintaining the workforce, with up to 20% of labor in some industries (like fruit picking) being performed by undocumented workers.
2. Economic Contribution via Consumption:
• Even if not directly contributing through income tax, undocumented migrants still contribute to VAT. The average UK household pays around £5,800 annually in VAT (per Office for National Statistics). If even a fraction of the estimated undocumented population (ranging from 800,000 to 1.2 million) spends at this rate, they contribute billions to the economy.
3. Overall Migrant Contributions:
• While illegal immigration data is scarce, studies on legal immigration may provide a useful proxy. A 2018 study from the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics showed that immigration as a whole has little to no negative impact on wages or employment for UK-born workers and actually has a small positive effect on the economy.
• According to the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), EU migrants (which could include some undocumented workers) have made a net positive fiscal contribution of £2,300 per head annually. Non-EU migrants make a smaller but still positive net contribution.
4. Tax Contributions from Undocumented Workers:
• While many illegal immigrants work in the informal economy, some studies suggest that undocumented workers in some sectors are actually paying taxes. In the United States, for example (which has parallels to the UK situation), it’s estimated that undocumented immigrants contribute around $11.74 billion annually in state and local taxes. While direct UK figures aren’t as easily available, similar mechanisms are likely in place.
5. Demographic and Workforce Support:
• The UK’s aging population presents a challenge to the labor market. According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), by 2050, almost one in four people will be aged 65 or over. Migrants, including illegal immigrants, are typically younger and of working age, which helps balance out the workforce and supports pension systems indirectly by sustaining economic activity.
6. Healthcare and Public Services:
• A 2020 report by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) suggests that while there are costs associated with providing healthcare and education to undocumented migrants, the overall fiscal impact is often overstated. The NHS, for example, spends a small percentage of its budget on treating undocumented migrants, who also contribute to the system through indirect taxes like VAT.
7. Cost of Deportation:
• There are significant costs associated with deporting undocumented immigrants. The UK Home Office’s estimates from 2019 suggest that deporting a single individual costs around £12,000 to £25,000, not including legal fees, detention, and ongoing enforcement costs. These costs are considerably higher than any assumed fiscal burden undocumented immigrants may place on public services in many cases.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@alangardner8596 I think I can see where you are confused. Correct me if you meant something else but my point about Schengen wasn't anything to do with the free movement aspect, it was to do with the significant impact this now has on the UK. This is important because the UK is now at a significant disadvantage compared to Switzerland because of Brexit.
Since the UK is no longer part of the European Union (and thus no longer part of the Dublin Agreement), the UK's exit from the EU and the Schengen Area has had several significant impacts on its immigration and asylum policies:
The Dublin Agreement is a key mechanism that regulates which country in the EU (and Schengen Area) is responsible for processing asylum applications. Under this agreement:
Asylum seekers must apply for asylum in the first EU country they enter.
If they travel to another EU country, they can be returned to the first country where they entered and applied for asylum.
Now that the UK is no longer part of the Dublin system due to Brexit, this means:
No automatic returns to other EU countries: The UK can no longer return asylum seekers to the first EU country they entered under the Dublin Regulation. This used to be a mechanism the UK relied on to reduce the burden of processing asylum claims for people who had passed through countries like France or Greece.
In the absence of the Dublin Agreement, the UK has had to develop new bilateral or multilateral agreements with individual EU countries for cooperation on asylum and immigration matters. However, as of now, there is no comprehensive replacement for the Dublin Regulation. This affects:
Asylum cooperation: Without the DA, there is no legal basis for returning migrants between the UK and EU countries unless specific agreements are in place. The UK has made efforts to negotiate deals with countries like France, but these are more limited in scope.
Border and security cooperation: The UK also loses access to key EU systems like the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the Eurodac database, which track asylum seekers' fingerprints across the EU. This reduces the UK's ability to easily identify if an asylum seeker has already applied in another EU country.
The lack of a replacement for the Dublin Agreement may have several effects on migration flows:
Increased difficulty in managing asylum seekers: With no formal framework for returning asylum seekers to other EU countries, the UK may face increased pressure to handle more asylum claims domestically. This might increase the number of people seeking asylum in the UK.
Channel crossings: The end of the Dublin Agreement has coincided with a notable rise in the number of migrants and asylum seekers crossing the English Channel by small boats from France to the UK. The UK government has attributed part of this increase to the absence of Dublin-style returns and has made efforts to curb these crossings through increased border patrols and bilateral agreements with France, though challenges remain.
1
-
@alangardner8596 That is simply not true. Both Switzerland and the UK have strong deportation policies, but the UK has taken a more public stance on deterrence. Switzerland, on the other hand, typically focuses on pragmatic and efficient deportation processes.
The UK has a stricter stance on asylum, particularly after Brexit, with the government reducing options for regularisation. Switzerland has a similarly tough asylum system but is sometimes seen as more flexible in cases involving humanitarian concerns or long-term residents.
Integration Policies: Switzerland offers limited integration opportunities at the cantonal level for certain illegal immigrants, while the UK’s "Hostile Environment" policy aims to restrict services to those without documentation. This makes life more difficult for illegal immigrants in the UK.
In both countries, immigration is a highly politicized issue. However, the UK’s immigration debate is more visible internationally, particularly after Brexit, with frequent discussions on reducing immigration numbers. Switzerland’s discussions, while equally intense, tend to focus more on practical enforcement rather than high-profile political rhetoric.
Regarding your second sentence, the specific number of 1.6 million as "new arrivals" in a single year is not supported by mainstream data for any recent year.
I assume you are referring to so called data coming from The Centre for Migration Control (CMC). The CMC is not widely recognized as a mainstream or academic institution and is not mentioned frequently in major, reputable sources like the UK's Office for National Statistics (ONS) or large international organizations like the UN or the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Think tanks and advocacy groups like the CMC often produce reports to support specific policy positions, and the reputability of such organizations can vary depending on their methodologies, transparency, and biases.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@azazel_5319 Not exactly right - you rounded up by quite a bit - but your point is still valid. The 2024 UK general election brought significant changes in the political landscape. Here are some key details about the results:
1. Labour Party:
• Labour won 33.7% of the total vote share, which is a slight increase from their 2019 result of 32.1%. However, this is still lower than their 2017 result of 41%  .
• In terms of seats, Labour secured a commanding majority with 412 seats, which is 63% of all available seats in the House of Commons . Labour made significant gains in constituencies previously held by the Conservatives, such as Tamworth and Finchley .
• Notably, Labour had a huge breakthrough in Scotland, winning 37 seats (up from just 1 in 2019) due to major swings from the Scottish National Party (SNP) .
2. Conservative Party:
• The Conservatives suffered severe losses, winning 23.7% of the vote share and securing just 121 seats, a historic low  . This represented a loss of 251 seats compared to their 2019 result.
3. Liberal Democrats:
• The Liberal Democrats had one of their best performances ever, winning 12% of the vote share and 72 seats . This was a notable increase from their previous elections, with significant swings in several former Conservative constituencies, particularly in the South East .
4. Reform UK:
• Reform UK also saw substantial growth, capturing 14.3% of the vote share, although they only won 5 seats . Their presence had a notable impact on right-wing voters, splitting the conservative vote in many areas .
5. Other Parties:
• The SNP suffered major losses, winning just 9 seats, down from 48 in 2019 .
• The Green Party made gains, securing 6.39% of the vote share, and won 4 seats, the highest in their history .
6. Voter Turnout:
• Voter turnout was 59.8%, the lowest in over two decades, down from 67.3% in 2019 .
These results reflect a significant shift in the UK political landscape, with Labour achieving a strong victory, the Conservatives suffering a historic defeat, and smaller parties making record gains. The devil however is in the detail. If your wish is for Reform to succeed then it might just be a fools gold to go for the Labour vote (the stated aim of Reform). The detailed data suggests that this will not work. At least what I have seen anyway.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1