Comments by "SpaniardsR Moors" (@spaniardsrmoors6817) on "The Regia Marina in WW2 - The Under-appreciated Navy (w. Vincent O'Hara)" video.

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  5.  @kloschuessel773  Why was Germany in Greece? Here's why: From Hitler’s own words: “Others among the German leadership were less critical, most notably Adolf Hitler. In his address to the Reichstag following the conclusion of the Balkan Campaign, Hitler was complimentary to the Greeks for their "extremely brave resistance", but stated that given the Greek logistical situation, German involvement was not decisive in the Greco-Italian conflict: "The Duce... was convinced that a quick decision would be arrived at one way or another in the forthcoming season. I was of the same opinion." He stated that he had no quarrel with Greece (which he had acknowledged as part of the Italian sphere anyway) and that his intervention was aimed solely at the British as he suspected that they planned to set up a threat to his rear in the vein of the Salonika Front of the First World War: "the German forces, therefore, represented no assistance to Italy against Greece, but a preventive measure against the British." He further noted that by the beginning of April the Albanian campaign against the Italians "had so weakened [Greece] that its collapse had already become inevitable", and credited the Italians with having "engaged the greater part of the Greek Army." [251] In his private correspondence in April 1942, Hitler said: "It is equally impossible to imagine what might have happened if the Italian front had not been stabilized in Albania, thanks to Mussolini; the whole of the Balkans would have been set alight at a moment when our advance towards the southeast was still in its early stages." In N. Africa the Italians had successfully WON , BEFORE Germany arrived .
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  15. “A popular impression in the United States of the Regia Marina, the Italian Navy, during World War II is that because its powerful surface fleet spent so much time in port, it was more effective as a fleet in being – in other words, for what it could do – than for what it actually did. As with all generalities, there are exceptions, and in this case that exception was its Decima Flottiglia MAS (10th Light Flotilla), one of the most effective units in the history of special operations.” None of the major participants of World War II have suffered as much unjust and unfounded criticism as the military forces of the Kingdom of Italy. It really is just amazing how this false narrative has taken hold and grown ever stronger and more prevalent over time. The nonsense of the Italian Navy being completely inept: “This revisionist history convincingly argues that the Regia Marina Italiana (the Royal Italian Navy) has been neglected and maligned in assessments of its contributions to the Axis effort in World War II. After all, Italy was the major Axis player in the Mediterranean, and it was the Italian navy and air force, with only sporadic help from their German ally, that stymied the British navy and air force for most of the thirty-nine months that Italy was a belligerent. It was the Royal Italian Navy that provided the many convoys that kept the Axis war effort in Africa alive by repeatedly braving attack by aircraft, submarine, and surface vessels. If doomed by its own technical weaknesses and Ultra (the top-secret British decoding device), the Italian navy still fought a tenacious and gallant war; and if it did not win that war, it avoided defeat for thirty-nine, long, frustrating months.”
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  18. This is NEVER mentioned and is the key to Italy's under performance: Won the Spanish Civil War which greatly hampered the Greek campaign and the remainder of Italy’s war effort of an already unprepared Italy back-stabbed by Germany when they broke the Pact of Steel just 4 months after signing in Sept. ‘39, stipulating Italy would receive 3 more years to rearm, invaded Poland and brought an unprepared Italy in WW II. "The Consequences of Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War" Italian participation in the Spanish conflict from July 1936 and March 1939 had three major consequences: First. Italian aid to the Nationalists played a major role in their victory — possibly the decisive role. Furthermore, the high level of Italian assistance to the Nationalists was crucial in bringing the downfall of the Second Republic prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. This prevented any rescue of the Republic by the French, as might have occurred lad it survived until September 1939. Second. The diplomatic and political consequences of Italian involvement in the war gravely hindered any post-Ethiopian War reconstruction of the anti-German Stresa Front. In particular, Italian and French aid to opposite sides in the Civil War made a rapprochement between Rome and Paris virtually impossible. Instead, the de facto Mussolini-Hitler alliance in support of the Nationalists led directly to the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in October 1936 and contributed significantly to the May 1939 Italian-German military alliance known as the Pact of Steel. In turn, the Pact of Steel gave Hitler the confidence to attack Poland in September 1939, initiating the outbreak of World War II. Third. The Italian Army and Air Force were significantly drained by their heavy material support to the Nationalist and the involvement of significant Italian ground and air units in the Civil War. To a lesser degree, the Italian Navy also suffered from its participation in the conflict. The resultant military weaknesses were a major factor in persuading Mussolini to proclaim Italian “non-belligerence” in September 1939. More significantly, after the defeat of France persuaded Mussolini to intervene in the European conflict in June 1940, the continuing debilities of the Italian forces due to their participation in the Spanish war contributed to the disasters suffered by Italian arms in 1940-41.
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  23. From Hitler’s own words: “Others among the German leadership were less critical, most notably Adolf Hitler. In his address to the Reichstag following the conclusion of the Balkan Campaign, Hitler was complimentary to the Greeks for their "extremely brave resistance", but stated that given the Greek logistical situation, German involvement was not decisive in the Greco-Italian conflict: "The Duce... was convinced that a quick decision would be arrived at one way or another in the forthcoming season. I was of the same opinion." He stated that he had no quarrel with Greece (which he had acknowledged as part of the Italian sphere anyway) and that his intervention was aimed solely at the British as he suspected that they planned to set up a threat to his rear in the vein of the Salonika Front of the First World War: "the German forces, therefore, represented no assistance to Italy against Greece, but a preventive measure against the British." He further noted that by the beginning of April the Albanian campaign against the Italians "had so weakened [Greece] that its collapse had already become inevitable", and credited the Italians with having "engaged the greater part of the Greek Army." [251] In his private correspondence in April 1942, Hitler said: "It is equally impossible to imagine what might have happened if the Italian front had not been stabilized in Albania, thanks to Mussolini; the whole of the Balkans would have been set alight at a moment when our advance towards the southeast was still in its early stages."
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