Comments by "SpaniardsR Moors" (@spaniardsrmoors6817) on "History Hustle" channel.

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  7. USUAL/BS about Greece: ITALY won, not Germany, not Greece: Which country occupied 2/3 of Greece the remainder Germany/Bulgaria? From Hitler’s own words: “Others among the German leadership were less critical, most notably Adolf Hitler. In his address to the Reichstag following the conclusion of the Balkan Campaign, Hitler was complimentary to the Greeks for their "extremely brave resistance", but stated that given the Greek logistical situation, German involvement was not decisive in the Greco-Italian conflict: "The Duce... was convinced that a quick decision would be arrived at one way or another in the forthcoming season. I was of the same opinion." He stated that he had no quarrel with Greece (which he had acknowledged as part of the Italian sphere anyway) and that his intervention was aimed solely at the British as he suspected that they planned to set up a threat to his rear in the vein of the Salonika Front of the First World War: "the German forces, therefore, represented no assistance to Italy against Greece, but a preventive measure against the British." He further noted that by the beginning of April the Albanian campaign against the Italians "had so weakened [Greece] that its collapse had already become inevitable", and credited the Italians with having "engaged the greater part of the Greek Army." [251] In his private correspondence in April 1942, Hitler said: "It is equally impossible to imagine what might have happened if the Italian front had not been stabilized in Albania, thanks to Mussolini; the whole of the Balkans would have been set alight at a moment when our advance towards the southeast was still in its early stages." [252] ”
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  11.  @HistoryHustle  Italian participation in the Spanish conflict from July 1936 and March 1939 had three major consequences: First. Italian aid to the Nationalists played a major role in their victory — possibly the decisive role. Furthermore, the high level of Italian assistance to the Nationalists was crucial in bringing the downfall of the Second Republic prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. This prevented any rescue of the Republic by the French, as might have occurred lad it survived until September 1939. Second. The diplomatic and political consequences of Italian involvement in the war gravely hindered any post-Ethiopian War reconstruction of the anti-German Stresa Front. In particular, Italian and French aid to opposite sides in the Civil War made a rapprochement between Rome and Paris virtually impossible. Instead, the de facto Mussolini-Hitler alliance in support of the Nationalists led directly to the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in October 1936 and contributed significantly to the May 1939 Italian-German military alliance known as the Pact of Steel. In turn, the Pact of Steel gave Hitler the confidence to attack Poland in September 1939, initiating the outbreak of World War II. Third. The Italian Army and Air Force were significantly drained by their heavy material support to the Nationalist and the involvement of significant Italian ground and air units in the Civil War. To a lesser degree, the Italian Navy also suffered from its participation in the conflict. The resultant military weaknesses were a major factor in persuading Mussolini to proclaim Italian “non-belligerence” in September 1939. More significantly, after the defeat of France persuaded Mussolini to intervene in the European conflict in June 1940, the continuing debilities of the Italian forces due to their participation in the Spanish war contributed to the disasters suffered by Italian arms in 1940-41.
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  15.  @beau4170  Source: Courage and Cowardice in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and Defeat in the Summer of 1942, War in History, 2013, 20(1) 99–122 by Dr Jonathan Fennell Dr Jonathan Fennell of King College, London has written a very insightful article about the poor combat performance of the British 8th Army in the summer of 1942. Accusations of cowardice and lack of courage were bandied about in the upper echelons of the British high command and war cabinet. Of course, any hint of cowardliness was hushed up and kept from the general public. According to Dr Fennell, the situation of cowardliness and low morale among the rank and file of the British soldier and infantryman leading to an unwillingness to fight and a distinct tendency to surrender, that General Auchinleck, “with the unanimous agreement of his army commanders, forwarded to the War Office a recommendation for the reintroduction of the death penalty for ‘desertion in the field’ and for ‘misbehaving in the face of the enemy in such a manner as to show cowardice’.” The situation was so bad, that Auchinleck could not wait for a reply from the War Office to his request that he issued a general order to his senior officers that they were to ‘take the strongest possible action against any individual of whatever rank who refused to conform to orders. If necessary, in order to stop panic, there must be no hesitation in resorting to extreme measures, such as shooting an individual who cannot otherwise be stopped’.” To back up his request for the death penalty, Auchinleck provided further statistics to support his argument, reporting that:
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