Youtube comments of Eastory (@Eastory).
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1. I think you are not taking into account the situation in Germany in the end of 1918. There had been a revolution that had brought a Social Democratic government into power. This had not put an end to internal turmoil and political infighting, which continued. There was also the continuing British blockade, which was creating shortages in the food supply. Army was being dissolved and the Germany's ability to exert its power outside its borders was falling fast. Eventually they would not even have the power to keep control over their own country, as some of the eastern provinces became part of Poland.
So what benefit would it provide to set up a puppet states in a remote corner of Eastern Europe? There was no ability and political will to support it due to domestic problems and the pressure from the Entente countries. Even if some sort of a government would be set up locally, it would impossible to coerce it to take steps benefiting Germany due to lack of power.
Lastly, it was considered improbable that as the territory had no strong established government nor an army, it would be able to create them during the the 1,5 months the German troops were conducting their withdrawal. It was therefore considered likely that it would defect to the Bolsheviks or fall without much resistance. Therefore the German help to the Estonian government was limited, as it was believed that most of the weapons given to Estonian Army would eventually end up in the hands of the Bolsheviks. For this reason, when the last German troops boarded ships in Tallinn, then instead of giving their weapons over to the Estonian forces they threw them into the sea.
Creating German puppet states in Eastern Europe post Armistice was both unfeasible and pointless from the German perspective.
2. The German Freikorps and regular army did fight in Latvia in 1919. However, as before, the focus of the German government was on domestic issues. The leader of the Freikorps did try, with the help of local Baltic German nobility, to establish their regime in Latvia, however this was not in line with official policies of Berlin. Creating a semi-feudal state in the Baltics did not benefit the German Social democratic government, which was at the same time under pressure from the Entente to limit its involvement in the region. The Freikorps was ordered several times to limit their activity and pull back, but as they were autonomous, they were able continue. This is the reason the Estonian and Latvian forces were able to defeat the Germans so easily - they were dealing only with the Freikorps, with the German regular army staying far behind and not taking part in the hostilities.
I agree with your point that the existence of an Anti-Bolshevik state in Estonia did benefit the German government, as it probably lessened the Red Army's pressure in the direction of East Prussia.
3. Päts was in prison, but he was not the whole government. There was also a body of individuals, which had remained free and coordinated the various institutions in order to be ready to take over the reigns of power when a suitable opportunity arrived.
4. In November-December the Estonian army was being built up and was at its low, with desertions, insubordination and lack of weapons plaguing it, so it was not considered as a serious threat. Nevertheless the Germans did not trust it and in many cases did not cooperate with Estonian forces, despite having made promises to do otherwise. The existence of Estonian state and army was tolerated, because doing otherwise carried the danger of losing control over the railroad network and the Germans needed it to evacuate their army and requisitioned foodstuffs back to Germany.
5. Päts was just the prime minister of a large coalition government, which was supported by most of Estonian political parties other than Bolsheviks and therefore had the support of the majority of the people. Without popular support they would have not been able to create the army and the state in such a short notice. Päts, despite the mediocre popularity of his party was given the position of prime minister, because the left wing parties wanted to distance themselves from the negative aspects of conducting a war (such as mobilisations and requisitions) and therefore gave the reigns of government to the right wing parties. In this way they were able to keep the Bolsheviks out and at the same time criticise the unpopular aspects of war, meanwhile fully supporting them. This strategy proved to be successful and ended up in the left wing parties winning the elections to the Estonian Constituent Assembly of 1919.
Estonian government regained its power in November of 1918 mostly due to public unrest. After the outbreak of the German revolution there was a general strike and demonstrations in Tallinn lasting for several days. The German military administration attempted to suppress them, but the soldiers refused to do so. From the 11th of November the German authorities compromised and the Estonian government began operate in the open and the general strike ended. However not all were content with the outcome and on the 12th of November a workers demonstration was indeed dispersed by the Germans, but it is improper to speak of an "uprising" of the around 40% per cent of the population that had voted for the Bolsheviks in early 1918. During this time most of the workers in Tallinn had become to be under the control of the Social Democratic Party, which supported the Estonian government. This can be seen by the fact that the general strike ended the day before the demonstration, after the German occupational authorities had agreed to allow the Estonian government to operate.
Päts was not arrested in the beginning of the German occupation, because after the Germans had taken over, there was a period of several months when they had not decided whether to collaborate with the Estonian elites or the Baltic Germans. After they had decided in the favor of the latter, they extended the repression towards Estonian elites in order to coerce them to cooperate with the Baltic German regime.
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Estonia got control over its territory as a result of the German troops leaving the country because of the Armistice of 1918. Soviet Russia did not recognize it as a state and sent troops to restore the communists to power.
If Estonia would have lost this war, it would have become annexed into RSFSR or have some sort dependency established and the main goal of the war was to have the RSFSR recognize Estonia's independence and sovereignty. So as the main goal was to gain independence from the RSFSR, then why can't it be called "war for independence"?
If it is not the case, then a lot of "Wars of Independence" should not be named so, for example Latvian, Turkish, Indonesian, Norwegian, Italian, Lithuanian, etc.
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@ГригорийШумилов-ф5р
Вообщем то я согласен с вашеи позициией, но есть некоторые места разногласия.
I) "Запад хотел:
а) чтобы Украина была плацдармом для НАТО (военная/политическая задача)"
Я думаю это не подтверждается фактами. Мне кажется, что у НАТО не было стратегического интереса в сторону Украины.
1) Украину не готовы были брать в НАТО, потому что много стран НАТО не считают Украины столько важной для своих интересов, чтобы за нее воевать.
2) Если бы у стран НАТО был бы большой интерес в сторонy Украины, то они бы тратили на её много денег. Например Америка потратила на Афганситан 2014-2020 около 350 миллиарда а на помощь Украине (2014-2021) только 2.5 миллиарда.
3) Раньше вторжения в 2022 году, никто не считал Украину как плацдарм таким важим, чтобы посылать туда крупную военную помощь. А перед вторжением скорее готовились поддерживать партизанскую войну поритив России чем помогать Украине сохранить контроль над свойей территорией .
II) Если главным интересом России и Западных стран был контроль над Украиной, то шаги России в 2014/2015 в этом смысле не логичны, потому, что они привели к падению, а не усилению Российского влияния. В Украине осталось менше населения дружественного России из за потери Донбаса и Крыма. А остальное население на территории Украины стало более враждебно относится к России. Из за этого у меня сложилось мнение, что причина этих шагов России была иная, чем сохранить контроль над Украиной.
III) Я не думаю, что у Украины была возможность решить конфликт в Донбассе военным путем. Если Россия готова ввести свои войска в Донбас для отражениа Украинской атаки, то военной силы у Украины для захватa Донабса нет. Ведь сейчас Российская армия наступает на Украинскую, а не наоборот.
IV) "Западу очевидна не выгодна сильная Россия."
По моему не логично, что из за капитализма Запад хочет, чтобы Россия не была сильной. Ведь экономика Китая на много больше Российской (в 10 раз) и выросла она во многом с помощью торговли с западом. И это допустили не смотря на то, что Китай представляет угрозу Америке.
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The thing is that the Enigma and other encryption methods were constantly upgraded and therefore it was not enough to break in once. You could read the messages for some time, but then the enemy would upgrade their hardware or methods and in order to read the traffic again you would have to figure out the nature of the changes. The Poles themselves did not break the Enigma codes once but had done it several times. Every time after the Germans added something to the Enigma or changed their methods, the Poles could not read the new messages until they understood what exactly had the Germans changed.
In 1939 the war began and the Poles share their expertise with the British and so the British too were now able to read the German messages. But after some months the Germans upgraded their methods again and now the messages became unreadable. As it proved to be difficult to figure out the changes, the British decided that it would be easier to capture some of the new Enigma equipment and learn of the nature of the changes in this way. This helped them to read the messages again until the Germans upgraded their Naval Enigma the second time by adding a fourth rotor. The Allies were unable to read the messages until they had captured one of these new Enigmas.
The Germans could read the Allied messages for the first part of the war, but when the Allies abandoned their old cyphers for an Enigma-like system, the Germans stopped being able to read the traffic. So they studied the Allied traffic and concluded that they could decipher it easily, but only if they could capture the Allied encryption devices and study them. If they were unable to capture the Allied devices, the messages could not be read. However they were unable to do that and could not read the Allied traffic until the end of the war.
What I am trying to say is that Enigma was constantly updated and had therefore to be "broken" several times. Although the Poles gave the Allies the ability to read the messages in the beginning of the war it lasted until the first time the Germans upgraded their Naval Enigma.
From then on the ability to capture new versions of the Enigma proved to be decisive. This is how I understand it.
The article you brought up does not challenge this and speaks only of "contribution" by the Poles and, in a slight self-contradiction, goes even as far as to claim that "the Enigma code (deciphering machine, left) was cracked by Englishman Alan Turing".
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@КрысапёсБолотный Putin's popularity might be high now, but he needs to plan 5 years ahead.
I see the situation in Russia like the one in Belarus. Like, originally people did support Lukashenko, but his support went more and more down with time and in 2020 he had large protests. By that time probably he would have lost power, if Putin had not come to his aid. Lukashenko faced protests in his 26th year in power and Putin is in his 22nd, so there seems to be trouble ahead. While majority does indeed support Putin now, I think you agree that it is more probable that if Putin continues his present policies, his popularity is more likely to fall even further.
And my argument is that one of the few ways to boost his support is to have a strong enemy from the outside. Then he has the people rally around the government and the perfect excuse to repress anyone, who is against Putin.
You are right that the present war in Ukraine can reduce Putin's popularity, but it is believed that he expected this be over in a week. With this it would have been a major boost, just like Crimea. That is why he did not prepare his army nor the public opinion for a longer war.
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Thanks for the extensive reply!
I think that you find cliches in my video by default as it being part of Western media. Actually the claims you listed are not the ones I did make in the video. Although you write about operations elsewhere, I feel competent enough to answer about the things I described in the video.
1) Logistics. I did not claim, that Germany overextended them by advancing too fast. What I wanted to say was, that before the Battle of Moscow the the Germans knew that their present logistics were inadequate for a prolonged fight and took a gamble - they planned to destroy most of the Red Army in the beginning of the operation and then advance with little resistance. They did not plan on heavy fighting near Moscow. In reality, the Red Army recovered and the risk backfired. So the German logistical difficulties in this case were caused in large part due to their own miscalculations and the actions of the Red Army.
2) Reinforcements. I did not claim that the Red Army had a large numerical superiority in the battle of Moscow. All that I said about the reinforcements was that the Red Army was gradually able to recover from the casualties sustained under Vyazma and Bryansk and had achieved a small numerical superiority in infantry during the beginning of the Moscow counteroffensive, while lacking tanks and heavy equipment. Later, as more men had finished training, the superiority became larger. From what I've learned the number of Axis and Soviet troops on the Eastern Front in December of 1941 was roughly equal. As for the resistance in the pockets - according to the Russian Wikipedia the main fighting in Vyazma was over by the 14-th of October. After that the Germans continued their advance for 1,5 months.
3) Winter.
I did cover in depth the ways winter benefited the Germans, from playing into their air superiority, to clogging the roads, through which the Soviet forces advances, to heavy snow inhibiting tactical maneuvers and assaults on German held villages. I even mentioned, that a lot of Soviet casualties were due to the fact that they had to maneuver under winter conditions meanwhile the Germans could stay in the villages with the sources of heat.
Overall I think, that my content is less biased, than usual Western depiction of the Eastern Front. For example, for this video I mainly relied on Russian authors.
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1) Ну.например..оборона Лиепае..что тут показано7 -
Слишком маленький эпизод - если бы все такие эпизоды показывать, то в 10 минут не уместится. Луче зделать одтельное видео про боевых действий в одном направлении.
2) ..выход из Белостокского котла войск..что показано?
На карте указаны в этом периоде корпуса. Те части, которые вырвались, были меньше и они на карте не показаны. Сколько человек в плен не попало, можно установить по цыфрами данными на карте.
3) из Уманькского котла вырвалось почти половина.
На карте показаны опять-так корпуса, и их организация была уничтожена в западной Украине и под Уманью. К тому же - на карте ведь видно, что из 907 000 бойцев Юго-Западного фронта в плен под Уманью попало только 103 000.
4) Контрудар под Сольцами - https://youtu.be/wu3p7dxrhl8?t=273
5) Елецкая операция - (внизу) https://youtu.be/wu3p7dxrhl8?t=505
6) вообще тут похоже попахивает гавнецом от пропаганды Гебельса..типа Сталин садист и людоед,в 37 100млн перестрелял,но солдаты умирали за ту власть.. - Я думаю, что это предубеждение, связано с тем, что видео на английском. Если смотреть без каких-то предубеждений, нейтрально, то таких мыслей не должно возникнуть.
7) Про потери в Кииевском котле: http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW/poteri.txt#w06.htm-_Toc536603362
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Hmm... it is strange, that Wikipedia gives so different figures. I tried to look into it in order to reconcile the accounts, but I was unable to do so.
As I understand, your point is, that the resources provided by the Soviet Union had little effect in the ability of Germany to inflict a defeat on France in 1940. It is a good point - the campaign lasted for such a short time and therefore expended so few resources, that Germany might have been able to carry it out relying on its own stocks if it had been preparing exactly for such a campaign.
However, the fact is that nobody thought, that France might fall so quickly and Germany was preparing for a long war. The Allied plan rested on the assumption, that they would cut off Germany from some key strategic materials. Germany could indeed trade with its European neighbours for some things, but these countries were unable to provide all the materials needed for the war and therefore Germany was unable to wage a long war in full capacity. The Soviet Union agreed to provide the materials it was missing. Their value was not in the large quantities, but in the fact, that it undermined the Allied strategy and allowed Germany to theoretically sustain a long war without overseas imports.
The point given in the video was that Germany would probably not dared to go to war if it could not rely on the Soviet Union for the strategic goods for the long war and they would definitely not been able to get enough troops for a massive invasion of France in 1940, if they could not be sure, that there was no danger of the invasion from the Red Army from the East.
So your point that the consumption of the resources given by the Soviet Union did not play a decisive role in the campaigns of May-June 1940, can be correct. This is not, however, what I claim in video.
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I don't tell you that this work their work was unimportant. I am telling, that the ability to capture the equipment was the decisive factor in the Battle of Atlantic, as the machinery and methods had become too complex to be reasonably solved by cryptanalysis alone. Of course you may argue, that the Polish contribution with the cryptanalysis was decisive in the Allies ability to read the Enigma, but I would still argue in favor in favor of my original argument.
As I don't want to lose focus and make the video 30 minutes long, I have time for the most important factors. For example the whole rather important topic of German surface raiders was cut from the video entirely to save on length, also Italian submarines, direction finding techniques, Arctic convoys, US and Canadian shipbuilding, Destroyers for Bases, the Undeclared War and many other factors are not mentioned, etc.
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@andregarcia3355 1) and 2) I don't disagree with the fact that several NATO countries don't want Ukraine to join. But that is not against my position. The US must have known that this opposition exists, so why did they launch the coup in 2014, if they knew that Ukraine would not be able to join NATO due to opposition of the NATO countries?
There were much better tools than NATO for whatever goals US had that would not be reliant on approval by other countries. If US wanted to make a defensive alliance with Ukraine, it could have done so by the treaty between Ukraine and USA, which would not involve other countries. If it wanted to station its military in Ukraine, it would have had no problem to do so, if Ukraine consented to that.
However the USA has not done any of that, so what was the point of the 2014 coup?
I believe that Yanukovych was deposed because of internal politics of Ukraine and economic reasons. There was strong public opposition to him (USA could not have paid all of them off) and there was an election soon afterwards, where Poroshenko was elected, so the government that was between Yanukovych and Poroshenko could not have played a major role.
3) The point is not that the security services are not obeying the president, but that the president has expanded the role of the security services to the extent that the security services have a strong influence on political decisions.
4) This is true. A strong military and the military industrial complex can influence/lobby the government into thinking that going to war is the right solution.
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