Comments by "Tim Trewyn" (@timtrewyn453) on "UnHerd" channel.

  1. Mr. Lieven rests his case largely on Russian artillery superiority. That can be dealt with through tightly coordinated tactical reconnaissance (the role of the F-35 or its radar, computers and communications on some other suitable aircraft) and long-range Ukrainian artillery. The question is does the West want to provide that capability in the necessary quantity through an air wing of foreign volunteer pilots and donated aircraft. The price for Russia keeping Crimea should be Ukraine in NATO and the EU and no land bridge across southern Ukraine. Ukraine gets the Zaporizhya power plant back and controls, but allows, the fresh water supply to Crimea from Nova Kakhovka. Thereafter a Ukrainian navy and air force should be built up to the point of providing significant deterrence of future Russian adventures. Until that is achieved, Russia would have to tolerate an expanded NATO air and naval presence, even ground presence, in and around Ukraine. And I don't think trading Crimea to not have all that happen is something the Russians will do. Before Ukraine exhausts its military it needs to have severed the land bridge and put all of Crimea under threat of bombardment for the leverage that gains them. When it's over Russia wins Crimea and dreams of somehow eroding NATO in Ukraine in the future. What Ukraine must get is a remnant that looks secure enough for Western investment. Russia will always want to thwart that, but they would do so at the risk of activating some or all of the levers Ukraine would have over Crimea. Crimea has important resources off-shore. This is a very significant loss for Ukraine. Ukraine does have a gas field in its west that could provide revenue from the rest of Europe. But Russia will have had success in limiting Ukraine's ability to serve European energy needs. Lost me at "Russian-speaking". Russian speaking is common throughout Ukraine and does not signal loyalty to Russia. I have Ukrainian friends. Russian loyalists in Ukraine should migrate to Crimea and serve in the tourist industry or work the infrastructure supporting it. In a few years non-Russian tourists might start showing up. Meanwhile Russia has to figure out how its going to update its navy to make Sevastopol relevant. In the end, the Russian fetish with Crimea may prove to be very expensive for Russia. It deserves to be.
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  2.  @Markusctfldl  That would be the case if Russia maintains an insurgency in Ukraine and random bombardment of Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. If Russia actually has to stop even insurgency operations in Ukraine, then some parts of that country become viable for investment. Never say never. There's a lot of capital looking for things to do.
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  3. We do not know Putin's intentions. We do not know if Russian perceptions are those of desperation or will to power or what percentages of both. What we see is that Putin annexes small regions of adjacent nations. It would be reasonable to assume there is an underlying and less spoken issue for his doing so. Russian public statements are so often mendacious it is reasonable to assume the world is always being tested by Russian pretext in search of opportunity. The actions of Russia indicate they want jurisdiction over particular and additional lands, no matter how badly they have damaged them. Looking at the geography and economy and climate change aspects of Asia and Russia, what Russia really needs to be concerned about in the long run is China. Russia and Mearsheimer seem to quietly put great stock in the simple difference in population between Russia and Ukraine. The difference in population between China and Russia is considerably more acute, and the difference in relative economic power amplifies it. The Chinese, more than ever, have cause to downrate Russian conventional military capability. The densely populated areas of China are subject to sea level rise impacts. Those people will need a place to go. The land areas north of China, while not a paradise, would be mor habitable in a warmer world. Rather than Japan, the analogy here is Afghanistan, a nation the Soviet Union considered within its sphere of influence and Islam a long-term existential threat to Russia. The Soviets were worn down by a motivated native population supported by the West. They pulled out. The Russians can pull out of Ukraine, and Ukraine is aligned, preferably for Russia perhaps, not with the Islamic empire but with the American empire. While potent at a distance, the US is unlikely to establish anything like an offensive capability against Russia in Ukraine. This is demonstrated by the limited deployments of US troops and other forces to Estonia, Romania, etc. It would be American oil and gas interests that would want to break up Russia into smaller parts. The revenue from sales to Europe is obviously lucrative.
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