Youtube hearted comments of Tim Trewyn (@timtrewyn453).
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Thanks Jake for the logical argument for postponing ATACMS. I still think there have been and will be occasions where their presence and/or use could deter or counter Russian attacks. They would need to be a part of a strike package that would burden Russian AD, improving the likelihood of success while also improving the survivability of any piloted aircraft in the strike package. While Ukrainian AD and heightened electric utility repair capability can do a lot this winter, there may be something to ATACMS presence and use that could improve winter conditions for the Ukrainians. ATACMS could also pose a threat to MIG-31 bases. Currently MIG-31s and their very long-range air-to-air missiles provide a very serious CAP, limiting UAF operations. In the months ahead this CAP could begin to enable the re-emergence of Russian air power as Ukraine draws nearer to Russian borders. MIG-31s are also very fast, presenting a challenge for UAF AD. Like the ME-262s of WWII, their vulnerability is when they are low on fuel and on RTB or are in the open at their base. Not only the aircraft but their supporting base infrastructure would be more exposed to ATACMS as part of a strike package of UAVs, decoys, ECM, and HARMs. I'm not sure how the MIG-31 threat can be dealt with without threatening MIG-31 bases long range. F-16s do not match the air-to-air missile range of the MIG-31. It really takes F-22s, maybe F35s, to sneak up on a MIG-31. The downside for the MIG-31 is that it is not stealthy and it cannot turn hard to evade a missile. Ukraine can usually know where they are. Checkout Ward Carroll's latest piece with Justin Bronk.
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