Comments by "Doncarlo" (@doujinflip) on "America predicts war with China in 2025" video.

The US is a relatively distant power whose bases are often wanted there to subsidize their national security and/or provide a convenient lightning rod to deflect domestic political anger at. Often there's more concern about the subsequent costs and consequences should the Americans leave. Ask the Philippines or Iraq or Afghanistan how secure they felt after US forces departed like they had asked. Meanwhile China is viewed with significantly more suspicion especially as Chinese locals throughout history don't readily intermingle and integrate with the local majority. Chinese division and exclusion (and sometimes literal invasion) was seen akin to colonization, a sentiment that simmers at various strengths within ASEAN to this day. "Don't you realize what it means if the Chinese remain? Don't you remember your history? The last time the Chinese came, they stayed a thousand years... As for me, I prefer to sniff French shit for five years than to eat Chinese shit for the rest of my life." -- Ho Chi Minh, in reference to asking China to help liberate SE Asia
7
@ivanjokovic "Obeyed" in that the PRC's expansion, condescension, and overselling promises of prosperity forced the Philippines to reconsider its security posture after kicking out US forces the first time.
3
SK and Vietnam have substantial recent experience against hostile forces (SK in Vietnam plus the constant showdown with the North; Vietnam against the US, the PRC, and Cambodia), while Japan constantly exercises with the US. Meanwhile guided munitions were still an experiment the last time the PLA fielded a sizeable military expedition, and all the wargames they've had with Russia since then turns out might not be as valid as they had hoped.
2
Sailing around practically unopposed is one thing, unarmed merchant vessels do this routinely. It's a different game to try performing missions under the constant threat of hostile anti-ship assets.
2
Smaller ships that lack real anti-air defenses, vulnerable to guided gravity bombs which are dirt cheap to drop compared to missiles and which the US has hundreds of thousands of base shells already in stock.
1
@PaulColclough47 Zeihan's specific timelines might be imprecise, but I've yet to find anyone with a better data-driven grasp of global trends.
1
Overland won't make up for the collapse of current sea trade routes getting scared off by the crossfire; Beijing would run out of money paying for movements due to the reduced capacity and efficiency compared to shipments by ship. Plus the polar routes would have to go past the not so friendly Japan and US (Alaska).
1
Invade is unlikely, but striking at "American forces and those who harbor them" is certainly plausible.
1
Everyone else also thinks so, including China. Ironically it's those outer islands like Guam, AS, and PR that provide more volunteers per capita into the US military than the States themselves.
1
Collapse of trade would be the most likely scenario: just scare off the civilian ships and watch the Mainland implode as food and energy prices there rocket out of reach despite all the overland alternatives Beijing was trying to build.
1
Not NATO formally as a whole, but a lot of its members would independently support a US-led effort to thwart PLA objectives and prevent the effective expansion of a condescending unilateral autocracy.
1
Unfortunately ASEAN can't even agree to negotiate as a unified bloc, and Běijīng prefers it this way to divide and conquer SE Asia by consistently demanding only siloed bilateral conversations.
1
Not even actually target the ships, just returning fire would create a void of shipping insurance and cause maritime trade to steer clear of China.
1
It's a pressure release, but nowhere near a realistic and affordable replacement for the maritime trade direct to the coastal population and production centers that will get scared off once the shooting starts.
1
Táiwān wants to not be ruled by the CPC, that's the basic issue behind this whole conflict.
1
Power. It's a zero-sum game because power is relative to what you can do while others can't. Sharing power is a fairly new and niche development in the otherwise brutal and indifferent competition that is natural life.
1
Formidable, but not insurmountable. Technical quality (i.e. technology, logistics, and experience) is the dominant factor in air and sea combat where there are no casual combatants to set traps nor roaming media to hijack public opinion, and the US has a considerable edge on the quality of its airborne and seaborne forces. US political goals were defeated in Vietnam and Afghanistan (and only after like 20 years in each), despite relatively overwhelming industrial capacity and practically secure supply lines throughout. If anything the US knows best about how to thwart the objectives of a superior but overseas power -- its very existence hinged on ambushing Redcoats while developing powerful relationships abroad.
1
Just make ship movements through the South and East China Seas uninsurable: embargoes or dominance not required, simple return fire of guided missiles would do. Affordable food and fuel would disappear as sea trade collapses, and the Chinese people would take care of the rest.
1
Even with all those overland alternatives, it can't replace the capacity and affordability of maritime trade which exchange their loads right in China's population and production centers. Beijing would run out of money (especially valuable foreign currencies) just trying.
1
PLA land forces wouldn't really be targeted, the West would probably avoid it so that the soldiers can be seen starving out the Chinese people as rations dwindle with the collapse of global trade with the Mainland. The primary targets would be the PLA's Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force assets which can strike at its neighbors over the horizon.
1