Comments by "Nick Danger" (@nickdanger3802) on "TIKhistory"
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Clark heard Churchill’s use of “soft underbelly” shortly after the Moscow meeting, when he and Eisenhower took up the question of where the Anglo-Americans should strike first. In autumn 1942, he and Eisenhower explained to General Marshall, U.S. Army chief of staff:
A cross-channel operation was [then] utterly impossible. We could not even get across without the British showing us the way and taking us by the hand. We did not have the means. And so it was decided that we would take this matter up with Mr. Churchill, which we did. And that is where his persuasive eloquence first impressed me. He got up before a map with his pointer and he kept pointing to Gibraltar, North Africa, the Mediterranean, Sicily and Italy. Finally he said, “We should slit the soft belly of the Mediterranean.” Well, my friends, I assure you, when I landed at Salerno, I found it was a tough old gut!3
https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/soft-underbelly-fortress-europe/
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"Meanwhile, V weapons continued to be launched from the Neatherlands, within sight of British troops. Some went towards Britain, some went towards Antwerp, none went towards the USA."
"...suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague."
The Hague is 80 miles from Antwerp, so both of those statements can not be correct.
If Market Garden had reached Arnhem it would have been 80 miles short of the V2 sites.
You seem to be under the impression the USA was obligated to fight the war Britain started, was the entire war in Europe to be put on hold to end the V weapon threat?
The RAF bombed Peenemunde in August 1943 and accomplished little. The USAAF bombed Peenemunde three times in July and August 1944, before the first V2 was launched, when those aircraft could have been supporting ground operations. link below
MG was a British planned and led operation in the British AO. The USA provided 2/3 of the airborne and the vast majority of the air assets and there were millions of US service men in Britain, yet you seem to be of the opinion the USA's support was half assed because the USA didn't care about V2's because none were falling on the USA.
From 1942 where did Britain's tanks, APC's and jeeps come from?
"Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat."
Winston Churchill
In November 1942 the British Empire had it's first major land victory over the Axis in over three years at war. Montgomery refused a "request" from Churchill to attack before he had a two to one advantage in every category. In tanks and aircraft that advantage was provided by the USA through Lend Lease and brought on US flagged ships around Africa to the Red Sea.
So Britain's losses prior to MG are very relevant. If Britain had been winning before then Ike may have been inclined to give Montgomery the lead. In Sicily the USA had twice the distance to Messina, but Patton got there before Montgomery and at least one British vet claimed it was because "the Americans had it easier".
According to Max Hastings in 1945 the USA had 60 combat divisions in Europe and Britain and Canada combined had 20. So it was the USA's show to run and the USA was going to be in three times as many operations and have three times the losses.
Bombing of Peenemünde in World War II
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Peenemünde_in_World_War_II
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@jonathanjonathansen Some of the major reasons I do not put the same "Value" on the USSR's Great Patriotic War losses as some people.
The Holodomor (Ukrainian: Голодомо́р; Голодомо́р в Украї́ні;[a][2] derived from морити голодом, "to kill by starvation")[3][4][5] was a man-made famine in Soviet Ukraine in 1932 and 1933 that killed millions of Ukrainians.
The Great Purge or the Great Terror (Russian: Большой террор) was a campaign of political repression in the Soviet Union which occurred from 1936 to 1938.
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact USSR sold oil, wheat and manganese ore to Germany while Germany conquered half of Poland (USSR the other half), Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete and lay siege to Britain with U boats and bombers.
Winter War 1939-1940 USSR took 10 per cent of Finland, territory taken is part of Russia today.
Katyn Massacre Over 20,000 Poles were murdered by the Soviet Army in the Katyn Forest of western Russia.
November 1941 Lend Lease extended to USSR. December 1941 Hitler declared war on the "neutral" USA. USSR received 11 Billion 1944 USD in goods and services and paid next to nothing. This does not bother me, but USSR fan boys who claim it didn't make any difference and/or everything was paid for, that does bother me.
175,000 Red Army soldiers were executed for crimes as minor as being AWOL for a few hours because they didn't speak Russian.
Great Patriotic War "The term is not generally used outside the former Soviet Union, and the closest term is Eastern Front of World War II (1941-1945). Both terms do not cover the initial phase of World War II in Eastern Europe during which the USSR, then still in a non-aggression pact with Germany, occupied East part of Poland (1939), the Baltic states (1940), and Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (1940) and fought with Finland (1939-1940)."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Patriotic_War_(term)
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"At the request of the British War Cabinet, on April 19, 1944,[22] General Eisenhower directed Crossbow attacks to have absolute priority over all other air operations, including "wearing down German industry" and civilian morale[23] "for the time being", which he confirmed after the V-1 assault began on the night of June 12/13, 1944 saying to Arthur Tedder "with respect to Crossbow targets, these targets are to take first priority over everything except the urgent requirements of the Overlord [invasion of Normandy] battle; this priority to obtain until we can be certain that we have definitely gotten the upper hand of this particular business".[24] The launches surprised the Allies, who had believed that the earlier attacks on the sites had eliminated the danger. The British, who had not expected German bombing of Britain to resume so late in the war, were especially upset. Some suggested using gas on the launch sites, or even executing German civilians as punishment.[13]
Carl Spaatz, commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USTTAF), responded on June 28[25] to "complain that Crossbow was a 'diversion' from the main task of wearing down the Luftwaffe and bombing German industry" for the Combined Bomber Offensive, and to recommend instead that Crossbow be a secondary priority since "days of bad weather over Germany's industrial targets would still allow enough weight of attack for the rocket sites and the lesser tactical crises."[26]:349 By July 10, Tedder had published a list of Crossbow targets which assigned 30 to RAF Bomber Command, six to the tactical Allied Expeditionary Air Force, and 68 to Spaatz' USSTAF; after which Spaatz again complained,[27]:239 so Eisenhower allowed "spare" bombing of non-Crossbow targets: "Instructions for continuing to make Crossbow targets our first priority must stand, but ... when ... the entire strategic forces cannot be used against Crossbow, we should attack—(a) Aircraft industry, (b) Oil, (c) ball bearing (German): Kugellagerwerke, (d) Vehicular production" (Eisenhower, July 18)."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Crossbow#Bombing_priority
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Before the first V2 hit Britain. USAAF bombing of Peenemunde: 19 July 1944 Three B-17s were lost and 64 were damaged, three P-51s were lost.
4 August 1944 Three B-17s were lost, one was damaged beyond repair and 94 damaged; 2 airmen were KIA, 2 WIA and 40 MIA, 9 P-51s were lost and 1 was damaged beyond repair; 1 pilot was KIA. 25 August 1944 5 B-17s were lost and 75 damaged; 1 airman was KIA, 9 WIA and 45 MIA, 2 P-51s were lost. link below, again
This was semi interesting, again, now it's just tedious, again.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Peenemünde_in_World_War_II
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IWM Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy
"By 1944 Britain was running out of soldiers. The campaigns in the Mediterranean and Far East, the war at sea and the bomber offensive had all drained her manpower reserves. The army that was sent to Normandy lacked for nothing except adequate reserves of fighting troops. Though well supplied with weapons, vehicles and equipment, Second Army could not afford huge losses, militarily or indeed politically. With vast reserves of US manpower now coming on stream, it was vital for Britain's interests and national standing that her field army was strong enough both to engage and defeat the Germans, and then also provide a sustainable army of occupation. Everything had to be done to minimize casualties and preserve the army's fighting strength.
One who understood this only too well was the land forces commander, General Sir Bernard Montgomery. 'Monty' was a controversial leader, criticised by many, as much for his personality as for his handling of the campaign. But his operational methods reflected an acute awareness of the size and limitations of the army under his command. Much of it was untested in action, having spent long years training in the UK. Even his veterans lacked the sort of intense combat experience gained by many German soldiers on the Russian Front. Nor were his men imbued with the political and ideological fanaticism that characterised some German units, particularly Waffen-SS formations."
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An twerp, Ultra and Market Garden "This ferrying activity continued throughout September, and Ultra provided continuous coverage of the German activities while the British failed to seal off their escape route. On 6 September an Ultra message stated that a GAF division and other
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miscellaneous units had already been ferried across and that they were preparing to
increase their activities. An intercept on 8 September “estimated that so far 25,000 men, 350 vehicles and 50 tons of equipment had been ferried across.”44 Ultra continued to
provide almost daily situation reports that detailed the evacuation of the Fifteenth Army.
On the day that Market-Garden commenced, it was estimated that 70,000 men had been
ferried across the Scheldt Estuary and escaped into Holland.45 By the end of the
evacuation on 23 September, a summary stated that 82,000 men, 530 guns, 46,000
vehicles, and 4,000 horses were ferried out of the pocket.46 These numbers are low
compared to those provided by the 21st Army Group G2 Brigadier Bill Williams. In his
intelligence summary on 18 September, he stated that, “probably over 100,000 men had crossed into the Scheldt Peninsula since Antwerp was captured.”47
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a406861.pdf
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Throughout May and June, both before the German-French armistice and after it, Mr. Churchill sent to the President many personal telegrams containing specific requests for aid.3 The same requests were made through the usual channels in official communications from Government to Government; for example, they were systematically enumerated in the aide-mémoire presented by Lord Lothian to the State Department on 3rd July. The aid requested was of two kinds: immediate aid, weapons that the Americans could deliver at once, action that they could take at once: long-term aid, the tasks that American industry would have to set itself if it were to provide, at some future date, the tools 'to finish the job'.
The demands for immediate aid, and the American response to them, cannot be discussed without some reference to the evolution of America's neutrality policy. Needless to say, no British historian is competent as yet to handle this topic with authority; all that the present writers will offer is a minimum of relevant comment suggested by the British documents, which reveal, not the full content of American policy, but those contemporary British interpretations of it that influenced British action. It is simple enough to write down the things the British demanded: the lists are clear. On 15th May, Mr. Churchill asked the President for 'forty or fifty of your old destroyers'. That was always the most urgent demand.4 On 17th July Mr. Churchill told the President: 'Nothing that America could do would be of greater help that to send fifty destroyers—except sending a hundred.' But destroyers were not by any means the only reinforcements
--225--
the British needed for their struggle at sea: they asked the Americans to give them motor torpedo boats for Channel fighting and seaplanes for Atlantic patrol: they wanted the United States Navy to make a show of power by sending units to the Mediterranean and to Iceland: they asked the United States Government to consider whether it was ready to take steps leading to the abolition of the 'combat zones'—for it was a reinforcements of their carrying capacity in dangerous waters that they needed, not only of their fighting strength. They needed at the same time immediate help for the battles they might very soon have to fight on their own soil against invading German armies. They asked for American aircraft for the R.A.F and American rifles, machine guns, field guns and mortars to replace some of the equipment that the B.E.F. had lost in France and to arm the Home Guard.
British War Economy
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"In the period from 1st October, 1941, to 31st March, 1946, we supplied to the Soviet Union 5,218 tanks, of which 1,388 were from Canada. We supplied 7,411 aircraft, including 3,129 aircraft sent from the United States of America. As previously explained on the 10th May, 1944, the aircraft from the United States of America were sent on United States Lend Lease to the Soviet Union as part of the British commitment to the U.S.S.R. in exchange for the supply of British aircraft to United States Forces in the European Theatre. The total value of military supplies despatched amounts to approximately £308 million. We have also sent about £120 million of raw materials, foodstuffs, machinery, industrial plant, medical supplies and hospital equipment."
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1946/apr/16/russia-british-empire-war-assistance
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Planning "The essential plan (Comet) was not dead, however, and on the 10th September 1944, Montgomery personally briefed Browning for Operation Market Garden."
"Browning, having asked Montgomery how long the 1st Airborne would have to hold Arnhem and being told two days, replied that they could hold it for four."
"Browning denied their (1st AB) request for a larger allocation as the swift progress of the 2nd Army was judged to be of the greatest importance, and so the 101st Airborne Division, closest to the relieving troops, had priority on aircraft, followed by the 82nd Airborne Division and finally the 1st Airborne."
"If Browning was at fault then it is because he made no effort to mention the possibility of this threat to the 1st Airborne Division, whom he had briefed to expect nothing more than a brigade group of infantry supported by a small number of tanks during the later phases of the battle. Suggestions of the presence of these two panzer divisions nevertheless filtered through, but more emphatic information may have resulted in them taking additional anti-tank equipment and adopting tactics better suited to dealing with heavy opposition."
Pegasus Archive Browning, on line
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RAF on Market "Postponements for one reason or another were frequent and all this time the aircraft and crews were inevitably kept idle, to the openly expressed dismay of those who urged the alternative. In their view the right course was to use all available transport aircraft to maintain supplies to Patton's army, which was the furthest forward, so that he could continue his offensive. It was impossible to do both once the Supreme Commander ruled in favour
--192--
of airborne operations. Montgomery had decided on a bold stroke. He would outflank the defences of the 'SIEGFRIED Line' and, leaping over the three natural water barriers, the Maas at Grave, the Waal at Nijmegen and the Neder Rijn at Arnhem, secure positions from which to make a major advance eastwards.' The essential feature of the plan', he notes 'was the laying of a carpet of airborne troops across these waterways. . . . The airborne carpet and the bridgehead force were to be provided by the Allied Airborne Corps consisting of two American and one British Airborne Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade'.1 The crossings of the Maas and the Waal were to be secured by two American parachute divisions, the 101st and the 82nd, that at Arnhem by the British 1st Airborne Division. The operation, known as 'MARKET', was complicated by the fact that Transport Command could not take the whole division to its destination in one lift, and it was unable to do so for the simple but compelling reason that it did not have enough aircraft. Whether or not there were sufficient transport aircraft, of which the bulk were manufactured in the United States of America, to meet the needs of air transport all over the world is a question which cannot be answered here. All that can be said is that their allocation was made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff whose duty it was to survey the war in every theatre, and who did not place at Leigh-Mallory's disposal enough squadrons to take all three airborne divisions to their objectives in one lift. Those who had furthest to go, the British 1st Airborne, and who were to drop on the third defensive river line were allocated fewer than were given to the other two divisions. This was unavoidable in the circumstances, for the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen had to be first captured if that at Arnhem was to be of value to the prospective invaders of Germany."
pages 192-193
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RAF-III/UK-RAF-III-9.html
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WAR AND INTERNATIONA SITUATION
HC Deb 22 February 1944 vol 397 cc663-795663
The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill) This is no time for sorrow or rejoicing. It is a time for preparation, effort and resolve. The war is still going on. I have never taken the view that the end of the war in Europe is at hand, or that Hitler is about to collapse, and I have certainly given no guarantees, or even held out any expectations, that the year 1944 will see the end of the European war. Nor have I given any guarantees the other way. On the whole, my information—and I have a good deal—goes to show that Hitler and his police are still in full control, and that the Nazi party and the Generals have decided to hang together. The strength of the German Army is about 300 divisions, though many of these are substantially reduced in numbers. The fighting quality of the troops is high. The German General Staff system; which we failed to liquidate after the last war, represents an Order comprising many thousands of highly-trained officers and a school of doctrine of long, unbroken continuity. It possesses great skill, both in the handling of troops in action and in their rapid movement from place to place. The recent fighting in Italy should leave no doubt on these points.
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@davemac1197 "Browning and Brigadier-General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, were in agreement that the priorities around Nijmegen were first the vast area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, followed by the bridge at Grave, the three smaller bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally the very large bridge at Nijmegen. Browning also told Gavin that he was not to make any attempt to move towards Nijmegen until the Heights had been secured; Gavin agreed though he later felt confident enough in his plan to allow one battalion to head for the bridge immediately after landing. The Groesbeek Heights were certainly important as they served as the Division's main drop zone and dominated the entire area, and so there is no question that the position of the 82nd Airborne Division, not to mention the right flank of the 2nd British Army when they arrived, would have been placed under considerable pressure if the area were to remain in enemy hands. Even so, the priorities of any airborne formation has to be the capture of its ultimate objectives, i.e. the bridges, and all other concerns are entirely secondary. Browning defended his decision long after the War, but it was a great mistake not to attach a higher priority to Nijmegen Bridge as, without it, the 1st Airborne Division would be cut-off behind two large rivers and 13 miles of hostile territory."
Pegasus Archive Browning
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"The location of these zones, however, was a matter for the Royal Air Force and not the 1st Airborne Division, and Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst, the commander of 38 Group, one of the air force formations which was to transport the Division into battle and supply it thereafter, refused to drop paratroopers any closer to Arnhem. His reasoning was that after the troops had been dropped, his aircraft could only begin the return to their bases by banking left, in a northerly direction; to have banked right would have led them into the path of the 82nd Airborne Division's aircraft returning from Nijmegen. If the aircraft approached too close to Arnhem, their return flight path would lead them directly over the top of a very large flak installation on the nearby Deelen Airfield, and to fly over this would result in severe losses which Transport Command could not afford. For this reason, the air force insisted on dropping all of the 1st Airborne Division roughly eight miles from Arnhem."
Pegasus Archive In Depth 3. Recipe for Disaster
http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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"On 20 September, D+3, he (General Ridgway) was moving through the battlefield near Eindhoven. He was alone but for his jeep, driver, and two aides.
[W]e came up with the advance elements of British armor. There a junior officer stopped me and told me I could go no further because the road in front was swept with small arms fire. So we stopped a minute to watch how good our British comrades would take out this resistance. They had the muzzles of their tank guns pointing down the road toward where the enemy was supposed to be, but not a shot was being fired. It was a demonstration of caution. . . .I had seen it, and dealt with it many times before. . . .I couldn’t order this tank commander to move on down the road. So, after waiting about forty minutes, and seeing no visible effort being made to outflank this resistance. . .we (Author’s note: “we” means Ridgway and his aides) started walking down the ditch along the side of the road. We went a mile and a half, perhaps, with every sense alert, but not a shot was fired at us. . . .We moved on until we found General Max Taylor at the CP of the 101st Division." page 26 OPERATION MARKET GARDEN: CASE STUDY FOR ANALYZING SENIOR LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a500814.pdf
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"Browning and Brigadier-General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, were in agreement that the priorities around Nijmegen were first the vast area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, followed by the bridge at Grave, the three smaller bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally the very large bridge at Nijmegen. Browning also told Gavin that he was not to make any attempt to move towards Nijmegen until the Heights had been secured; Gavin agreed though he later felt confident enough in his plan to allow one battalion to head for the bridge immediately after landing. The Groesbeek Heights were certainly important as they served as the Division's main drop zone and dominated the entire area, and so there is no question that the position of the 82nd Airborne Division, not to mention the right flank of the 2nd British Army when they arrived, would have been placed under considerable pressure if the area were to remain in enemy hands. Even so, the priorities of any airborne formation has to be the capture of its ultimate objectives, i.e. the bridges, and all other concerns are entirely secondary. Browning defended his decision long after the War, but it was a great mistake not to attach a higher priority to Nijmegen Bridge as, without it, the 1st Airborne Division would be cut-off behind two large rivers and 13 miles of hostile territory."
Pegasus Archive Browning
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"On 18 July, the area around Caen was heavily bombarded from the air. German resistance was unexpectedly firm, both in the ruins of Caen and in the surrounding villages. On 20 July, the British approached the crucial ridge of Bourguébus, overlooking the town; there the advance stalled. Once again, Montgomery's tactics were called into question, Eisenhower railing that 'it had taken 7,000 bombs to gain seven miles'. However, the sheer weight of the Allied assault had taken its toll on German morale."
BBC Caen Captured page
These failed attempts to outflank Caen were an early demonstration of flaws in British tactics, as well as the debilitating effect of the confined Normandy landscape and the impressive fighting qualities of German forces. 7th Armoured Division's previous experience of mobile warfare in North Africa did not readily translate to a congested European battlefield. With its infantry left too far behind, it had been stopped in its tracks in terrain unsuitable for the large scale deployment of tanks.
IWM Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy page
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@johnburns4017 While Allied leaders expressed mixed feelings on Patton's capabilities, the German High Command was noted to have more respect for him than for any other Allied commander after 1943.[153] Adolf Hitler reportedly called him "that crazy cowboy general".[248] Many German field commanders were generous in their praise of Patton's leadership following the war,[c] and many of its highest commanders also held his abilities in high regard. Erwin Rommel credited Patton with executing "the most astonishing achievement in mobile warfare".[250] Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, chief of staff of the German Army, stated that Patton "was the American Guderian. He was very bold and preferred large movements. He took big risks and won big successes."[248] Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring said that
Patton had developed tank warfare into an art, and understood how to handle tanks brilliantly in the field. I feel compelled, therefore, to compare him with Generalfeldmarschall Rommel, who likewise had mastered the art of tank warfare. Both of them had a kind of second sight in regard to this type of warfare.[248]
Referring to the escape of the Afrika Korps after the Battle of El Alamein, Fritz Bayerlein opined that "I do not think that General Patton would let us get away so easily."[248] In an interview conducted for Stars and Stripes just after his capture, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt stated simply of Patton, "He is your best."[251]
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Excerpts from Hitlers declaration of war on the United States of America; "(FDR) came back on the scene and on the 4th November, 1939, engineered the reversion of the Neutrality Law so as to suspend the ban on the export of arms (Cash and Carry amendment to the Neutrality Act), in favor of a one-sided delivery of arms to Germany's opponents." "On the 17th July, 1940, the American President orders the blocking of French assets with a view, as he puts it, to placing them beyond German reach, but really in order to transfer the French gold from Casablanca to America with the assistance of an American cruiser." "In August 1940, a military programme is jointly drawn up between the U.S.A. and Canada. To make the establishment of a Canadian-U.S. Defence Committee" "In September 1940 he draws still nearer to the war. He turns over to the British Fleet 50 destroyers of the American Navy..." "Since England is no longer in the position to pay cash for all the American deliveries, he imposes the Lease-Lend Law on the American people." "As far back as the 9th December 1939, American (?cruisers) in the security zone handed over the German ship Columbus to the British ships. In the circumstances she had to be sunk (note: i.e. scuttled). On the same day, U.S. forces co-operated to prevent the attempted escape of the German steamer Arauca." (March 1940 SS Hannover captured in US Neutrality Zone and converted into escort carrier HMS Audacity.) "...in March, all German ships were requisitioned by the American authorities." "Two German officers who had escaped from Canadian captivity, were-again contrary to all the dictates of international law-handcuffed and handed over to the Canadian authorities." "From the middle of April onwards, American watch over the Western Atlantic by U.S.A. patrols was extended, and reports were made to the British. On the 26th April, Roosevelt transferred to the British 20 motor-torpedo-boats and at the same time, British warships were being repaired in U.S. ports. On 5th May, the illegal arming and repairing of Norwegian ships for England took place. On 4th June American troop transports arrived in Greenland, to build airdromes. On 9th June, came the first British report that, on Roosevelt's orders, a U.S. warship had attacked a German U-boat with depth charges near Greenland. On 4th June, German assets in the U.S.A. were illegally blocked. On the 7th June Roosevelt demanded under mendacious pretexts, that German consuls should be withdrawn and German consulates closed. He also demanded the closing of the German Press Agency, Trans ocean, the German Information Library and the German Reichs bank Central Office. On 6th and 7th July, Iceland, which is within the German fighting zone, was occupied by American Forces or the orders of Roosevelt." "At the same time, he promised American help to the Soviet Union. On 10th June, the Navy Minister, Knox, suddenly announced an American order to shoot at Axis warships. On 4th September, the U.S. destroyer Greer obeying orders, operated with British aircraft against German U-boats in the Atlantic. Five days later, a German U-boat noticed the U.S. destroyer acting as escort in a British convoy. On 11th September Roosevelt finally made a speech in which he confirmed and repeated his order to fire on all Axis ships. On 29th September, U.S. escort-vessels attacked a German U-boat with depth charges east of Greenland. On 7th October, the U.S. destroyer Kearney acting as an escort vessel for Britain, again attacked German U-boat with depth-charges. Finally, on 6th November U.S. forces illegally seized the German steamer, Odenwald, and took it to an American port where the crew were taken prisoner."
Jewish Virtual Library Adolf Hitler: Speech Declaring War Against the United States
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"Montgomery desperately tried to persuade Eisenhower to agree to a number of plans that he felt would achieve this, one of these was given the codename Operation Comet. The plan was to drop the elite 1st British Airborne Division, by parachute and glider, into Holland to capture the five key bridges in and around the towns of Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem. The 2nd British Army would then break through the German front line and advance the sixty-four miles to the River Rhine at Arnhem, properly securing each of the bridges as they went. Once the final bridge at Arnhem had been reached, there would be no more river obstacles standing between the 2nd British Army and Germany. Montgomery then wished to advance on Berlin and seize it from under the noses of the Russians, but with the great distances that this involved it was considered far too cavalier a move to be possible. Eisenhower, however, was persuaded of the merit of capturing the Dutch bridges and so gave his consent to Operation Comet. It was to have been launched on the 9th September, but Comet was cancelled shortly before take-off as it became apparent that it was asking too much of a single Division to capture and defend so many bridges over such an expanse of territory. It is widely accepted that if Comet had taken place then it would have been a complete disaster for all concerned.
The plan was not dead, however. Instead it was renamed Operation Market Garden, and the number of airborne troops involved was dramatically increased with the addition of the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. The plan was essentially the same, except that the bridges in the Eindhoven and Nijmegen areas became the responsibility of the 101st and 82nd Airborne respectively, allowing the 1st Airborne Division to concentrate on the bridges at Arnhem. At the moment that these troops began to land on their drop zones, the 2nd British Army, with XXX Corps in the lead, would then drive with all speed to Arnhem, linking up with the Airborne troops in turn."
Pegasus Archive Market Garden In-Depth page
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RUSSIA (BRITISH EMPIRE WAR ASSISTANCE) 16 April 1946
In the period from 1st October, 1941, to 31st March, 1946, we supplied to the Soviet Union 5,218 tanks, of which 1,388 were from Canada. We supplied 7,411 aircraft, including 3,129 aircraft sent from the United States of America. As previously explained on the 10th May, 1944, the aircraft from the United States of America were sent on United States Lend Lease to the Soviet Union as part of the British commitment to the U.S.S.R. in exchange for the supply of British aircraft to United States Forces in the European Theatre.
(One thousand aircraft per Yesterdays Air Force Reverse Lend Lease on U tube)
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1946/apr/16/russia-british-empire-war-assistance
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@Colonel Blimp "In the event, the state of the flanks did become important when, on Friday 22nd September, a German counterattack near Veghel, in the 101st Airborne Division's sector, successfully cut the single road for forty-eight hours, forcing Lieutenant-General Horrocks, already struggling with enemy counterattacks and the wide diffusion of his strength, to send armour back down the line to help re-open the road. Montgomery largely blamed the failure of the Operation on the lack of progress made by XII and, in particular, VIII Corps, who were ordered to protect the flanks of XXX Corps as they advanced. The progress of both of these was very slow and so the single road became extremely exposed to such attacks. It must be stressed, however, that the supplies Montgomery had asked for to fuel the advance of the 2nd British Army had only partially arrived, and both VIII and XII Corps experienced great difficulties in this regard. In addition it is important to note that German resistance on the flanks was equal to that encountered by XXX Corps, and both VIII and XII Corps sustained marginally higher losses."
Pegasus Archive Market Garden 30. Reasons for the Failure page
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"The location of these zones, however, was a matter for the Royal Air Force and not the 1st Airborne Division, and Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst, the commander of 38 Group, one of the air force formations which was to transport the Division into battle and supply it thereafter, refused to drop paratroopers any closer to Arnhem. His reasoning was that after the troops had been dropped, his aircraft could only begin the return to their bases by banking left, in a northerly direction; to have banked right would have led them into the path of the 82nd Airborne Division's aircraft returning from Nijmegen. If the aircraft approached too close to Arnhem, their return flight path would lead them directly over the top of a very large flak installation on the nearby Deelen Airfield, and to fly over this would result in severe losses which Transport Command could not afford. For this reason, the air force insisted on dropping all of the 1st Airborne Division roughly eight miles from Arnhem."
Pegasus Archive In Depth 3. Recipe for Disaster
http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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RUSSIA (BRITISH EMPIRE WAR ASSISTANCE)
HC Deb 16 April 1946 vol 421 cc2513-92513
§45. Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre asked the Prime Minister if he will publish a comprehensive statement giving a list of 2514the weapons and materials, together with their costs, that were supplied in aid to the U.S.S.R. by the British Empire, between 1st October, 1941, and the termination of hostilities in Europe.
§The Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee) Yes, Sir. I am circulating a full statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT. The House may like to have the following summary of this. In the period from 1st October, 1941, to 31st March, 1946, we supplied to the Soviet Union 5,218 tanks, of which 1,388 were from Canada. We supplied 7,411 aircraft, including 3,129 aircraft sent from the United States of America. As previously explained on the 10th May, 1944, the aircraft from the United States of America were sent on United States Lend Lease to the Soviet Union as part of the British commitment to the U.S.S.R. in exchange for the supply of British aircraft to United States Forces in the European Theatre. The total value of military supplies despatched amounts to approximately £308 million. We have also sent about £120 million of raw materials, foodstuffs, machinery, industrial plant, medical supplies and hospital equipment.
We are very glad to have been able to give this assistance to our Soviet Allies and to have helped to equip and sustain them in their bitter struggle against the common enemy.
§Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre Can the Prime Minister say whether the Soviet public have been informed by the Soviet Press and radio of this substantial contribution to the Allied victory over Germany in the East?
§The Prime Minister Full publicity was given to the reply which was given by the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) on 10th May, 1944 Of course, this is essentially a matter for the Soviet authorities, but I should hope that full information will be given.
Mr. Skeffington-Lodģe Will my right hon. Friend arrange for this information to be put over the B.B.C. by the regular Russian broadcasts which are now being made so as to enable our Russian Allies to develop a proper perspective in judging the relative merits in contributions of those who brought about our united victory?
§The Prime Minister I would like to consider that suggestion, which seems to me to be a good one.
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"The primary source of the intelligence was Ultra, the codename for the interception and decoding of German signals received through the Enigma machine. Ultra clearly identified the presence of the 9th and 10th S.S. Panzer Divisions, but due to the vital need to protect the system and not give the Germans cause to suspect that their codes had been broken, only a select few were privy to this information in its purest form. The 1st British Airborne Corps, under whose umbrella all the airborne units involved in Market Garden were to fight, only received a particularly vague suggestion of armoured strength in the area. The commander of the Corps, Lieutenant-General Browning, accordingly advised Major-General Roy Urquhart that the immediate opposition to his 1st Airborne Division would be derisory, but that they could later expect to encounter little more than a Brigade Group of infantry supported by a few tanks."
"These showed a small number of tanks close to one of the 1st Airborne Division's drop zones, but a mere handful of armoured vehicles did not automatically mean the presence of an entire panzer division. Lieutenant-General Browning chose to play down the significance of these photographs, and when Major Urquhart persisted with his opposition to the plan, Browning forced him away on a period of sick leave."
Pegasus Archive In Depth 2. Recipe for Disaster
http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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@davidrendall7195 "Browning's original plan, Op Comet, saw just 1st Airborne and the Polish Brigade land at night, led by coup de main parties landing alongside all the bridges and nothing but screening forces on the Groesbeek."
What would have to achieved for MG to be considered a victory?
All questions may be treated as rhet.
Other than the day one mission focus on the Waal bridges did the plan 50 years after the fact proof XXX Corps would make it to Arnhem in time? Was the same exercise done for 1st AB?
Day Two Per your plan for just one regiment on the Heights, what happens when the 406th composite division attacks and Kampfgruppe Gobel attacks Reithorst? Assuming it does not join with the 406th.
406th had 2,300 grade B men, 3 halftracks with quad 20mm and 5 armored cars. About 80 per cent of German AC's had a 20mm auto cannon in a dual purpose mount. "Just 24 medium mortars supported the whole force but, in common with most German units, the attackers had a high proportion of machine guns ..." pages 98-99 Nijmegen US 82nd Airborne & Guards Armoured Division
I am fairly certain a large part of the day two gliders would have been loaded with ammo and rations and the like.
Assuming XXX Corps makes it to Frosts' men before they run out of ammo, what happens then? Relieve the Pocket which is almost out of everything and had been fighting for days just as XXX Corps had been doing.
Then take the airfield so a division(?) can be flown in? A C47 could carry 28 troops, that is going to take a while. The Allies did not have air superiority and per Wackipedia over 500 German and Allied planes and gliders were lost in 8 days.
XXX Corps was stretched out over 70 miles with a supply line that began in England. Arnhem is about 100 miles from Cologne (Koln) and the road from Cologne to Essen, about 40 miles, was Autobahn.
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@victornewman9904 Do you really believe if the 82nd had captured 4 bridges instead of 2 the operation would have been a huge success ?
"In the event, the state of the flanks did become important when, on Friday 22nd September, a German counterattack near Veghel, in the 101st Airborne Division's sector, successfully cut the single road for forty-eight hours, forcing Lieutenant-General Horrocks, already struggling with enemy counterattacks and the wide diffusion of his strength, to send armour back down the line to help re-open the road. Montgomery largely blamed the failure of the Operation on the lack of progress made by XII and, in particular, VIII Corps, who were ordered to protect the flanks of XXX Corps as they advanced. The progress of both of these was very slow and so the single road became extremely exposed to such attacks. It must be stressed, however, that the supplies Montgomery had asked for to fuel the advance of the 2nd British Army had only partially arrived, and both VIII and XII Corps experienced great difficulties in this regard. In addition it is important to note that German resistance on the flanks was equal to that encountered by XXX Corps, and both VIII and XII Corps sustained marginally higher losses."
Pegasus Archive Market Garden 30. Reasons for the Failure
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What Ifs? and How was that supposed to work? "Vacuum" Logic
Gavin gets a lot of grief for not taking the Waal bridges on day one. With 20/20 hindsight and 75 years of airborne operations as a guide, Sandhurst tells us the 82nd should have concentrated everything on the bridge at Grave (captured in the first hours) and the Waal bridges and done nothing about capturing any bridges over the Maas Waal canal or securing the Heights (where Browning wanted his useless HQ, brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders) and LZ for the day two lift with the bulk of 82nds arty.
Conversely, the Netherlands military academy tells us the entire plan was bollocks.
IRL 9th SS panzer recon batt used Arnhem bridge before one lightly defended end was captured by 740 men (of over 2,000 men tasked with taking all three bridges and the ferry) and joined the 88 and 20mm AAA already at the bridges. It remained at the Waal bridges until relieved by elements of 10th SS panzer after being ferried across after 1st AB captured one end of the last intact bridge in Arnhem.
On day four XXX Corps started on the north side of the River Waal and advanced 10 miles to Driel and about six miles short of Arnhem bridge.
What If? The 82nd captured the Waal bridges on day one? (Assuming both were not demoed as were the rail bridge at Arnhem, the bridge at Son and all but one of the bridges over the Maas Waal canal.) 9th SS Pz Recon stays put and is joined by elements of 10th SS Pz. 9th SS is not decimated on day two on Arnhem bridge. The forces at Grave and Waal bridges have no way to support each other and XXX Corps has to put a Bailey bridge over the Maas Waal canal on day three.
IRL The Heights Early on day two the main German attack by 2,300 grade B men with 5 armored cars, 3 halftracks with quad 20mm guns, "just 24 medium mortars" and plenty of MG's was repelled at about 1330 after being strafed by fighters escorting the day two gliders. That was not the only battle that day.
In the What If? The day two gliders are diverted or land on the Germans and are decimated. There is no resupply or reinforcement of the 82nd. The Germans have the Heights and are able to spot for artillery and air. Contrary to popular belief the Allies did not have air superiority over the area. It was close to the Ruhr Valley (the supposed objective of MG) which was visited on a regular basis by the RAF and to a lesser degree by 8th AF. German forces cut off in town on day one link up with forces on the Heights.
Depending on what the Germans do at the Waal bridges, try to retake with infantry supported by armor or just sit back and pound the 82nd with arty for two days, I think it's safe to say that what would have been left of the 82nd would not have been in any condition to support XXX Corps in its advance north.
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@davemac1197 Because 1st AB captured three bridges on day one and held them and the landing and resupply drop zones for the entire time.
"The location of these zones, however, was a matter for the Royal Air Force and not the 1st Airborne Division, and Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst, the commander of 38 Group, one of the air force formations which was to transport the Division into battle and supply it thereafter, refused to drop paratroopers any closer to Arnhem. His reasoning was that after the troops had been dropped, his aircraft could only begin the return to their bases by banking left, in a northerly direction; to have banked right would have led them into the path of the 82nd Airborne Division's aircraft returning from Nijmegen. If the aircraft approached too close to Arnhem, their return flight path would lead them directly over the top of a very large flak installation on the nearby Deelen Airfield, and to fly over this would result in severe losses which Transport Command could not afford. For this reason, the air force insisted on dropping all of the 1st Airborne Division roughly eight miles from Arnhem."
Pegasus Archive 3. Recipe for Disaster
"This would enable 1st Airborne and the Polish Brigade with their superior anti-tank gun resources to be concentrated where the armoured threat was considered to be greatest, eventually determined to be at Arnhem."
How did that work out ?
I watched a real documentary on Deadstick long before the internut.
Prior to D Day a PR aircraft filmed the flight path the gliders were to use and glider pilots watched it until they had it memorized. That was not possible for MG.
Distance over occupied territory was no more than five miles and distance was not much more than 20 miles from England. Arnhem is 74 miles from the coast and the area was regularly flown over by RAF and 8th AF heavies to bomb Krupp Werks in Essen, 72 miles southeast of Arnhem.
Almost by accident the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire were trained for that mission. By MG most of those men were not in the unit. The rest of 6th AB was on the other side of the bridges. Only Germans on the other side of the bridge for MG and no guarantee the bridge would not be blown up as happened at Arnhem rail bridge, Mook, Son and all but one of the Maas Waal canal bridges in Nijmegen.
Fuk wit Limey fan boys like to parade Deadstick as one of those "the Yanks never did anything like that". It was almost the same as the capture of Fort Eben-Emael with the exceptions of being done in darkness and not attacking a fort. Opposing Forces 50 men "The unit was poorly equipped with a mixture of foreign weapons and manned by conscripts from Poland, the Soviet Union, and France under a German officer and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Schmidt's soldiers had orders to blow up the two bridges if they were in danger of capture." wiki
Even with those odds a case has been made that if not for a "golden BB" PIAT hit on the first tank on the scene the whole thing could have gone sideways.
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1938 "Let the House remember that we buy our aviation spirit mostly from the United States or South America, or the Dutch East Indies. Supplies from the Dutch East Indies would have to run the gauntlet of the Mediterranean and, as to the supplies from the United States, under the Neutrality Act of 1937, the export from the United States of what can be clearly defined as munitions, is prohibited in case of war, to either of the combatants, whether the combatant is a victim or an aggressor. The President has also power to prohibit the export of things which are in his judgment ancillary to the conduct of war. It is clear that under these conditions the export of aviation spirit to this country from the United States might well be prohibited, if we were involved in a war, even though we were the victims and not the aggressors." below 1444 of link below
In November 1939 the Neutrality Act was amended to allow Cash and Carry. With most of the wells, refinerys and the Houdry Process for Catalytic Cracking the USA produced almost all of the high octane avgas used in WWII.
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1938/may/26/finance-bill
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Market Garden RAF on Market "Postponements for one reason or another were frequent and all this time the aircraft and crews were inevitably kept idle, to the openly expressed dismay of those who urged the alternative. In their view the right course was to use all available transport aircraft to maintain supplies to Patton's army, which was the furthest forward, so that he could continue his offensive. It was impossible to do both once the Supreme Commander ruled in favour
--192--
of airborne operations. Montgomery had decided on a bold stroke. He would outflank the defences of the 'SIEGFRIED Line' and, leaping over the three natural water barriers, the Maas at Grave, the Waal at Nijmegen and the Neder Rijn at Arnhem, secure positions from which to make a major advance eastwards.' The essential feature of the plan', he notes 'was the laying of a carpet of airborne troops across these waterways. . . . The airborne carpet and the bridgehead force were to be provided by the Allied Airborne Corps consisting of two American and one British Airborne Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade'.1 The crossings of the Maas and the Waal were to be secured by two American parachute divisions, the 101st and the 82nd, that at Arnhem by the British 1st Airborne Division. The operation, known as 'MARKET', was complicated by the fact that Transport Command could not take the whole division to its destination in one lift, and it was unable to do so for the simple but compelling reason that it did not have enough aircraft. Whether or not there were sufficient transport aircraft, of which the bulk were manufactured in the United States of America, to meet the needs of air transport all over the world is a question which cannot be answered here. All that can be said is that their allocation was made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff whose duty it was to survey the war in every theatre, and who did not place at Leigh-Mallory's disposal enough squadrons to take all three airborne divisions to their objectives in one lift. Those who had furthest to go, the British 1st Airborne, and who were to drop on the third defensive river line were allocated fewer than were given to the other two divisions. This was unavoidable in the circumstances, for the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen had to be first captured if that at Arnhem was to be of value to the prospective invaders of Germany." pages 192-193
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
Hyperwar Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Vol III on line
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Montgomery claimed that Market Garden was "90% successful" and said:
It was a bad mistake on my part – I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp ... I reckoned the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong ... In my – prejudiced – view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market Garden's unrepentant advocate.[185] Montgomery, Bernard Law (1958), The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G., London: Collins
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden#Controversy
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Metz "However, after the Allied "break out" from the lodgement established by the Normandy landings, the U.S. Third Army raced 400 miles across France, with the German forces retreating in disorder. As Third Army supply lines became stretched, materiel (especially gasoline) became scarce, and Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower called a halt to the Third Army advance so that supplies could be stockpiled for Operation Market Garden, an attempt to break into the vital (and heavily industrialized) German Ruhr Valley in the north. This pause by Third Army gave the Germans time to reorganize and fortify Metz, in an attempt to contain the Allied advance.[4]
By the end of August 1944, German forces in Lorraine had managed to reestablish a defensive line around Metz and Nancy. According to an order issued by Hitler in March 1944, fortress commanders were to hold their positions at all costs, surrendering only with Hitler's approval, which he would never give. Metz was surrounded by forts built by the Germans between 1870 and 1919, then allowed to decay by the French, who possessed the Lorraine region until it was retaken by Germany in 1940. The German commanders of the Metz forts were required to follow Hitler's "hold at all costs" order when attacked, in September 1944, by the U.S. Third Army led by General George S. Patton, who had reached Verdun before Eisenhower's order to halt the advance and conserve supplies. Hitler understood the pause was due to a supply shortage, and would not last, and he recognized that the Third Army posed a threat to the Saar region of Germany.[4] Hitler ordered his commanders to hold the Allies "as far west as possible," to give time for the strengthening of the West Wall, which had been depleted to build up the Atlantic Wall.
The defense of Metz was undertaken by the German First Army, commanded by General Otto von Knobelsdorff. The number of German troops positioned in the vicinity of Metz was equivalent to four and a half divisions."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Metz#Background
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Who Had More Enemies? "The Holodomor (Ukrainian: Голодомо́р; Голодомо́р в Украї́ні;[a][2] derived from морити голодом, "to kill by starvation")[3][4][5] was a man-made famine in Soviet Ukraine in 1932 and 1933 that killed millions of Ukrainians." 230,000 Ukrainians volunteered to serve in the SS.
November 1939 Winter War USSR invaded Finland Finnish armed forces over 300,000. Continuation War 25 June 1941 – 19 September 1944 Finnish forces retake territory lost in Winter War. Surrendered 1944. Territory taken is now part of Russia.
1940 USSR coerced large chunks of territory from Romania. Romania joined the Axis and contributed more soldiers than all other Axis nations combined (minus Germany) in the war against the USSR.
1940 USSR "annexed" the Baltic States 20,000 Estonians and 80,000 Latvians volunteered for the SS.
Anti Communist Forces: Belgium Total: 40,000 Denmark Total: 6,000 Netherlands Total: 25,000 Norway Total: 6,000 Soviet Union Russian Liberation Movement. Russian Liberation Army 50,000.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waffen-SS_foreign_volunteers_and_conscripts#France
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