Comments by "Nick Danger" (@nickdanger3802) on "Who's to Blame for the Failure of Operation Market Garden? BattleStorm 8/8" video.
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"Meanwhile, V weapons continued to be launched from the Neatherlands, within sight of British troops. Some went towards Britain, some went towards Antwerp, none went towards the USA."
"...suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague."
The Hague is 80 miles from Antwerp, so both of those statements can not be correct.
If Market Garden had reached Arnhem it would have been 80 miles short of the V2 sites.
You seem to be under the impression the USA was obligated to fight the war Britain started, was the entire war in Europe to be put on hold to end the V weapon threat?
The RAF bombed Peenemunde in August 1943 and accomplished little. The USAAF bombed Peenemunde three times in July and August 1944, before the first V2 was launched, when those aircraft could have been supporting ground operations. link below
MG was a British planned and led operation in the British AO. The USA provided 2/3 of the airborne and the vast majority of the air assets and there were millions of US service men in Britain, yet you seem to be of the opinion the USA's support was half assed because the USA didn't care about V2's because none were falling on the USA.
From 1942 where did Britain's tanks, APC's and jeeps come from?
"Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat."
Winston Churchill
In November 1942 the British Empire had it's first major land victory over the Axis in over three years at war. Montgomery refused a "request" from Churchill to attack before he had a two to one advantage in every category. In tanks and aircraft that advantage was provided by the USA through Lend Lease and brought on US flagged ships around Africa to the Red Sea.
So Britain's losses prior to MG are very relevant. If Britain had been winning before then Ike may have been inclined to give Montgomery the lead. In Sicily the USA had twice the distance to Messina, but Patton got there before Montgomery and at least one British vet claimed it was because "the Americans had it easier".
According to Max Hastings in 1945 the USA had 60 combat divisions in Europe and Britain and Canada combined had 20. So it was the USA's show to run and the USA was going to be in three times as many operations and have three times the losses.
Bombing of Peenemünde in World War II
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Peenemünde_in_World_War_II
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"At the request of the British War Cabinet, on April 19, 1944,[22] General Eisenhower directed Crossbow attacks to have absolute priority over all other air operations, including "wearing down German industry" and civilian morale[23] "for the time being", which he confirmed after the V-1 assault began on the night of June 12/13, 1944 saying to Arthur Tedder "with respect to Crossbow targets, these targets are to take first priority over everything except the urgent requirements of the Overlord [invasion of Normandy] battle; this priority to obtain until we can be certain that we have definitely gotten the upper hand of this particular business".[24] The launches surprised the Allies, who had believed that the earlier attacks on the sites had eliminated the danger. The British, who had not expected German bombing of Britain to resume so late in the war, were especially upset. Some suggested using gas on the launch sites, or even executing German civilians as punishment.[13]
Carl Spaatz, commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USTTAF), responded on June 28[25] to "complain that Crossbow was a 'diversion' from the main task of wearing down the Luftwaffe and bombing German industry" for the Combined Bomber Offensive, and to recommend instead that Crossbow be a secondary priority since "days of bad weather over Germany's industrial targets would still allow enough weight of attack for the rocket sites and the lesser tactical crises."[26]:349 By July 10, Tedder had published a list of Crossbow targets which assigned 30 to RAF Bomber Command, six to the tactical Allied Expeditionary Air Force, and 68 to Spaatz' USSTAF; after which Spaatz again complained,[27]:239 so Eisenhower allowed "spare" bombing of non-Crossbow targets: "Instructions for continuing to make Crossbow targets our first priority must stand, but ... when ... the entire strategic forces cannot be used against Crossbow, we should attack—(a) Aircraft industry, (b) Oil, (c) ball bearing (German): Kugellagerwerke, (d) Vehicular production" (Eisenhower, July 18)."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Crossbow#Bombing_priority
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Before the first V2 hit Britain. USAAF bombing of Peenemunde: 19 July 1944 Three B-17s were lost and 64 were damaged, three P-51s were lost.
4 August 1944 Three B-17s were lost, one was damaged beyond repair and 94 damaged; 2 airmen were KIA, 2 WIA and 40 MIA, 9 P-51s were lost and 1 was damaged beyond repair; 1 pilot was KIA. 25 August 1944 5 B-17s were lost and 75 damaged; 1 airman was KIA, 9 WIA and 45 MIA, 2 P-51s were lost. link below, again
This was semi interesting, again, now it's just tedious, again.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Peenemünde_in_World_War_II
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An twerp, Ultra and Market Garden "This ferrying activity continued throughout September, and Ultra provided continuous coverage of the German activities while the British failed to seal off their escape route. On 6 September an Ultra message stated that a GAF division and other
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miscellaneous units had already been ferried across and that they were preparing to
increase their activities. An intercept on 8 September “estimated that so far 25,000 men, 350 vehicles and 50 tons of equipment had been ferried across.”44 Ultra continued to
provide almost daily situation reports that detailed the evacuation of the Fifteenth Army.
On the day that Market-Garden commenced, it was estimated that 70,000 men had been
ferried across the Scheldt Estuary and escaped into Holland.45 By the end of the
evacuation on 23 September, a summary stated that 82,000 men, 530 guns, 46,000
vehicles, and 4,000 horses were ferried out of the pocket.46 These numbers are low
compared to those provided by the 21st Army Group G2 Brigadier Bill Williams. In his
intelligence summary on 18 September, he stated that, “probably over 100,000 men had crossed into the Scheldt Peninsula since Antwerp was captured.”47
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a406861.pdf
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"On 20 September, D+3, he (General Ridgway) was moving through the battlefield near Eindhoven. He was alone but for his jeep, driver, and two aides.
[W]e came up with the advance elements of British armor. There a junior officer stopped me and told me I could go no further because the road in front was swept with small arms fire. So we stopped a minute to watch how good our British comrades would take out this resistance. They had the muzzles of their tank guns pointing down the road toward where the enemy was supposed to be, but not a shot was being fired. It was a demonstration of caution. . . .I had seen it, and dealt with it many times before. . . .I couldn’t order this tank commander to move on down the road. So, after waiting about forty minutes, and seeing no visible effort being made to outflank this resistance. . .we (Author’s note: “we” means Ridgway and his aides) started walking down the ditch along the side of the road. We went a mile and a half, perhaps, with every sense alert, but not a shot was fired at us. . . .We moved on until we found General Max Taylor at the CP of the 101st Division." page 26 OPERATION MARKET GARDEN: CASE STUDY FOR ANALYZING SENIOR LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a500814.pdf
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Montgomery claimed that Market Garden was "90% successful" and said:
It was a bad mistake on my part – I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp ... I reckoned the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong ... In my – prejudiced – view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market Garden's unrepentant advocate.[185] Montgomery, Bernard Law (1958), The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G., London: Collins
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden#Controversy
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Metz "However, after the Allied "break out" from the lodgement established by the Normandy landings, the U.S. Third Army raced 400 miles across France, with the German forces retreating in disorder. As Third Army supply lines became stretched, materiel (especially gasoline) became scarce, and Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower called a halt to the Third Army advance so that supplies could be stockpiled for Operation Market Garden, an attempt to break into the vital (and heavily industrialized) German Ruhr Valley in the north. This pause by Third Army gave the Germans time to reorganize and fortify Metz, in an attempt to contain the Allied advance.[4]
By the end of August 1944, German forces in Lorraine had managed to reestablish a defensive line around Metz and Nancy. According to an order issued by Hitler in March 1944, fortress commanders were to hold their positions at all costs, surrendering only with Hitler's approval, which he would never give. Metz was surrounded by forts built by the Germans between 1870 and 1919, then allowed to decay by the French, who possessed the Lorraine region until it was retaken by Germany in 1940. The German commanders of the Metz forts were required to follow Hitler's "hold at all costs" order when attacked, in September 1944, by the U.S. Third Army led by General George S. Patton, who had reached Verdun before Eisenhower's order to halt the advance and conserve supplies. Hitler understood the pause was due to a supply shortage, and would not last, and he recognized that the Third Army posed a threat to the Saar region of Germany.[4] Hitler ordered his commanders to hold the Allies "as far west as possible," to give time for the strengthening of the West Wall, which had been depleted to build up the Atlantic Wall.
The defense of Metz was undertaken by the German First Army, commanded by General Otto von Knobelsdorff. The number of German troops positioned in the vicinity of Metz was equivalent to four and a half divisions."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Metz#Background
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