Comments by "Nick Danger" (@nickdanger3802) on "The REAL Operation Market Garden | BATTLESTORM Documentary | All Episodes" video.

  1. "The decision to commit 1st British Airborne Corps Headquarters to the battle is a highly questionable one. Despite the fact that they landed at Nijmegen, alongside the 82nd Airborne Division, politics demanded that the 1st Airborne Division consequently lost thirty-eight gliders from its First Lift, and as such only half of the 2nd South Staffordshires were brought in on the first day." day."http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/depth_reason2.htm
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  2. "If any one factor can be singled out as to why Market Garden failed, then it is this over-optimistic attitude that the Germans were already beaten." Pegasus Archive In-Depth 29. Reasons for the Failure http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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  3.  @johnburns4017  Who didn't take which bridge and when. Over six hours after landing 1st AB takes one end of a lightly defended bridge (of three) AFTER 9th SS Recon battalion crosses on it's way to Nijmegen. There were approx. 750 second echelon soldiers at the Waal bridges before 9th SS arrived plus 88mm and 20mm AA batteries. Map Arnhem day one http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/Photos/Map1ParaProg.gif
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  4. "The primary source of Intelligence for Operation Market Garden was Ultra, the codename for the interception and decoding of German signals received through the Enigma machine. Ultra clearly identified the presence of the 9th and 10th S.S. Panzer Divisions, but due to the vital need to protect the system and not give the Germans cause to suspect that their codes had been broken, only a select few were privy to this information in an undiluted form. The 1st British Airborne Corps, therefore, only received a blurred suggestion that the two Divisions were in the area, but this did not necessarily mean that these units were at anything like full or half strength. During the chaotic retreat from Normandy, the German divisions that survived had been so severely mauled that many were reduced to the strength of a weak brigade. Browning advised Major-General Roy Urquhart that his total opposition would consist of nothing stronger than a Brigade Group of infantry supported by a few tanks." Pegasus Archive In Depth 29. Reasons for the Failure http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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  5. How long would it take to refuel 1,438 transport aircraft (at least those that had not been shot down) and escort fighters?
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  6. "While they waited for the Typhoons, Vandeleur halted the column for lunch. He and his cousin Giles found a villa by the road with it's own swimming pool. They had a swim and revived themselves with more champagne afterwards when a young woman war correspondent joined them. Finally, two hours after the initial request, Love heard that the strike had been cancelled due to poor flying conditions. Vandeleur was livid." page 168 Arnhem Beevor
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  7. 43.00 All available 82nd units were required to drive 2,300 Grade B Germans with five armored cars, three half tracks with quad 20mm, "just 24 medium mortars" and more than a few MG42's off of the Heights as gliders landed among the retreating Germans. pages 98-99 Nijmegen US 82nd Airborne & Guards Armoured Division
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  8. "The 82nd Airborne Division, however, certainly does not deserve any particular criticism for this as their priorities appear to be a further product of the blind optimism that dogged Operation Market Garden, of which everyone involved was guilty. At Nijmegen, as with everywhere else, the assumption was that resistance would be light and so the main concern of the airborne units was to make the advance of the ground forces as rapid and as uncomplicated as possible, instead of devoting all their attention to primary objectives. Furthermore, it should be understood that the 82nd Airborne Division had by far the most complicated plan of any of the Airborne units involved with Market Garden, their troops being required to capture numerous objectives over a considerable expanse of terrain." Pegasus Archive 30. Reasons for the Failure page
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  9.  @bigwoody4704  Arnhem Day One 1300 Glider landings begin 1500 Reconnaissance Squadron moves from the landing zone, 2nd Battalion moves off the landing grounds, 3rd Battalion moves out 1530 1st Battalion starts its advance 1700 2nd Battalion arrives near the rail bridge (4 miles/6k from LZ Z), it is blown up 2000 Frost's 2nd Battalion arrives at the road bridge (740 men total) page 34 Operation Market Garden 1944 (2) The British Airborne Missions
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  10. "If any one factor can be singled out as to why Market Garden failed, then it is this over-optimistic attitude that the Germans were already beaten." Pegasus Archive In-Depth 29. Reasons for the Failure http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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  11.  @TheNoonish  "The real problem at Arnhem was poor planning and leadership. The 1st Airborne Division’s strategy was for the first troops on the ground to remain at the drop zone until the second lift arrived 24 hours later, with the exception of Brigadier Gerald Lathbury’s 1st Parachute Brigade. The unit was to detach from the main body immediately and advance into Arnhem. Unfortunately, Lathbury planned to drop his units along three widely spaced routes to half-a-dozen isolated objectives. This virtually guaranteed the brigade would be overwhelmed piecemeal. Lathbury also wasted precious time by holding his troops back at the landing area for over an hour. Later, he drove back and forth harassing his commanders to move faster until he was cut off with part of the brigade and badly wounded." "Division commander Major-General Roy Urquhart knew even less about airborne operations, having been promoted as a Montgomery protégé with zero experience leading paratroops. He made no effort to tailor his plan to the specific mission like the two U.S. divisions, and the idea that he could simply move into Arnhem after giving the Germans 24 hours’ notice was rooted in conventional operational procedures and fanciful at best." "This was compounded by a series of poor decisions that included abruptly leaving his headquarters in response to a baseless rumour, deliberately severing his sole radio link in the process and then being cut off from his formation for 48 hours after an eventual and ill-advised attempt to regain his headquarters." "Urquhart had not properly grasped the essential difference between airborne and conventional operations, and by the time he returned to his command post the Arnhem portion of Market had effectively failed and his division was cut off with little prospect of relief." https://militaryhistorynow.com/2019/06/16/debacle-at-arnhem-five-reasons-for-the-failure-of-operation-market-garden/
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  12. "both Rauter, the SS Security chief for the Netherlands, and one of the officers of Helle’s Dutch SS battalion at Arnhem told him that a British officer was captured on D-Day with the plans for the ground markers and smoke signals. The Germans also listened in to British radio signals on No.68P sets which captured paratroopers had not destroyed." page 48/12 pdf Airborne Communications in Operation Market Garden David Bennett
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  13. As I understand it. XXX Corps had averaged just over 2 miles/3k per daylight hour when it arrived at Grave, 25 miles from Arnhem on current map, at 0820 on day three. If it had proceeded at that pace, it would have been a few miles south of Arnhem road bridge at sundown (1830) on day three. Due to lack of ammo on day three Frosts' men were ordered to fire only if fired upon. Frosts' men lost control of the bridge at about 0900 on day four The Tank Museum did a reenactment of XXX Corps advance. They arrived at Driel, six miles short of Arnhem, on day five. Tank Convoy | Operation Market Garden 75 | The Tank Museum https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bKY6ms6V2FI
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  14. How long would it take to refuel the thousands of aircraft? All pilots and aircraft were scheduled to fly every day until the mission was over and after for resupply because there was only one road.
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  15. "it is far from historically accurate." It did leave out this action. A Bridge Too Far: The Failed Jeep Attack At Arnhem https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EejO0uwmmzo&t=1s
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  16. @Colonel Blimp What were the losses at Dunkerque? In how many days? Crete? Norway? Greece? Dieppe? Leros?
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  17. If Only 1st AB's radios had worked as well as they hoped. 1st AB's commander had not been cut off and surrounded for 2 days. 1st AB got more than 740 men to the road bridge. XXX Corps had arrived at Eindhoven on day one as planned. 1st AB had "got the stick out" and walked the three miles from LZ-Z and captured the rail bridge before it was destroyed. Browning had not taken 38 of 1st AB's gliders for his useless HQ. map Arnhem day one https://www.saak.nl/battlefield%20tour/2009%20oosterbeek/landingszone%20S/landing%20zone%20S%2017%20sept%201944%20(9).gif
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  18. At the time the 82nd was the most combat experienced airborne division in any army. The Heights was the only glider landing zone and had to held for the next day's landing with the bulk of 82nd artillery, it was on the border with Germany and the Reichswald national forest, it was where Browning wanted his HQ which was brought in by 36 of 1st AB's gliders (normal load one battalion) and redundant after contact was made with XXX Corps less than 48 hours after landing, it was the only high ground between the Maas and Waal river valleys. Before 1st AB captured one end of one lightly defended bridge, the 82nd had captured the bridge at Grave (one of the longest bridges in Europe) and captured the last intact bridge over the Maas-Waal canal. AND 9th SS Panzer recon battalion had used the bridge at Arnhem to move to the north side of Nijmegen. map Nijmegen day one https://i.pinimg.com/736x/d1/fa/bb/d1fabb09d7b032564d98331e871cf633.jpg
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  19. XXX Corps Recon arrived at Grave at around 0800 on the third day and north of Eindhoven and still over 10 miles from the River Waal bridges.
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  20. Churchill  "I do not think that the award of a special medal would be appropriate. Indeed, were such special distinction to be considered for this very gallant episode it would have to be considered with many other noble and memorable battles and actions that have taken place and may yet take place, at sea and in the air, as well as on land." Arnhem (Recognition) (Hansard, 3 October 1944) (parliament.uk)
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  21. When XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three they were still 27 miles from Arnhem road bridge (Grave to Heuman to Arnhem). They had averaged just over two miles per hour in daylight up to that point, if they had proceeded at that pace they would have arrived on the south side of the lower Rhein at about sunset on day three. On day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water and Frost was informed no more attempts to reach him would be made by 1st AB and the Germans regained control of the bridge. The rest of 1st AB withdrew into the Pocket. It took 1st AB four hours to travel four miles from LZ Z to the rail bridge arriving just in time to see it blown up.
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  22. 1940 British forces "evacuated" from Norway, Belgium and France (led by Montgomery). 1941 Greece, Crete and Libya. 1942 Dieppe and Tobruk.
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  23. Unravelling the Tragic Consequences of Operation Market Garden's Failure https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tUxrgeS2nZs
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  24. 1,000 Tanks in the Reichswald The 82nd had the usual day one load out of artillery, primarily 75mm pack howitzers. No Tanks in Arnhem 15 four engine bombers to tow 15 Hamilcar gliders loaded with 17 pounder Anti tank guns and Bren carriers to tow them.
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  25. Your mum.
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  26. 6.22 "refused to fly in more than one lift per day" Assuming he is using Operation Dragoon (South of France in August 44) as justification for thinking two lifts in one day was possible, Dragoon was 800 miles to the south and one month earlier so had two more hours of daylight. In any case the fog didn't lift from the airfields used by the transports until 0930 on day one. As I understand it.
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  27. Planning "The essential plan (Comet) was not dead, however, and on the 10th September 1944, Montgomery personally briefed Browning for Operation Market Garden." "Browning, having asked Montgomery how long the 1st Airborne would have to hold Arnhem and being told two days, replied that they could hold it for four." "Browning denied their (1st AB) request for a larger allocation as the swift progress of the 2nd Army was judged to be of the greatest importance, and so the 101st Airborne Division, closest to the relieving troops, had priority on aircraft, followed by the 82nd Airborne Division and finally the 1st Airborne." "If Browning was at fault then it is because he made no effort to mention the possibility of this threat to the 1st Airborne Division, whom he had briefed to expect nothing more than a brigade group of infantry supported by a small number of tanks during the later phases of the battle. Suggestions of the presence of these two panzer divisions nevertheless filtered through, but more emphatic information may have resulted in them taking additional anti-tank equipment and adopting tactics better suited to dealing with heavy opposition." Pegasus Archive Browning, on line
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  28. @ninjakid6 IWM "Their supporting tanks led the attack, but raced too far ahead, so that well-hidden German troops cut down the isolated infantry and then turned on the tanks from the rear. 7th Armoured Division attempted a 'right-hook' towards Villers-Bocage on 13 June, but this was also blunted by a fierce German response, not least by the intervention of a handful of SS Tiger tanks which decimated its lead elements. These failed attempts to outflank Caen were an early demonstration of flaws in British tactics, as well as the debilitating effect of the confined Normandy landscape and the impressive fighting qualities of German forces. 7th Armoured Division's previous experience of mobile warfare in North Africa did not readily translate to a congested European battlefield. With its infantry left too far behind, it had been stopped in its tracks in terrain unsuitable for the large scale deployment of tanks." Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/tactics-and-the-cost-of-victory-in-normandy
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  29. 1940 British forces "evacuated" from Norway, Belgium and France. 1941 Greece, Crete and Libya. 1942 Tobruk and Dieppe.
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  30. "The decision to commit 1st British Airborne Corps Headquarters to the battle is a highly questionable one. Despite the fact that they landed at Nijmegen, alongside the 82nd Airborne Division, politics demanded that the 1st Airborne Division consequently lost thirty-eight gliders from its First Lift, and as such only half of the 2nd South Staffordshires were brought in on the first day." Pegasus Archive Reasons for the Failure http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/depth_reason2.htm
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  31. https://www.ww2-weapons.com/military-expenditures-strategic-raw-materials-oil-production/
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  32. "Nevertheless, further increases in the octane rating of aviation fuel were sought, led by the world-famous air racer and manager of the aviation department of Shell in the USA, Jimmy Doolittle." Of the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo Feb. 1942. "The Royal Air Force had agreed to a limited supply of 100-octane fuel in 1938, but the outbreak of war placed supply routes under threat until the USA invoked a revised Neutrality Act in late 1939; allowing large quantities of 100-octane fuel to be shipped from the United States. Those supplies began to reach front-line squadrons in bulk through the first half of 1940 and would see its first use in battle in defending the evacuation of Dunkirk, immediately prior to the Battle of Britain." https://scarfandgoggles.wordpress.com/tag/100-octane/
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  33. "Suffice it to say that in the year 1938 no less than 92 per cent. of our oil supplies came from foreign countries, the remaining 8 per cent. from British sources. In spite of long, costly and sustained efforts to find virgin oil in this country, only an insignificant quantity has been discovered." below 566 https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1939/jul/26/fuel-supplies-in-war-time
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  34. "In January 1937 noted internal combustion engine expert F.R. Banks wrote a paper recommending 100-octane fuel become standard and British aero engines be developed to take advantage of it. His recommendation was rejected on the basis that the US was then the only source of supply and continued supply in time of war could not be guaranteed. The RAF maintained 87-octane as its standard. Personnel changes in the Air Ministry led to changed attitudes. Experiments were conducted with imported 100-octane petrol in 1938. Later an entire tanker of 100-octane reached Britain and tests were conducted at operational units. By June 1939 three months before World War II began the British started stockpiling 100-octane gasoline." link below The paper is in the book I Kept no Diary by Air Commodore F.R (Rod) Banks and can be found as WWII Aircraft Performance by searching wwiiaircraftperformancebanks100octane https://warbirdforum.com/octane.htm
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  35.  @bigwoody4704  Schneider Trophy Race This is an interesting story, this is the short version. It was national, not manufacturer based competition. The US won in 1923 and as the winner hosted the next race. In 1924 none of the other nations were ready so the Yanks cancelled a race they could have won easily by completing one circuit of the course. Some guy named J. Doolittle won in 1925 then the USA withdrew from the series. In 1931 Britain won for the third time in a row against no/zero/none competitors (that year).
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  36.  @thevillaaston7811  "The prospect of such accidents appeared to be the only cause for concern, because although the standard procedure for disembarking from a glider calls for a rapid and defensive exit, there was such a lack of enemy activity that men calmly left their craft and went about their business as if they were on a training exercise in England." Pegasus Archive The First Lift
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  37. On the morning of the second day, Brigadier Hackett and his 4th Parachute Brigade would arrive on DZ-Y, ten miles west of Arnhem, together with the remainder of the 1st Airlanding Brigade and the Divisional units. As soon as these troops were assembled, the whole Division would then march to Arnhem, relieve the 1st Parachute Brigade and establish a wide defensive perimeter around Arnhem and Oosterbeek. Pegasus Archive Market Garden The Plan
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  38. The only "boy" in this operation was Boy Browning who was in command of all airborne on the ground from the time his glider landed. He failed jump training, twice, and took 38 of 1st AB's gliders for his HQ.
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  39. "a few obsolete tanks for training" "He needed every unit possible, and Knaust, with his four panzergrenadier companies, would also receive a platoon of assault guns and a company of seven Mark III and eight Mark IV tanks from a driver-training school in Bielefeld." page 134 Arnhem Beevor
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  40. 30.34 "handful of Germans" "By late evening there were 1,000 men in Nijmegen under the Headquarters of Fallschirmjager Reserve Training Regiment Henke, who also had both 88mm (4th Company, 572 Heavy Flak Battalion) and 20mm anti-aircraft guns ..." page 131 Nijmegen US 82nd Airborne & Guards Armoured Division
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  41. "Montgomery continually badgered Eisenhower for a reorientation in strategy from mid-August onwards, but to no avail, and on 4 September Second Army’s advance ground to a halt around Antwerp for want of supplies. Nevertheless, six days after this loss of Allied momentum, Eisenhower finally agreed to some of Montgomery’s wishes and to a scheme that aimed to use Lieutenant-General Lewis Brereton’s First Allied Airborne Army." page 4 PDF Netherlands 17–25 September 1944 - GOV UK
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  42. The fortifications of Metz consisted of several forts and observation posts with connecting entrenchments and tunnels. As Third Army supply lines became stretched, material (especially gasoline) became scarce, and Eisenhower called a halt to the Third Army advance so that supplies could be stockpiled for Operation Market Garden... This pause by Third Army gave the Germans time to reorganize and fortify Metz, in an attempt to contain the Allied advance. The defense of Metz was undertaken by the German First Army, commanded by General Otto von Knobelsdorff. The number of German troops positioned in the vicinity of Metz was equivalent to four and a half divisions. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Metz
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  43. What's the excuse for British forces being "evacuated" from France where Monty was second in command and Rommel had "training" tanks?
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  44. 23 September "The fate of the 1st Airborne Division at Oosterbeek was also affected by the German attacks on Hell's Highway. They prevented Horrocks from bringing any more troops forward to reinforce the two divisions north of Nijmegen in the Betuwe. Only a single infantry brigade from the 43rd Wessex Division could be spared to join the Poles at Driel and cross the Neder Rijn to reinforce Urquhart's exhausted force. XXX Corps was virtually immobilized as German artillery engaged convoys coming up it's supply route." page 294 Arnhem Beevor
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  45. Map Nijmegen day one https://www.flamesofwar.com/Portals/0/all_images/Historical/MarketGarden/Market-Garden-History-08.jpg
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  46. RAF on Market "Postponements for one reason or another were frequent and all this time the aircraft and crews were inevitably kept idle, to the openly expressed dismay of those who urged the alternative. In their view the right course was to use all available transport aircraft to maintain supplies to Patton's army, which was the furthest forward, so that he could continue his offensive. It was impossible to do both once the Supreme Commander ruled in favour --192-- of airborne operations. Montgomery had decided on a bold stroke. He would outflank the defences of the 'SIEGFRIED Line' and, leaping over the three natural water barriers, the Maas at Grave, the Waal at Nijmegen and the Neder Rijn at Arnhem, secure positions from which to make a major advance eastwards.' The essential feature of the plan', he notes 'was the laying of a carpet of airborne troops across these waterways. . . . The airborne carpet and the bridgehead force were to be provided by the Allied Airborne Corps consisting of two American and one British Airborne Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade'.1 The crossings of the Maas and the Waal were to be secured by two American parachute divisions, the 101st and the 82nd, that at Arnhem by the British 1st Airborne Division. The operation, known as 'MARKET', was complicated by the fact that Transport Command could not take the whole division to its destination in one lift, and it was unable to do so for the simple but compelling reason that it did not have enough aircraft. Whether or not there were sufficient transport aircraft, of which the bulk were manufactured in the United States of America, to meet the needs of air transport all over the world is a question which cannot be answered here. All that can be said is that their allocation was made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff whose duty it was to survey the war in every theatre, and who did not place at Leigh-Mallory's disposal enough squadrons to take all three airborne divisions to their objectives in one lift. Those who had furthest to go, the British 1st Airborne, and who were to drop on the third defensive river line were allocated fewer than were given to the other two divisions. This was unavoidable in the circumstances, for the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen had to be first captured if that at Arnhem was to be of value to the prospective invaders of Germany." pages 192-193 PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RAF-III/UK-RAF-III-9.html
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  47. The Ardennes Offensive Part 3 - Forget Bastogne, head for the Meuse British Army Documentaries https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bz3ZI2OA78&t=387s
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  48.  @bigwoody4704  On the "why no second lift on day one like Dragoon?" debate, Dragoon was approx. 800 miles south of England so would have had about two more hours of daylight.
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  49. "At the beginning of September the 1st Allied Airborne Army was put under command of Montgomery. Planning began on Operation ‘Comet’. ‘Comet’ was a carbon copy of what would become ‘Market Garden’ except that it expected 1st British Airborne Division and 1st Polish Parachute Brigade only to seize all the bridges from Grave to Arnhem." page 288 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1470243042000344777
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  50.  @bigwoody4704  Good to know. I don't think the tosser collective has any interest in facts. Offering opinions as facts and attempting to piss people off for amusement are their only purposes in life.
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  51. "Time and time again at Caen, for closing the Falaise gap, in the planning and execution of the MARKET GARDEN campaign, and in opening the port of Antwerp, Montgomery seemed to promise the desired breakthroughs but delivered much less." The British Army in Normandy: Winning the War the Wrong Way https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour/finest-hour-181/british-army-normandy-montgomery/
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  52. The Tank Museum did a "reenactment" of XXX Corps advance. It arrived at Driel on day five, six miles short of Arnhem bridge. Tank Convoy | Operation Market Garden 75 | The Tank Museum https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bKY6ms6V2FI
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  53. 1940 British forces "evacuated" from Norway, Belgium and France. 1941 Greece, Crete and Libya. 1942 Dieppe and Tobruk.
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  54. ABTF was directed by Richard Samuel Attenborough, Baron Attenborough, CBE, FRSA, RAF 1940-1945. Nominated for 8 BAFTA's including best picture, won 4. Not nominated for any academy awards. Look up which studios made Mrs. Miniver, 633 squadron and the most recent Dunkirk, French spelling Dunkerque.
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  55. At the beginning of September the 1st Allied Airborne Army was put under command of Montgomery. Planning began on Operation ‘Comet’. ‘Comet’ was a carbon copy of what would become ‘Market Garden’ except that it expected 1st British Airborne Division and 1st Polish Parachute Brigade only to seize all the bridges from Grave to Arnhem." page 288 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1470243042000344777
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  56. XXX Corps scout cars arrived at GRAVE at approx. 0820 on day three having averaged just over one mile per hour. Grave is 25 miles from Arnhem. If XXX Corps had kept the same pace it would have arrived at Arnhem bridge on the morning of the day Frosts' men ran out of ammo. map Grave to Arnhem https://www.bing.com/search?q=distance+grave+to+arnhem&form=EDNTHT&refig=ccb5e5cfa7a240629103b9a2b5e9b5a2&mkt=en-us&msnews=1&PC=HCTS&DAF1=1&sp=1&ghc=1&qs=AS&pq=distance+grave+to+&sk=PRES1&sc=7-18&cvid=ccb5e5cfa7a240629103b9a2b5e9b5a2&cc=US&setlang=en-US
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  57. "The location of these zones, however, was a matter for the Royal Air Force and not the 1st Airborne Division, and Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst, the commander of 38 Group, one of the air force formations which was to transport the Division into battle and supply it thereafter, refused to drop paratroopers any closer to Arnhem. His reasoning was that after the troops had been dropped, his aircraft could only begin the return to their bases by banking left, in a northerly direction; to have banked right would have led them into the path of the 82nd Airborne Division's aircraft returning from Nijmegen. If the aircraft approached too close to Arnhem, their return flight path would lead them directly over the top of a very large flak installation on the nearby Deelen Airfield, and to fly over this would result in severe losses which Transport Command could not afford. For this reason, the air force insisted on dropping all of the 1st Airborne Division roughly eight miles from Arnhem." Pegasus Archive In Depth 3. Recipe for Disaster http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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  58. Planning "The essential plan (Comet) was not dead, however, and on the 10th September 1944, Montgomery personally briefed Browning for Operation Market Garden." "Browning, having asked Montgomery how long the 1st Airborne would have to hold Arnhem and being told two days, replied that they could hold it for four."  Pegasus Archive Browning, on line Of the over 2,000 men tasked with taking all three bridges only 740 men captured one end of a lightly defended bridge in Arnhem and held it for 3 days and 12 hours. As I understand it.
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  59. Hours In the first six hours the 82nd captured the bridge north of Grave and Grave (11 miles Grave to Waal bridges on current map), the last intact bridge on the Maas-Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ (brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders) and the LZ for the next day. About 8 hours after landing 740 men of 1st AB (of the over 2,000 men and "special jeeps" tasked with taking bridges) took one end of one lightly defended bridge. 4 miles from LZ-Z to the rail bridge.
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  60. "Brereton's staff scheduled only one lift based on the need to prepare for the first drop by bombarding German flak positions for half a day and a weather forecast on the afternoon of 16 September (which soon proved erroneous) that the area would have clear conditions for four days, so allowing drops during them." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden#Market
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  61. If Only 1st AB's radios had worked as well as they hoped. 1st AB's commander had not been cut off and surrounded for 48 hours total. 1st AB got more than 740 men to the road bridge. XXX Corps had arrived at Eindhoven on day one as planned. 1st AB had "got the stick out" and walked the four miles from LZ-Z and captured the rail bridge before it was destroyed. Browning had not taken 38 of 1st AB's gliders for his useless HQ.
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  62. 406th Losses "at least 50 men killed and 150 prisoners." page 101 Nijmegen US 82nd Airborne & Guards Armoured Division
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  63. At the beginning of September the 1st Allied Airborne Army was put under command of Montgomery. Planning began on Operation ‘Comet’. ‘Comet’ was a carbon copy of what would become ‘Market Garden’ except that it expected 1st British Airborne Division and 1st Polish Parachute Brigade only to seize all the bridges from Grave to Arnhem." page 288 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1470243042000344777
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  64. "Montgomery desperately tried to persuade Eisenhower to agree to a number of plans that he felt would achieve this, one of these was given the codename Operation Comet. The plan was to drop the elite 1st British Airborne Division, by parachute and glider, into Holland to capture the five key bridges in and around the towns of Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem." Pegasus Archive Marlet Garden Introduction
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  65. "Browning and Brigadier-General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, were in agreement that the priorities around Nijmegen were first the vast area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, followed by the bridge at Grave, the three smaller bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally the very large bridge at Nijmegen. Browning also told Gavin that he was not to make any attempt to move towards Nijmegen until the Heights had been secured; Gavin agreed though he later felt confident enough in his plan to allow one battalion to head for the bridge immediately after landing. The Groesbeek Heights were certainly important as they served as the Division's main drop zone and dominated the entire area, and so there is no question that the position of the 82nd Airborne Division, not to mention the right flank of the 2nd British Army when they arrived, would have been placed under considerable pressure if the area were to remain in enemy hands." Pegasus Archive Marlet Garden LG Browning
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  66. "both Rauter, the SS Security chief for the Netherlands, and one of the officers of Helle’s Dutch SS battalion at Arnhem told him that a British officer was captured on D-Day with the plans for the ground markers and smoke signals. The Germans also listened in to British radio signals on No.68P sets which captured paratroopers had not destroyed." page 48/12 pdf Airborne Communications in Operation Market Garden David Bennett
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  67. From the BBC: "At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges."       Distance from start line to Arnhem: 70 miles http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml
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  68.  @joecombs7468  Pilot Revolt? RAF aircrew who refused to fly were labeled LMF. USAAF pilots who refused to fly would have found themselves in the infantry.
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  69. @Colonel Blimp Where did fuel come from to run those trucks and the 280,646 trucks and jeeps Lend Leased to Britain? Oil Production by Country in Last 120 Years (1900-2020) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NaDslP39ykY
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  70.  @johnburns4017  FOAD fuk wit
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  71. Your mum.
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  72. Theoretical Second Lift on Day One 17 September 1944 Actual first lift 0945 Take off begins 1350 Main jump over Arnhem begins Four hours back to home field (not including circling while waiting to land) Theoretical Second Lift Assume minimum of one hour for turn around 1850 Take off begins (Sunset Arnhem 17 Sept. 2024, 1945 DST Central European Time) 2255 Jump begins Britain was on Double Summer Time, two hours ahead of GMT.
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  73.  @davemac1197  How many bridges was 1st AB supposed to capture before sundown on day one ? Lt. Col. J.D. Frost about Operation Market Garden https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdvpA94XSv0
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  74.  @bigwoody4704  I can't figure out how an army that had not won a major land battle in over two years of combat managed to turn into the best army in the world over night.
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  75. Yes
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  76. Montgomery Have been thinking about future plans but have not (repeat not) discussed the subject with Ike [Eisenhower]. My views are as follows. After crossing the Seine 12 and 21 Army groups should keep together as a solid mass of some 40 divisions which would be so strong that it need fear nothing. This force should move northwards, 21 Army Group should be on the western flank, and should clear the Channel coast and the Pas de Calais and Western Flanders and secure Antwerp. The American armies should move on Ardennes, directed on Brussels, Aachen and Cologne. The movement of the American armies would cut the communications of enemy forces on the Channel coast and thus facilitate the task of British Army Group. The initial objects of the movement would be to destroy German forces on the coast and to establish a powerful air force in Belgium. A further object would be to get enemy out of V-1 or V-2 range of England. Bradley agrees with above conception. Would be glad to know if you agree generally. When I have your reply will discuss matter with Ike.[62] Montgomery contended that the 21st Army Group needed the assistance of at least twelve American divisions, and to provide the logistical support for them, he recommended that Patton's Third Army be halted.[63] In August and September 1944, the US First Army consisted of nine divisions, so giving up twelve would have meant handing over the entire army to Montgomery.[64] The broad front versus narrow front controversy in World War II wiki
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  77. Vain Browning lost 1944 Arnhem battle in Nijmegen: Col. Robert Kershaw & Dr Adriaan Groeneweg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJrSRwv7EEk&lc=UgxpuwkRlw-USHXlNpF4AaABAg.98IT2w5wcbA9JdPqq_Qk2d
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  78. "These showed a small number of tanks close to one of the 1st Airborne Division's drop zones, but a mere handful of armoured vehicles did not automatically mean the presence of an entire panzer division. Lieutenant-General Browning chose to play down the significance of these photographs, and when Major Urquhart persisted with his opposition to the plan, Browning forced him away on a period of sick leave." In Depth http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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  79.  @stevewiles7132  My mothers first husband died in North Africa. "Of course we can beat them. I shall drag the United States in." Churchill 1940 https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1207763/Privately-Churchill-called-bloody-Yankees--lovers-ardour-fawned-flattered-flirted-woo-U-S.html
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  80. "Montgomery desperately tried to persuade Eisenhower to agree to a number of plans that he felt would achieve this, one of these was given the codename Operation Comet. The plan was to drop the elite 1st British Airborne Division, by parachute and glider, into Holland to capture the five key bridges in and around the towns of Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem. The 2nd British Army would then break through the German front line and advance the sixty-four miles to the River Rhine at Arnhem, properly securing each of the bridges as they went. Once the final bridge at Arnhem had been reached, there would be no more river obstacles standing between the 2nd British Army and Germany." Pegasus Archive In-Depth Introduction https://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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  81. Conversations with History: Brian Urquhart https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfuJ4W-wqI4&t=1889s
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  82. 1,438 C47's (including 164 RAF), fuel capacity 804 US gallons/each equals 1,156,152 US gallons. http://www.pwencycl.kgbudge.com/C/-/C-47_Skytrain.htm
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  83.  @Mulberry2000  Bridges captured by 82nd in the first six hours: Two Bridges captured by 1st AB in the first six hours: Zero map Nijmegen day one https://i.pinimg.com/736x/d1/fa/bb/d1fabb09d7b032564d98331e871cf633.jpg
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  84. "Between Sept. 4 and 10, Montgomery searched for ways to achieve his goal while ignoring the problem of Antwerp." "Montgomery later admitted that he was wrong to assume the Canadians could open the approaches to Antwerp while his forces tried to reach Germany. But his timing was off. The Canadians began fighting around Antwerp in early October, after Market Garden had ended. So, our original question prompts another: Why did it take to the middle of October for Montgomery to support the embattled Canadians and make Antwerp a priority?" Should Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery have tried to clear the Scheldt Estuary in September 1944? https://legionmagazine.com/en/2018/03/should-field-marshal-bernard-montgomery-have-tried-to-clear-the-scheldt-estuary-in-september-1944/
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  85. History Learning Site UK "To start with, Antwerp was not considered to be overly important as Montgomery wanted to push to the Ruhr as soon as was possible. His belief that an attack on Arnhem would bring a swift end to the war did not succeed – and it was only after the failure of Operation Market Garden that Montgomery realised the importance of Antwerp in solving the increasing supply difficulties that the Allies had as their supply lines became more and more extended as they approached Germany." "As early as September 8th, 1944, Winston Churchill had written to his chiefs-of-staff about the importance of the Walcheren area and the port of Antwerp." https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/world-war-two-in-western-europe/antwerp-and-world-war-two/
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  86.  @Phantomrasberryblowe  Are you a DCSer? If you do not like the quotes take it up with the sites they came from.
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  87. "Tedder was appointed Deputy Supreme Commander at SHAEF beneath General Eisenhower, taking up the role in January 1944. However he developed an antipathy towards the British General Bernard Montgomery and during the difficult Battle of Normandy and later, he was a critic of Montgomery's performance and advocated Montgomery's removal from command." Marshal of the Royal Air Force Arthur William Tedder https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Tedder,_1st_Baron_Tedder#Second_World_War
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  88. "The Germans had managed to solidify their defences after the panic of September 1944; had British forces thrust north from Antwerp immediately after its capture, they would have found the Scheldt poorly defended. Instead, Infanterie Division 70 had the opportunity to improve its defences on Walcheren Island." The Calgary Highlanders https://calgaryhighlanders.com/about-the-regiment/detailed-history/calgary-highlanders-1939-45/battle-of-the-scheldt/
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  89. They could not land close to the bridges due to the terrain. Polder is basically mud. Then there was the matter of AA at the bridges to defend against airborne and bombers. LZ-Z was about four miles from the railroad bridge and even closer to the ferry according to the map of 1st Para Plan. The map can be found by searching: Arnhem plan map Pegasus Pegasus Archive is on line
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  90. The first bridge too far, 1st AB in Sicily. Pegasus Archive In-Depth http://www.pegasusarchive.org/sicily/frames.htm
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  91. Battle of Caen June 6 to July 18 He (Montgomery) stressed that the main D-Day objective of the Second British Army was to take Caen. “Once we can get control of the main enemy lateral [corridor], Granville-Vire-Argentan-Falaise-Caen, and the area enclosed in it is firmly in our possession, then we will have the lodgement area we want and can begin to expand,” he assured his audience. The British Army in Normandy: Winning the War the Wrong Way https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour/finest-hour-181/british-army-normandy-montgomery/
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  92. It was cut repeatedly due to the flanking forces not advancing at the same pace, just over 2 miles/3k per daylight hour for XXX Corps to Grave.
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  93. MAP Arnhem Day One https://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/Photos/Map1ParaProg.gif
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  94. @Colonel Blimp There was no surprise, hours before the jump fighter-bombers and medium bombers raked the AA and other known positions. 100 octane Page 84 The Burning Blue, Addison and Crang, Faber and Faber Ltd London WC1B 3DA
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  95. A Bridge Too Far: The Failed Jeep Attack At Arnhem https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EejO0uwmmzo&t=116s
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  96.  @bigwoody4704  I think you will appreciate this. https://www.cnet.com/news/the-roughneck-us-cowboys-who-drilled-britains-secret-wwii-oil-wells/
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  97. "As stated in the second paragraph of the Report on Mutual Aid published in November, 1943 (Cmd. 6483), we had, up to that date, spent some £1,500,000,000 in the United States since the outbreak of war on supplies of all kinds. The greater part of this expenditure was incurred in connection with contracts placed before the application of the Lend-Lease Act." https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1944/dec/14/british-war-purchases-usa
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  98. Airborne combat experience: Browning none, failed jump training twice. Urquhart none, failed jump training due to air sickness. Lathbury one op, Sicily.
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  99.  @thevillaaston7811  By the following morning both Lathbury and Urquhart were with the leading B Company, which had become separated from the rest of the 3rd Battalion, lingering somewhere in the rear, and spent most of the daylight hours of Monday trapped in a stalemate inside a few houses on the outskirts of Arnhem. By the afternoon it became clear to Roy Urquhart that the situation was getting out of hand and he decided that he must risk returning to Divisional HQ, with only three men accompanying him; Brigadier Lathbury, Captain Willie Taylor, and Lieutenant Jimmy Cleminson. To conceal their escape, Lathbury threw a smoke grenade out of the house in which they had been hiding and the group dashed out of the back door and were in the process of negotiating a fence when Lathbury's Sten gun accidentally discharged and the bullet narrowly missed the General's right foot. Pegasus Archive Major-General Robert Elliot Urquhart
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  100. On LZ-L, thirty-three RAF Stirlings dropped eighty-six tons of supplies, but unfortunately the Germans had already overrun much of this area and only an estimated twelve tons found their way into British hands. Despite this setback, the 1st Airborne Division was now complete, and all of its units were free to advance on Arnhem Bridge. Pegasus Archive The Second Lift
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  101.  @johnlucas8479  Thank you for your concise observations.
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  102. Before 740 men of 1st AB captured one end of the last intact bridge in Arnhem the 82nd captured the bridge north of Grave (one of the longest bridges in Europe), captured the last intact bridge over the Maas-Waal canal and cleared the Heights for Brownings' HQ (brought in by 36 of 1st AB's gliders) and for the day two landing. The 82nd was the most combat experienced airborne division in any military. 1st AB was the least experienced having done only one unopposed division level operation and not by air. Browning and the commander of 1st AB failed jump training and had not commanded airborne in combat before MG.
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  103. 82nd, day two All available 82nd units were required to drive 2,300 Grade B Germans with five armored cars, three half tracks with quad 20mm, "just 24 medium mortars" and more than a few MG42's off of the Heights as gliders landed among the retreating Germans. pages 98-99 Nijmegen US 82nd Airborne & Guards Armoured Division
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  104.  @robertseavor4304  Right, thats why he landed, by glider, with the 82nd at Nijmegen. "Browning was to command a corps of three airborne divisions, made up of 1st British Airborne Division, and the 82nd and 101st US Airborne Divisions." page 22 Nijmegen US 82nd Airborne & Guards Armoured Division
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  105.  @stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85  "the industrial heartland of Germany: the Ruhr." How was XXX Corps, with supply line over 400 miles back to Normandy, going to win the logistics battle with Germany when Arnhem is 67 miles from Krupp Werks in Essen?
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  106.  @bigwoody4704  More like dingy.
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  107. Market Garden The Second World War by John Keegan page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.
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  108.  @bigwoody4704  British Battalions TRAPPED in Market Garden's Deadliest Battle | With Al Murray & James Holland https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-Iapunp2I0
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  109.  @bigwoody4704  Haig and Montgomery: a comparison | Gordon Corrigan https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i-1zRbgwdkw
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  110. Conversations with History: Brian Urquhart https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfuJ4W-wqI4
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  111. 3.07 "capture several bridges" several More than two but not many. It is widely assumed each division had to take only one bridge. This was only true for 1st AB in Arnhem and there were three possibility's. The 82nd had to take two of the longest bridges in Europe, the bridge at Grave, which was captured within a few hours of landing, and the bridge on the River Waal 10 miles away (one sixth of the distance from XXX Corps start point to Arnhem) and a heavy bridge over the Maas Waal canal. Map of Nijmegen 17 September 1944 https://i.pinimg.com/originals/d1/fa/bb/d1fabb09d7b032564d98331e871cf633.jpg
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  112. "The Grave bridge was in 1944, the Continents longest bridge at almost 400 metres in length." page 38 NIJMEGEN US 82nd Airborne & Guards Armoured Division Pen & Sword Books Limited South Yorkshire "The full length of the Waalbrug is 604 metres (1,982 ft), the middle of the arch being about 65 metres (213 ft) high. The arch itself is 244.1 metres (801 ft) long and was the longest arch in Europe at the time of construction (1936)." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waalbrug
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  113. Bridges captured by 82nd on day one: Two. Bridges captured by 1st AB during entire operation: One half of one out of three possible and it was lightly defended. Map Nijmegen day one https://i.pinimg.com/originals/d1/fa/bb/d1fabb09d7b032564d98331e871cf633.jpg
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  114. Map of Arnhem on day one. www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/Photos/Map1ParaProg.gif
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  115. Official UK PDF booklet on M-G https://marketgardenveterans.nl/download/marketgarden60.pdf
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  116. @Colonel Blimp "However, the success of the Germans lasted just two days. Despite punching a bulge into the Allies front line, the Germans could not capitalise on this. The Germans had based their attack on a massive armoured onslaught. However, such an attack required fuel to maintain it and the Germans simply did not possess such quantities of fuel." History Learning Site UK
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  117.  @johnburns4017  Same time as your mum.
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  118. Tank Parade At El Alamein (1942) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PLWojSd8IJU
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  119.  @johnlucas8479  map 1st Para Brigade Plan 3 miles LZ-Z to rail bridge 1st AB took all of it's vehicles including "special jeeps" and artillery on day one. https://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/Photos/Map1ParaPlan.gif
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  120. A Bridge Too Far: The Failed Jeep Attack At Arnhem https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EejO0uwmmzo
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  121. A Bridge Too Far was directed by Richard Attenborough, OBE (Order of the British Empire).
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  122. He and Tik shared a foxhole.
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  123.  @davemac1197  IWM "These failed attempts to outflank Caen were an early demonstration of flaws in British tactics, as well as the debilitating effect of the confined Normandy landscape and the impressive fighting qualities of German forces. 7th Armoured Division's previous experience of mobile warfare in North Africa did not readily translate to a congested European battlefield. With its infantry left too far behind, it had been stopped in its tracks in terrain unsuitable for the large scale deployment of tanks." Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy page
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  124. Airborne Communications in Operation Market Garden https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1445&context=cmh
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  125. @Achilles Smith Thanks for the link.
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  126. @Colonel Blimp Which tanks did Rommel have when Monty masterfully led the BEF to Dunkerque? How many men were lost? In how many days? Greece? Crete? Leros?
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  127.  @alastairbarkley6572  Churchill couldn't tell Montgomery what to do. "Still, when Churchill learned that Montgomery planned to take over 2000 officers and clerks in the early days of the cross-channel invasion simply to keep records, the prime minister decided to have it out with the commander of the armies in person..." "Monty explained that he had personally approved the logistical arrangements for the invasion following well-established procedures. To make any last-minute changes would undermine the confidence of his staff in their commander. “I could never allow it–never,” Monty pronounced." https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/churchill-bulletin/bulletin-070-apr-2014/montys-clash-with-churchill/
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  128. Patton was in Messina (top right corner) before Montgomery. map Sicily 1943 https://www.themaparchive.com/media/catalog/product/cache/1/image/b9d24ee63e043d9dae72d8cfeefe8ff8/A/x/Ax00345.jpg
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  129. "A new explanation now comes from Canadian historian Richard Rohmer, a former reconnaissance pilot who flew many missions over the Falaise pocket. He claims it was Montgomery's fault, but implies that Eisenhower and Bradley must share some blame. Only Patton comes out clean in this book, 'Patton's Gap'." https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/03/02/The-big-Allied-blunder-in-France-Montgomerys-fault/2406383893200/
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  130. An American on Brownings staff in one of the 38 1st AB gliders taken by Browning to lift his useless HQ to Nijmegen. "both Rauter, the SS Security chief for the Netherlands, and one of the officers of Helle’s Dutch SS battalion at Arnhem told him that a British officer was captured on D-Day with the plans for the ground markers and smoke signals.56 The Germans also listened in to British radio signals on No.68P sets which captured paratroopers had not destroyed" page 48/12 Canadian Military History pdf Airborne Communications in Operation Market Garden
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  131. How I Won the War is a 1967 British black comedy film starring Michael Crawford, Jack MacGowran, Roy Kinnear, Lee Montague, and John Lennon in his only non-musical acting role. Overlord (not Gold or Sword beach) is a 1975 black-and-white British war film written and directed by Stuart Cooper. Set during the Second World War, around the D-Day invasion (Operation Overlord), the film is about a young British soldier's experiences and his meditations on being part of the war machinery, including his premonitions of death.
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  132.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  Unlike yourself so course.
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  133. 9.00 According to the 1st AB plan map, which can be found by searching: map 1st Para plan Arnhem Pegasus archive, the distance from LZ-Z to the rail bridge is four miles.
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  134. History Learning Site/UK "To start with, Antwerp was not considered to be overly important as Montgomery wanted to push to the Ruhr as soon as was possible. His belief that an attack on Arnhem would bring a swift end to the war did not succeed – and it was only after the failure of Operation Market Garden that Montgomery realised the importance of Antwerp in solving the increasing supply difficulties that the Allies had as their supply lines became more and more extended as they approached Germany." "As early as September 8th, 1944, Winston Churchill had written to his chiefs-of-staff about the importance of the Walcheren area and the port of Antwerp." https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/world-war-two-in-western-europe/antwerp-and-world-war-two/
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  135. Operation Dragoon was not on the border of Germany. "Because the C-47s served as paratrooper transports and glider tugs and because IX Troop Carrier Command would provide all the transports for both British parachute brigades, this massive force could deliver only 60 percent of the ground forces in one lift. This limit was the reason for the decision to split the troop-lift schedule into successive days. Ninety percent of the USAAF transports on the first day would drop parachute troops, with the same proportion towing gliders on the second day (the RAF transports were almost entirely used for glider operations).[i] Brereton rejected having two airlifts on the first day, although this had been accomplished during Operation Dragoon, albeit with slightly more daylight (45 minutes) and against negligible opposition." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden#Allied_preparation
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  136. 5 When the opportunity arose Montgomery could be bold, but he used requisite boldness; on the one occasion later in the War when he went outside this paradigm, at the Battle of Arnhem, he failed through being too bold and omitting some stages of preparation. https://www.uos.ac.uk/sites/default/files/basic_file/REAMS_1-(1)_Weir-v2.pdf
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  137. "Montgomery’s plan was to seize a 70-mile road from the border with Belgium to the city of Arnhem in Holland. He expected that controlling this road would be the key to crossing the Rhine River. In turn, this would put him ahead of his American rival, General Omar Bradley. As a result, General Dwight Eisenhower would have to give him the go-ahead to move ahead into Germany." https://www.warhistoryonline.com/war-articles/operation-market-garden.html
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  138. "Gavin knew the best way to take a bridge was from both ends at once, so he decided to put a force across the river and assault the northern ends of the bridges while the task forces on the southern end continued putting pressure on the defenders there. He took the plan to Generals Browning and Horrocks. Browning approved the idea, but the airborne troops had no boats available, and the Germans had stripped the river of all local craft. Horrocks, however, had 32 boats in his engineer units and ordered them forward, giving them priority to move up along the narrow roadway XXX Corps was using for its advance. The boats were supposed to arrive at 8 am on the 20th, but traffic jams along the road delayed their arrival until 2 pm. Gavin wanted to start the crossing in the morning, but the late arrival of the boats meant the crossing had to go at 3 pm." https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2019/11/15/the-bridges-at-nijmegen/
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  139. Monty's plan In the summer of 1944 General Bernard Law Montgomery came up with an ambitious scheme to cross the River Rhine and advance deep into northern Germany and shorten the war. Codenamed 'Market Garden', his plan involved the seizure of key bridges in the Netherlands by the 101st and 82nd US Airborne Divisions, and 1st British Airborne Division who would land by parachute and glider. National Army Museum https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/market-garden
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  140. "When Britain declared war on Germany in 1939, Montgomery was sent to France with the British Expeditionary Force. He commanded the 3rd Division. Predicting the operation would be a disaster, he trained for tactical retreat. This proved vital during the evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940." https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/bernard-montgomery
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  141. A Bridge Too Far: The Failed Jeep Attack At Arnhem https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EejO0uwmmzo
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  142. General Roy Urquhart Not jump qualified. Had never commanded airborne. Cutoff and out of contact for 36 hours at Arnhem.
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  143. SIX HOURS AFTER 1st AB landed, 9th SS Panzer recon battalion rolled over the Arnhem road bridge and on to Nijmegen. Was that in the movie?
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  144. A Bridge Too Far was directed by Richard Samuel Attenborough, Baron Attenborough, CBE, FRSA English politician, actor, filmmaker and entrepreneur. Attenborough joined the Royal Air Force during the Second World War and served in the film unit.
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  145. "both Rauter, the SS Security chief for the Netherlands, and one of the officers of Helle’s Dutch SS battalion at Arnhem told him that a British officer was captured on D-Day with the plans for the ground markers and smoke signals. The Germans also listened in to British radio signals on No.68P sets which captured paratroopers had not destroyed." page 48/12 pdf Airborne Communications in Operation Market Garden David Bennett
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  146.  @JammyDodger45  Operation Overlord was the codename for the Battle of Normandy, the Allied operation that launched the successful invasion of German-occupied Western Europe during World War II. The operation was launched on 6 June 1944 with the Normandy Landings (D-Day). wiki
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  147. @Dodgey Jammer "In the military, D-Day is the day on which a combat attack or operation is to be initiated. The best-known D-Day is during World War II, on June 6, 1944—the day of the Normandy landings—initiating the Western Allied effort to liberate western Europe from Nazi Germany. However, many other invasions and operations had a designated D-Day, both before and after that operation." wiki
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  148. The entire operation could have been defeated by the destruction of the two River Maas bridges or the two River Waal bridges or the three Rhine bridges. As it happened the 82nd captured the Maas bridge at Grave with the other being destroyed, both Waal bridges were rigged but were not destroyed and the rail bridge at Arnhem was destroyed, the center section of the pontoon bridge was moved and the road bridge was not destroyed because the garrison commander was KIA on the way to his HQ.
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  149. Before 740 men of 1st AB had even arrived at the bridge at Arnhem, the 82nd had captured the bridge at Grave (one of the longest bridges in Europe) and the last intact bridge over the Maas-Waal canal, the first and second bridges that would be needed by XXX Corps. map Nijmegen day one https://i.pinimg.com/736x/d1/fa/bb/d1fabb09d7b032564d98331e871cf633.jpg
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  150.  @johnburns4017  "the professional British" 1940 British forces "evacuated" from Norway, Belgium and France. 1941 Greece, Crete and Libya. 1942 Tobruk and Dieppe. BBC The Second Battle of El Alamein was a turning point in the North African campaign. It ended the long fight for the Western Desert, and was the only great land battle won by the British and Commonwealth forces without direct American participation.
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  151. "The location of these zones, however, was a matter for the Royal Air Force and not the 1st Airborne Division, and Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst, the commander of 38 Group, one of the air force formations which was to transport the Division into battle and supply it thereafter, refused to drop paratroopers any closer to Arnhem. His reasoning was that after the troops had been dropped, his aircraft could only begin the return to their bases by banking left, in a northerly direction; to have banked right would have led them into the path of the 82nd Airborne Division's aircraft returning from Nijmegen. If the aircraft approached too close to Arnhem, their return flight path would lead them directly over the top of a very large flak installation on the nearby Deelen Airfield, and to fly over this would result in severe losses which Transport Command could not afford. For this reason, the air force insisted on dropping all of the 1st Airborne Division roughly eight miles from Arnhem." Pegasus Archive In Depth 3. Recipe for Disaster http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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  152. 18.40 "shelling the nearby woods" Since the bulk of the 82nd's artillery arrived on the day two landing (on retreating Germans) I doubt there was a lot of shelling. They may have fired a few ranging rounds.
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  153. Bradley was separated from forces in the north because his HQ was too far forward, a problem Monty never had.
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  154. map Arnhem day one www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/Photos/Map1ParaProg.gif
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  155. 31.40 The Bridge north of Grave, captured in the first hours, is over 500 meters long.
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  156. Because the C-47s served as paratrooper transports and glider tugs and because IX Troop Carrier Command would provide all the transports for both British parachute brigades, this massive force could deliver only 60 percent of the ground forces in one lift. This limit was the reason for the decision to split the troop-lift schedule into successive days. Ninety percent of the USAAF transports on the first day would drop parachute troops, with the same proportion towing gliders on the second day (the RAF transports were almost entirely used for glider operations). Brereton rejected having two airlifts on the first day, although this had been accomplished during Operation Dragoon, albeit with slightly more daylight (45 minutes) and against negligible opposition. D'Este Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life pages 614 and 616
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  157. If Only 1st AB's radios had worked as well as they hoped. 1st AB's commander had not been cut off for 48 hours total. 1st AB got more than 740 men to the road bridge. XXX Corps had arrived at Eindhoven on day one as planned. 1st AB had "got the stick out" and walked the four miles from LZ-Z and captured the rail bridge before it was destroyed. Browning had not taken 38 of 1st AB's gliders for his useless HQ.
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  158. @Braintrust Ashton What would have happened if ALL of the Nijmegen bridges had been taken before XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three? When XXX Corps arrived at Grave and was "back on schedule" it had averaged just over two miles an hour during daylight with 24 miles to Arnhem bridge with eleven hours of daylight remaining. How many of the 740 men to actually make it to the last intact bridge would have been left by the time XXX Corps arrived? What about the men in The Pocket? None of them made it to the bridge. Would XXX Corps rescue them without infantry support? XXX Corp supplies were being hit with arty because the forces that were supposed to be covering XXX Corps flanks were not advancing at even two miles an hour. 9th and 10th SS Panzer were not going to run away when XXX Corps showed up and Arnhem is 63 miles from Essen, the center of German arms production.
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  159. The Royal Air Force, however, refused to land any troops so close to Arnhem, and so Lathbury sought an alternative. His solution was to take Major Gough's 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron under his command and charge them with undertaking a coup de main. This unit, consisting of one hundred and eighty men, were all mounted on Jeeps which were vulnerable to enemy fire but armoured with powerful twin-Vickers "K" Machine Guns. Although completely unsuited to the purpose, the Squadron was expected to face only minimal opposition and so should have little difficulty in racing to the Bridge, as soon as their vehicles had been unloaded from their gliders, and holding it until the leading elements of the 1st Parachute Brigade arrived several hours later. Pegasus Archive Market Garden The Plan
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  160.  @bigwoody4704  Why Operation Market Garden Failed and Its Devastating Consequences https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tUxrgeS2nZs&t=1s
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  161. RAF on Market Garden "In their view the right course was to use all available transport aircraft to maintain supplies to Patton's army, which was the furthest forward, so that he could continue his offensive. It was impossible to do both once the Supreme Commander ruled in favour --192-- of airborne operations." Hyperwar Royal Air Force 1939-1945 CHAPTER IX From Brussels to the Rhine
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  162.  @stewartorr1939  map Nijmegen day one https://i.pinimg.com/originals/6a/5c/de/6a5cde8f149179bb749b61c2b92bb3e3.jpg
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  163.  @bigwoody4704  XXX Corps rate of travel and when it might have arrived near Arnhem were found by using current maps, a lot of "adjusting" was required, and info from three books.
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  164.  @bigwoody4704  Ewe toob is deleting comments at random, if this is not the answer you wanted I will try again.
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  165.  @stewartorr1939  Four hours after landing elements of 1st AB managed to travel 4 miles/6k from LZ Z to the rail bridge arriving just in time to see it destroyed. Before 740 men had even arrived at the last intact bridge in the Arnhem area the 82nd: Captured the bridge north of Grave, one of the longest road bridges in Europe and first bridge needed by XXX Corps. Captured the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal, the second bridge needed by XXX Corps. Captured the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders and day two landing zone. Lt. Col. J.D. Frost about Operation Market Garden https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdvpA94XSv0
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  166.  @stewartorr1939  "Poor communications caused heavy and avoidable casualties in 1st Parachute Brigade since the battalions and companies were unable to coordinate their advances, sometimes running into the same opposition which had frustrated an earlier unit advance. Yet this was not the cause of failure. By the time the German opposition had solidified on D+1, with mortars, light flak and armoured vehicles, there was really no chance of relieving Frost at the bridge, even with communications at their best." page 51/15 Canadian Military History Volume 16 Issue 1 Article 4 2007 Airborne Communications in Operation Market Garden David Bennett
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  167.  @stewartorr1939  Lt. Col. J.D. Frost about Operation Market Garden https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdvpA94XSv0
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  168. Four hours after landing elements of 1st AB managed to travel 4 miles/6k from LZ Z to the rail bridge arriving just in time to see it destroyed. Before 740 men had even arrived at the last intact bridge in the Arnhem area the 82nd: Captured the bridge north of Grave, one of the longest road bridges in Europe and first bridge needed by XXX Corps. Captured the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal, the second bridge needed by XXX Corps. Captured the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders and day two landing zone.
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  169. Map Nijmegen day one https://i.pinimg.com/originals/6a/5c/de/6a5cde8f149179bb749b61c2b92bb3e3.jpg
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  170. Map Nijmegen day one https://i.pinimg.com/originals/6a/5c/de/6a5cde8f149179bb749b61c2b92bb3e3.jpg
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  171. Lt. Col. J.D. Frost about Operation Market Garden https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdvpA94XSv0
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  172. 5.13 "SURPRISE" Hours before the landings AA and other known positions were attacked by fighter-bombers and medium bombers. A large part of the forces stationed in the area were trained in anti-airborne operations.
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  173. 90 km equals 56 miles, that would have put them 8 miles from Arnhem instead of the 24 miles they actually were.
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  174. Conversations with History: Brian Urquhart https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfuJ4W-wqI4
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  175. Conversations with History: Brian Urquhart https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfuJ4W-wqI4
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  176.  @thevillaaston7811  When did tanks show up in Arnhem? C47's, jeeps, 75mm pack howitzers? 19,000 T16 Universal (Bren) carriers Lend Leased to Britain, page 10. 35,638 UC engines page 16. Hyperwar Lend Lease shipments Ordnance General Supplies on line
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  177. Conversations with History: Brian Urquhart https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfuJ4W-wqI4
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  178.  @johnlucas8479  "In addition, the Division had lost thirty-eight of its aircraft on the First Lift because of the need to transport 1st British Airborne Corps Headquarters into battle. Despite the fact that Corps HQ were to land at Nijmegen, alongside the 82nd Airborne Division, politics dictated that their inclusion with the First Lift should be to the detriment of the British troops of the 1st Airborne Division. The decision to commit the Headquarters to the Market Garden was dubious to say the least, as their ability to exercise control over three Divisions, fighting independent actions at great distances from each other, was particularly remote. The loss of these aircraft resulted in two companies of the 2nd South Staffordshires, approximately three hundred men, being left in England until the second day." Pegasus Archive In Depth 3. Recipe for Disaster http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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  179. "While they waited for the Typhoons, Vandeleur halted the column for lunch. He and his cousin Giles found a villa by the road with it's own swimming pool. They had a swim and revived themselves with more champagne afterwards when a young woman war correspondent joined them. Finally, two hours after the initial request, Love heard that the strike had been cancelled due to poor flying conditions. Vandeleur was livid." page 168 Arnhem Beevor
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  180. If success rested on all of the bridges being taken intact, why did XXX Corps bring Bailey bridges and engineers?
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  181.  @stevewiles7132  "The real problem at Arnhem was poor planning and leadership. The 1st Airborne Division’s strategy was for the first troops on the ground to remain at the drop zone until the second lift arrived 24 hours later, with the exception of Brigadier Gerald Lathbury’s 1st Parachute Brigade. The unit was to detach from the main body immediately and advance into Arnhem. Unfortunately, Lathbury planned to drop his units along three widely spaced routes to half-a-dozen isolated objectives. This virtually guaranteed the brigade would be overwhelmed piecemeal. Lathbury also wasted precious time by holding his troops back at the landing area for over an hour. Later, he drove back and forth harassing his commanders to move faster until he was cut off with part of the brigade and badly wounded." "Division commander Major-General Roy Urquhart knew even less about airborne operations, having been promoted as a Montgomery protégé with zero experience leading paratroops. He made no effort to tailor his plan to the specific mission like the two U.S. divisions, and the idea that he could simply move into Arnhem after giving the Germans 24 hours’ notice was rooted in conventional operational procedures and fanciful at best." "This was compounded by a series of poor decisions that included abruptly leaving his headquarters in response to a baseless rumour, deliberately severing his sole radio link in the process and then being cut off from his formation for 48 hours after an eventual and ill-advised attempt to regain his headquarters." "Urquhart had not properly grasped the essential difference between airborne and conventional operations, and by the time he returned to his command post the Arnhem portion of Market had effectively failed and his division was cut off with little prospect of relief." https://militaryhistorynow.com/2019/06/16/debacle-at-arnhem-five-reasons-for-the-failure-of-operation-market-garden/
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  182. "The primary source of Intelligence for Operation Market Garden was Ultra, the codename for the interception and decoding of German signals received through the Enigma machine. Ultra clearly identified the presence of the 9th and 10th S.S. Panzer Divisions, but due to the vital need to protect the system and not give the Germans cause to suspect that their codes had been broken, only a select few were privy to this information in an undiluted form. The 1st British Airborne Corps, therefore, only received a blurred suggestion that the two Divisions were in the area, but this did not necessarily mean that these units were at anything like full or half strength. During the chaotic retreat from Normandy, the German divisions that survived had been so severely mauled that many were reduced to the strength of a weak brigade. Browning advised Major-General Roy Urquhart that his total opposition would consist of nothing stronger than a Brigade Group of infantry supported by a few tanks." Pegasus Archive In Depth 29. Reasons for the Failure http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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  183. @Answer Questions "Major-Generals Allan Adair’s Guards Armoured Division was scheduled to link up with the U.S. 101st Airborne at Eindhoven, approximately 16 miles from the start line, by 19:30h on Sept. 17. It did not move until 14:35 and halted at dusk after covering just seven miles. It took another full day to cover the remaining distance against minimal German resistance." https://militaryhistorynow.com/2019/06/16/debacle-at-arnhem-five-reasons-for-the-failure-of-operation-market-garden/
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  184.  @thevillaaston7811  Planning "Browning denied their (1st AB) request for a larger allocation as the swift progress of the 2nd Army was judged to be of the greatest importance, and so the 101st Airborne Division, closest to the relieving troops, had priority on aircraft, followed by the 82nd Airborne Division and finally the 1st Airborne." "If Browning was at fault then it is because he made no effort to mention the possibility of this threat to the 1st Airborne Division, whom he had briefed to expect nothing more than a brigade group of infantry supported by a small number of tanks during the later phases of the battle. Suggestions of the presence of these two panzer divisions nevertheless filtered through, but more emphatic information may have resulted in them taking additional anti-tank equipment and adopting tactics better suited to dealing with heavy opposition." Pegasus Archive Browning, on line
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  185.  @davemac1197  "everyone had done their job as planned," "They were beaten to the bridge by the recon battalion of the 9.SS-Panzer-Division moving down from Arnhem." Frost captured one end of the last intact bridge in Arnhem after 9th SS Panzer Recon Batt rolled over it and on to Arnhem (correction Nijmegan). Frost was the only one to accomplish any of 1st AB's "jobs". By the time that happened the 82nd had captured the bridge at Grave, the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders.
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  186.  @davemac1197  Do canals have bridges over them? Frost had jeeps.
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  187. Link to Nijmegen map day one
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  188.  @davemac1197  Under the category of "everyone had done their job as planned," 1st AB accomplished next to none of what it was supposed to do. The 82nd did everything it was supposed to do except capture at least one of the River Waal bridges.
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  189. Link to 1st Para Brigade Plan map
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  190.  @davemac1197  1st AB was supposed to capture and hold both sides of three bridges and the ferry and the airbase north of Arnhem. Of the over 2,000 men and "special jeeps" tasked with taking the bridges on day one 740 men captured one end of the last intact bridge after 9th SS Panzer Recon Batt rolled over it and held it for three and one half days.
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  191. They might have taken a few of the 2,127 Bazookas Lend Leased to Britain. Seems a better choice for troops with little transport.
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  192. 7.50 The bridges were heavily defended against airborne and bombers by AA. The area south of the bridge was polder, basically mud, so could not be used for landing gliders. By the time the Polish paras were to arrive the AA was supposed to have been eliminated as a threat.
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  193.  @johnlucas8479  XXX Corps scout cars arrived at Grave at approx. 0820 on day three (with tanks two hours behind) and "back on schedule" having averaged just over one mile per hour. Grave is 25 miles from Arnhem. If it had maintained the same pace it would have arrived at Arnhem bridge on the morning of day Frosts' men ran out of ammo and lost control of the north end. map Grave to Arnhem https://www.bing.com/search?q=grave+natherlands+to+arnhem+drive&form=EDNTHT&refig=b14f379592bc4c9585c55a3db1613888&mkt=en-us&msnews=1&PC=HCTS&DAF1=1&sp=-1&pq=grave+natherlands+to+arnhem+drive&sc=0-33&qs=n&sk=&cvid=b14f379592bc4c9585c55a3db1613888
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  194. Six hours after 1st AB landed, 9th SS Panzer recon battalion rolled over the bridge at Arnhem and drove to Nijmegen where it joined the 750 first and second echelon troops and 88mm and 20mm AA battery's that were already there to defend the bridges. It remained there until relieved by elements of 10th SS Panzer.
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  195.  @thevillaaston7811  By the air raids on AA and barracks dipshit.
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  196. Airborne combat experience: Browning none, failed jump training twice. Urquhart none, failed jump training due to air sickness. Lathbury one op, Sicily.
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  197. 5.53 "sixty miles" Current maps have the distance at almost 70 miles for the route taken by XXX Corps. Grave to Heumen to Nijmegen.
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  198.  @petterwiggen5833  At the beginning of September the 1st Allied Airborne Army was put under command of Montgomery. Planning began on Operation ‘Comet’. ‘Comet’ was a carbon copy of what would become ‘Market Garden’ except that it expected 1st British Airborne Division and 1st Polish Parachute Brigade only to seize all the bridges from Grave to Arnhem." page 288 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1470243042000344777
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  199. Conversations with History: Brian Urquhart https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfuJ4W-wqI4
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  200. "The primary source of the intelligence was Ultra, the codename for the interception and decoding of German signals received through the Enigma machine. Ultra clearly identified the presence of the 9th and 10th S.S. Panzer Divisions, but due to the vital need to protect the system and not give the Germans cause to suspect that their codes had been broken, only a select few were privy to this information in its purest form. The 1st British Airborne Corps, under whose umbrella all the airborne units involved in Market Garden were to fight, only received a particularly vague suggestion of armoured strength in the area. The commander of the Corps, Lieutenant-General Browning, accordingly advised Major-General Roy Urquhart that the immediate opposition to his 1st Airborne Division would be derisory, but that they could later expect to encounter little more than a Brigade Group of infantry supported by a few tanks." "These showed a small number of tanks close to one of the 1st Airborne Division's drop zones, but a mere handful of armoured vehicles did not automatically mean the presence of an entire panzer division. Lieutenant-General Browning chose to play down the significance of these photographs, and when Major Urquhart persisted with his opposition to the plan, Browning forced him away on a period of sick leave."  Pegasus Archive In Depth 2. Recipe for Disaster http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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  201. General Roy Urquhart Not jump qualified. Had never commanded airborne. Cutoff and out of contact for 36 hours at Arnhem.
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  202. National Army Museum "In the summer of 1944 General Bernard Law Montgomery came up with an ambitious scheme to cross the River Rhine and advance deep into northern Germany and shorten the war." "The plan failed largely because of 30 Corps’ inability to reach the furthest bridge at Arnhem before German forces overwhelmed the British defenders. Allied intelligence had failed to detect the presence of German tanks, including elements of two SS Panzer divisions." https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/market-garden
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  203.  @teseseko  No trouble link to Pegasus Archive https://pegasusarchive.org/
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  204. "When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon." Zon, 16 miles from start line, was a Day One objective for XXX Corps. XXX Corps managed 7 miles on Day One. XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on Day Three and "back on schedule" having averaged just over one mile per hour. If XXX Corps had maintained that pace it would have arrived at Arnhem bridge on the morning of the day Frosts' men ran out of ammo and lost control of the North end of the bridge.
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  205. 20.00 Failed Jeep Attack At Arnhem https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EejO0uwmmzo
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  206. Later, he convinced US General Dwight Eisenhower to agree to Operation Market Garden... Montgomery’s plan failed, owing to the large number of German armoured units in the region, and resulted in heavy losses. National Army Museum Bernard Law Montgomery: Unbeatable and unbearable
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  207. "Postponements for one reason or another were frequent and all this time the aircraft and crews were inevitably kept idle, to the openly expressed dismay of those who urged the alternative. In their view the right course was to use all available transport aircraft to maintain supplies to Patton's army, which was the furthest forward, so that he could continue his offensive. It was impossible to do both once the Supreme Commander ruled in favour --192-- of airborne operations. Montgomery had decided on a bold stroke." http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RAF-III/UK-RAF-III-9.html
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  208.  @davemac1197 When XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day THREE it had averaged just over two miles per hour during daylight and still had 24 miles to go to Arnhem bridge. Frosts men lost control of the bridge on day four.
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  209. Conversations with History: Brian Urquhart https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfuJ4W-wqI4
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  210. map Arnhem day one http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/Photos/Map1ParaProg.gif
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  211. AFTER ARNHEM 1944 | Q&A 9 TIK https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6GgokduUvQ8
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  212. Grave to Heumen to Arnhem bridge, 24 miles/36k. About 10 hours to sunset.
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  213. What Ifs? and How was that supposed to work? "Vacuum" Logic Gavin gets a lot of grief for not taking the Waal bridges on day one. With 20/20 hindsight and 75 years of airborne operations as a guide, Sandhurst tells us the 82nd should have concentrated everything on the bridge at Grave (captured in the first hours) and the Waal bridges and done nothing about capturing any bridges over the Maas Waal canal or securing the Heights (where Browning wanted his useless HQ, brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders) and LZ for the day two lift with the bulk of 82nds arty. Conversely, the Netherlands military academy tells us the entire plan was bollocks. IRL 9th SS panzer recon batt used Arnhem bridge before one lightly defended end was captured by 740 men (of over 2,000 men tasked with taking all three bridges and the ferry) and joined the 88 and 20mm AAA already at the bridges. It remained at the Waal bridges until relieved by elements of 10th SS panzer after being ferried across after 1st AB captured one end of the last intact bridge in Arnhem. On day four XXX Corps started on the north side of the River Waal and advanced 10 miles to Driel and about six miles short of Arnhem bridge. What If? The 82nd captured the Waal bridges on day one? (Assuming both were not demoed as were the rail bridge at Arnhem, the bridge at Son and all but one of the bridges over the Maas Waal canal.) 9th SS Pz Recon stays put and is joined by elements of 10th SS Pz. 9th SS is not decimated on day two on Arnhem bridge. The forces at Grave and Waal bridges have no way to support each other and XXX Corps has to put a Bailey bridge over the Maas Waal canal on day three. IRL The Heights Early on day two the main German attack by 2,300 grade B men with 5 armored cars, 3 halftracks with quad 20mm guns, "just 24 medium mortars" and plenty of MG's was repelled at about 1330 after being strafed by fighters escorting the day two gliders. That was not the only battle that day. In the What If? The day two gliders are diverted or land on the Germans and are decimated. There is no resupply or reinforcement of the 82nd. The Germans have the Heights and are able to spot for artillery and air. Contrary to popular belief the Allies did not have air superiority over the area. It was close to the Ruhr Valley (the supposed objective of MG) which was visited on a regular basis by the RAF and to a lesser degree by 8th AF. German forces cut off in town on day one link up with forces on the Heights. Depending on what the Germans do at the Waal bridges, try to retake with infantry supported by armor or just sit back and pound the 82nd with arty for two days, I think it's safe to say that what would have been left of the 82nd would not have been in any condition to support XXX Corps in its advance north.
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  214. Current map has the shortest route from Grave to Lent at 11.3 miles. At the pace XXX Corps had managed to Grave, just over 2 miles per hour of daylight, it would have arrived at Lent at about 1330 on day three not including time required to bring up and assemble a Bailey bridge over the Maas Waal canal.
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  215.  @bigwoody4704  No trouble.
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  216. 1938 "Let the House remember that we buy our aviation spirit mostly from the United States or South America, or the Dutch East Indies. Supplies from the Dutch East Indies would have to run the gauntlet of the Mediterranean and, as to the supplies from the United States, under the Neutrality Act of 1937, the export from the United States of what can be clearly defined as munitions, is prohibited in case of war, to either of the combatants, whether the combatant is a victim or an aggressor. The President has also power to prohibit the export of things which are in his judgment ancillary to the conduct of war. It is clear that under these conditions the export of aviation spirit to this country from the United States might well be prohibited, if we were involved in a war, even though we were the victims and not the aggressors." below 1444 of link below In November 1939 the Neutrality Act was amended to allow Cash and Carry. With most of the wells, refinerys and the Houdry Process for Catalytic Cracking the USA produced almost all of the high octane avgas used in WWII. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1938/may/26/finance-bill
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  217. Houdry Process https://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/education/whatischemistry/landmarks/houdry.html
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  218. @Colonel Blimp Cookies enable required. https://www.forces.net/heritage/history/battle-britain-inside-story-how-we-beat-luftwaffe
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  219.  @bigwoody4704  "In the first 18 months of war Government expenditure was roughly £4,650,000,000." below 1306 of link below Approx. 19 Billion 1940 USD. In the 18 months Prior to Lend Lease (March 1941) Britain spent less than 6 Billion in the USA. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1941/apr/07/the-new-financial-white-paper
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  220. Just 740 men getting to the last intact bridge during the entire operation did not help.
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  221.  @thevillaaston7811  Why would a US soldier have the "entire MARKET GARDEN plan" since the only people who would need or have access to the "entire MARKET GARDEN plan" would be Browning and his useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders. The Germans would not need the "entire MARKET GARDEN plan" to know where the British were or that they would be resupplied by air drop, would they? Also, your mum.
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  222. Day Two "Landing Zone L, to the north-east of Wolfheze, was originally assigned for re-supply drops, but most of the area was still in enemy hands." page 56 OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 1944 (2) The British Airborne Missions
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  223. Browning would also later design his own personal uniform, made of barathea with a false Uhlan-style front, incorporating a zip opening at the neck to reveal regulation shirt and tie. A highly polished Sam Browne belt after the style of the Guards was worn over this, as were the usual medal ribbons, collar patches and rank badges, the entire ensemble being completed with grey kid gloves and a swagger stick. It was this uniform that he wore during Operation Market Garden in September 1944. Pegasus Archive Lieutenant-General Frederick Arthur Montague Browning
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  224. at 1.00 Frost; "my task was to take the three bridges ... on that first afternoon" As of 2000 hours only a single platoon had arrived at the last intact bridge. 1st Parachute Brigade (BG Lathbury, 2,212 men) and 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron (181 men with "special jeeps") were tasked with taking and holding the three bridges on day one. 70th COMMEMORATION - MARKET GARDEN 1944 - 2014 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iSeTMmkrDuI&t=1s
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  225. Market Garden RAF on Market "Postponements for one reason or another were frequent and all this time the aircraft and crews were inevitably kept idle, to the openly expressed dismay of those who urged the alternative. In their view the right course was to use all available transport aircraft to maintain supplies to Patton's army, which was the furthest forward, so that he could continue his offensive. It was impossible to do both once the Supreme Commander ruled in favour --192-- of airborne operations. Montgomery had decided on a bold stroke. He would outflank the defences of the 'SIEGFRIED Line' and, leaping over the three natural water barriers, the Maas at Grave, the Waal at Nijmegen and the Neder Rijn at Arnhem, secure positions from which to make a major advance eastwards.' The essential feature of the plan', he notes 'was the laying of a carpet of airborne troops across these waterways. . . . The airborne carpet and the bridgehead force were to be provided by the Allied Airborne Corps consisting of two American and one British Airborne Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade'.1 The crossings of the Maas and the Waal were to be secured by two American parachute divisions, the 101st and the 82nd, that at Arnhem by the British 1st Airborne Division. The operation, known as 'MARKET', was complicated by the fact that Transport Command could not take the whole division to its destination in one lift, and it was unable to do so for the simple but compelling reason that it did not have enough aircraft. Whether or not there were sufficient transport aircraft, of which the bulk were manufactured in the United States of America, to meet the needs of air transport all over the world is a question which cannot be answered here. All that can be said is that their allocation was made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff whose duty it was to survey the war in every theatre, and who did not place at Leigh-Mallory's disposal enough squadrons to take all three airborne divisions to their objectives in one lift. Those who had furthest to go, the British 1st Airborne, and who were to drop on the third defensive river line were allocated fewer than were given to the other two divisions. This was unavoidable in the circumstances, for the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen had to be first captured if that at Arnhem was to be of value to the prospective invaders of Germany." pages 192-193 PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE Hyperwar Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Vol III on line
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  226. "both Rauter, the SS Security chief for the Netherlands, and one of the officers of Helle’s Dutch SS battalion at Arnhem told him that a British officer was captured on D-Day with the plans for the ground markers and smoke signals. The Germans also listened in to British radio signals on No.68P sets which captured paratroopers had not destroyed." page 48/12 pdf Airborne Communications in Operation Market Garden David Bennett link below
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  227. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/143687035.pdf
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  228.  @thevillaaston7811  FOAD DS
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  229. @Colonel Blimp "Montgomery was part of the British Expeditionary Force with the 3rd Division at the beginning of the war. Predicting defeat on the same level as the First World War, he focused on tactical withdrawal instead of offensives." Bernard Montgomery - Welcome to During the War! page
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  230. When did the fog lift in England on the 17th?
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  231.  @johnlucas8479  If a second lift had been planned, would it have gone off under those conditions? The example given for comparison is Dragoon in the south of France in August 44 and was not over hostile territory and the Allies had air superiority and two more hours of daylight.
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  232.  @bigwoody4704  Getting close to my expiration date. Just bought Shattered Sword since RN fan boys are trying to paint the US victory at Midway as mostly luck. They usually go with "if they had not cracked JN25" conveniently forgetting Bletchley Park supposedly shortened the war by two years. I guess it conflicts with the myth that only the Brits could break a code.
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  233.  @bigwoody4704  Just about any of the recent vids on Midway. I lived 40 miles north of London for over a year. Counting on good weather in England is like pissing into the wind and hoping it does not blow back on you.
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  234. A Bridge Too Far: The Failed Jeep Attack At Arnhem https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EejO0uwmmzo
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  235.  @robertseavor4304  Browning was in command of all of the airborne until contact with XXX Corps.
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  236.  @robertseavor4304  Pegasus Archive Reasons for Failure, on line
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  237. Search: Netherlands 17-25 September 1944 PDF for UK government booklet on Market Garden.
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  238.  @johnburns4017  Last V2's launched on England 27 March 1945.
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  239.  @stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85  What would have been the result?
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  240.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  The war was not going to end until Hitler was dead.
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  241. "Montgomery had decided on a bold stroke. He would outflank the defences of the 'SIEGFRIED Line' and, leaping over the three natural water barriers, the Maas at Grave, the Waal at Nijmegen and the Neder Rijn at Arnhem, secure positions from which to make a major advance eastwards.' The essential feature of the plan', he notes 'was the laying of a carpet of airborne troops across these waterways. . ." page 193 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RAF-III/UK-RAF-III-9.html
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  242.  @thevillaaston7811  Buy the book or any book on MG.
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  243.  @thevillaaston7811  Day one Einstein.
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  244.  @thevillaaston7811  Browning wanted his useless HQ on the Heights. Brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders.
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  245.  @thevillaaston7811  at 1.07 Frost "my task was to take the three bridges" 70th COMMEMORATION - MARKET GARDEN 1944 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iSeTMmkrDuI
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  246.  @thevillaaston7811  Who directed it fuk stik? How many BAFTA's did it win? How many Academy Awards?
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  247. Churchill on MG "Finally, by the largest airborne operation ever conceived or executed, a further all-important forward bound in the North has been achieved. Here I must pay a tribute, which the House will consider due, to the superb feat of arms performed by our First Airborne Division. Full and deeply moving accounts have already been given to the country and to the world of this glorious and     fruitful operation,     which will take a lasting place in our military annals and will, in succeeding generations, inspire our youth with the highest ideals of duty and of daring."    below 472    https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1944/sep/28/war-and-international-situation
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  248. Lt. Col. J.D. Frost about Operation Market Garden https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdvpA94XSv0
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  249. Frost "my task was to take the three bridges ... on that first afternoon" Lt. Col. J.D. Frost about Operation Market Garden https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdvpA94XSv0
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  250. Arnhem The first of the 740 men to make it to the last intact bridge arrived 2000 hours. 1st Parachute Brigade (BG Lathbury, 2,212 men) and 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron (181 men with "special jeeps") were tasked with taking and holding the three bridges on day one. Pegasus Archive
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  251. The rest of 1st AB landed on day two and was supposed to advance to the last intact bridge.
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  252. BA 6th AB and US 82nd and 101st landed in Normandy on D Day. 1st AB was on alert in England. 82nd and 101st got tagged of Market Garden while 6th AB was stood down.
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  253. map Nijmegen day one https://i.pinimg.com/736x/d1/fa/bb/d1fabb09d7b032564d98331e871cf633.jpg
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  254. map Arnhem day one www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/Photos/Map1ParaProg.gif
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  255. @M Glenn No trouble.
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  256.  @TheNoonish  Grave "Construction of the original nameless bridge was finished in 1929. It had a length of 515 to 520 metres (0.32 miles). With the threat of an attack from Germany increasing, in 1936 the Dutch decided to give the bridge more protection and build two casemates on the south side of the bridge. The most northern of the Casemates protects the north side of the bridge, while the southern casemate, which is the bigger of the two, obviously protects the south side. The south casemate is capable to shoot over the entire length of the bridge." The John S. Thompson Bridge, the 11th bridge of Operation Market Garden https://www.landmarkscout.com/the-john-s-thompson-bridge-one-of-the-bridges-of-market-garden-near-grave-in-the-netherlands/
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  257.  @johnlucas8479  No trouble
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  258. If that were correct XXX Corps would have been 2 miles/3km from Arnhem at the end of day two. At 0820 on day three XXX Corps arrived at Grave and "back on schedule" having averaged just over one mile per hour. If it had maintained that pace it would have arrived at Arnhem bridge on the morning of the day Frosts' men ran out of ammo and lost control of the north end of the bridge. map XXX Corps advance https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/wp-content/uploads/W-MarketGarden-Map-1-4CSep04.jpg
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  259. As i understand it. Ike approved it but the final decision rested with Monty.
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