Comments by "Nick Danger" (@nickdanger3802) on "Gavin wasn't to blame? 'New' evidence on Operation Market Garden's failure?" video.
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@davemac1197 "Browning and Brigadier-General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, were in agreement that the priorities around Nijmegen were first the vast area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, followed by the bridge at Grave, the three smaller bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally the very large bridge at Nijmegen. Browning also told Gavin that he was not to make any attempt to move towards Nijmegen until the Heights had been secured; Gavin agreed though he later felt confident enough in his plan to allow one battalion to head for the bridge immediately after landing. The Groesbeek Heights were certainly important as they served as the Division's main drop zone and dominated the entire area, and so there is no question that the position of the 82nd Airborne Division, not to mention the right flank of the 2nd British Army when they arrived, would have been placed under considerable pressure if the area were to remain in enemy hands. Even so, the priorities of any airborne formation has to be the capture of its ultimate objectives, i.e. the bridges, and all other concerns are entirely secondary. Browning defended his decision long after the War, but it was a great mistake not to attach a higher priority to Nijmegen Bridge as, without it, the 1st Airborne Division would be cut-off behind two large rivers and 13 miles of hostile territory."
Pegasus Archive Browning
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"Browning and Brigadier-General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, were in agreement that the priorities around Nijmegen were first the vast area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, followed by the bridge at Grave, the three smaller bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally the very large bridge at Nijmegen. Browning also told Gavin that he was not to make any attempt to move towards Nijmegen until the Heights had been secured; Gavin agreed though he later felt confident enough in his plan to allow one battalion to head for the bridge immediately after landing. The Groesbeek Heights were certainly important as they served as the Division's main drop zone and dominated the entire area, and so there is no question that the position of the 82nd Airborne Division, not to mention the right flank of the 2nd British Army when they arrived, would have been placed under considerable pressure if the area were to remain in enemy hands. Even so, the priorities of any airborne formation has to be the capture of its ultimate objectives, i.e. the bridges, and all other concerns are entirely secondary. Browning defended his decision long after the War, but it was a great mistake not to attach a higher priority to Nijmegen Bridge as, without it, the 1st Airborne Division would be cut-off behind two large rivers and 13 miles of hostile territory."
Pegasus Archive Browning
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@johnburns4017 While Allied leaders expressed mixed feelings on Patton's capabilities, the German High Command was noted to have more respect for him than for any other Allied commander after 1943.[153] Adolf Hitler reportedly called him "that crazy cowboy general".[248] Many German field commanders were generous in their praise of Patton's leadership following the war,[c] and many of its highest commanders also held his abilities in high regard. Erwin Rommel credited Patton with executing "the most astonishing achievement in mobile warfare".[250] Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, chief of staff of the German Army, stated that Patton "was the American Guderian. He was very bold and preferred large movements. He took big risks and won big successes."[248] Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring said that
Patton had developed tank warfare into an art, and understood how to handle tanks brilliantly in the field. I feel compelled, therefore, to compare him with Generalfeldmarschall Rommel, who likewise had mastered the art of tank warfare. Both of them had a kind of second sight in regard to this type of warfare.[248]
Referring to the escape of the Afrika Korps after the Battle of El Alamein, Fritz Bayerlein opined that "I do not think that General Patton would let us get away so easily."[248] In an interview conducted for Stars and Stripes just after his capture, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt stated simply of Patton, "He is your best."[251]
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@Colonel Blimp "In the event, the state of the flanks did become important when, on Friday 22nd September, a German counterattack near Veghel, in the 101st Airborne Division's sector, successfully cut the single road for forty-eight hours, forcing Lieutenant-General Horrocks, already struggling with enemy counterattacks and the wide diffusion of his strength, to send armour back down the line to help re-open the road. Montgomery largely blamed the failure of the Operation on the lack of progress made by XII and, in particular, VIII Corps, who were ordered to protect the flanks of XXX Corps as they advanced. The progress of both of these was very slow and so the single road became extremely exposed to such attacks. It must be stressed, however, that the supplies Montgomery had asked for to fuel the advance of the 2nd British Army had only partially arrived, and both VIII and XII Corps experienced great difficulties in this regard. In addition it is important to note that German resistance on the flanks was equal to that encountered by XXX Corps, and both VIII and XII Corps sustained marginally higher losses."
Pegasus Archive Market Garden 30. Reasons for the Failure page
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@davidrendall7195 "Browning's original plan, Op Comet, saw just 1st Airborne and the Polish Brigade land at night, led by coup de main parties landing alongside all the bridges and nothing but screening forces on the Groesbeek."
What would have to achieved for MG to be considered a victory?
All questions may be treated as rhet.
Other than the day one mission focus on the Waal bridges did the plan 50 years after the fact proof XXX Corps would make it to Arnhem in time? Was the same exercise done for 1st AB?
Day Two Per your plan for just one regiment on the Heights, what happens when the 406th composite division attacks and Kampfgruppe Gobel attacks Reithorst? Assuming it does not join with the 406th.
406th had 2,300 grade B men, 3 halftracks with quad 20mm and 5 armored cars. About 80 per cent of German AC's had a 20mm auto cannon in a dual purpose mount. "Just 24 medium mortars supported the whole force but, in common with most German units, the attackers had a high proportion of machine guns ..." pages 98-99 Nijmegen US 82nd Airborne & Guards Armoured Division
I am fairly certain a large part of the day two gliders would have been loaded with ammo and rations and the like.
Assuming XXX Corps makes it to Frosts' men before they run out of ammo, what happens then? Relieve the Pocket which is almost out of everything and had been fighting for days just as XXX Corps had been doing.
Then take the airfield so a division(?) can be flown in? A C47 could carry 28 troops, that is going to take a while. The Allies did not have air superiority and per Wackipedia over 500 German and Allied planes and gliders were lost in 8 days.
XXX Corps was stretched out over 70 miles with a supply line that began in England. Arnhem is about 100 miles from Cologne (Koln) and the road from Cologne to Essen, about 40 miles, was Autobahn.
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@victornewman9904 Do you really believe if the 82nd had captured 4 bridges instead of 2 the operation would have been a huge success ?
"In the event, the state of the flanks did become important when, on Friday 22nd September, a German counterattack near Veghel, in the 101st Airborne Division's sector, successfully cut the single road for forty-eight hours, forcing Lieutenant-General Horrocks, already struggling with enemy counterattacks and the wide diffusion of his strength, to send armour back down the line to help re-open the road. Montgomery largely blamed the failure of the Operation on the lack of progress made by XII and, in particular, VIII Corps, who were ordered to protect the flanks of XXX Corps as they advanced. The progress of both of these was very slow and so the single road became extremely exposed to such attacks. It must be stressed, however, that the supplies Montgomery had asked for to fuel the advance of the 2nd British Army had only partially arrived, and both VIII and XII Corps experienced great difficulties in this regard. In addition it is important to note that German resistance on the flanks was equal to that encountered by XXX Corps, and both VIII and XII Corps sustained marginally higher losses."
Pegasus Archive Market Garden 30. Reasons for the Failure
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