Comments by "DynamicWorlds" (@dynamicworlds1) on "The 12 Causes of the Russo-Ukrainian War" video.

  1. There is no point where Russia/Putin will have enough. Appeasement does not work on fascists as the annexation of Crimea showed yet again and Putin's use of Nazi "blood and soil" rhetoric. (And please note I am using the term "fascism" in the academic sense not just a vague symptom for "authoritarian I don't like") Ukrainian will not yield more territory because it knows it would just be giving more power to a future aggressive action and Russia will not accept peaceful and independent coexistance because its internal politics are incompatible with such. This is mirrored in the geopolitical situation where Russia's status is dependent on the perceived might of its military to both support allies and threaten other regional countries with. Accepting the at least temporarily diminished status and the domestic changes needed to transition Russia to not leaning on its military for geopolitical power would have ended the cult-like propaganda Putin relies on to stay in power. When a country seems to be doing something against its interests, check for a conflict between the internal and international political interests of those in power in the country. Putin put himself in a situation where he needed to win the war (and even if he did would then need to start and win another before too long) and Ukraine in a situation where it couldn't afford concede anything to Russia. Putin followed the inevitable pattern for his ideology and created a no-win situation for himself and the only way this ends is when he is removed one way or another (almost certainly by the hands of other Russians when they decide that the war is worse whan what it would take to deal with him). He has past the point where there is any possibility of a way out for him. Every path he could take leads to his end, so he will keep throwing as many lives as it takes to drag this military aggression out as long as possible until he reaches his dead end.
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  2. Largely solid analysis but you are wrong about the shifting balance of power. Russia is a great power in decline. Every year its military becomes more outdated and poorly maintained. Meanwhile its economy is reliant on a natural resource which the world (and Europe especially) is seeking to phase out entirely so every year its economic position becomes more untenable. Likewise, the domestic shifts that would be needed to transition Russia to a more advanced 21st century economy would kick the power structures the current regime relies on out from under it (as would the acceptance of diminishing from a world power to a regional power). Putin needs to both ward off competition for his gas exports and find some highly necessary extractive industry to replace that geopolitical economic leverage and income so that he can keep buying things like computer components and other tech developed by societies educated and well off enough to not be inclined to tolerate his authoritarianism. What a better thing than highly productive farmland with reliable water in a future where climate change will increasingly strain food security? Conversely, Ukraine is a rising economic power with increasing ability to translate that economic power into military power and increasing inclination to transition aspects of its economy (such as rail line width) to EU standards and away from Russian standards. That means that every year Ukraine's ability to resist Russian aggression was increasing. (And because of the shared language, the harder it would be to hide how much of a failure Putin's government has been for the average people of Russia). This all, as noted, dovetails extremely tightly with the personal benefits from Russia's internal politics where between the more tangible political situation and the palingenetic ultranationalism (which makes both the Russian Irredentism and Ukrainian unwillingness to engage in appeasement because they know it will just be ceding power to an adversary who will never be satisfied nonnegotiable) Putin relies on to stay in power, Putin has walked himself into a position where he has to win ar any cost (or at least drag the conflict out indefinitely) and both Ukraine and other European powers know they gain nothing long term from making concessions to Putin's unquenchable (and for him, domestically, absolutely necessary) ambitions, which Putin has reminded them through his unwillingness to be satisfied with Crimea (as just one example). Put together, this creates a situation where peace would ultimately require or result in Putin's removal from power (and considering all of his crimes both internationally and domestically that would probably number his days even if he would be willing to quietly retire in humility, which I doubt) which means Putin has trapped himself in a no-win situation from which noone can free him. This means that we should expect this conflict to continue until those in Russia find the war more costly than what it would take to remove him from power.
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  3. The history of Ukraine-Russia relations is largely a history of Russia trying to control Ukraine and the Ukrainian people not wanting to be ruled over by Russia. The way to peace is really straightforward: Russia leaving Ukraine alone.
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