Comments by "Bullet-Tooth Tony" (@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-) on "Montgomery: Unbeatable and unbearable? | Great British Battle Commanders" video.
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@bigwoody4704 Got many men killed? Woody slow down for a second, please just examine his casualties compared to his opponents below....
In his first performance at Dunkirk, his handling of the 3rd Infantry division during the retreat was outstanding. By the end of the campaign he had got his division back to Britain in such good order, that it was the only division from the BEF to be considered fully combat effective immediately after Dunkirk.
At Alam El Halfa, his Eighth Army took 1,700 casualties, the Afrika Corps had 2,900.
At 2nd El Alamein, his Eighth Army took 13,000 casualties, the Afrika Corps had 73,000.
At Medinine his Eighth Army lost 130 men, the Afrika Corps lost 635.
At the Mareth Line, once again his Eighth Army took less losses than the Africa Korps with 4,000 casualties compared to 7,000. In France during the Battle of Caen the British 2nd Army and 1st Canadian Army took around 50,000 casualties, the Germans took around 158,000.
In Operation Veritable, his 21st Army Group took 15,000 casualties, the Germans 44,000 casualties.
In the crossing of the Rhine in Operation Plunder his 21st Army Group took 6,700 casualties the Germans 16,000 casualties.
In Market Garden the Allies suffered 17,000 casualties, the Germans 30,000 casualties.
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@michaelkenny8540 Yeah Patton faced only 9 divisions at Metz while Monty faced 15 divisions at Caen including 3 Tiger heavy tank battalions, 1 Jagdpanther battalion ( 654 Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung), 2 Stug III companys and 3 Nebelwerfer brigades.
The German First Army forces in Pattons sector comprised the 11th Panzer and 17th SS Panzer-grenadier Divisions, the 48th and 416th Divisions, the Luftwaffe 9th Flak Division, and the 19th, 361st, 462nd, and 559th Volksgrenadier Divisions.
Lets face it, only 3 of those on that list the 17th SS, 9th Flak division a long with the 11th Panzer division were probably the only decent German units defending Metz.
The other 6 remaining are mostly Volksgrenadier units which were new infantry divisions with less manpower and equipment.
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@bigwoody4704 Bradley lobbied against supplies going to Market Garden actually, this is from "The Men Behind Monty" by Richard Mead
Quote “With supplies needing to be built up, Monty sent off a signal on the next day advising Eisenhower that he would have to delay the operation until 23 September. The response was immediate. On 12 September, Bedell Smith arrived in Brussels to tell Monty that Eisenhower had now agreed to divert the transport of three American divisions to supporting the new operation, to halt the Saar thrust, to give priority within 12th US Army Group to Hodges’s First US Army on Monty’s right flank and to allow Monty to deal directly with Hodges, rather than through Bradley. It seemed that the Northern Thrust was now becoming a reality and an exultant Monty advanced D-Day for MARKET GARDEN to 17 September. It all proved to be an illusion. Bradley, who visited Monty on 13 September and heard all about the proposals, then lobbied Eisenhower, with the result that none of the promised support materialized. With Monty, Dempsey and Browning all completely unaware of this, preparations for the operation continued.”
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@johnpeate4544 I would also mention Slim's actions in Syria while he was in command of a division.
"Slim's division advanced into eastern Syria from Iraq in mid-June 1941 as part of a three-pronged invasion of Vichy territory designed to prevent Hitler gaining a foothold in the Middle East. Wavell's plan (he was the British Commander-in-Chief Middle East) was for Slim's division to apply pressure on Syria's eastern flank through the capture of the town of Deir-ez-Zor on the Upper Euphrates and thereafter to advance on Aleppo. The capital of Eastern Syria and a historic crossing of the Euphrates, Deir-ez-Zor was the meeting place of desert tracks that converged from across Asia Minor on the only bridge to cross the river for many hundreds of miles. The long distances combined with a lack of adequate transport for his division and the difficulties of maintaining a long line of communication for his petrol and stores, particularly in the face of regular attacks by insurgents, made any long-range penetration with substantial forces a significant challenge. Because of these difficulties and the need to protect his supply lines while he advanced, Slim decided to advance with one brigade forwards while his other brigade guarded his rear. Establishing a base first at the straggling riverside village of Haditha, part-way between Habbaniya and the French border, he stocked it with supplies for 15 days. On 28 June the frontier post at Abu Kemal was captured, but the French had by that time fled. By stripping Iraq Command bare, Slim gathered some 300 3-ton trucks to assist in his advance up the Euphrates. In total his leading brigade had some 800 vehicles; the plan was to advance with these about 200 miles (320km) in two days."
"The advance into Syria was extremely difficult in the intense heat and clouds of dust, made worse by the movement of such a large number of vehicles. Deir-ez-Zor was well defended by machine-gun posts and concrete gun emplacements, especially to the south and west of the town. The garrison was said to comprise between 2,000 and 4,000 troops, with up to four batteries of artillery, a desert company, Foreign Legionnaires and armoured cars. This was not a place that would fall to a conventional attack. Even if he had had a preponderance of troops, Slim was not by now disposed to tactics that would have entailed an attack from a direction the enemy would expect. Indeed, with the limited troops available to him, he was convinced that only a quick surprise attack would have any chance of success. Accordingly, a plan was hatched in which most of the forward brigade would move to the north in a conventional approach whilst at the same time a motorized column would make its way in a wide flanking move across the desert to attack the town from the rear. In the process it was hoped that the defenders would be surprised and their defence dislocated. The attack was planned for 2 July."
"The plan was full of risks, however. The 80-mile (130km) approach through the desert could easily have been discovered from the air, and navigation in the desert was notoriously difficult. However, Slim was convinced that boldness was the right approach, and he was certain that with careful control his plan had every chance of success. The advance on the right flank began on 1 July and made good progress, although the column was attacked a number of times from the air. The lack of effective air defences and the paucity of supporting aircraft made the division desperately vulnerable to the unrelenting attacks by Vichy bombers flying all the way from Aleppo."
"However, at the end of the first day of travel the motorized column out in the desert flank had been badly dispersed by a sandstorm, attacked from the air, and had consumed more fuel than planned, making it doubtful that it would reach the rear of Deir-ez-Zor as planned. The brigade commander ordered the column to stop. When, very early the next morning Slim discovered that his plan had gone awry, he leapt into a vehicle and drove immediately across the desert in the darkness to reach the stationary column. Reviewing his options, Slim determined that the approach most likely to succeed, despite its risks, was his original plan, despite the overconsumption of fuel. Every way he looked at it, the desert flank option was vastly superior to the idea of mounting a frontal attack. Siphoning petrol from all vehicles not required for the operation, Slim managed to provide just enough fuel(5,000 gallons)to enable his desert column to continue. The column emerged to the rear of Deir-ez-Zor just as planned at first light on 3 July, catching the defenders in an entirely unexpected pincer movement that determined the battle. After a day of fighting the surrounded Vichy forces surrendered. Slim's division was now free, resupplied from captured stores, to motor deep into Syria and thereby to complete the strategic squeeze which Wavell had applied against the country, and which led to its eventual collapse."
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@bigwoody4704 "He was slow in North Africa, schooled by Patton in Sicily, dithered in Italy and recalled before embarrassing himself any further, he then got stuck for 43 days @ Caen."
1: 780 miles in 19 days isn't slow Woody.
2: In Sicily, the plan was for the British to reach Messina by advancing up the eastern coast, cutting off any retreat for the remaining Italian forces on the island. However, those coastal towns needed clearing and some of them had or were naval bases and were therefore militarised, and posed a threat to British supply lines if they weren't taken. Whatever your opinions of Sicily and the level of its success. We can both agree it didn't go to plan, but I think Montgomery learnt some lessons from that experience and how best to conduct a multinational amphibious landing.
3: Mainland Italy was terrible for any sort of rapid, mechanised maneuver warfare so you can't hold that against Montgomery or any other Allied commander for that matter. I think he did quite well given the easily defensible terrain.
4: Do you think it was a coincidence that during the Allied Invasion of France that British and American armies deliberately fulfilled the same roles they unwittingly did in Sicily?
The British drawing the bulk of the axis forces away at Caen whilst the Americans prepared to breakout and out-flank. I think not, Montgomery planned it to be that way.
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